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1. INTRODUCTION 
STEVEN BLOCKMANS & SOPHIA RUSSACK 
1.1 Identity crisis 
The state of democracy in the European Union is a subject of 
constant debate. While some have argued that concern about the 
‘democratic deficit’ is misplaced,1 the prevailing sense is 
nevertheless that the EU has a democracy problem.2  
This sense of a problem is compounded by recent figures 
about the decline of electoral democracy and the protection of civil 
liberties, including freedom of expression and backsliding on the 
rule of law in a growing number of member states.3 In Europe’s 
patchwork of political cultures, languages, national memories and 
diverse press channels, the algorithms behind social media are 
polarising people in a way not seen since the creation of the EU. The 
seismic shock of the Brexit referendum and the electoral upsets by 
                                                        
1 Adherents of the former view include, e.g. G Majone. (1998), “Europe’s 
‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards”, European Law Journal, 
4(1): 5–28; or A. Moravcsik (2002), “In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: 
Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union”, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 40(4): 603–24. 
2. For the view of the mainstream see, e.g. F. Scharpf (1999), Governing in 
Europe. Effective and Democratic?, Oxford: Oxford University Press; S. Hix 
and Follesdal, A. (2006), “Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A 
Response to Majone and Moravcsik”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
44(3): 533-562; and Lindberg, 2018. 
3 V-Dem Institute, “Democracy for All? The V-Dem Annual Democracy 
Report 2018” (https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/3f/19/ 
3f19efc9-e25f-4356-b159-b5c0ec894115/v-
dem_democracy_report_2018.pdf).  
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nativist and Eurosceptic parties across the continent show that, in 
the EU too, “all politics is local”.4 
Paradoxically, half a billion people living in a Union that has 
advanced the notion of ‘citizenship’ since 1991 have never before 
shared such an intertwined destiny. The single market, free 
movement and the Erasmus student 
exchange programme have all helped to 
break down cultural boundaries. But 
these achievements risk being reversed 
by political narratives that drive citizens 
into ever more divided national mind-
sets. The popular anger that populists 
feed on seems to be deliberately 
channelled towards a growing list of 
targets: from the single currency and 
austerity policies attached to it, to EU 
trade agreements with third countries 
(mainly the US and Canada), refugees and economic migrants. 
Now, the radical right is encouraging Europeans to turn against 
each other.5  
At the grassroots level, citizens’ perceptions have drifted a 
long way from the European ‘demos’ imagined by the architects of 
modern Europe. European integration is often perceived as an elite-
driven project that is too remote from ordinary citizens. The 
‘polycrisis’ that has plagued the EU for the past few years has led to 
a cacophony of voices calling for fundamental change to the 
European integration project. 
Insofar as such proposals exist, they have been developed by 
elites, either “as damage limitation to placate a restless populace”6 
or as an effort to reduce EU institutional interference at the national 
level. Examples of the former include the aim to create transnational 
                                                        
4 T. O’Neill & G. Hymel (1994), All Politics Is Local: And Other Rules of the 
Game, Holbrook, Ma: Bob Adams Inc. 
5 H. Grabbe & S. Lehne (2018), “Could an Illiberal Europe Work?”, Carnegie 
Europe. 
6 R. Youngs (2017), Europe Reset: New Directions for Europe, London: I.B. 
Tauris, at 11. 
The achievements of single 
market, free movement and 
the Erasmus student 
exchange programme have 
all helped to break down 
cultural boundaries, but 
they risk being reversed by 
political narratives that 
drive citizens into ever more 
divided national mind-sets. 
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lists for the European Parliament elections and to revive the lead 
candidate (‘Spitzenkandidat’) system pioneered in 2014. An 
example of the second category is the renewed call from Central and 
Eastern European governments to arm national parliaments with a 
red card to shoot down the European Commission’s unpalatable 
legislative initiatives. Emmanuel Macron’s proposal to organise 
civilian assemblies to debate the future of Europe may be more in 
tune with the mood of the masses, but a self-declared ‘Jupiterian’7 
president seems hardly the right person to push for its 
implementation. 
While the leaders of the EU institutions and member states 
increasingly invest their hopes in reviving ‘output legitimacy’ by 
delivering on policy objectives (e.g. 
shoring up security and defence 
cooperation, reform of the eurozone and 
the Schengen area, striking up 
progressive trade deals), the democratic 
legitimacy problem has in effect been 
left to fester. The (perception of) non-
transparent decision-making continues 
to feed into popular frustration about 
how governments and EU institutions operate. The risk of an even 
greater negative feedback loop is therefore real. 
1.2 Towards a Citizens’ Union? 
Against this backdrop, 20 renowned think tanks from the European 
Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) have joined forces in a three-year 
research project supported by the European Commission under its 
Erasmus+ programme. The ‘Towards the Citizens’ Union (2CU)’ 
project is concerned with the two-pronged question of i) how the 
relationship between citizen, state and EU has changed, and ii) 
whether and how direct democracy (this volume), representative 
democracy (volume 2, forthcoming in 2019) and the accountability 
of democratic institutions (volume 3, forthcoming in 2020) can be 
improved in a multi-layered EU. As such, 2CU uses the 
                                                        
7 See J. Grayson, “The dual meaning behind Macron’s ‘Jupiterian 
Presidency’”, JohnGraysonBlog, 15 July 2017.  
While the leaders of the EU 
institutions and member 
states invest their hopes in 
reviving ‘output legitimacy’ 
... the democratic legitimacy 
problem has been left to 
fester. 
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phenomenon of populism8 not so much to engage with policy, but 
as a research handle to assess process and polity. 
Building on the notion of 
increasing social, economic and political 
interdependence across borders, this first 
volume asks whether and, if so, how a 
sense of solidarity and European identity 
can be rescued from the bottom up by 
politically empowering citizens to ‘take 
back control’ of their EU.  
This first 2CU book on the state of direct democracy in the EU 
presupposes a common understanding of the semantics of direct 
political participation. Some clarifications may nevertheless be in 
order. 
The EU is founded on the principle of representative 
democracy (Article 10(1) TEU). Citizens are thus directly 
represented at Union level in the European Parliament. The 
functioning of the EU is thus based on the assumption that the 
elected representatives reflect the goals and preferences of the 
citizens. Yet delegates might follow their own agenda more than the 
citizens’ will. Complementary procedures may therefore help 
maintain the legitimacy of governance.9 Mechanisms have been 
created to give more substance to the right of every citizen to 
participate in the democratic life of the EU (Article 10(3) TEU). The 
European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) is the most emblematic of these 
(Article 11(4) TEU). It has been hailed as the world’s first 
transnational tool of direct democracy.10 Yet, as neither the ECI nor 
any of the other of the Union’s own instruments (cf. Article 11 TEU) 
                                                        
8 J.W. Müller (2016), What is Populism?, University of Pennsylvania Press; 
and C. Mudde & C. Rovira Kaltwasser (2017), Populism: A Very Short 
Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
9 H. Catt and M. Murphy (2003), “What voice for the people? Categorising 
methods of public consultation”, Australian Journal of Political Science, 38(3): 
418. 
10 J. Greenwood and K. Tuokko (2017), “The European Citizens’ Initiative: 
the territorial extension of a European political public sphere?”, European 
Politics and Society, 18(2): 5. 
This volume asks whether a 
sense of solidarity and 
European identity can be 
rescued from the bottom up 
by politically empowering 
citizens to ‘take back 
control’ of their EU. 
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is able to directly catalyse or constrain EU decision-making, the 
term ‘direct democracy’ is probably a misnomer at the 
supranational level. The power to govern the EU certainly does not 
lie directly in the hands of the people and cannot be expressed 
through, say, EU-wide referendums. The term ‘participatory 
democracy’ might thus be better suited for the EU as this concept 
challenges what is perceived as elitist forms of representation in 
liberal democracies and puts a prime on the active participation of 
civil society in public decision-making.11 
In a narrower sense, however, ‘participatory democracy’ is a 
process of collective decision-making that combines elements from 
both direct and representative democracy: citizens have the power 
to decide on policy proposals through referendums, civilian 
assemblies, public consultations, initiatives, petitions, etc., for 
example12 and politicians assume the role of policy implementation 
with little personal discretion. In this sense, instruments of direct 
democracy are no silver bullets but may be valuable supplements to 
representative democracy. They provide “the opportunity to break 
the cycle of increasingly distant, technocratic political institutions 
and increasingly disconnected citizens supporting populist 
positions”.13 
In its original form, ‘populism’ is an ideology that considers 
society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and 
antagonistic groups: ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and 
argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale of 
the people. Practically, populist politicians almost always combine 
it with other ideologies, such as nativism on the right and socialism 
on the left. Populism is a particular view of how society is and 
should be structured, but it addresses only a limited part of the 
larger political agenda. For example, it says little about the ideal 
                                                        
11 C. Pateman (1970), Participation and Democratic Theory, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
12 R. Lindner and U. Riehm (2011), “Broadening Participation Through E-
Petitions? An Empirical Study of Petitions to the German Parliament”, 
Policy & Internet, 3(1): 63–85. 
13 J. Organ (2017), “EU Citizen Participation, Openness and the European 
Citizens Inititaive: The TTIP Legacy”, Common Market Law Review, 54: 1747. 
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economic or political system that a (populist) state should have. Its 
essential features are: morality and monism. In his seminal book, 
‘What is Populism?’14 Jan-Werner Müller argues that ‘populism’ is 
inimical to pluralism. Its target is pluralist, liberal democracy, with 
those vital constitutional and social checks and balances that 
prevent any “tyranny of the majority” from prevailing over 
individual human rights, safeguards for minorities, independent 
courts, a strong civil society, and independent, diverse media. 
Müller rejects the term ‘illiberal democracy’, arguing that it allows 
people like Viktor Orbán to claim that Hungary just has a different 
kind of democracy. Timothy Garton Ash stresses the need for  
a term to describe what happens when a government [like 
that also of Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland] that emerges 
from a free and fair election is demolishing the 
foundations of a liberal democracy but has not yet erected 
an outright dictatorship – and may not even necessarily 
intend to.15  
1.3 Structure of the book 
The volume opens with a chapter that digs into the existing EU-level 
mechanisms intended to give European citizens a louder voice and 
have it heard. This analysis is complemented by a handful of 
thematic chapters on narrative, procedural and technical aspects of 
political participation (Part II). The main body of the book (part III) 
comprises an empirical analysis of local demand and upward 
mobilisation. In a representative cross-section of half of the EU’s 
membership (determined along geographical, economic, political, 
cultural and other lines), 14 country reports provide a bottom-up 
framework of political change and power contestation in the EU. 
Working with the grain of these socio-economic, cultural and 
political developments across the Union, the book concludes with a 
chapter that synthesises the research findings, debunks the myth of 
the unifying effects of direct democracy and offers 
recommendations to improve participatory democracy in the EU. 
                                                        
14 Op. cit, supra note 8. 
15 T. Garton Ash, Is Europe Disintegrating?, New York Review of Books, 19 
January 2017. 
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2. PATHWAYS FOR CITIZENS TO 
ENGAGE IN EU POLICYMAKING 
SOPHIA RUSSACK 
Introduction: direct democracy at EU level? 
Participatory democracy has been a topic of discussion since the 
beginning of European integration, but mainly around the question 
of whether treaty revision should be legitimised by popular vote. 
The right to petition the European Parliament (EP) was for a long 
time the only instrument at EU citizens’ disposal. Only with the 
Treaty of Lisbon was the role of participatory democracy formally 
recognised (through Article 11, TEU), when four more mechanisms 
were introduced. Most notably the European Citizens’ Initiative, 
which is the first instrument that provides the opportunity for the 
direct participation of European citizens in the EU decision-making 
process (Böttger, Conrad and Knaut, 2016, 16). There are five EU 
instruments that can be classified as participatory:  
 European Citizens’ Initiative 
 Petitioning the European Parliament 
 Formal complaints to the ombudsman 
 Public consultations 
 Citizens’ Dialogues 
These will be subject of this analysis. The five instruments that are 
the subject of this analysis can be categorised as either bottom-up or 
top-down. Whereas the European Citizens’ Initiative, petitions to 
the European Parliament, and complaints to the European 
ombudsman fall into the category of bottom-up instruments as 
these offer citizens the opportunity to trigger certain processes 
themselves, Citizens’ consultations and Citizens’ dialogues account 
for top-down’ approaches that are instigated by the EU’s political 
elite. Bottom-up instruments facilitate citizens’ influence over 
policy outcome because they challenge the existing policy 
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preferences of the political elite. Top-down instruments are 
generally weaker as they aim for support of existing policies and the 
clarification of policy value to achieve more effective governance. 
Certainly, this requires a very 
wide interpretation of the term 
‘participatory’, which more closely 
resembles mere channels of 
communication between the EU citizens 
and the EU institutions.1  
This chapter looks at how effective 
these instruments are at influencing EU 
policy and decision-making and what impact they have on the 
democratic quality of the EU. It offers a descriptive and analytical 
view of the benefits and shortfalls of the current system.  
The main body of this contribution (sections 2.1 – 2.5) gives 
some background information on each of these five instruments and 
assesses them from three different angles, following the research 
design of (Hobolt, 2006)). First is the behaviour of citizens – who 
makes use of this tool, and how? Second, the political elite, who are 
the main institutional actors and do they (publicly) support the 
respective instrument? Third, the (potential) effects of these tools 
are analysed, as is whether they are able to influence EU policy 
outcomes. This analysis concludes with presenting the key findings 
(section 2.6).2 
                                                        
1 Certainly, there are many more other channels of communication, such as 
a letter to the Commission or the president. These are, however, informal 
in character; this contribution only looks at the formal mechanisms 
mentioned in the EU treaties. 
2 The qualitative data on which this paper is based was gathered in 18 semi-
structured expert interviews conducted between May and October 2018. 
The author would like to thank the interviewees from the European 
Commission (from the political and administrative level); the European 
Parliament (MEPs, as well as administration); the office of the European 
Ombudsman; NGOs as well as academia for taking the time to share their 
insights. 
Top-down instruments are 
generally weaker as they 
aim for support of existing 
policies and the clarification 
of policy value to achieve 
more effective governance. 
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2.1 The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) 
2.1.1 Background 
This is the most prominent but rather recent participatory 
democratic instrument at EU level. It claims to allow for the direct 
participation of citizens in the development of EU policies by 
granting them the right them to ask the Commission to adopt 
legislation. It is the world’s first transnational direct democracy tool 
(Greenwood and Tuokko, 2017, 5). 
Articles 11(4) TEU and 24 TFEU allow citizens (“not less than 
a million” and “nationals of a significant number of member states”, 
currently seven) to invite the Commission to act within its powers 
and submit “any appropriate proposal” on matters where they 
consider that a legal act is required “for the purpose of 
implementing the Treaties”. If the required number of signatures is 
gathered within the timeframe of one year, then the Commission 
will consider the proposal.  
The ECI idea was developed in the context of the Convention 
on the Future of Europe (2002-03) and incorporated into the draft 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe only at the last 
meeting of one of the Working Groups (Kaufmann, 2012, 3) thanks 
to the efforts of civil society organisations3 and two convention 
members.4 There was no wide public debate beforehand, which is 
why it caught many observers by surprise (Interview 15). Due to 
this rather hasty inclusion, the legal text outlines the contours of the 
ECI only broadly (Dougan, 2011, 1809). Despite the failure of the 
Constitutional Treaty, the ECI found its way into the Treaty of 
Lisbon in 2009.  
To give hands and feet to the treaty provisions, the 
Commission published a Green Paper, followed by a formal 
proposal a few months later. The institutions reached final 
                                                        
3 More Democracy/democracy international, IRI Europe. 
4 Jürgen Meyer (Representative of the German Bundestag, Social Democrat) 
and Alain Lamassoure (Representative of the EP, French Conservative). 
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agreement in December 2010, and the current ECI regulation5 came 
into force in April 2012. The legal framework for the ECI is 
complemented by a Commission Implementing Regulation, which 
further defines technical specifications.6 
Since its implementation in 2012, various stakeholders have 
raised concerns about the functioning of the ECI and claimed that 
the existing instrument and procedures are too complicated and 
user-unfriendly. They have repeatedly called on the Commission to 
revise them. Among these stakeholders are civil society 
organisations, former campaign organisers and academics. Also, 
EU institutions and bodies have been very vocal on this, including 
the European Parliament,7 the European Ombudsman,8 the 
Committee of the Regions,9 and the European Economic and Social 
Committee.10 
Those (and other) review processes revealed problems in all 
key phases of the ECI lifecycle: the preparatory phase; registration 
of initiative; collection of signatures; submission to the Commission 
and follow-up; and transparency and awareness-raising. The key 
problems can be structured around the following aspects: 
First, the number of initiatives that pass the threshold of one 
million signatures is very low due to technical shortcomings and the 
cumbersome administrative procedures for organisers. 
                                                        
5 Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council 
of 16 February 2011 on the citizens' initiative: https://eur-lex. 
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:065:0001:0022:en:PDF. 
6 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1179/2011 of 17 
November 2011: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? 
uri=OJ:L:2011:301:0003:0009:en:PDF. 
7 See more in section 2.1.3 of this contribution. 
8 The ombudsman closed own-initiative inquiries in 2015 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/decision.faces/en/59205
/html.bookmark#hl1 and 2017 http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-
initiative/files/2017_6_SI_EN_V1.pdf.  
9 In 2015: http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/opinions/Pages/opinion-
factsheet.aspx?OpinionNumber=CDR%202606/2015.  
10 In 2016: See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/ 
?uri=CELEX:52016IE0889&from=en.  
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Second, the initiatives have high refusal rates – about a third 
of all requests (20 out of 68. Once an initiative is submitted for 
approval, the Commission needs to execute an admissibility test to 
ensure that a) the proposal is within the framework of its powers to 
submit a proposal for a legal act; b) the content of the respective 
initiative is in line with the EU’s fundamental rights (as enshrined 
in Article 2 TEU); and c) it is not “manifestly abusive, frivolous or 
vexatious”.11  
Where the Commission refuses to register an ECI, it has to 
provide the reasons for such a decision. Most initiatives fail because 
the Commission considers them to be beyond the scope of its 
powers. Critical observers have stated that the Commission’s 
approach to the legal admissibility test has been overly restrictive 
and formalistic. The question of legal admissibility was brought 
before the European Court of Justice several times and sometimes 
confirmed the criticism.12 
Third, the Commission’s follow-up is perceived as 
insufficient. Critical voices highlight both the non-binding character 
of the instrument (as there is no legislative impact of successful 
initiatives so far), and the Commission’s unresponsiveness. The 
regulation does not oblige the Commission to take legislative action, 
but only prescribes that it shall publish a communication containing 
its “legal and political conclusions” and “the actions it intends to 
take” or justifying why it decided not to proceed with the initiative. 
The ECI was deliberately not designed as a ‘popular legislative 
initiative’ by the members of the convention as they did not want to 
introduce such an instrument without also granting the EP a right 
of initiative (Vogiatzis, 2017, 257). The TEU is clear on this question 
and only foresees the initiative to “ask” the Commission to propose 
legislation, however, there is a certain expectation of “self-
obligation” on the part of the Commission to act upon successful 
initiatives (Böttger, Conrad and Knaut, 2016, 20).  
                                                        
11 Art. 4(2)(a)–(d) of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011. 
12 In the most prominent case, which aimed to stop TTIP, the Court decided 
that the initial refusal was unlawful, and the Commission was forced to 
register it: Judgment in Case T-754/14, Michael Efler and Others v 
Commission, 10 May 2017. 
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As a result, there is general agreement among various 
stakeholders that the ECI is currently not reaching its full potential 
as a democratic tool at European level. Instead of providing a 
“whole new dimension of participatory democracy” as hoped by 
observers in the beginning (the words of Vice President of the 
European Commission Maroš Šefčovič in (Organ, 2014, 422) and 
due to the above-mentioned weaknesses in its design and 
implementation, the ECI is “virtually unnoticed by the mass media 
and the wider public” (Böttger, Conrad and Knaut, 2016, 10). 
To respond to the shortfalls and respect the obligation to 
revise the instrument, the Commission proposed a revision of the 
ECI regulation.13 First, the Commission’s proposal makes some 
crucial improvements with regards to technical and 
administrational hurdles, particularly to the signature collection 
phase, data requirements and online collection systems. Hence, on 
the technical side, the revised regulation will ease the process for 
organisers and supporters. Second, one important change 
concerning legal admissibility was proposed: the partial registration 
of initiatives, when it sees only parts of the ECI within its powers. 
Third, the Commission intends to strengthen the follow-up phase 
by proposing a longer response period to allow for broader 
participation and debate around the respective initiatives, before it 
is formulates its legal and political conclusions.14 No stronger 
legislative follow-up mechanism is foreseen.  
                                                        
13 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/com-
2017-482_en.  
This regulation is adopted under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure and 
is currently under inter-institutional negotiation, (‘trilogues’) expected to 
reach agreement by the end of 2018.13 The declared aim of the Commission 
is to adopt this new regulation within this legislature by April 2019, before 
the election of the next European Parliament and before the new 
Commission. That way, it could come into force in early 2020. 
14 Add reference proposal. 
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2.1.2 EU citizens 
To date, 68 initiatives were submitted to the Commission, of which 
4615 were registered. Four of those initiatives gathered the required 
number of signatures. These initiatives were: ‘Right2Water’ 
(intending to declare water and sanitation services as a human 
right); ‘One of us’ (to prevent the EU from supporting any human 
embryonic stem cell research); ‘Stop vivisection’ (aims to end live 
animal testing) and ‘Ban Glyphosate’. In accordance with its 
obligation, the Commission responded to them by issuing 
communications; in two cases (‘Right2Water’ and ‘Ban Glyphosate’) 
it committed to follow-up actions. No initiative has so far resulted 
in a legislative action, however. The Commission has adopted a 
proposal for a revision of the Water Directive (98/83/EC).16 
However, this is partly a follow-up to the successful Right2Water 
initiative, but also as a reaction to a REFIT (Regulatory Fitness and 
Performance) evaluation and the intention to meet the Sustainable 
Development Goals.  
The declining numbers of proposed initiatives is a 
consequence of the above-mentioned shortcomings under the old 
regulation: in each of the first two years, 19 ECIs were submitted, 
since 2014 there have been five on average per year.17  
The ECI is increasingly becoming an instrument for organised 
civil society rather than for ’ordinary’ citizens (Organ, 2014, 440). 
While the vast majority of ECI campaigns have been described as 
“largely autonomous from established organisations” (Tuokko and 
Greenwood, 2017, 2), behind all successful campaigns stands an 
organised interest group. Campaigners must be part of a big 
network to have a chance of success (Interview 11). The ECI 
campaigns are extremely time and cost intensive and are thus 
difficult for citizens to carry out in a private capacity. On average, 
                                                        
15 According to the official register: http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-
initiative/public/welcome.  
16 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-drink/review_ 
en.html.  
17 Own calculation based on http://www.citizens-initiative.eu/eci/open-
closed/.  
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an ECI campaign costs about €160,000.18 These are only the actual 
costs and do not include the value of volunteers’ labour. The EP 
rapporteur on the ECI proposal estimated that a campaign costs 
about €1 per signature, hence exceeding €1 million for a successful 
campaign. Achieving this is hardly possible without organisational 
or corporate funding. Indeed, all successful campaigns were 
financially supported by organisations working for the same or a 
similar cause.19 Hence, while signatures are collected from among 
individual citizens, organised interest groups are key actors behind 
the launch of an ECI and its campaign.  
2.1.3 EU institutions 
European Commission 
The Commission is by far the most important player in the ECI: with 
regards to the adoption of the new regulation, and even more so in 
the implementation of that regulation. All the important stages of 
an ECI cycle are led and controlled by the Commission, particularly 
the admissibility and follow-up stages, which have been described 
as the most important and delicate. There is considerable discretion 
involved in the decision-making about whether to register an 
initiative and how to follow up on the successful ones (Vogiatzis, 
2017, 266). The Commission therefore possesses the roles of 
mediator and gatekeeper of the practical ECI procedure.  
The previous Commission (2009-14), as the one implementing 
the ECI treaty provision first, showed some reluctance and 
resistance towards the ECI instrument and designed the current ECI 
regulation to be quite strict (Interview 4). This was due to three 
concerns: a) fear that citizens would utilise the instrument so 
extensively that the institution would become overwhelmed by 
initiatives, which would require more resources than available. 
Furthermore, b) it feared that this instrument would be abused, for 
instance by anti-EU and populist forces. And lastly, c) the 
Commission was afraid that this instrument could potentially 
                                                        
18 The costs of the four successful campaigns ranged between €23,000 and 
€328,000. 
19 The official register lists sponsors of all successful initiatives: 
http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/successful.  
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endanger its sole right of legislative initiative (Interview 11). 
Therefore, it designed the first and current regulation to be quite 
burdensome and developed a very strict admissibility test 
(Interview 4). The overall mindset was cautious and sceptical 
(Interview 10), which set the ECI on the wrong footing and made it 
rather difficult to develop. Outspoken critics would say that the 
former Commission killed the instrument by being overly cautious.  
The current Commission (2014-19) was contractually obliged 
to revise the initial ECI regulation in 2015.20 With considerable 
delay, First Vice-President Frans Timmermans turned his attention 
to the revision of the regulation in 2017.21 The Commission justified 
this two-year delay with the argument that the instrument needed 
to mature and that more time was necessary to allow a review and 
robust revision (Interview 2). Certainly, the ECI revision was not on 
top of Timmermans’ agenda; more pressing issues in the fields of 
migration and justice and home affairs took precedence by that 
time.  
The current Commission can allow itself to be slightly more 
accommodating in its handling of the instrument, as none of the 
above-mentioned fears has materialised and the ECI has proved to 
be a ‘toothless tiger’ (Interview 11). Indeed, it shows a more positive, 
proactive attitude towards the ECI (Interview 8) and seems to be 
politically more open-minded and willing to take a generous 
approach (Interview 5). 
Evidence for this can be found in two practices: first, the 
partial registration of initiatives is already common practice, long 
before the new regulation comes into practice, which has led to a 
massive decrease in refused registrations. Second, the decision on 
new registrations is now taken by the political level of the 
Commission, whereas before it was the Commission’s Secretariat-
General that would decide on the admissibility of initiatives, it now 
runs through the same decision-making channels as legal 
proposals.22 That makes the registered ECIs more visible within the 
                                                        
20 Article 22 of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011. 
21 Following a report and public stakeholder consultation. 
22 According to the internal decision-making procedures of the 
Commission, most decisions are prepared and de facto made by the 
Commissioner’s cabinets and only formally adopted by the College.  
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Commission (Interview 11). Also, it entails that the admissibility 
decisions can be appealed against before the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ).  
European Parliament  
The EP has proactively supported the ECI regulation revision 
process. In October 2015 it adopted a Resolution on the ECI 
revision,23 based on an own-initiative report that achieved 
unanimous support in the Constitutional Affairs Committee 
(AFCO) and a majority in the plenary. When calling for a review the 
Commission refused to take action, arguing that the revision 
process needed more time to identify constructive changes to the 
regulation. In 2017 the EP picked up its work and drafted a new 
own-initiative report, which was interrupted as the Commission 
tabled a proposal before the EP had completed the report.24  
Hence, there seems to be interest on the side of the EP to turn 
the ECI into a workable instrument, although the level of ambition 
of different groups within the EP varies. All political party families 
have their own ideas, and they diverge on some points significantly. 
Some political families, particularly to the left of the political 
spectrum, had far more ambitious goals than the Commission’s 
proposal, such as the idea to entitle the ECIs to provoke treaty 
change; or to establish an independent body to decide on 
registration (Interview 2). These more controversial ideas, however, 
did not find their way into the EP’s report. One can therefore 
conclude that the Parliament’s compromise is no more ambitious 
than the Commission’s proposal. 
In 2018, the EP was generally supportive but not overly 
enthusiastic about the ECI. This might have had something to do 
with the frustration of having been ignored by the Commission, 
after investing work in the own-initiative report in 2015 (Interview 
15); or with a certain kind of pragmatism due to the desire to adopt 
                                                        
23 European Parliament resolution of 28 October 2015 on the European 
Citizens’ Initiative (P8_TA(2015)0382): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-
0382+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
24 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do? 
reference=2017/2024(INL)&l=en.  
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the revision in the current legislature (Interview 5); or perhaps some 
underlying reservations about the ECI as competing with the 
representative model that the MEPs stood for (Interview 6). The ECI 
is an instrument that certainly supplements rather than replaces 
their representative function, but nevertheless might grant citizens 
a right that the EP itself does not possess. What might explain this 
guarded reception to the ECI is a general sense of frustration about 
the limited powers of the EP over the Commission in the legislative 
process, particularly with regards to initiation (Interview 3). 
The Parliament’s role regarding the operation of the ECI 
regulation is rather limited (Vogiatzis, 2017, 265). The only formal 
responsibility that the EP has is the hosting of a public hearing of 
successful ECIs. With the new regulation, however, these hearings 
will be upgraded, as the EP committed itself to holding a plenary 
debate on any successful initiative. This follows up on demands 
from activists’ groups,25 which want to encourage the EP to take 
more ownership of successful campaigns. The obligatory plenary 
debate is not in the regulation but will be in the EP’s rules of 
procedure, which too will be under revision soon.26 The EP is thus 
showing greater responsibility for improving the implementation of 
the ECI. 
The Council 
In general, the Council only has an impact on the adoption of the 
ECI regulation, not on its operation: the Commission’s reaction to 
each successful ECI (as a Communication) is sent to the organisers, 
the EP, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and 
the Committee of the Regions (CoR) – not to the Council. 
Furthermore, the Council does not take part in EP hearings.27 
                                                        
25 Such as the ECI campaign; see the open letter from the ECI campaign to 
the EP under: http://www.citizens-initiative.eu/open-letter-european-
parliament-take-your-responsibility/.  
26 The Parliament’s report only found a majority in plenary after EP 
rapporteur György Schöpflin announced the amendment to the 
Parliament’s own Rules of Procedure, to ensure that plenary debates are 
held on successful ECIs. 
27 See https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/correspondence/en/81311.  
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The European Ombudsman proposed to include the Council 
(next to the EP) better in the follow-up process, in order to get both 
co-legislators involved in the decision as to how to act on successful 
initiatives.28 However, the Commission and the EP remain the co-
organisers for the hearing; no advanced role for the Council is 
foreseen.  
The Council’s position towards the ECI can be described as 
rather restrained. There does not seem to be any substantial 
objections towards the instrument as such or to the revision of its 
regulation among member states. On the content, there are only 
minor technical points of objection, about which no great 
institutional conflict is expected (Interview 2).  
2.1.4 Effects of the instrument 
While there is undoubtedly improvement in the way the ECI has 
been handled under the current Commission (expected to become 
technically easier in the new regulation), 
the very discretionary nature of this 
instrument has not changed: the 
Commission remains the ultimate 
gatekeeper, which limits the capacity of 
citizens to use it.  
The proposal for the revised ECI 
Regulation does not limit the 
discretionary power of the Commission. 
To strengthen the clout of this 
instrument, the idea of an automatic follow-up has been floated in 
the debate, which would entail the Commission’s obligation to 
adopt a new law as a response to every successful initiative. 
Following the Commission’s argument, an automatic follow-up 
would be unlawful as a) it would breach the sole right of initiative; 
and b) disrespect the Commission’s responsibility to check if the 
principles of proportionality and subsidiarity are respected in the 
law-making process and to conduct impact assessments (Interview 
2).  
                                                        
28 See https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/correspondence/en/81311.  
While there is improvement 
in the way the ECI has been 
handled under the current 
Commission, the very 
discretionary nature of this 
instrument has not 
changed, which limits the 
capacity of citizens to use it. 
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It is hardly surprising that the Commission does not support 
the automatic follow-up as this would touch on its right of initiative, 
the very core of its institutional power (Interview 10). This 
monopoly is constitutionally guaranteed under Article 17 TEU and 
the Commission is reluctant to sacrifice it. However, Article 17(1) 
TEU states that the Commission serves and promotes the common 
interest of the EU. That means that the Commission’s monopoly is 
based on its obligation to act on behalf of the Union. When making 
the decision to act on an initiative, the Commission does this not 
only in a legal sense, it also makes “political choices”.29 The 
perception of the consistent promotion of the general interest of the 
EU has been challenged: observers have found that the 
Commission’s responses are often legally explainable but cannot be 
easily justified politically. They thus conclude that the follow-up 
procedure leaves too much room for the discretion of the 
Commission (Vogiatzis, 2017, 269).  
This leads to the ECI’s key problem: the divergent 
expectations of the nature and purpose of this instrument. What 
does the ECI intend to be, a legislative or an agenda-setting tool? 
There is a discrepancy between the 
citizens’ and the Commission’s 
expectations (as the two main parties 
involved). In the eyes of the Commission, 
the ECI is an agenda-setting tool, serving 
to draw attention to certain issues (Interview 5). Citizens, however, 
have the expectation that they can effectively influence 
policymaking and change existing policy preferences. They 
therefore perceive the Commission’s response to be inadequate 
(Interview 8). 
This discrepancy persists in the imbalance between the ECI’s 
design and its outcome: it is designed as a direct democratic tool but 
has the effect of an agenda-setting tool (Interview 15). Yet the 
restrictive registration and heavy procedural requirements of this 
instrument are more suited to a law-making than an agenda-setting 
                                                        
29 Letter from the European Ombudsman to the President of the European 
Commission containing suggestions for improvement of the European 
Citizens Initiative procedure: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/ 
correspondence/en/81311.  
What does the ECI intend to 
be, a legislative or an 
agenda-setting tool? 
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tool (Interview 15). There is, however, no doubt that the ECI has not 
been very successful in legislative terms. 
There is a huge gap between the effort 
that citizens must invest in an 
admissible ECI and the final outcome of 
their initiative. This ‘expectations-
delivery gap’ generates popular 
frustration and constitutes the main 
problem of the ECI.  
It is therefore advisable to clarify the ECI’s nature and 
purpose and to develop it further in one or the other direction: either 
as an agenda-setting or a legislative tool. Supporters of the ECI as a 
legislative tool suggest a relaxation of the follow-up procedure, in 
which the Commission also passes those proposals that are not in 
line with their own agenda to the EP and the Council. The co-
decision procedure facilitates discussion among all law-making 
institutions (Vogiatzis, 2017, 267). The continuation of the strict 
admissibility test would be crucial because it guarantees that only 
initiatives that promote real change be turned into new legislation. 
That procedure would allow deliberation between the two co-
legislators, which are in a better position to 
reject proposals that might be too 
controversial.30 This, however, would 
require treaty change, as Article 11(4) TEU 
prescribes that citizens can only ‘invite’ the 
Commission to take action. 
To touch upon the Commission’s sole 
right of initiative would certainly meet with 
some resistance on the part of the 
Commission. Instead of developing the ECI 
into a legislative instrument, the ECI might also continue to be an 
agenda-setting tool, which simply serves to draw attention to 
certain issues. If so, then its registration process should be designed 
in a less restrictive fashion so as to allow more initiatives to reach 
the political elites – if only for debate (Interview 15).  
                                                        
30 In 2015 this idea was almost included in the EP’s own-initiative report 
but was scrapped due to S&D opposition (Interview 15).  
There is a huge gap between 
the effort that citizens must 
invest in an admissible ECI 
and the final outcome of 
their initiative. 
Instead of developing the 
ECI into a legislative 
instrument, the ECI might 
also continue to be an 
agenda-setting tool, which 
simply serves to draw 
attention to certain issues. 
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The potential added value of the ECI also lies in generating 
pan-European debates among citizens. Some find that the very 
collection of one million signatures is already a sign that the tool has 
succeeded in fostering debate.31 Research has shown that about 1 
out of 5 campaigns32 continue their advocacy work on behalf of the 
issues they raised, also after the signature-collection phase 
(Greenwood and Tuokko, 2017, 13). The ECI might be able to 
promote transnational civic discussion, but the creation of a 
transnational political public sphere, as sometimes stated as the 
ultimate goal, seems far away. Also, the initiatives do not generally 
trigger real dialogue on substance between citizens and 
institutions33 and the ECIs and their debates are rarely picked up by 
the media.34 
Hence, one of the two crucial stages of the ECI cycle, either 
the registration or the follow-up procedure should be adapted, 
depending on the desired nature and purpose of the ECI. If seen as 
a legislative instrument, ease the follow-up stage (‘high effort, high 
potential impact’); as an agenda setter, relax the registration phase 
(‘less restriction, less impact’). Either way, expectations, effort and 
outcome need to be aligned.  
                                                        
31 See https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/correspondence/en/81311.  
32 10 out of the 48 campaigns that were launched between 2012 and 2015. 
33 See for instance the policy position of the European Movement: 
https://europeanmovement.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ 
EMI_16_PolicyPosition_Transparency_17_Final_VIEW.pdf.  
34 In an analysis of 84 online and print media sources in 14 EU member 
states, the Bertelsmann Foundation finds that on average, less than one 
article on the ECI appears in each media source per year. Relatively 
speaking, there is still a lot of media coverage in Germany, Austria and 
Luxembourg; however hardly any media attention is paid to it in the 
Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Denmark.: 
https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/our-projects/democracy-and-
participation-in-europe/project-news/the-european-citizens-initiative-is-
largely-unknown-and-hardly-has-any-impact/.  
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2.2 Petitions to the European Parliament  
2.2.1 Background 
The right to petition is the oldest participatory instrument, as it is 
the only one that existed prior to the last treaty revision (Dougan, 
2011, 1808).  
A petition to the European Parliament “may take the form of 
a complaint or a request and may relate to issues of public or private 
interest”, thereby “may present an individual request, a complaint 
or observation concerning the application of EU law or an appeal to 
the European Parliament to adopt a position on a specific matter.”35 
According to this very wide definition, a variety of requests can be 
expressed via a petition and they can be seen as a communication 
tool between the EP and European citizens regarding all 
competences that fall under the mandate of the EU.  
2.2.2 EU citizens 
Since the Treaty of Maastricht, every EU citizen has the right to 
address the EP with a petition. The right to petition is based on 
Article 227 TFEU and its specifics are determined by the EP’s rules 
of procedure.36  
In 2017, 1,271 petitions were filed, with most coming from 
Spain, Italy and Germany in the last two years. EU citizens are most 
likely to petition the EP in the areas of environment, fundamental 
rights and justice.37 
                                                        
35 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/petitions.  
36 Rules 215 to 218. 
37 In 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017: These numbers can be found in the draft 
report on the deliberations of the Committee on Petitions during the year 
2017 (2014/2018(INI)) (forthcoming). 2014 and 2015: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/148/the-right-of-
petition.  
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2.2.3 EU institutions  
European Parliament 
In contrast to what applies for the EC (i.e. a key role for the 
Commission), the key player with respect to petitions is the EP, 
more precisely the Committee on Petitions (PETI). Most petitions 
(about two-thirds) are dealt with in the written procedure, which 
entails the secretariat of the committee checking its admissibility 
and suggesting a follow-up action. The secretariat’s 
recommendations are considered approved if MEPs do not voice an 
objection. Petitions are deemed admissible if the matter at stake lies 
within the EU’s fields of activity and if it affects the petitioner 
directly (Article 227 TFEU). About one third are usually declared 
inadmissible.38 Effectively, the MEPs discussed only a very small 
share of cases in its public committee meetings (about 10-15%). In 
those committee meetings, there is the general attempt to bundle 
several (if not all) petitions on the same topic. A potentially high 
number of petitions on the agenda ensures that the same follow-up 
is given to all petitions and that members get a more comprehensive 
picture of the subject matter.  
When a petition is assessed as admissible, formally several 
follow-up actions that can be taken: a) the Commission can be 
contacted to request more information on the respective case; b) 
petitions can be referred to another committee; c) the report can be 
voted on in plenary; d) any other appropriate action may be taken. 
In most cases the committee prepares a response to the petitioner 
explaining the EU’s actions on that matter. The Commission is 
consulted in about a third of cases (Interview 9). No individual cases 
go to plenary. If the EP receives a number of petitions circulating 
around the same topic, and if there is a certain political interest, the 
Committee can decide to transform them into an oral question (with 
or without resolution). This means that the whole EP – and not only 
PETI – then takes a position on a subject matter, based on concerns 
                                                        
38 The main reason why petitions are declared inadmissible is that 
petitioners confuse EU and member state competences, as well as EU and 
Council of Europe responsibilities: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
factsheets/en/sheet/148/the-right-of-petition.  
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raised by citizens in their petitions to the European Parliament. 
Petitions provide the data and basis for questions and arguments 
expressed in the oral question resolutions. For example, an oral 
question and a resolution was debated and adopted in plenary on 
the topic of precariousness and the abuse of fixed-term contracts.39 
Hence, petitions can lead to political parliamentary action. This, 
however, is an exception (which occurs about four or five times a 
year) (Interview 9). 
There might be reports adopted by the PETI committee only, 
without adoption in the plenary. In the context of such 
investigations, PETI can also do fact-finding visits in order to give a 
proper follow-up to a group of petitions (or to just one petition, if 
the matter is important enough). One example here would be a fact-
finding visit to London to investigate the issue of adoption without 
parental consent in 2015, based on approximately 20 petitions on 
this topic. After the visit, a report is adopted by Committee, 
containing a set of non-binding recommendations to various 
bodies.40  
European Commission 
The EP is the key player with regards to petitions, but the 
Commission is the “natural partner” of the EP when it comes to 
processing petitions.41 Most petitions concern the application of and 
compliance with EU law and it is the Commission’s responsibility 
to provide legal reply to the issue at stake. Coordinated by the 
Secretariat-General, the responsible Directorate-General analyses 
the issue, gives its opinion on how to act and drafts a response to 
the petitioner (Interview 9). The Commission sees petitions as 
‘grassroots’ feedback on loopholes and breaches in EU law 
implementation. Petitions often raise awareness about the mal-
implementation of EU law by member states and draw attention, for 
                                                        
39 Responding to petitions on tackling precariousness and the abusive use 
of fixed-term contracts (2018/2600(RSP)): http://www.europarl.europa. 
esides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B8-2018-
0238&language=EN.  
40 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/519 
236/IPOL_STU(2015)519236_EN.pdf.  
41 Committee report, p. 17. 
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example, to shortcomings in the area of waste disposal or 
wastewater in a given member state (Interview 12). 
As a last resort there might be infringement procedures, but 
this hardly ever happens. Many steps can be taken to verify, falsify 
and potentially act on concerns expressed via petitions, for instance 
contacting national authorities. Since the Commission rarely 
launches its own investigations it is rather dependent on the 
information received from national authorities (Interview 9). And 
within the Commission, petitions hardly ever translate into political 
action but mostly remain on a technical level as they concern rather 
technical small-scale issues. Only in very exceptional cases do 
petitions move to the Commission’s political level. 
In short, the Commission does not see the right to petition as 
a potential legislative instrument, but more of a communication and 
information-gathering instrument. It has been described as one 
‘mosaic’ piece in a very complex picture and one of many ways in 
which to get in touch with the Commission (Interview 17). This 
means that petitions mainly target the implementation not the 
adoption phase of the decision-making procedure in a bid to 
improve policy output. 
The Council 
The Council Secretariat and member state representatives are 
present in the PETI committee meetings but otherwise the Council 
is not involved in the petitions process and there is no collaboration 
between the EP and Council during the procedure (Interview 12). 
The Council’s main focus is on the legislative procedures, under 
which petitions rarely fall (Interview 10). 
2.2.4 Effects of the instrument 
Linder and Riehm (2011) define three kind of functions of petitions: 
individual-level functions; intermediate-level functions and 
system-level functions. The individual-level function is determined 
by two different kinds of requests:  individual complaints (res 
privata) rather than requests to change public policy (res publica) 
(Korinek, 1977).  
At the national level petitions are primarily understood to 
serve a legislative function. National constitutional systems 
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interpret them as a tool with which a significant number of eligible 
individuals (collected signatures) can, when a certain threshold is 
reached, trigger a government response or plenary debate (Yasseri, 
Hale and Margetts, 2013). In this sense they resemble the ECI and 
its requirements. 
At the EU level, however, 
petitions do not usually result in 
legislative action but serve more as an 
information tool that operates in two 
directions. They convey information 
from citizens to the institutions with 
regards to implementation problems on the ground and 
shortcomings of individual cases (Interview 12). In turn, citizens 
receive information about issues that concern them; the competence 
and (if an EU competence) and status of EU action. A petition can 
help citizens find ways though the maze of EU and national 
administration.  
Petitions to the EP are generally 
more subject to a technical handling: they 
hardly trigger any other political 
attention or action such as plenary 
discussion or resolution adoption by the 
EP, or the launch of infringement 
procedures by the Commission. 
Most petitions remain within the 
PETI secretariat as they are processed by 
written procedure. With regards to the 
Commission, the services deal with them 
as they do not require collegial decision, 
as for instance with parliamentary questions or the registration of 
an ECI. Very few petitions are transferred to the political level and 
rarely do they gain media attention. Petitions to the EP thus have a 
stronger individual complaint (res privata) character. 
According to the intermediate-level functions, petitions can 
improve the responsiveness of the Parliament and its 
communication with citizens. Petitions to the EP certainly constitute 
the easiest and most accessible way for EU citizens to get in touch 
with the institutions and can even strengthen the Parliament vis-à-
vis the other institutions or the executive (Lindner and Riehm, 2011, 
At the EU level, petitions do 
not usually result in 
legislative action but serve 
as an information tool that 
operates in two directions. 
Petitions to the EP are 
generally more subject to a 
technical handling: they 
hardly trigger any other 
political attention or action 
such as plenary discussion 
or resolution adoption by 
the EP, or the launch of 
infringement procedures by 
the Commission. 
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5). It has been argued that the right to petition has facilitated the 
expansion of the EP’s rights vis-à-vis the European Council 
(Guckelberger, 2004, 24).  
With regard to the third function of petitions, the system-level 
function, we see that petitions generally have the potential to boost 
democratic legitimacy. Citizens participate in policymaking as they 
hand in requests to the political elite. If the elite picks up the idea 
constructively, both input (from citizens) and output legitimacy (by 
improving political decisions) could be enhanced (Lindner and 
Riehm, 2011, 5–6). However, without any kind of political action as 
a result, the ability to boost EU legitimacy seems very limited. 
2.3 Complaints to the European ombudsman 
2.3.1 Background 
The ombudsman’s mandate is established by Article 24 TFEU42 and 
primarily defined in 228 TFEU. According to that provision, the 
ombudsman shall “receive complaints”, or launch own initiatives 
“concerning instances of maladministration” in the activities of the 
EU’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. Hence, the 
Ombudsman can be described as a mediator between citizens and 
institutions (Interview 13). Whereas the EP is responsible for the 
democratic oversight of legislation, the European ombudsman takes 
care of the democratic oversight of the EU administration (Interview 
6). What is unique is that with the help of the ombudsman citizens 
can inspect documents that are otherwise not publicly available 
(Kostadinova, 2015, 1080).  
Rather than binding powers, the ombudsman has an own-
inquiry power, which means that s/he is also able to investigate 
without complaint (Tsadiras, 2008).43 That extends her/his role as a 
mediator to being an external investigator (Interview 13). 
                                                        
42 Every citizen of the Union may apply to the ombudsman established in 
accordance with Article 228. 
43 A prominent example here is the special report on the transparency of 
the Council’s legislative work: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/ 
en/press-release/en/89685. 
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The ombudsman is independent from the other institutions 
but has a natural tie to the EP since s/he is elected by the EP and 
reports to it. Her/his mandate extends only to the administrative 
sphere of the EP, the political (the MEPs) falls outside the mandate 
(Interview 6). 
2.3.2 EU citizens 
According to the treaties “any citizen of the Union or any natural or 
legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member 
State” (Article 228 TFEU) can file a complaint with the EU 
ombudsman.  
The kind of people who might contact the ombudsman are: 
current or potential future EU staff on employment issues or 
contractors and others who are in any way beneficiaries of the EU. 
With regards to general transparency or to gain information on 
specific topics, i.e. EU funding received. Journalists, NGOs, 
researchers and think tanks might contact the ombudsman, as might 
businesses and law firms on state aid and competition cases, or on 
the implementation of EU law (Interview 13). 
Be they organisations or individuals, those contacting the 
ombudsman are already engaged with the EU institutions in one 
way or another in a professional 
capacity. (Interview 6). In short: Without 
prior interaction with one of the EU 
institutions, there is no interest in 
contacting the ombudsman.  
2.3.3 EU institutions 
The European ombudsman has no legal power over the other 
institutions, hence can only issue non-binding recommendations. 
Nevertheless, the other institutions show a great willingness to 
implement those recommendations ((Kostadinova, 2015). In 85% of 
cases, the institutions take up the ombudsman’s proposals on how 
to improve EU administration.44 Among others, recommendations 
have been made to the European Commission; the European 
                                                        
44 See the European ombudsman’s annual report: 
https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/annual/en/87679.  
Without prior interaction 
with one of the EU 
institutions, there is no 
interest in contacting the 
ombudsman. 
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Personnel Selection Service (EPSO), the Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF); 
the European Medicines Agency (EMA); the Court of Justice of the 
EU; the European External Action Service (EEAS); the Council of the 
European Union and the European Parliament. Most of the 14 
institutions accessed scored 100%; the Commission 77% (accounts 
for almost all cases) in taking up the ombudsman’s proposals. 
Institutions want to improve their internal functioning, which 
generally makes them comply with the recommendations of the 
ombudsman; that and concern about their reputation towards the 
outside world. Although the ombudsman has no powers to enforce 
her recommendations, she has soft power mechanisms at her 
disposal, such as publicly exposing the institution’s poor 
administrative practices (Interview 13). 
2.3.4 Effects of the instrument  
The European ombudsman has a vital role in improving the EU’s 
administration. In being an advocate for EU citizens vis-à-vis the EU 
institutions, she is an “important venue for EU citizens to practice 
their rights of transparency and accountability” (Kostadinova, 2015, 
1078). As seen in her work for instance on the Council’s “opaque” 
decision-making; or her inquiry on the Commission’s Secretary-
General’s appointment procure: the Ombudsman’s mandate is 
about administrative transparency.  
Transparency is understood as the openness of the EU 
institutions and implies the right of citizens to access information 
about the activities of EU institutions and also these institutions’ 
responsibility to provide such access and information (Kostadinova, 
2015, 1080). Transparency is a crucial 
element of democracy. But transparency 
does not equal participation: it underpins 
democratic governance as it facilitates the 
accountability of policymakers, but it does 
not in itself guarantee increased democratic 
legitimacy. Effective citizen participation is 
therefore a key indicator for a polity’s 
democratic legitimacy and a criterion in its 
own right (Organ, 2017, 1716). 
This leads to the conclusion that the presence and work of the 
European ombudsman improves EU democracy insofar as 
The presence and work of 
the European ombudsman 
improves EU democracy 
insofar as transparency is 
concerned. It does not, 
however, impact citizens’ 
ability to participate in EU 
decision-making. 
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transparency is concerned. It does not, however, impact citizens’ 
ability to participate in EU decision-making.  
2.4 Public Consultations 
2.4.1 Background 
The European Commission organises public online consultations in 
which EU citizens can give feedback on concrete proposals. They 
can express their views on the scope, priorities and added value of 
EU action for new initiatives, or evaluations of existing policies and 
laws. These consultations are organised on all major initiatives that 
the Commission is preparing, but not on every proposal. This is 
done before the Commission tables the proposal and gives citizens 
a minimum of 12 weeks to react. The results are then supposed to 
feed into the proposal. The treaties state the importance of this 
exchange by prescribing that “the Commission shall carry out broad 
consultations with parties concerned in order to ensure that the 
Union’s actions are coherent and transparent” (Article 11 (3) TEU). 
The most prominent case so far is the public consultation on 
summertime, as the participation hit a record number: 4.6 million 
Europeans gave their opinion on whether to keep or abolish the 
daylight-saving time.45  
Apart from the consultations for regular law-making 
purposes, there is an ongoing consultation process on the future of 
the EU, which would allow the Commission to find out how EU 
citizens imagine the future of European integration. This does not 
feed into the regular EU’s policymaking, but will be handed to the 
European Council, hence on a different level of governance. 
Whereas the consultations on regular law-making are conducted by 
the respective Directorate-Generals and coordinated by the 
Secretariat-General, consultations on the future of Europe are led by 
DG Communication.   
                                                        
45 See https://ec.europa.eu/info/consultations/2018-summertime-
arrangements_en#add-info.  
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2.4.2 EU citizens 
These consultations are open to everyone; any EU citizen who is 
interested can provide input. The consultations are designed as 
online questionnaires which are usually accessible in all official EU 
languages (except Irish) and replies may be submitted in any EU 
language. That makes it very inclusive and the Commission invites 
“all individual and organisations” to respond to consultations. The 
aim is to reach a broad range and potentially a large number of 
stakeholders.  
However, the respective DGs usually identify a target group 
according to the policy field at stake, especially concerning a very 
specific issue. Although there are no statistical data (publicly) 
available on this, there is a general perception that participants are 
mostly lobby and interest groups, but hardly ‘ordinary citizens’ 
(Interview 6).  Also, the Commission itself manages expectations by 
drawing attention to the self-selection causes bias and the potential 
lack of representativeness.46 
The fact that it is mostly professionals and experts 
participating in these consultations is not necessarily a bad thing: 
organised interest is also part of participatory democracy, as long as 
it is not imbalanced or overly dominant. Legal acts are complex and 
often require previous knowledge of the field. Expert knowledge is 
justified when policymakers seek to “base a new policy initiative on 
more accurate and up-to-date knowledge of a particular issue area” 
(Catt and Murphy, 2003, 409). Advocacy groups might be more able 
to do that than citizens in a private capacity, particularly in very 
technical or sensitive areas.  
However, by focusing on specific subgroups and not on the 
community at large, the aim of the consultation is not to gather 
information on the perspective and preferences of the wider public. 
Consultations are therefore not generally an instrument through 
which normal citizens can make their voice heard. 
                                                        
46 See http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/ 
br_toolbox_en.pdf, p. 319.  
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2.4.3 EU institutions 
The consultation instrument is solely bound to the Commission, 
which initiates, implements and assesses the consultations. They 
serve to feed into the Commission’s legislative proposals and 
improve policy outputs. 
2.4.4 Effects of the instrument 
The consultation procedure is based on the assumption that 
citizens’ input leads to better policy results and an increased 
legitimacy of decisions. According to (Catt and Murphy, 2003), 
there are three purposes to give voice to groups within a 
government-created policy process: synthesis, contestation and to 
provide information. All three categories of the ‘consultation 
matrix’ aim to provide information to the policymaker, not 
involvement in policy creation. Consultations fall under the 
category of ‘information provision’ in which groups “are invited to 
present evidence that may include facts, views, values and 
preferences (Catt and Murphy, 2003, 417). 
Whether information provision for decision-makers falls 
under ‘influence’ is a matter for debate. Consultations might 
increase public influence if the political elite is willing to incorporate 
its input into the policymaking process (Catt and Murphy, 2003, 
419). That is not always the case, as this instrument can also be used 
to equip decision-makers with a “veneer of legitimacy” without 
actually incorporating citizens’ input into the policy decisions 
(Cheeseman and Smith, 2001, 97–9).  
It is beyond the scope and intention of 
this volume to assess how far the 
Commission incorporates the results of 
consultations into its policy proposals and 
whether the Commission’s consultations 
indeed increase the quality of policy 
outcomes. These consultations do not serve 
to give citizens any direct control over or 
involvement in policymaking, rather it is 
experts that provide knowledge and feedback. Hence, at best (if 
picked up by the decision-maker), they can increase the output 
legitimacy of EU decision-making (Catt and Murphy, 2003, 420). 
Public consultations do not 
serve to give citizens any 
direct control over or 
involvement in 
policymaking, rather it is 
experts that provide 
knowledge and feedback. 
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2.5 Citizens’ Dialogues 
2.5.1 Background 
Citizens’ Dialogues are public debates where representatives of the 
European Commission, the European Parliament, other EU bodies 
and EU decision-makers such as national, regional and local 
politicians, discuss with EU citizens. These are prescribed by the 
treaties in Article 11 (2) TEU, which determines the requirement for 
the institutions to “maintain an open, transparent and regular 
dialogue with representative associations and civil society”. These 
might be dedicated to one specific policy topic or designed in a 
broader fashion, allowing questions on all fields of EU governance. 
These dialogues usually start with keynote remarks by an EU 
representative, followed by a question and answer session, and 
usually take 60 to 90 minutes.47  
2.5.2 EU citizens 
These dialogues invite all EU citizens to participate, without formal 
restrictions. Further research is needed to determine exactly who 
attends these meetings – ‘ordinary’ citizens in a private capacity 
wishing to learn more about EU politics, or people already familiar 
and connected with EU activities in one way or another.  
2.5.3 EU institutions 
Most of these dialogues are organised by the Commission, and 1000 
citizens’ dialogues in 345 towns have already taken place across the 
EU since 2012. There has been a marked increase in dialogues 
recently; whereas in 2015 there were 53 talks, by September 2018 
there had been 515 dialogues across the EU. The Commission 
intends to organise 300 more by the end of March 2019.48 Initially 
                                                        
47 See for instance: Frans Timmermans in Utrecht 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Aku8OKKmXY; or Violeta Bulc in 
Vienna https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ckMF3n39uAM.  
48 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/ 
soteu2018-brochure_en.pdf, p. 148. 
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these events were designed only for members of the College but 
were then extended to include high-rank officials (Interview 18).   
The Juncker Commission has thus amplified the exercise, 
compared to his predecessor. Organising responsibilities are spread 
across the Commission, the Commission representations in member 
states and in local Europe directs information centres.49 DG 
Communication formally coordinates these events, but it remains 
unclear what the formal requirements are to be categorised as a 
‘Citizens’ Dialogue’. It is hard to identify any overarching 
methodology of Commission-organised Citizens’ Dialogues. 
2.5.4 Effects of the instrument 
The quality of the debates depends on the Commissioner that is 
participating, as well as on the moderator. There are some careful 
attempts to experiment with innovative forms of quality 
improvement, such as the introduction of randomly selected 
citizens’ participation.50 However, the Commission generally seems 
to prioritise quantity over quality.  
According to the categorisation of (Catt and Murphy, 2003) 
citizens’ dialogues fall under the category of public meetings that 
fulfil the purpose of ‘contestation’. Here, citizens are invited to 
present their thoughts and opinions (p. 417). It goes one step further 
than information provision as there is an interactive element. To 
have an effect, however, the discussions would need to be recorded, 
aggregated and fed into the decision-making process; there is no 
clear methodology behind the dialogues and no process of 
channelling back the information received into decision-making. 
Since these meetings are more question and answer sessions they 
cannot really be called ‘dialogues’ –  a true exchange can hardly be 
achieved. Citizens’ Dialogues therefore constitute more of a 
Commission communication strategy than an in-depth discussion 
with citizens. 
                                                        
49 See https://europa.eu/european-union/contact/meet-us_en.  
50 See https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/ 
Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/224-2018_BST_Evaluationsberich_ 
Citizens_Panel_final.pdf.  
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That being said, it is still an 
important exercise to inform citizens 
about EU and Commission activities, and 
political institutions (especially at EU 
level) should always make an effort to 
reach out to citizens. The Citizens’ 
Dialogues, however, do not facilitate the 
opportunity for citizens to participate in 
the EU’s decision-making.  
Both types of top-down instrument do not aim to be involved 
in policy creation. They work in two directions: public consultations 
seek information that citizens feed into the political process; and 
citizens’ dialogues aim mainly to inform citizens about the EU’s and 
the Commission’s activities. The Commission engages with citizens 
in a top-down fashion and citizens largely remain passive actors.  
2.6 Conclusion and Key Findings 
This contribution assessed all the participatory instruments that are 
available to European citizens. It concludes that these instruments 
do not allow citizens much influence over the EU decision-making 
process. Participatory elements are not very developed, and this is 
due to the reasons given below.  
Few ‘ordinary’ citizens 
Interestingly, most of the analysed tools do not address or involve 
‘ordinary’ citizens. They mainly target 
either organised (ECI), or professional 
(ombudsman) interests, or experts in a 
particular field (consultation). The only 
one that includes individual citizens is 
the right to petition, which is a 
particularly weak tool, and the citizens’ dialogues, which aim for 
transparency, not for participation.   
Top-down trumps bottom-up 
The Commission supports and promotes top-down more than 
bottom-up instruments. This suggests that it considers allowing 
citizens to bring in their own policy preferences as less important 
Citizens’ dialogues 
constitute more of a 
Commission 
communication strategy 
than an in-depth discussion 
with citizens. 
Interestingly, most of the 
analysed tools do not 
address or involve 
‘ordinary’ citizens. 
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than improving existing policymaking. 
It favours instruments that justify its 
own policy decisions and provide more 
transparency in policymaking.   
Expertise trumps opinion 
The Commission did not manage to 
overcome the rather technocratic modus 
operandi on which it was once built. For 
a long time, European policies were 
shaped according to the ‘Monnet 
method’, in which step-by-step integration was guided by the 
judgement of a technocratic elite rather by political (involving 
citizens) judgement (Radaelli, 1999, 759). Technocratic expertise 
provided effectiveness and efficiency of decision-making 
(Vogiatzis, 2017, 245). This was considered legitimate, as it was the 
best way to arrive at the valuable aim of European unity (Tsakatika, 
2005, 195).  
Despite the post-Maastricht democracy concerns, the Monnet 
conception of legitimacy is ever present. The expert knowledge that 
the Commission possesses is, besides its neutral position vis‐à‐vis 
the member states, the key element on which it builds its legitimacy 
to represent the Union’s interest (Tsakatika, 2005, 199–200). The 
Commission argues that the EU law-making process is complex and 
often requires profound knowledge of the respective policy fields at 
stake. Organised interest and advocacies are often said to be in a 
better position to comment and assess than individual citizens. This 
makes ‘civic dialogue’ mainly an elitist one, between the institutions 
and interest representative organisations 
(Greenwood and Tuokko, 2017, 4).   
This analysis suggests that the 
Commission’s default position is still a 
technocratic one, triggering a natural 
constraint towards citizens’ (bottom-up) 
participation. The Commission is aware 
of the distance between itself as an 
institution and is currently showing more 
willingness to reach out and bridge this gap. Nevertheless, the value 
The Commission supports 
and promotes top-down 
more than bottom-up 
instruments. This suggests 
that it considers allowing 
citizens to bring in their 
own policy preferences as 
less important than 
improving existing 
policymaking. 
This analysis suggests that 
the Commission’s default 
position is still a 
technocratic one, triggering 
a natural constraint 
towards citizens’ (bottom-
up) participation. 
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it places on citizens’ opinion is very low compared to in-house and 
external expertise.  
Output trumps input 
The EU remains more focused on output than input legitimacy. It is 
commonly accepted that input-oriented legitimacy can currently 
hardly be claimed for the EU (noted most famously by Scharpf, 
2009, 178). Next to input legitimacy (government by the people) and 
output legitimacy (government for the people), EU governance 
relies on government with the people, in which civil society, 
businesses, consumer advocates and other interest groups 
participate in consultations and the implementation of new EU law 
(Schmidt, 2006). Rather than developing fully fledged mechanisms 
for direct participation, EU democracy rests almost solely on the 
principles of representation. 
This research confirms this by highlighting the Commission’s 
focus on only those forms of participation that potentially improve 
the policy outcome (top-down). The aim 
is not a generally permeable system, but 
the improvement of output. As citizens 
are not able to challenge politicians’ 
decision-making, the input is almost 
entirely limited to the consultative phase 
of policymaking. The tools are too much 
at the discretion of the political elite to 
facilitate true input. 
The fact that most forms of 
participation offered do not address 
‘ordinary’ citizens but rather organised interest and expert 
communities plays into this argument. The low involvement of 
individual citizens at the same time hinders the potential of 
democracy with the people. According to Schmidt (2006), direct 
individual citizen participation in the EU institutions and policy 
processes, outside of elections for the EP, has great potential to 
strengthen EU democracy. Perhaps inspiration can be found from 
the experiences at member state level in the following chapters of 
this volume. 
As citizens are not able to 
challenge politicians’ 
decision-making, the input 
is almost entirely limited to 
the consultative phase of 
policymaking. The tools are 
too much at the discretion of 
the political elite to facilitate 
true input. 
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3. EUROPE’S CONVENTIONS 
DÉMOCRATIQUES  
DÍDAC GUTIÉRREZ-PERIS, POL MORILLAS & 
HÉCTOR SÁNCHEZ MARGALEF 
This chapter analyses the democratic conventions taking place in 
the European Union (EU) throughout 2018 and 2019. These 
Conventions are the latest EU-wide initiative to enhance citizens’ 
participation and awareness of the European integration process, 
and are an attempt to address the EU’s democratic deficit.  
To explore whether the Democratic Conventions bring 
something new to the table, this chapter looks at the experiences of 
the European Convention in 2004 and 
the Citizens’ Dialogues since 2012 and 
retraces how the Democratic 
Conventions take inspiration from 
Emmanuel Macron’s presidential 
campaign. It argues that the 
Conventions successfully offer a 
bottom-up approach to democratic 
engagement but that they may not 
translate public expression into political 
reform effectively enough. This chapter 
also points to the disconnect between participatory initiatives and 
the legitimacy of political reform at the European level if such 
initiatives are not coupled with visible political outcomes.  
Introduction 
The set of events and participatory initiatives commonly identified 
as ‘Democratic Conventions’ for the future of Europe are attracting 
increasing attention (Malherbe, 2018). To a certain extent, these 
conventions are perceived as the ultimate mechanism to overcome 
This chapter looks at the 
experiences of the European 
Convention in 2004 and the 
Citizens’ Dialogues since 
2012 and retraces how the 
Democratic Conventions 
take inspiration from 
Emmanuel Macron’s 
presidential campaign. 
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the longstanding legitimacy deficit in European integration, which 
has become more salient as a result of the multiple crises affecting 
the EU and the need to involve citizens in EU decision-making 
mechanisms. Discussion of Europe’s democratic deficit has tended 
to focus on voter turnout in European Parliament elections, the 
powers of the European Parliament and the ownership of European 
decisions by national electorates. The reinforcement of participatory 
mechanisms opens a new debate about the capacity of bottom-up 
initiatives to empower the voice of citizens and bridge the 
democratic deficit in the construction of Europe. 
This chapter reflects on this process while acknowledging 
that the debate is still a live one and that final conclusions will have 
to be drawn after the European Parliament elections in May 2019 
(Versini, 2018). Keeping these qualifications in mind, the following 
analysis focuses on three main research goals: exploring some of the 
earlier initiatives at European level, such as the 2004 European 
Convention and the Citizens’ Dialogues organised by the European 
Commission since 2012; describing Emmanuel Macron’s method in 
order to argue that the political rationale behind the Democratic 
Conventions is largely connected to the 2017 French presidential 
campaign; and summarising the findings regarding the essential 
precautions and difficulties in translating large participatory 
processes at the European scale. 
Despite their evolving nature, there is already some 
consensus about the nature of the current Democratic Conventions. 
They encompass a set of political initiatives organised by the 
European Commission, as well as by different member states of the 
European Union, between the first semester of 2018 and the 
European Parliament elections in May 2019. These initiatives might 
be further expanded in the future, but currently are based on three 
key developments. The first consists of a substantial increase in the 
number of Citizens’ Dialogues organised throughout the continent 
– up to 500 Dialogues will be organised by May 2019, as indicated 
by the European Commission (2018a).1 The second development 
consists of a pan-European qualitative online consultation – open, 
voluntary and addressed to the entire EU population, which has 
                                                        
1 See the section of the official website of the European Commission, Future 
of Europe: https://goo.gl/ZQfRjv. 
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been accessible via the European Commission website since May 
2018 for all citizens wishing to take part. The third ‘leg’ of the 
Conventions is a series of events organised independently in each 
participating member state – often referred to as ‘Citizens’ 
Consultations’. These events might take different forms – from 
conferences to town hall meetings or online consultations, but they 
all have the specific quality of allowing citizens to express their 
ideas and worries about the future of the EU. 
The political drive behind the Conventions is connected with 
the advent of Emmanuel Macron’s presidency, more specifically 
from what his En Marche! movement achieved across France in 2016, 
inspired by a philosophy that seeks to issue a political ‘diagnosis’ as 
the start of any project of political reform (Couturier, 2017). This was 
best described by Macron himself during an interview with Les 
Echos in May 2016 (Les Echos, 2016): “we will propose a 
transformation plan for the country on the basis of the diagnosis. It 
will be different than a detailed programme because it will contain 
a very detailed vision but only a few very concrete measures and 
how we will adapt them”. In this sense, the Democratic Conventions 
are set up as part of a process following a cyclical order: first listen 
to people, then translate opinions into political direction, finally, 
achieve historical progress (Couturier, 2017).  
Following this methodology, the Democratic Conventions 
currently taking place have been designed as a series of discussions 
that are completely transparent and potentially accessible to all. The 
content of such discussions is not homogenous;2 the topics generally 
include a wide range of subjects connected in some way with the 
European Union and the public perception of transnational policies. 
The ambition to use the initiative as a way to ‘legitimate’ the next 
wave of reforms indicates the will to use the Conventions to 
strengthen the input legitimacy of the EU (Schmidt, 2010; 2012; 
2015).  
The initiative is very much presented in its first phase as a 
bottom-up approach for EU reform as well as a way of expanding 
                                                        
2 For more on the content and weaknesses of the initiative, please see below 
‘Reflections on the Conventions’. 
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Macron’s idea of European sovereignty (Macron, 2017a).3 However, 
the process is still managed on an intergovernmental basis and the 
responsibility of translating into action the outcomes of the 
Conventions will reside solely with the European Council.4 Indeed, 
the main advocate of the initiative was the French President himself 
and despite the initial reluctance of some member states, they later 
voluntarily joined the project.5 Moreover, those governments 
participating in the initiative retain control over where, when and 
how the Conventions take place. National governments will also be 
in charge of gathering the thoughts and putting together the 
conclusions, which denotes a much more top-down approach at the 
end of the process. The Democratic Conventions are thus taking 
shape with a certain amount of flexibility, not to mention ambiguity, 
since they vary enormously from one country to another. The 
following section explores two initiatives that have attempted to 
tackle the same question since 2002. 
3.1 Prior Experiences 
Before the current Democratic Conventions, there were other 
participatory exercises at the European level whose outcomes –– 
have been rather nuanced. Cases in point would be the 2004 
European Convention, prior to the ‘Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe’, and the Citizens’ Dialogues implemented 
since 2012. 
In December 2001, European leaders established the 
Convention on the Future of the EU at the European Council of 
Laeken. The declaration already mentioned the democratic 
                                                        
3 Emmanuel Macron developed a ‘six-point’ manual for reinforcing 
European sovereignty, presented for the first time at the Sorbonne 
University (see footnote 11). The points covered the following fields: 
Security, Borders & Immigration, Foreign Policy, Ecology & Agriculture, 
Digitalisation, the Eurozone. E. Macron (2017a), “Initiative pour l'Europe - 
Discours d'Emmanuel Macron pour une Europe souveraine, unie, 
démocratique”, Elysée official website (https://goo.gl/oNybvj). 
4 See footnote 1.  
5 For more about the member states participating in the initiative, please 
refer to the European Commission webpage: https://ec.europa.eu/ 
commission/consultation-future-europe_en.  
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challenge at the top of the agenda: “the European Union stands at a 
crossroads, a defining moment in its existence (…). Within the 
Union, the European institutions must be brought closer to its 
citizens. (…) Many [citizens] also feel that the Union should involve 
itself more with their particular concerns, instead of intervening, in 
every detail, in matters by their nature better left to member states 
and regions elected representatives” (European Council, 2001). 
Concern regarding “legitimacy and popular sovereignty” 
(Magnette and Nicolaïdis, 2004: 383) and responding to “the vague 
but powerful urge to democratise the EU” (2004: 385) were the 
issues that led to the convention. So, back in 2001, this ‘democratic 
deficit’, although it did not yet bear this name, demanded a form of 
treaty revision other than the ‘business as usual’ intergovernmental 
conference (IGC). 
Trenz and Eder argued that “the European Convention 
[became] the major forum for turning ‘policy debates’ restricted to 
the institutional field into ‘public debates’ opening a European-
wide public sphere for the salient issues of constitutional reform” 
(2004: 14). However, when the time for drafting came, government 
representatives tried to take control of the outcome, since they had 
not been able to control the process as much as they would have 
wished (Magnette and Nicolaïdis, 2004: 389), and national interests 
prevailed over any other cleavage (Crum, 2004). Given that some 
debates were left out on purpose and that the final text would be 
adopted at an ICG, it hindered the claim of an open and transparent 
and bottom-up process capable of reforming the EU.6 
The current Democratic Conventions have ‘learnt’ some of the 
lessons of the 2004 Convention, in particular giving citizens centre 
stage to overcome the democratic deficit and avoiding the IGC logic 
as much as possible. Also, the fact that the convention ended up in 
a failed constitutional treaty might explain why some member 
states prefer to call the current process ‘Citizens’ Consultations’, 
instead of the ‘Democratic Conventions’ often referred to by 
Emmanuel Macron. Moreover, both the 2004 Convention and the 
2018 Conventions retain a significant element of ‘top-down’ 
methodology and their success will very much rely on the quality 
of political leadership to transform public expression into public 
                                                        
6 See S. Blockmans and S. Russack in this volume for further information. 
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appropriation. The risk here is that citizens will be left feeling 
disempowered and neglected if at the end of the process there is no 
clear leadership to give meaning to all 
the public opinions collected across the 
different countries. 
The second experience informing 
the Democratic Conventions is a series 
of delocalised initiatives under the 
name ‘Citizens’ Dialogues’ (Euractiv, 
2010) launched in 2012 under the 
personal leadership of Commissioner 
Viviane Reding. The Dialogues were 
set up in a ‘town hall meeting’ format across several cities in Europe, 
with the objective of allowing an informal and close debate between 
a high representative of the European Union – it started with 
Commissioners – and the local population. Up until then, citizens’ 
access to Commissioners had always been indirect and mainly 
occurred through the pressroom, journalists and the institutions 
themselves. 
The European Commission evaluated the debate originating 
from the Dialogues and the public audiences attending the events 
reached 195 million EU citizens. The number of participants is 
officially 88,000, which illustrates, in the opinion of the European 
Commission, people’s growing interest for such formats since 2012 
(European Commission, 2018b). 
Conventions retain a 
significant element of ‘top-
down’ methodology and 
their success will very much 
rely on the quality of 
political leadership to 
transform public expression 
into public appropriation. 
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Figure 3.1 Dialogue with citizens ahead of the European elections 
 
Source: European Commission (2018b). 
The quantitative assessment could simply be the outcome of the 
increasing number of Dialogues organised, but whereas Citizens’ 
Dialogues were only a secondary political project during Barroso’s 
mandate (Candau, 2018), they have been expanded since 2014 by 
the cabinet of Commissioners led by Juncker – and will run until 
2019 as part of the ‘Discussion on the future of Europe’. In a sense, 
the Citizens’ Dialogues managed to start a conversation about how 
people and EU representatives engage with one another and can be 
considered one of the first structured initiatives to put the highest 
EU civil servants on the level of 
ordinary citizens (European 
Commission, 2014). Moreover, they 
are probably the only Democratic 
Convention initiatives that have 
already been tested in real 
conditions. 
The outcome of the different Democratic Conventions 
organised in 2018 and 2019 in several member states will mostly 
depend on how far lessons have been learned from the Citizens’ 
Dialogues. The first of these lessons is that debating and discussing 
an issue can raise more public awareness than simply facilitating 
information about the issue. Think tanks in Europe have explored 
The EU’s Citizens 
Dialogues are probably the 
only democratic convention 
initiatives that have been 
tested in real conditions. 
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this lack of knowledge about the EU (Llaudes, 2014), but the 
experience of the Citizens’ Dialogues seems to point to debating as 
the key tool for achieving the engagement objective between 
institutions and citizens. 
The second outcome points to the importance of promoting a 
sincere, proactive conversation between institutions and citizens. 
This is often defined as a ‘two-way’ communication strategy, where 
both agents are truly interested in listening to each other. This is a 
common mistake of representative bodies. Daniel Innerarity (2014) 
has addressed this issue in the particular context of the European 
Union, and concluded that European institutions – compared to 
national institutions – are particularly vulnerable to public 
perception because they justify their existence primarily on the basis 
of public support. 
3.2 The Emmanuel Macron method (2016-17) 
3.2.1 The three principles set in place by ‘En Marche!’  
It is well known that Emmanuel Macron’s campaign strategy was 
inspired by that of Barack Obama in 2008 (Le Journal du Dimanche, 
2017). For example, his election team hired Liegey Muller Pons, a 
French start-up founded by specialists that worked on the American 
presidential campaign in 2008. This company played a central role 
in the digital dimension of Macron’s candidacy by using new 
statistical software to improve the micro-targeting approach to 
door-to-door canvassing (Dryef, 2017). Another example is the 
influence of David Plouffe – the director of Barack Obama’s first 
campaign, particularly his book The Audacity to Win: The Inside Story 
and Lessons of Barack Obama's Historic Victory (Kakutani, 2009). 
Two elements of Plouffe’s strategy seem to have been at the 
core of Emmanuel Macron’s strategy. The first was the importance 
of setting clear goals and objectives before the launch of the 
campaign; the second was never to deviate from these goals. This 
communication strategy was led by Adrien Taquet whom, 
influenced by Obama’s campaign, sought, in Taquet’s own words, 
“to create a campaign which differentiated itself from the others” 
(Gutiérrez-Peris, 2018). Emmanuel Macron’s vision for the 
Democratic Conventions in Europe recognisably takes inspiration 
from his own positive experience during the first months of his 
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campaign in 2016 and 2017. Among the various elements that 
differentiated the campaign from others was the decision to create 
a movement that did not require ‘a membership fee’. By doing so, 
En Marche! managed to occupy a political space with relative ease, 
despite the movement being extremely new to the political 
landscape. 
A second key decision that in retrospect appears to have been 
decisive is that the movement allowed double party membership. 
Instead of approaching the election as a zero-sum electoral 
competition, En Marche! broke with the idea that electoral support 
must be the monopoly of a single party. This, again, allowed the 
movement to compete with mainstream parties within the record 
time of four months – between July and November 2016. 
Finally, there is a third key criterion that proved to be central 
to the rise and success of Emmanuel Macron’s movement in the 
early stage: the central direction granted absolute autonomy to all 
local communities. This meant that in comparison with other 
parties, supporters of En Marche! were able to freely create, without 
supervision or ideological preconditions, local action committees. 
Citizens could become members of the movement with a few clicks 
on its website, and with a few more set up their own local 
committee. At this early stage, the role of En Marche! was 
circumscribed to suggesting some common topics for the local 
committees to discuss, as well as suggesting some common 
activities. Apart from this, the movement also managed to reinforce 
itself by betting on spontaneous activism on the ground. This is 
particularly essential to understanding the rationale behind the 
Democratic Conventions. Ideally, the same philosophy of 
decentralisation and absolute autonomy at the national level should 
have been promoted. 
The strategy of the movement was to link these organisational 
choices with a coherent message and communication policy. 
Decisions such as choosing the initials of Emmanuel Macron for the 
slogan of the movement (En Marche), or the use of Macron’s 
handwriting for the logo made all its operations more authentic and 
personal. These decisions would ultimately prove essential to 
gaining track and differentiating En Marche! from other parties, 
ahead of the second phase known as the ‘Longue Marche’. 
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3.2.2 The ‘Longue Marche’ 
‘La longue marche’ (the long march)7 officially took place between 28 
May 2016 and 31 July 2016. Emmanuel Macron had already created 
his movement on 6 April, but at that time he was still a Minister in 
the François Hollande administration – he would quit at the end of 
August of 2016. By then, he had already created the small ‘start-up’ 
team of roughly 15 people, who were responsible for all the 
decisions regarding Macron’s method (Les Echos, 2017). 
In practical terms the march referred to the substantial 
qualitative surveying exercise undertaken across the French 
countryside over several weeks. The aim was to mobilise several 
hundred En Marche! supporters and send them to survey thousands 
of French people in a vast door-to-door operation. Emmanuel 
Macron himself published a YouTube video filled with images of 
the march, explaining why the exercise was so important for his 
political ‘package’ and strategy (Macron, 2016). Both the narrative 
and the rationale behind the march was the same as that presented 
to justify the European Democratic Conventions in 2018 and 2019. 
As Macron explained in 2016: “the final step will consist of 
analysing more than 25 000 questionnaires (filled in France, 
overseas and abroad) which represent an extraordinary source for 
getting feedback on personal experiences. The following weeks will 
allow us to learn some lessons from all this material” (Macron, 
2016). In other words, Macron’s strategy consisted of using the 
march and its outcome to build momentum, but more importantly, 
to justify his presidential intentions and his political programme, 
which would be unveiled at the end of the year. By doing so, he 
implemented a methodology that is very close to that proposed at 
the European level: first, issue a clear diagnosis of the country, 
second, set in motion some sort of public exercise to collect data 
from society, and only then, create a precise political programme.  
3.2.3 Setting the stage for the Democratic Conventions 
The rationale behind the long march echoes the initiative launched 
by Emmanuel Macron at the European level during two symbolic 
                                                        
7 Despite the military connotation, in French, the phrase suggests the idea 
of moving forward. 
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speeches that took place on 7 September 2017 in Athens, and 26 
September 2017 at the Sorbonne University in Paris. In Athens, for 
example (Macron, 2017b), only four months after being elected, 
Macron pointed to a “roadmap to build the future of Europe”. Such 
a roadmap was presented as the basis for the next ten years and the 
first feature envisaged was that a new “treaty should not be 
negotiated behind the citizens’ back, on the sly, whether it be a text 
discussed behind doors in a dark room in Paris, Brussels or Berlin” 
(Macron, 2017b). Macron suggested a new method, for those willing 
to join him, consisting of organised consultations, “democratic 
conventions that will be a time during which our people throughout 
our countries discuss the Europe they want” (Macron, 2017b). 
During the Sorbonne speech, Macron announced “democratic 
conventions”, taking the form of “vast debates in order to identify 
the priorities, the preoccupations, the ideas, which could nourish 
our roadmap for the upcoming Europe” (Macron, 2017a). There are 
also other similarities, such as using a common questionnaire and 
avoiding too many open questions that could broaden or blur the 
feedback from respondents. The initial methodology and the 
intention behind those Democratic Conventions were set out by 
Macron himself during the Sorbonne speech: “debates will be 
organised around the same questions”, following a “shared 
roadmap between the governments that are ready to go in that 
direction” (Macron, 2017a). A “group for the re-foundation of 
Europe” will be charged with analysing and delivering the 
proposals to the political leaders (Macron, 2017a). The initiative 
invited member states to organise a series of debates to identify 
priorities, preoccupations and ideas to stimulate Europeans’ future 
redesigning. This second speech evoked the idea of a European 
sovereignty understood as the involvement of citizens in order to 
justify the Union’s reform.  
Following the strategy as for his own campaign – that 
communication must serve the overall message, the places chosen 
for these speeches were also linked with the idea of popular 
empowerment. Pnyx Hill in Athens is the birthplace of democracy, 
and the founder of the Sorbonne University, Pierre de Sorbon, was 
one of the most outspoken supporters of the collegial method for 
decision-making. 
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Finally, during an address delivered before the European 
Parliament in Strasbourg (Macron, 2018a), the president also held 
that the idea that simply voting to ratify a text was too simplistic. 
Instead, he suggested an “open, difficult and honest” (Macron, 
2018a) debate to truly take steps forward regarding democracy in 
Europe. This same idea came to the fore during his acceptance of 
the Charlemagne Prize (Macron, 2018b), when he took the 
opportunity to defend the thesis that only a more democratic 
approach to Europe can preserve the European ideal, as well as 
protect it from foreign powers, ensuring that the continent remains 
free to decide its own future. 
3.3 The Democratic Conventions 
3.3.1 The European Commission initiatives 
Between September 2017 and July 2018 (the time of writing), several 
documents have cast some further light on the methodology being 
used for the Democratic Conventions. There are two useful 
references: the Information Report published by the French 
National Assembly on 7 December 2017 (Assemblée Nationale, 
2017) and all the material published by the European Commission 
on its website, in the section ‘Online Consultation on the Future of 
Europe’.8 
This official material shows how the European Commission 
started the process by setting up an equivalent of the long march 
organised in France in 2016. This takes the form of an open, free, 
online public consultation. Any citizen from any member state, and 
even citizens from abroad, can take the survey by accessing a 
website specifically designed for this purpose: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/consultation-future-europe_en. 
The consultation is being eagerly promoted by the European 
Commission through its communication channels, its national 
representation offices and its own communication personnel. 
Operations are overseen by the Directorate-General for 
Communication, which has been under the direct responsibility of 
                                                        
8 See footnote 1.  
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the president since the re-organisation put in place by Jean-Claude 
Juncker in 2014.  
The online consultation consists of a qualitative survey 
regarding a set of elements. These elements include questions on 
immigration, environment, education, inequalities, healthcare, 
technology, economic security, risks and threats, agriculture, as well 
as questions on the desire will for more or less harmonisation across 
Europe regarding different public policies. The content of the 
survey was designed after a series of workshops held on the 5th and 
6th of May 2018 under the umbrella of the European Economic and 
Social Committee (EESC). The EESC explains how a “a group of 80 
European citizens from 27 member states came to the EESC 
premises in Brussels to work together and draft a 12-question online 
consultation” (European Economic and Social Committee, 2018). 
An essential specific aspect of the overall process regarding 
the online consultation is that the data collected and the 
methodology used does not follow the requirements for 
representativeness at the European level. In this sense, the operation 
is significantly different from the statistical data published by 
Eurostat, or the survey monitoring conducted regularly through 
Eurobarometer. Therefore, the ‘online consultation’ – as an essential 
part of the Democratic Conventions campaign – cannot be defined 
as a representative sampling of public opinion among European 
citizens. The final step envisaged is to transform all the citizen’s 
feedback and opinions into a clear and coherent report, written by 
the European Commission and discussed first during the European 
Council in December 2018, and then officially presented in Sibiu, 
Romania during the summit scheduled for 9 May 2019.  
3.3.2 The Conventions in the member states 
The online consultation driven by the Commission complements a 
series of events organised throughout several member states on a 
voluntary basis between June 2018 and March 2019. After 
Emmanuel Macron announced his intention to launch the 
Democratic Conventions, experts and commentators started to 
think about the requirements for reproducing the process 
successfully across several member states. At an informal European 
Council Meeting on 23 February 2018 (European Council, 2018), the 
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initiative was officially launched, with all member states except 
Hungary joining.9 
The French Government and National Assembly expressed 
their views on how to conduct the process (Assemblée Nationale, 
2017). The French Minister for European Affairs, Nathalie Loiseau, 
suggested seven topics on which the citizen’s consultation could 
focus (security in Europe, Europe in the world, sustainable 
development in Europe, innovation in Europe, prosperity and 
stability in Europe, the unity of Europe and a more democratic 
Europe) (Nominacher, 2018). Among the suggestions she called 
organisers to defend and abide by “certain common principles” 
(representativeness, objectivity, transparency, and interoperability) 
and suggested some questions to be answered at all conventions. 
The French Parliament’s report also called for “national steering 
committees” in charge of supervising the process, whose most 
important role would be to draw conclusions and transform them 
into “coherent legal proposals” (Assemblée Nationale, 2017).  
Spain has also implemented Citizens’ Consultations. The 
process is defined on the Spanish webpage devoted to the 
initiative,10 but this does not necessarily coincide with the definition 
used by consultations in other member states. The organisation of 
the consultations is led by the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and civil society organisations, which confirms the ambiguity 
regarding a bottom-up or top-down approach. Regarding the 
Spanish agenda of events, results are not posted online and speakers 
and organisers are typically pro-European, which might hinder the 
opportunity to reach neutral or overtly critical segments of society. 
Reflecting on the methods and objectives of the conventions 
in member states, Stephen Boucher and Lex Paulson (2018) suggest 
that to engage citizens in a meaningful debate, national 
governments should ask a representative sample of Europeans 
what issues should be discussed. These topics should then be 
debated by policymakers and experts in Brussels, although it is far 
from clear whether this method will be applied in the consultations 
organised by member states. Other authors have flagged challenges 
related to implementation of the conventions, such as time 
                                                        
9 See footnote 5. 
10 For more details, see the official webpage: https://goo.gl/BBAsLc.  
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constraints; how to encourage wide participation; the difficulty of 
comparing results across member states; and the production of an 
effective, inclusive and independent synthesis of these results 
(Nominacher, 2018). Another key aspect is whether these exercises 
will ultimately be influential, meaningful and real policy options, 
due to the differences between member states (Font, 2018). 
To overcome some of these challenges, Stratulat, Rittelmeyer 
and Butcher (2018) suggest a one-month period of public 
awareness-raising led by national governments. National 
secretariats led by civil society should then be formed to coordinate 
the organisations and report to a European secretariat. Such a body 
would coordinate the national secretariats and act as facilitator. It 
would be composed of “one or more independent, non-profit 
organisation(s) with experience in setting up, supporting and 
coordinating similar projects on a transnational scale”, whose tasks 
would include drafting a report which includes the findings of all 
national reports.  
3.3.3 Reflections on the Democratic Conventions 
Civil society and experts agree that the exercise runs a substantial 
risk of disappointment. Either the implementation process obeys a 
bottom-up approach or overcoming the democratic deficit will be 
impossible, widening the distrust instead of bridging citizens and 
EU politics. Stratulat, Rittelmeyer 
and Butcher believe that it is better to 
“leave the idea unimplemented than 
to risk making matters worse” 
(2018). 
It could be argued that should 
the Democratic Conventions thrive, 
now or in any future endeavours, 
they must comply with certain 
specifications. First, and most importantly, a clear definition and 
some clarity regarding their name is needed. Was it really necessary 
to adjust the name to ‘Citizens’ Consultations’ through fear of 
changing the treaties? What are these consultations for? Are they 
created to design the future of Europe – copying the strategy of 
Emmanuel Macron, to raise awareness, or provide food for thought 
for the European Parliament elections in 2019?  
Either the implementation 
process obeys a bottom-up 
approach or overcoming the 
democratic deficit will be 
impossible, widening the 
distrust instead of bridging 
citizens and EU politics. 
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The results of the online consultation led by the European 
Commission will be published in an interim report in December 
2018, whose final report is expected at the European Council 
Summit in Sibiu, in May 2019. Heads of State and Government will 
decide whether the results of the consultations can be translated into 
effective policy. National consultations should end in March 2019, 
but some member states will keep their events running until May 
2019. Therefore, each national government can produce a document 
with conclusions, but it is unclear whether they will be adopted or 
endorsed by the Heads of State and Government. It is also unclear 
whether the reports at national level and the report produced by the 
Commission can or will be merged. 
Another concern pertains to the process itself. The rationale 
behind the consultations was to bridge the gap between the citizens 
and the EU; thus implementing a bottom-up process that would 
lead to policy options. So far, the consultation organisers have been 
national governments – with government officials or ministers 
sometimes giving addresses (Munta, 
2018). This is precisely one of the risks that 
must be avoided at all costs, since the goal 
of the consultations should be to listen to 
citizens, not lecture them. Only by 
organising open, free and transparent 
consultations, where no topics are off the 
table and the citizens take centre stage can 
a bottom-up process be assured. The fact 
that there is no recognisable political figure leading or embodying 
the Democratic Conventions at the European level also poses a 
problem in terms of the pan-European visibility of the initiative. 
Another issue is the profile of participants and how to 
evaluate the consultations’ success. There is a risk that the biggest 
share of participants will come from the ‘Euroenthusiastic’ camp, 
although for credibility it is paramount 
to attract ‘Eurocritics’ and 
‘Eurosceptics’. It seems equally critical to 
involve those whom take a neutral view 
and citizens not politicised in European 
matters. Ultimately, the question is how 
‘success’ will be measured, both in terms 
Only by organising open, 
free and transparent 
consultations, where no 
topics are off the table and 
the citizens take centre stage 
can a bottom-up process be 
assured. 
The question is how 
‘success’ will be measured, 
both in terms of the number 
of citizens participating and 
the quality of policy 
recommendations. 
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of the number of citizens participating and the quality of policy 
recommendations. In short, to be successful the Democratic 
Conventions should first issue a diagnosis that evaluates the state 
of the country (or the continent); second, launch a broad 
participatory process to collect public views and concerns; and 
third, to translate such views into political proposals (or a political 
programme). 
3.4 Conclusion: challenges to the success of the 
Democratic Conventions 
The Democratic Conventions were originally aimed at overcoming 
the EU’s democratic deficit, but whose application is still in its test 
phase. Its methodology can learn from previous experiences, 
ranging from the 2004 European Convention and the European 
Commission-led Citizens’ Dialogues to the Emmanuel Macron’s En 
Marche! movement. However, there are still many open questions 
regarding the timing, representativeness and impact of the 
initiative. 
On timing, it must be noted that the calendar foreseen for the 
Democratic Conventions is very tight. The Conventions as a whole 
last for eight months (some national Citizen’s Consultations are 
even shorter), which could be too short to guarantee the inclusive 
scope underpinning the process. The representativeness challenge 
already detected in 2016 during Emmanuel Macron’s long march 
indicates the difficulty in granting the process some kind of 
representative value. As in France, participation in the Democratic 
Conventions is voluntary and the methodology used does not 
guarantee any of the traditional criteria to ensure that the samples 
of people are as representative as possible. In particular, there are 
no established quotas, so the final outcome cannot be framed as a 
representative sample of the population. This might prove to be a 
key point for Convention conclusions, which are meant to inform, 
inspire, and drive the practical proposals made by the Commission 
and the European Council.  
Finally, another pitfall relates to the question of who has the 
last word in the decision-making process. Member states, and in 
particular the relevant governments, are responsible for translating 
the popular will into “coherent legal propositions” (Assemblée 
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Nationale, 2017). In other words, there is no common European 
convention planned, so there will not be an opportunity for 
exchange between citizens from different member states. The 
responsibility to interpret and translate the popular will into 
practical initiatives resides with the national governments rather 
than, for example, an ad hoc transnational assembly made up of 
citizen representatives. In order to better translate the inputs into 
coherent political initiatives, it would be useful in this regard for 
Heads of State and Government to discuss and compare the national 
reports in the European Council alongside those from the 
Commission. 
Yet the Democratic Conventions do have a certain 
transformational potential. They allow for an improved perception 
of the proximity and interaction with citizens in defining the 
priorities of European integration. They are also a more creative, 
politically innovative and disenfranchised way of connecting 
citizens than traditional partisan 
structures. With the European 
Parliament elections on the horizon, the 
momentum generated by the initiative is 
also particularly well timed. The 
question remains whether the European 
Commission and national governments 
will be adventurous enough to transfer 
the outcomes of the Democratic 
Conventions to the European political 
agenda. 
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4. CIVTECH: THE DIGITAL 
REVOLUTION IN DEMOCRACY 
AND DECISION-MAKING 
WOJCIECH BIAŁOŻYT & ARKADIUSZ LEGIEĆ  
4.1 The digital revolution and its impact on 
relations between citizens and governments 
The digital revolution has become an integral part of human 
existence, facilitating but also disrupting it in fundamental ways. 
The internet and social media have 
changed how much of the population 
behaves socially, economically and 
politically, which has major 
consequences for the interaction between 
citizens and governments. The 
revolution has also contributed to the world becoming more chaotic 
and more difficult to understand and govern.   
New concepts and phenomena have emerged, such as: 
organising without organisation, the democratisation of innovation, 
crowdsourcing, ‘wikinomics’ and ‘cognitive surplus’. These 
developments increase pressure on governments to change the 
nature of their relations with citizens, with a focus on social and 
information networks, pushing both governments and citizens 
towards regular and close cooperation.  
The internet has been absorbed by individuals and social 
organisations in a way that has enabled them to act quickly and 
often more effectively than states and governments.  
These trends – the digitisation of all spheres of life coupled 
with social transformations and followed by new dimensions of 
governmental decision-making – are irreversible and interlinked 
while happening at different paces. This creates a need for new 
The internet and social 
media have changed how 
much of the population 
behaves. 
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holistic governance and decision-making models to respond to 
tensions between netizens (citizens of the net) who have become 
increasingly demanding and public administration that still works 
with outdated models and rules.   
4.2 Governmental legitimacy in the digital era 
The digital revolution means that governments and public 
administrations must meet the expectations, needs and 
requirements of citizens differently, and not persist with their 
internal bureaucratic logic. This is 
triggering a transformation towards a 
more transparent, open and mutually 
beneficial relationship between citizens 
and governments, in which the former 
can play an increasingly important role 
in shaping public policies. The final act 
of this transformation will be citizens 
acquiring real influence and co-ownership of decision-making 
processes.  
At the beginning of the 1970s, Harlan Cleveland pioneered 
the notion of governance (Frederickson, 2004) as an emerging form 
of relations between governments and citizens with his message of 
“less government, more governance”. Cleveland pointed out that:  
The organizations that get things done will no longer be 
hierarchical pyramids with most of the real control at the 
top. They will be systems – interlaced webs of tension in 
which control is loose, power diffused, and centers of 
decision plural (…). These new style public-private 
horizontal systems will be led by (…) Public Executives, 
people who manage public responsibilities whether in 
‘public’ or ‘private’ organizations. (They will be guided 
by) a sense of welfare; a sense of equity; a sense of 
achievement; and a sense of participating. 
In accordance with the ‘less government, more governance’ 
approach, the notion of a centreless society emerged. At the same time 
states became increasingly networked and governed in a 
polycentric way. The government’s goal in the polycentric model is 
to enable the broadest possible public and social interactions for 
public responsibilities to be managed by various agents on the 
A transformation is 
underway towards a more 
transparent, open and 
mutually beneficial 
relationship between 
citizens and governments. 
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grounds of cooperation, partnership and co-ownership. That model 
could equally be implemented at local, national and international 
levels. What distinguishes government from governance is that 
government relates to acts based on formal power while governance 
acts on common goals.  
Another form of decision-making and government-citizen 
relations is embodied in the notion of “governing without 
government” (Rhodes, 2006). Rhodes wrote that in place of the 
hollowed-out state, a new form of government is to emerge that is 
difficult to classify:  
Governance based on self-organizing networks will 
challenge governing abilities as networks are autonomous 
and resistant to top-down management. They become first 
examples of governing without government. 
Traditional examinations of politics, government and public 
administration are unable to embrace and explain the emergence of 
forces and social phenomena, making 
new forms of communication and 
decision-making necessary. They follow 
the fact that new economic and social 
phenomena, including new ways of 
online communication, are disrupting 
traditional legal frameworks and are 
making it clear that legal systems 
established in past decades on the one side and digital-driven social, 
technological, political and economic realities on the other are unfit 
with each other. 
4.3 Determinants for governmental efficiency in 
the digital era  
Factors other than technological that contributed to the 
transformation of relations between citizens and governments was 
the financial and economic crises in the late 2000s. The crises 
undermined citizens’ confidence in governments and showed that 
transparent and accountable decision-making is linked to how 
economies perform.  
Mobile technologies that are being added to governments’ 
toolkits are naturally an important way to communicate better and 
New economic and social 
phenomena, including new 
ways of online 
communication, are 
disrupting traditional legal 
frameworks. 
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involve citizens in decision-making processes. They may bring the 
following benefits to governments-citizens relations: 
 Increased participation 
 Increased empowerment and capacities of citizens in relations 
with governments  
 Increased effectiveness in delivering and evaluating policies.  
From an organisational perspective, permanent and direct 
communication with citizens requires governments to avoid the 
three most common traps: 
 Insufficient transparency in relations between citizens and 
governments/public administration  
 Isolated model of daily administrative routines 
 Citizens excluded from the centre of governmental planning 
and operations  
Avoiding these traps above would allow governments to learn, 
predict and understand individual and collective needs of citizens. 
This would represent a major shift from the top-down model of 
decision-making towards one in which decisions and policies are 
discussed continuously with citizens and modified depending on 
the feedback received from them.   
Factors defining the efficiency and effectiveness of 
governments in this model are: 
 Access: citizens need to have access to technologies and be 
able to use them 
 Participation: citizens need to keep involved and remain in 
touch with government representatives 
 Tools: the need for a proper format or delivery on proper 
platforms. 
4.4 The digital revolution as a disruptor of 
government  
4.4.1 From e-government to Digital Era Governance 
The introduction of the internet into government operations has led 
to the emergence of the notion of e-government, which initially 
focused on the introduction of hardware into daily public 
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administration. The concept of e-government has evolved since the 
early 2000s when it was defined as serving the needs of citizens 
better, seen as clients, with the use of new technologies. Over time, 
it evolved towards a model in which governments initiated the 
transformation of its internal and external relations, in recognition 
of the importance of civic participation. They now embrace practices 
and cultures arising from internet-related ideas such as open source 
or digital rights.  
4.4.2 Networked government 
The notion of networked government describes more transparent, 
cooperative and mutually beneficial relations among the 
government, citizens and private entities, as a result of the digital 
revolution. This model prioritises an active role for citizens and non-
governmental organisations to put them at the centre of designing 
and decision-making in cooperation with governments.  
The characteristics of the networked government model are: 
 Communication between citizens and governments are 
served on commercially delivered digital platforms  
 Communication is personalised as much as possible, 
 Advanced digital tools and multichannel communication 
devices are available without interruption. 
Governments need to be effectively connected to citizens in a digital 
world where the latter are part of the heterogeneous, moving stream 
of social media and blogs. Governments need to be a constant part 
of this stream, to influence it, contribute to it and make the most of 
it by sharing information. Governments need to be constantly 
present and active in this stream, unlike in earlier times when 
citizens had to actively seek the information they needed.  
Gathering and making available to the public various forms 
of communication (e.g. email, SMS, webpages, social media) is key 
to ensuring the effectiveness of networked government, enabling 
both an active and automatic participation in real time and at the 
lowest possible cost. Social media and governmental chats can be 
used to promote new initiatives and receive feedback to proposed 
draft policies. This would allow governments to identify challenges, 
needs and desired solutions more effectively, and to clearly 
communicate the outcomes of policies.    
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4.4.3 Experimental government 
In order to keep pace with the digital revolution governments must 
incentivise an internal work culture of work in which experiments 
involving citizens are par for the course. Most advanced countries 
structure their internal government communications so that they 
are a kind of innovation laboratory And 
several governments, making the most 
of digital tools, have set up internal 
laboratories to work on changing the 
ways administrations work, on 
supporting inclusiveness and better 
communication with citizens to reflect 
their actual needs. 
Leading government laboratories include the UK’s Policy 
Lab, the Danish Mindlab and the Finnish Design Lab.  These units 
are designed to be small and interdisciplinary, both in terms of 
policy fields and organisational structure. Government officials are 
being taught to communicate better with citizens and test new ways 
of working with them, with a view to evaluating the past and 
designing new policies. MindLab has implemented human-centred 
design as a way of identifying problems and needs of citizens and 
shaping policy recommendations. Similarly, Chile’s Laboratorio de 
Gobierno is examining how relationships between government and 
societies have changed and are designing new tools to boost the 
inclusiveness of the government’s operations. It also supports civil 
servants in upgrading their skills and organises challenges in which 
private entities compete by proposing prototypes of innovative 
solutions to transform government-citizen relations. 
4.5 Levels of e-democracy 
These developments have in turn led to an increasing number of 
initiatives and tools supporting civic engagement at the European, 
national and local levels. According to Ann Macintosh’s1 
                                                        
1 A. Macintosh (2004), “Characterizing E-Participation and Policy Making”, 
Proceedings of the 37th Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences (http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.98. 
6150&rep=rep1&type=pdf).  
Governments must 
incentivise an internal work 
work culture in which 
experiments involving 
citizens are common. 
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classification, citizens can be engaged using online tools through 
three levels of e-participation, which reflect the UN’s typology, 
concerning eEnabling (passive level of 
one-way information with accessibility 
and understandability functions), 
eEngaging (active level of two-way 
consultation with top-down direction) 
and eEmpowering (active level of 
advanced two-way participation with 
bottom-up direction). 
The information level (eEnabling) is about a one-way 
relationship in which government produces and delivers 
information for use by citizens. In other words, eEnabling is a 
process of supporting those who would not typically access the 
internet or take advantage of the large amount of available 
information. The objectives we are concerned with are how 
technological tools can be used to reach a wider audience by 
providing a range of technologies for the diverse technical and 
communicative skills of citizens.  
The consultation level eEngaging is about a two-way 
relationship in which citizens provide feedback to government 
during the process of information-sharing. Nowadays governments 
define the issues for consultation, set the questions (also with 
possible variants of answers) and manage the process, while citizens 
are enabled to contribute their views and opinions. This uses 
technology to engage with citizens and consult a wider audience to 
enable deeper contributions and support deliberative debate on 
policy issues.  
The active participation (decision-
making) level is about a relationship based 
on partnership with government in which 
citizens actively engage in defining the 
process and content of policy- and decision-
making. This level constitutes a crucial form 
of e-democracy, when e-society is fully 
enabled to shape social reality through the 
process of e-decision making. It 
acknowledges equal standing for citizens in setting the agenda, 
although the responsibility for the final decision rests with 
Citizens can be engaged 
using online tools through 
three levels of e-
participation: information, 
consultation and active 
participation. 
A crucial form of e-
democracy is based on 
partnership with 
government in which 
citizens engage in defining 
the process and content of 
policy and decision-making. 
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government. eEmpowering citizens is concerned with supporting 
active participation and facilitating ideas to influence the political 
agenda ‘bottom-up’, which is particularly effective for local 
communities and governing bodies. 
4.6 Tools of democratic engagement in the digital era 
E-consultations are an example of such tools; they are 
asynchronous, consultative, and offer provider-to-provider 
communications within a shared electronic record, system or web-
based platform. They are intended to improve access to services 
without the need for a face-to-face visit and constitute a basic- level 
e-tool in democratic and social activity. 
E-petitions are signed online, usually through a form on a 
website or other interactive platform (increasingly through the use 
of mobile apps). Visitors can sign the petition by adding their 
details, but also are able to modify the whole form to the extent 
enabled by the administrator. Typically, when there are enough 
signatories, a letter may be sent to the subject of the petition’s 
signatories, by email or also as an interactively realised web-page or 
mobile app. The online petition may also deliver an email to the 
target of the petition each time the petition is signed, which can at 
the same time be a tool of civic pressure as well as engagement. 
E-deliberations are a form of online enabling technology for 
collaborative decision- and strategy- making by individuals who 
have the expertise or are impacted by the focus of the e-deliberation 
(in the context of its subject, mechanism etc.). It takes deliberation 
online and provides a thinking process and platform to tie it all 
together, creating an interactive ‘brainstorm’ platform for a 
theoretically unlimited group of process leaders and end-users. 
E-budgeting is a process of using ICT applications and digital 
technologies for budgetary functions, procedures, or services across 
the budgetary cycle, such as planning, programming, budgeting, 
appropriations, control, and evaluation of financial resources. E-
budgeting refers to the digitalisation of budgetary and accounting 
procedures. One of the most distinctive features of e-budgeting (and 
e-government in general, which is a more consistent term and 
broader approach to e-budgeting) is that it promotes an active role 
70  CIVTECH: THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN DEMOCRACY & DECISION-MAKING 
 
for citizens and civil society organisations, also in the context of the 
social control and verification of public expenditures. 
Democratic engagement tools can be also applied to elections 
and broader voting processes. E-voting is an election system that 
allows a voter to record his/her secure and secret ballot 
electronically, without personal presence in the polling station. 
Electronic votes are stored digitally in a storage medium such as a 
tape cartridge, diskette, or smart card before being sent to a 
centralised location where tabulation programmes compile and 
tabulate results. Electronic voting can reduce election costs and 
increase civic participation by making the voting process more 
convenient. But this form of voting requires that governments put 
more effort into the protection of 
democracy. It is vital that all new e-tools 
and forms of civil engagement establish 
new safeguards for security of such 
processes, especially in the context of 
hacking, and potential electoral fraud, etc. Critics of e-voting 
maintain that without a paper trail recounts are more difficult and 
electronic ballot manipulation, or even a poorly written 
programming code, could affect election results. Data protection, 
voter secrecy, data storage and personal data archives could be 
under threat, especially in undemocratic countries. 
4.6.1 Examples of tools engaging citizens in the digital era 
Websites monitoring politics involve evaluation and review of the 
policy in action, research evidence and views of users, enabling 
them to go directly to users of services and those at whom the policy 
is aimed to seek their input. Interesting cases of such websites are 
‘TheyWorkForYou’ and ‘Abgeordnetenwatch.de’. 
TheyWorkForYou is a parliamentary monitoring website that 
aims “to make it easier for UK citizens to understand what is going 
on in Westminster as well as Scottish Parliament, the Welsh 
Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly” 
(TheyWorkForYou.com). It also contributes to create accountability 
for UK politicians by publishing a complete archive of every word 
spoken in Parliament, along with a voting record and other details 
for each MP.  
New e-tools and forms of 
civil engagement establish 
new safeguards for security. 
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Abgeordnetenwatch.de is an independent internet platform 
that offers the possibility to publicly consult parliamentarians of 
different parliaments (Abgeordnetenwatch.de.) This website 
enables citizens to get in touch with the deputies of the Bundestag, 
the German members of the European Parliament and the deputies 
of the provincial assemblies. It includes a basic entry on every 
candidate and is free of charge. 
Informal agenda-setting tools are informal policy instruments 
that affect either the content or processes of policy implementation; 
that is, they alter the way goods and services are delivered to the 
public or the manner in which such implementation processes take 
place (STOA Final Report, 2011).  Good examples are the petitions 
system in the House of Representatives in the Netherlands, The 
Finnish Citizens’ Initiative and even the portal ‘Participedia’. 
The House of Representatives in the Netherlands allows 
citizens to submit a petition to a committee of the House of 
Representatives or to the speaker of the House. Petitions to the 
speaker can only be made as part of a national project. Petition 
submissions may be requested via a letter explaining the purpose 
and the organisers of the petition. The House decides whether to 
accept the petition based on this letter. An initiative requires at least 
40,000 signatures by registered voters for the House to consider it. 
The Finnish Citizens’ Initiative aims to increase participatory 
democracy on the national level.  According to the Constitution, 
when 50,000 eligible voters express their support for a certain 
initiative, the Finnish Parliament is obliged to process the initiative 
(see chapter 11). Although it is a so-called agenda initiative, 
meaning that it does not lead to a popular vote, it does influence 
political agenda-setting and is therefore expected to increase 
political inclusion. 
Participedia harnesses the power of collaboration to respond 
to a recent global phenomenon, which is the rapid development of 
experiments in new forms of participatory politics and governance 
around the world. Participedia's research goal is to develop a large 
article and database. It is an experiment with a new and potentially 
powerful way to conduct social science research. All of 
Participedia’s content and data is and will remain free and publicly 
accessible. 
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Formal agenda-setting tools are formal policy instruments, 
that affect either the content or processes of policy implementation; 
that is, which alter the way goods and services are delivered to the 
public or the manner in which such implementation processes take 
place. Examples of such tools can be the process of writing a new 
constitution in Iceland2 (as the process itself), the Slovenian portal 
‘Predlagam’,the  European Citizens` Initiative3, the consultation 
platform ‘Futurium’ and the platform ‘Your Voice in Europe’.  A 
new view on democratic e-tools was also tried out through the 
European Citizens’ Consultation 2009. 
Predlagam.vladi.si is a government-initiated e-participation 
platform with an active interface for petition-type proposals for new 
policy by citizens that can be commented and voted upon. The 
proposals can amend current regulations (Predlagam.vladi.si). 
Futurium is a consultation platform on EU digital policy 
making dedicated to European citizens for discussing EU policies, 
which is a combination of online and offline participation 
instruments (offline meetings such as workshops, public events, 
community meetings, etc., also feed the online discussion and vice 
versa). 
Your Voice in Europe is a public consultation platform on EU 
policy conceived as a policy instrument 
such as e-consultations via the online 
platform or a communication 
instrument with a transformative 
mission aimed at sensitizing 
participants about EU policy issues 
(European Commission 2018).  
A similar project was The 
European Citizens’ Consultation 2009 
(ECC09), which was a participative cross-border deliberative 
                                                        
2 Iceland's 320,000 citizens all had a say in the writing of their new 
constitution. With the help of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Flickr, the 
25-member council drafting the constitution reached out to Icelanders for 
recommendations. Everyone registered with their name and address can 
submit a suggestion which, after being approved by local staff, was passed 
on to the council and became open for discussion online. 
3 See chapter 2 by Sophia Russack. 
The European Citizens’ 
Consultation 2009 was a 
participative cross-border 
deliberative experiment to 
give citizens a platform to 
propose and discuss ideas 
with other EU citizens. 
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experiment to give citizens across Europe a platform to put forth 
and discuss ideas with other EU citizens. The aim of the ECC09 was 
to give EU citizens a voice and allow them input in determining the 
economic and social future of Europe. The main objectives were to 
promote interaction between citizens and policy makers, establish 
citizens as policy advisors, bring the EU closer to its citizens, 
increase public interest in the EU, expand civil society networks 
across the EU, and to develop citizen participation as a policy tool 
for the future. 
Non-binding decision-making tools have been adjusted to 
the internal decision making - or consultation-making activities 
inside of political parties, civil associations and other civic 
organisations. A good example is the Pirate Party of Germany, 
which is making extensive use of new technology to communicate 
and collaborate on the decision-making process within the party 
itself on a national scale, especially during consultation of the 
party`s strategic documents and programmes. Another political 
party in Europe – Italy’s Five Star Movement – is making similar use 
of new technology, including election and voting on representatives 
(e-voting). Finally, the Spanish political party Podemos is making 
increasingly intensive efforts to use digital tools and make internal 
party procedures more decentralised and available to all its 
members. 
Cities like Paris are creating digital platforms designed to 
engage the voting population in decisions on budget allocation of 
pre-selected projects as proposed by the city government. 
Furthermore, in Paris, citizens can participate in the distribution of 
an increasing share of the city's budget by voting on pre-selected 
projects and submit proposals themselves. (European Parliament, 
2014). These are the binding decision making tools. 
More popular examples of binding decision-making tools are 
e-voting procedures. In Switzerland, e-voting includes not only the 
casting of votes in elections and referendums, but also the giving of 
'electronic signatures' for initiatives, referendums and proposals for 
candidates for membership of the National Council. Estonia allows 
citizens to vote electronically in local, national and European 
elections, ten to four days prior to the actual election day in addition 
to the traditional voting method. The German Green Party (a 
political party within the European Parliament) used e-voting even 
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for the selection procedures of the Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 
European Parliament (EP) elections. 
4.7 Cyber security in the age of digital tools in civil 
society – opportunities coupled with challenges 
The safe use of the internet is not a simple task on the level of 
individuals, which is why it will not be a simple task at the level of 
social procedures. There are many different threats on the level of 
e-tools stifling democratic processes and civil participation;  voiding 
all of them requires a lot of diligence, attention and carefully 
thought out actions in advance. Particularly fragile fields of e-
activisation of citizens are security systems in the context of data 
protection and data storage. In an age of cyber-espionage and 
technology hacking, origins of technologies (operating systems, 
security systems and all other software enabling administrating of 
system) should be a case of double checking and deep verification. 
Such responsibility can help avoid unplanned and unconscious data 
spoiling and external interference on these processes. But even 
without external threats, such processes will always be exposed to 
the risk of data loss resulting from technical failure or other random 
events. For this reason, data storage during such processes should 
be developed and prepared for potential risks.  
Cyber security threats coincide also with a much broader 
challenge that is being posed to increasingly digital elections, which 
is foreign interference in electoral systems. The case of the 2016 US 
election showed a massive and sophisticated attempt to influence 
the outcome of the vote, making the most of social media channels. 
Tactics included targeted ads via Facebook and Twitter that carried 
fake news and ‘alternative facts’. Similarly, the Brexit campaign was 
reportedly influenced by cyber hacking and disinformation linked 
to the Russian Federation. The mechanics of the disinformation and 
fake news generation system was provided in the stunning Channel 
4 report on Cambridge Analytica (CA). It was reported that the data 
of over 100 million Facebook users, mostly based in the US, were 
accessed by CA and targeted by malicious ads. BuzzFeed revealed 
that in 2016 US election, the most popular fake news stories reached 
more Facebook users than the most popular news items provided 
by traditional media. Several countries have already responded to 
the fake news threats – Germany has passed a law under which 
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social networks may be fined millions of euro; the British 
government has set up a 'fake news' unit; Italy has introduced an 
online service to report false articles; and a fake news law is being 
discussed in France.   
Conclusions 
The internet and mobile technologies made cooperation and 
communication between government and citizens possible on a 
scale that could not have been envisaged. This specific 
organisational culture has infiltrated government and has 
undermined old procedures driving governments to a new reality 
as simple digitisation of old bureaucratic relationships with citizens 
no longer works.  
The spread of e-technologies, led by social media 
technologies, has had an important effect on the ways in which 
people access and consume information, interact and relate to 
others. The ability to connect with wider communities, and to both 
receive and contribute information are part of these networks. 
Online social networks have enabled users to find and connect with 
other people across the globe, facilitating the development of 
powerful communities of individuals who may have struggled to 
access the same kind and level of peer support and engagement in 
their offline interactions.  
To a similar extent, e-tools are shaping a new form of relations 
between citizens and governments, governing bodies and all types 
of public administration. This irreversible process, with its 
opportunities and potential, also brings also challenges, especially 
in the field of data protection and security of public e-systems.   
Digital tools to track governments’ performance and online 
self-organisation will however not bring a value impact to the 
quality of democracy if it is not supported by citizens’ and netizens’ 
constant, personal involvement in civic and democratic processes in 
the real, not virtual world.  
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5. A NEW NARRATIVE FOR 
EUROPE: WHO WILL LISTEN? 
NIKOLETA VASILEVA & BORISLAV MAVROV 
EU communication policy – or more precisely the lack of it – directly 
affects the present and the future of the Union. A great deal of effort 
has already gone into improving communication with citizens with 
a view to enabling them to understand its functions and policies and 
participate in its political life. However, the EU appears to be failing 
in this endeavour and this is a failure it can ill afford. Relying on 
both quantitative and qualitative research, this chapter analyses 
existing EU communication methods, focusing on the so-called EU 
success stories, and recommends possible improvements by 
providing answers to three questions: what, who, and why? 
Introduction 
This chapter studies past and existing communication approaches, 
mostly at EU level, from different perspectives. It proposes a set of 
effective methods for EU storytelling and a new narrative for 
Europe to encourage political participation of European citizens. 
Existing practice and its effectiveness are explored, using both 
quantitative and qualitative research. The findings are based on two 
surveys, one of Bulgarian citizens and the other of EU 
communication experts. Reference is also made to Eurobarometer 
reports from 2017 and 2018. As an integral part of the analysis, the 
chapter also presents the positions of academics and practitioners in 
different spheres closely linked to EU communication policies. The 
aim is to explore the potential use of existing instruments to solve 
problems and increase turnout in the forthcoming elections so as to 
overcome the EU’s democratic deficit. 
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5.1 Survey methodology 
Two surveys were conducted online from March to April 2018 for 
the purposes of this research.  
The first was answered by more than 100 people in Bulgaria. 
Participants were not selected according to any specific criteria, but 
were instead reached through various means of communication 
such as email, social media and individual approaches. The age of 
the respondents ranged from 18 to over 65, with the majority being 
aged between 18 and 29.  
The second survey was answered by EU communication 
experts from 22 different countries within the European Union. 
Most of the participants work within the Europe Direct Network or 
with MEPs offices and are experts with field experience of 
communicating EU policies on regional, national and European 
levels. Some 56.45% of respondents declared that the citizens they 
most often communicate with are aged between 18 and 29. Experts 
from the following member states took part in the survey: Poland, 
Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Romania, Greece, Spain, Italy, Denmark, 
Germany, Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, France, Belgium, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Malta, 
Latvia and Sweden.  
5.2 Assessment of EU communication strategies 
and their impact on political participation – 
past, present and future 
“Democracy was not part of the original DNA of European 
integration.”1  
The term ‘democratic deficit’ has been increasingly used in 
recent years. It implies how the European Union’s complexity and 
its decision-making processes distance it from the ordinary citizen 
and end up leading to a deficiency in participatory democracy. This 
issue has been discussed on numerous occasions by authors and 
politicians alike, but a solution has yet to be found. Is it the unusual 
                                                        
1 J.H.H. Weiler (2011), “The political and legal culture of European 
integration: An exploratory essay”, International Journal of Constitutional 
Law, 9(3-4): 678-694 at 694. 
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character of the EU that simply does not correspond to the usual 
methods of analysis? Is it its ever-changing nature that makes it 
hard to keep up with? Or is it the inability of European leaders to 
bring about the changes that their voters seek? Greater efforts and 
new approaches are clearly needed. 
In 2011, Joseph Weiler presented his position on the matter, 
contending that Europe is at a great nadir, which the Treaty of 
Lisbon did not redress. Election turnout in 2004, before the Treaty 
of Lisbon, was 45.47% (in 25 member states), but in 2009 and 2014 
the percentages were even lower. This is not, however, a recent 
phenomenon: the turnout in 1979 was 62% and has been decreasing 
ever since. What is perhaps surprising is that the changes 
introduced by Lisbon to improve participatory democracy failed to 
encourage more citizens to exercise their right to vote in European 
Parliament elections.   
Perhaps the EU’s top-down communication is at fault. But if 
it is failing, it is not for lack of trying to improve it. Since 2012 for 
example, the European Commission has aimed to engage citizens in 
debates regarding the Future of Europe, along with the ‘New 
Narrative for Europe’ initiative that initially originated in the 
European Parliament.2 Its work included meetings between 
political leaders and civil society to develop ways to describe 
European ideals to generations that have not known war. The 
ultimate purpose of this initiative was to address the growing 
dissatisfaction among EU citizens and their growing sense of 
disconnection by exploring means for the EU to reconnect with 
people and assume a leadership role. In 2013, Commission 
President Barroso explained that it is for the new generation that 
does not identify with the peace narrative that ‘the story of Europe’ 
must be told again and again. He compared the latter with a book 
and stated: 
                                                        
2 While the administrative implementation of the project was carried out 
by the European Commission, the idea for “a new narrative for Europe” 
was originally presented in 2012 by MEP Morten Løkkegaard who 
succeeded in amending the budget to fund pilot actions in this direction. 
Later on, President Barroso’s “substantive interest” in the project led to its 
subsequent development, as described by Wolfram Kaiser in 2015.  
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It cannot only stay in the first pages, even if the first pages 
were extremely beautiful. We have to continue our 
narrative, continue to write the book of the present and of 
the future. This is why we need a new narrative for Europe. 
But does this approach take into account all the paths that have led 
to the current identity crisis? As Umberto Eco said, “It’s culture, not 
war that cements European identity”.3 The Barroso narrative sought 
to present European integration and institutions as an integral part 
of the cultural history of the continent by turning events into stories. 
However, the focus on cheap flights, mobile roaming and even on 
Erasmus+ was considered inadequate by many. The problems 
Europeans are faced with today include “unemployment, 
uncertainty and in many cases growing inequality … coupled with 
a lack of understanding” and simply could not be addressed by the 
transparent political campaigning attitude of the EU, which led to 
this initiative being either criticised or simply never heard of.  
Later, in the autumn of 2017, the European Parliament once 
again pointed out the need to take action and to develop a 
comprehensive strategy. It agreed on a note urging that a better-
armed Union address people’s concerns in the context of the 
forthcoming elections.  
The focus was put on storytelling – a powerful tool for 
highlighting the Europe Europeans may want (or the EU wants to 
parade before Europeans). But the stories are of little value if there 
is no one listening to them.  
It is therefore important to hear first-hand what citizens think 
about the EU. Happily, among more than 100 Bulgarians asked 
whether they think the country has benefited from its membership 
in the EU, 73.64% answered “yes”. However, only one third are of 
the opinion that they are sufficiently well-informed to actually vote 
in European elections as opposed to the 16.36% who feel the same 
way about national elections. This shows that people’s decision to 
vote is directly affected by the amount of information they think 
they have, and that they feel far less familiar with EU affairs – 
possibly because they seem too far removed. 
                                                        
3 G. Riotta (2012), “Interview with Umberto Eco”, La Stampa, 26 January 
(www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/26/umberto-eco-culture-war-
europa). 
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When respondents were asked about which EU areas they 
would like to learn more, one of the most curious answers read “the 
actions the EU plans to take in order to escape the deep existential 
crisis it is currently in the middle of” – speaking directly to the truth 
of the identity crisis of European citizens. While over 66% of 
respondents confirmed that they have personally benefited from 
their country’s EU membership, this is still no proof of a 
successfully developing collective identity comprised of mutual 
values and respect and shared by all European nations. When asked 
whether their vote matters, one of the answers included the 
discouraging contention that “nowadays, politics is not what it’s 
supposed to be – it’s robbing the people, no matter who you vote 
for”. Another important idea stands out here – that citizens fail to 
distinguish between national and European politics and they often 
blame the latter as they do not quite understand it.  
Experts working for the Europe Direct network or engaged 
with the work of MEPs also commented on what stories need to be 
told. In their experience throughout Europe, news about 
immigration, Schengen and Erasmus are examples of information 
that easily reaches a wide audience (see the tag cloud results of one 
of the questions below).  
Figure 5.1 A tag cloud depicting the answer to the question “Name at 
least one ‘success story’ that easily reached a wide audience”  
 
 
Other interesting examples from the data gathered include “the 
possibility for smaller regions and municipalities to access free Wi-
Fi” and “attempts at taxation for multinational corporations”.  
The experts also commented on the type of negative news that 
attracts attention. They all agree on one thing – fake news is an issue. 
Multiple examples were provided in this regard. A disturbing 
message from Poland read that “this is information that the EU 
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cannot control with the rule of law – the meaning of European 
values and of Article 7 should be clarified”. Equally worrying 
examples include “the EU wants to ban traditional Bulgarian food 
products” and “the EU forbids children’s books”. But when asked 
what is generally considered to be the greatest failure of the EU, 
almost 55% answered “terrorism and immigration”. Hence, this is 
definitely something that attracts attention – so it should be taken 
advantage of in the most advantageous way possible. 
Figure 5.2 A tag cloud depicting the answer to the question “Name at 
least one piece of fake or criticising EU news that easily reached a wide 
audience” 
 
 
The experts shared their opinion regarding the ways of communica-
ting these stories. According to them, media coverage and regular 
events are what can really contribute to improving the image of the 
EU and more importantly the citizens’ understanding of it. 
Figure 5.3 Answers to the question “What could help to reach more 
citizens when communicating EU stories?” 
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The survey also addressed the question of whether particular 
instruments can prove successful. While they obtain wide approval, 
online methods and social media tools are very limited, albeit 
powerful. They do not reach the majority of citizens and operate in 
an environment abundant in information and, unfortunately, fake 
news and propaganda. On the other hand, informal education was 
considered one of the most successful means of communicating the 
EU. While in terms of quantity its impact can also be limited, it does 
lead to significant and long-term results. Successful examples are 
the ‘Team Europe’ and ‘Team Europe Junior’ members in certain 
states. In particular, ‘Team Europe Junior’, an innovative pilot 
initiative by the Representation of the European Commission in 
Bulgaria, brings together a team of students who have the will, 
motivation and knowledge to participate as speakers in the 
communication activities of the Representation and of the Europe 
Direct information network in Bulgaria. This is a project where 
people communicate the EU themselves – clearly the shortest route 
to creating a citizens’ union. 
Figure 5.4 Answers to the question “What instruments in particular 
usually prove successful when communicating the EU?” 
 
 
One of the key objectives of this survey was to analyse the 
connection between the topics discussed and people’s actual 
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willingness to vote in European Parliament elections. When asked 
about the issues that influence voters, nearly 60% answered with 
“regional investment and development”, followed by “security and 
defence” and “economy and energy policy”. This points to two 
things: first, security is crucial to people (including financial); 
second, people look for the EU not in Brussels, but in their backyard. 
This is where they want to see a clear difference between member 
and non-members. They want to see the EU close to home – and this 
is indeed what the European idea was originally about.  
The EU has been making efforts to better communicate its 
image and its character. And it is the duty of ‘euro optimists’ to offer 
a critical appraisal of what has been done so far, when it has worked 
or failed and, most importantly, why. The experts interviewed 
shared their thoughts on EU storytelling and particularly on the 
following issues: the way the EU is spoken of (promotion versus 
criticism), the language that is used, the content of the stories, the 
target audience, the channels and the balance between EU and 
member-state stories. 
First, the way the EU is spoken of in general: the consensus 
was that the EU should be criticised, even if the self-criticism the EU 
opts for should be based on thorough argumentation, frank analysis 
of problematic areas and referral to its core values. With daily 
battles between optimists and sceptics, the best strategy might be to 
only emphasise the good. But treating 
the European project as a product that 
needs to be advertised opens the way 
for sceptics to emphasise its flaws and 
gives rise to a louder response from 
populists, who build on the lack of 
criticism to gain even more support. In 
this regard, Prof. Antony Galabov, a 
leading Bulgarian political scientist and sociologist, says 
Populism is a countercultural phenomenon. It needs an 
official policy to stand against and if it gets engaged in a 
dialogue – it dies. Even the most vociferous populists 
prefer yelling with a megaphone to maintaining a 
conversation because it involves a question to which they 
have no answer – how to solve the problem. 
Populism is a countercultural 
phenomenon. It needs an 
official policy to stand against 
and if it gets engaged in a 
dialogue – it dies. 
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He states that European leaders must admit when there is a problem 
while also pointing out that it is shared across Europe and that 
Europeans must work together to solve it.  
He further suggests that EU officials must not seek to avoid 
two topics – migration policy and Schengen: “The Dublin 
Regulations and the Schengen agreement need to be renegotiated – 
even as a package. Citizens need to know who, how and why gets 
into the EU.” Openly speaking of this issue would let people see that 
their safety and security are a priority and prevent populists from 
building on anti-immigration propaganda or islamophobia: “Islam 
is part of the history of Europe. This is a very important message 
that the EU must make sure to send.” 
Prof. Ingrid Shikova, a renowned specialist in EU policies, 
also shares the opinion that leaders must be careful not to speak of 
the EU in ways that resemble propaganda: “This is something that 
political candidates do and that may be one of the reasons why 
people are disappointed with the EU in the end – promises are made 
that can’t be kept.”  
Dr. Ralitsa Kovacheva, an experienced journalist and 
assistant professor at Sofia University, makes an interesting 
observation: “The EU is trying to sell itself as if it were a diet soft 
drink. This makes people see it as something plain and hollow.” She 
also links this to Brexit and criticises EU media coverage. She 
contends that political confrontations far removed from the EU’s 
normal comfort zone are needed to make European affairs more 
visible and engaging. 
People in the UK might not like the EU, but they have 
deeply internalised it. They fight over something EU-
related on a daily basis – not only when elections are 
coming. This is why the politically correct anti-Brexit 
campaign did not succeed. This is why Brexit happened. 
The language used for EU storytelling is also of crucial importance. 
If the goal is for the EU to be better understood through shedding 
more light on integration processes instead of adding to the 
widespread confusion, Brussels jargon is hardly the right way to 
reach the average citizen. At the same time, it is essential that they 
understand how the institutions function, how decisions are taken 
and how they concern everyone. There should be a strong emotional 
bond between the Union and its citizens, who now perceive its 
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institutions as boring and its language as encoded in impenetrable 
jargon. This is also a flaw of the ‘citizens’ dialogues’. Experts do not 
agree on their usefulness. While it is undeniably important to make 
sure people feel that their voice can be heard and that the notion of 
Brussels is not all that far away, it is a challenge for the dialogues to 
achieve any great success or go a significant way towards filling the 
existing communication gap. Addressing different target audiences 
with almost identical messages (and speakers) undermines the 
effectiveness of this device and limits its expected impact at local 
and national level.   
Prof. Shikova regularly meets with the public to discuss EU 
matters and she strongly advocates using simple words and being 
honest with people, because that is what people appreciate. She 
shared an amusing example of using Bulgarian cities that caught 
people’s attention after they got confused with terms such as 
‘cohesion’ or ‘two-speed Europe’: 
I told them that the European idea is like travelling from 
Sofia to Plovdiv.4 Some drive a sports car, others drive a 
Trabant. The important thing is that we are all going to 
Plovdiv. Maybe some of us will get there an hour early. 
Maybe the sports car will tow the Trabant. But the real 
problem comes if someone changes direction. We must all 
keep our arrangement. 
The most essential ingredient of storytelling is, of course, the stories 
themselves. The Commission rightfully recommends to institutions 
and journalists to make Europe seem more human so that citizens 
understand how the EU is part of their lives. This is most likely the 
right way – letting people do the actual talking. Regarding the 
content of the stories, Prof. Shikova emphasises the importance of 
instances that show everything is possible – such as the small 
Bulgarian village of Chavdar, also called ‘the European village’ that 
has benefited very noticeably from European funds, “making it a 
little piece of heaven”. “People need to know that the EU is not 
concerned only with Erasmus+, roaming charges and easy 
travelling. They need to know that if they are active enough, the EU 
might come to their village.” 
                                                        
4 Sofia and Plovdiv are the two biggest cities in Bulgaria. 
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The idea is to reach all groups of citizens. Recent data shows 
that 75% of European citizens have a positive image of the EU. 
Nevertheless, efforts should not necessarily be focused on the other 
25%. Instead, optimists and sceptics alike should be included if a 
sustainable outcome is sought when communicating the EU. While 
Erasmus+ is undoubtedly one of the most successful initiatives the 
EU has ever undertaken, it cannot be endlessly counted upon to 
burnish the EU’s image. Some experts maintain that the focus 
should not be on young people, but rather on middle-aged working 
and active voters who are interested in business opportunities, 
regional development and healthcare, for example. Moreover, this 
group is capable of influencing both the young and the elderly, 
leading to successful intergroup communication to the advantage of 
the EU. Others think the focus should indeed be on the young. Prof. 
Shikova in particular has always been keen on working with young 
people: “What you sow now might not grow during the next 
elections or the ones after them. But it will grow and there will be 
fruit.” She shared an extremely successful initiative she started that 
involved students visiting regional elder activist clubs to talk about 
the EU. In the end, every group should feel heard and whoever 
stands before the public should be ready with a key message for 
everyone. 
The channels used also determine who will be reached. It is 
crucial that EU affairs receive regular media coverage even if there 
is no specific occasion. A video of Jürgen Klopp, the current 
manager of Premier League club Liverpool, went viral recently. In 
a short but influential interview he speaks about the European idea 
and the implications of Brexit: “The EU is not perfect, was not 
perfect, will not be perfect. But it’s the best idea we’ve had so far.” 
Nonetheless, online coverage should not be to the detriment 
of traditional media. Not everyone is on Facebook or Twitter, nor 
does everyone follow the online accounts of EU institutions. Most 
people do not actively seek information and are entirely dependent 
on the news they receive. It is TV and radio coverage that can 
influence millions of people from all groups at once and to an extent 
that even the audience itself does not realise. Citizens from all 
member states voted in favour of traditional media in response to 
the question of which channels should be trusted. Radio, television 
and printed issues were preferred to online newspapers and 
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magazines. At the same time, more than one third of voters 
admitted that they do encounter fake news (almost) every day and 
consider that journalists have the responsibility to stop the spread 
of fake news. However, the EU has the responsibility to work with 
journalists in order to actually achieve this goal. 
Figure 5.5 Answers to the question “How much do you trust or not the 
news and information you access through…” 
 
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 464, February 2018. 
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Storytelling is also a way to draw the line between what is national 
and what is European. It is not that upholding European identity 
has become any less important for the success of the Union. On the 
contrary, Europe is a responsibility, moral and political, and must 
be shared among all Europeans. In Dr. Kovacheva’s words: “It’s not 
the EU that should talk – it’s the national politicians.” All the experts 
are unanimous on this matter, emphasising the impact that 
politicians have on the image of the EU and the way it is perceived 
by the people.  
Many citizens think of the Union as a source of funding, but 
this is far from being a universal perception or one that unites. The 
‘European charity’ notion is one of the fundamentally toxic but 
sadly widespread perceptions of the EU. This is disastrous on 
numerous levels – starting from the fact that the EU becomes the 
usual suspect to blame for certain failures of national governments, 
leading to the point where crucial elements for the survival of the 
European idea such as culture, identity and unity are completely 
overlooked.  
What is more, few citizens can tell for what the EU is 
responsible and what depends entirely on the member state itself. 
Knowing the difference could significantly influence attitudes 
towards the European Parliament elections: first, people would 
understand better that the Union is not a magic wand that can wave 
away national problems; second, people would appreciate the areas 
to which the EU has contributed, the ways in which it did, and 
especially those where only the EU could make that contribution. 
Recent data reaffirms that the areas that challenge governments the 
most are the ones in which the EU does not have competence to act. 
As pointed out by Prof. Galabov, the things citizens in countries like 
Bulgaria mostly complain about such as healthcare, education or 
salaries are almost always something the EU cannot help with – but 
something for which it stands accused of not improving. In line with 
this, the most positive results can be found in areas where the EU 
exercises exclusive competence. These are the kind of contemporary 
challenges that new narratives should focus on to help the EU 
reconnect with Europeans.  
The identity crisis has brought about the misconception that 
the EU is something we are only supposed to benefit from. Prof. 
Shikova is often asked the sceptical question “What did Bulgaria get 
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out of joining the EU?”, to which she always answers “Bulgaria got 
a chair and a microphone.” It is precisely this opportunity for a voice 
and the responsibility of member states to raise it that citizens 
usually forget when considering the pros of being part of the EU. 
They should, however, be regularly informed about the actual areas 
in which the EU has a say and which aspects are purely national 
problems, where the EU is not to blame.  
While the national perspective and its correlated interests 
cannot be avoided, what can be achieved is to present supranational 
values through this national perspective. This is why it is essential 
to always refer back to the bigger picture, especially when it comes 
to Eastern European countries. Today’s generation should be 
reminded not only of wars, but also of the basic rights, freedoms 
and privileges that can only now be enjoyed – not because they are 
all the EU is about, but because they were unthinkable just a few 
decades ago.  
It is therefore critical for pro-European political parties to 
conduct their campaigns accordingly and to have the courage to 
condemn all factors leading to disintegration, as maintained by 
Prof. Plamen Pantev, a leading expert in the theory of international 
relations.  
Conclusions 
The three questions with regard to today’s new narrative – what, 
who and how? – have been answered on the basis of these findings. 
Taken together these answers could pave the way towards more 
direct democracy and provide some of the tools citizens should 
understand and use in order to encourage their political 
participation.  
The ‘what’ is concerned with the stories themselves. They 
should convey the message of sustainable benefits connected with 
the EU and its core values. While everyday examples can be 
communicated more easily, they should still be seen as part of the 
bigger picture and as only being possible through European unity. 
Topics such as terrorism and migration, which are undoubtedly of 
key importance to citizens, must be communicated by the EU on a 
daily basis. The comparison between what was then and what is 
now should also be included as it highlights the great efforts made 
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along the road to achieve the present-day EU. At the same time such 
generation gaps that remain unaddressed are something 
Eurosceptics use for their benefit. All of this should be channelled 
into calls for political participation as the only way that positive 
change is possible.  
The ‘who’ relates to the actors who could impact the 
narrative. Reconsidering the leading role of traditional media is 
necessary. Although the current efforts put into online tools have 
proved successful, they should remain a subsidiary means of 
storytelling so as not to further reinforce 
the Brussels bubble. The EU needs to 
reconnect properly and actively with all 
its citizens, especially the middle-aged 
who are in the position of influencing 
other groups but often do not really 
benefit from globalisation. Audiences 
should be thoroughly analysed and 
every EU speaker has to be prepared to 
properly address the concerns of 
different groups. In this regard, there should only be 
complementary reliance on ‘citizens’ dialogues’. Most importantly, 
young people should be educated from a young age to realise that 
they have the responsibility to engage politically, even if they are 
the most pro-EU generation so far. Political participation can be 
improved if these unprecedentedly educated and ‘euro-optimistic’ 
young people are also taught how they are supposed to exercise – 
and not only enjoy – their much-appreciated rights.  
The ‘how’ represents the final recommendations in this paper 
and the manner in which successful storytelling could potentially 
take place. EU politicians should be 
visionaries who look beyond short-term 
political campaigns and accept measured 
risks by openly speaking about the failures 
of the Union in order to secure people’s 
long-term trust. Identifying the real 
problems while working on longstanding 
reforms is crucial for disarming populists. 
National politicians themselves should be 
the ones translating, if necessary, EU 
The EU needs to reconnect 
properly and actively with 
all its citizens, especially the 
middle-aged who are in the 
position of influencing other 
groups but often do not 
really benefit from 
globalisation. 
EU politicians should be 
visionaries who look beyond 
short-term political 
campaigns and accept 
measured risks by speaking 
about the failures of the 
Union in order to secure 
people’s long-term trust. 
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policies to their people and supporting 
them. It is not about blindly following 
the EU, but about clearly distinguishing 
the interests at hand and forcefully 
underlining how interconnected they 
are.  
All Europeans should understand three fundamental 
messages – what is good for the nation, what is good for the EU and 
why they must stand together to succeed. This is why they should 
be actively encouraged to make use of the existing direct democracy 
tools and to work towards the Union they want – towards a citizen’s 
Union.  
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6. CIVIL SOCIETY IN EU  
DECISION-MAKING: A LATVIAN 
CASE STUDY 
RASMUSS FILIPS GEKS 
The capacity of civil society organisations (CSOs) to engage with EU 
decision-making is vital to effective democratic participation in the 
member states. This chapter assesses the activities of CSOs in Latvia 
and their use of EU-level participation methods. While CSOs are 
generally informed about the methods available, most fail to use 
them extensively. CSOs lack the resources to be effective, and 
previously inconsequential efforts or poorly designed methods can 
deter further participation. Taking part in expert groups and 
transnational cooperation are viewed as effective methods of 
participation, while public hearings and online debating tools are 
seen as ineffective. Participation rates and quality can be boosted by 
improving local-level engagement with MEPs, focusing on low-cost 
and low-effort methods, simplifying the design of public 
consultations, and offering financial incentives to smaller CSOs. 
Introduction 
Democratic engagement in decision-making is an important part of 
participatory democracy. CSOs often serve as the main 
intermediaries between citizens and decision-makers; their function 
is to give citizens a voice by bringing the plurality of interests to the 
attention of decision-makers. Nowhere is this more important than 
in the EU, where institutional structures and procedures can impose 
considerable limits on representation, which means that additional 
attention must be paid to the accountability of decisions that are 
made by the institutions (Kohler-Koch & Quittkat, 2013). 
As such, consultations with external experts and interest 
groups on various legislative proposals are an important tradition 
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in various EU institutions. For the EC, this regime has evolved 
significantly over time, initially including only large trade unions 
and federations of associations, yet later expanding to create a more 
consistent dialogue with various European partners all along the 
policy chain (Lironi & Peta, 2017). The main principles of EU 
consultations are defined in the 2015 
‘Better Regulation Guidelines’ and its 
accompanying toolbox ‘Stakeholder 
Consultation Tools’, which include 
various opportunities for CSOs to be a 
part of the consultation process.  
Yet research on CSO engagement 
in EU decision-making often revolves 
around interest groups that are active 
only at the transnational level.1 Less 
attention is paid to national level 
organisations and the tools of 
participation that are available to them, especially in smaller 
member states (MS).  
This chapter first surveys the extent to which Latvian CSOs 
are aware of and use the methods that are available for participation 
at EU level. Then it examines the perspective of Latvian CSOs 
regarding the effectiveness of these tools, to better understand how 
engagement between CSOs in various countries and EU 
policymakers can be boosted. 
6.1 Characteristics of CSOs in Latvia 
Latvian legislation provides for two types of non-governmental 
legal structure: associations and foundations. Both organisation 
types have non-profit goals; the main differences between them 
relate to the institutional structure and functions of the 
organisations. Foundations focus on the redistribution of either 
property or funding provided by founders, while associations 
mostly deal with interest representation (Frīdenberga, 2001). 
Further legal provisions allow organisations to be classified as 
‘public benefit organisations’, assuming that their activities fulfil 
                                                        
1 For example, see Klüver (2013). 
Research on CSO engagement 
in EU decision-making often 
revolves around interest 
groups that are active only at 
the transnational level.  Less 
attention is paid to national 
level organisations and the 
tools of participation that are 
available to them, especially 
in smaller member states 
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certain public benefit functions specified in the law.2 This allows 
organisations to receive additional benefits, such as provisions for 
tax discounts. We refer to all of these organisations as CSOs in this 
chapter.  
The most detailed assessment of CSOs activities in Latvia is 
carried out by the association ‘Civic Alliance – Latvia’, which is an 
umbrella organisation representing the overall interests of civil 
society. In 2015 the total number of CSOs was around 20,000, and 
an average of 1,500 new organisations have been registered 
annually since 2008. Of these, around 30.4% worked on a city or 
municipal scale, 10.9% worked regionally, 38.6% nationally and 
12.5% on an international scale.  
Most organisations focus on advocacy (13.5% of all CSOs), 
education (12.9%) and community development (11%), while other 
areas of work include leisure activities (10.4%), social services 
(9.2%), as well as culture and art (7.4%). Around 5.5% of CSOs 
represent professional associations (Civil Alliance – Latvia, 2016). 
6.1.1 CSOs membership and participation in the 
legislative process 
The trend seems to indicate that the overall involvement of 
individuals in CSOs is increasing. In 2015, around 35% of Latvians 
confirmed in a survey that they had been involved in some public 
group organisation over the previous three years, which is slightly 
more than in previous years. Despite this, activism in CSOs in Latvia 
is generally viewed as moderate – only around 5% of the population 
are members of associations, and around 15% engage in interest 
groups and volunteer activities. Furthermore, only around 14% of 
the population think that they can meaningfully influence the 
decision-making process in Latvia, which is why the ability of CSOs 
to create real impact through their activities is so important (Civil 
Alliance – Latvia, 2016). 
The main means of cooperation between CSOs and 
policymakers include participation of representatives from CSOs in 
i) development of policy planning documents and legislation; ii) 
supervision of EU structural funds; iii) participation in working 
                                                        
2 Detailed explanation for requirements and benefits of the status is 
available at State Revenue Service (2015).  
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groups, either in ministries or Parliament; iv) ad hoc consultations 
regarding key issues in specific areas; v) research into economic or 
other social issues; vi) educational events; and vii) provision of 
services and delegation of tasks to the CSOs (Civil Alliance – Latvia, 
2016). 
Research into the capacity of CSOs in Latvia overwhelmingly 
concludes that most lack the capacity and expertise to successfully 
influence decision-making. It highlights the prominence of a few 
organisations with a reputation for active and successful advocacy, 
and a lack of access and interest on the part of smaller CSOs. 
Nevertheless, in a recent comparative assessment on the quality of 
access for CSOs in the EU, Latvia scored significantly above 
average, indicating that the environment for social dialogue is 
generally favourable (Alksne, 2014). 
6.1.2 Research on Latvian CSOs and EU-level 
participation 
Some research has specifically explored the involvement of Latvian 
CSOs in advocacy on an EU-level. A survey of Latvian CSOs in 2013 
concluded that CSOs mostly focus on national-level policymaking 
and choose to focus on advocacy in national organisations and 
institutions. Direct methods of interest representation, such as 
written communication, are used most often. When engaging in 
advocacy on an EU level, the survey suggests that Latvian CSOs 
seem to focus on the European Commission and European 
Parliament, with most of the actual advocacy done through the 
national representations of these institutions. Active advocacy in 
Brussels seems to be rare, as only 2-3% of organisations have any 
experience of this. Similarly, the research concluded that 
professional associations tend to be more active in Brussels than 
other types of social CSOs (Rūse, 2013). 
Additional research has explored the extent to which Latvian 
CSOs are able to engage in shaping Latvia’s national position on EU 
policy proposals. It concluded that the Latvian legislation overall 
provides good opportunities to influence national positions, but 
CSOs themselves often lack the skills and experience to 
meaningfully influence the national position in the short time frame 
during which they must give feedback to the draft national 
positions (PROVIDUS, 2014). 
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6.2 Survey methodology 
6.2.1 Opportunities for participation on an EU level 
We identified ten main ways in which organisations in Latvia might 
have had an opportunity to be involved in the discussion of EU 
issues and EU-level policymaking. These methods are: 
1) Public consultations with the EC online. These include 
surveys and questionnaires published by the European 
Commission and often promoted by the representative 
national organisation, in which the Commission seeks the 
views of citizens and stakeholders on proposed policy and 
legislation. As of August 2018, 486 such public consultations 
have been organised by the EC.3 
2) Participation in expert groups of the EC. These include 
expert groups and similar entities that assist the Commission 
in the preparation of legislative and policy initiatives, 
delegated acts, and the implementation of EU legislation, its 
coordination and cooperation with relevant stakeholders.4 
Experts from organisations tend to be invited to these groups. 
3) Consultations by the European Economic and Social Affairs 
Committee (EESC). As an independent consultative body of 
the EU, the EESC can also take up the role of facilitating the 
consultation process between the EC and civil society. One of 
its main functions is specifically giving a voice to workers’ 
and employers’ organisations, and other interest groups.5 
4) European Citizens’ Initiative. This is a specific participatory 
democracy instrument that allows citizens to propose 
concrete legislation in any field where the EC has a 
competence. Launching an initiative currently requires seven 
                                                        
3 For additional information on the method, see EC (2018), “Consultations”. 
4 For additional information on the method, see EC (2018), “Registration of 
Commission Expert Groups”. 
5 For example, see EESC (2018). 
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EU citizens in seven MS and one million signatures before the 
EC can decide to take action.6 
5) Citizens’ dialogues in member states organised by the EC. 
These are public events organised in a specific member state, 
which often include the participation of either the relevant 
Commissioner or another high-ranking EU official.7 
6) Consultations with EU institutions or politicians in 
cooperation with umbrella organisations. These include 
events or consultations that are facilitated specifically by 
transnational organisations that represent a specific interest 
group or a poll of organisations from various MS.  
7) ‘Debating Europe’ or other online discussion platforms on 
global EU issues. This platform offers an opportunity for 
citizens to engage in or initiate discussions on various global 
issues relevant for the EU. The platform aims to involve high-
level EU officials in the discussions (Cmeciu, C., & Doina 
Cmeciu, 2014). 
8) Public hearings organised by the EP Committees. EP 
committees can organise hearings that include experts on 
aspects that are essential to their work on a particular subject. 
Most committees organise such hearings regularly, since they 
allow MEPs to hear expert opinions and hold discussions on 
key policy issues.8  
9) Public consultations organised by Latvian MEPs on specific 
EP policy initiatives. These include either public or private 
meetings with MEPs, during which EU policy initiatives are 
discussed. 
10) Participation in shaping Latvian national positions on EU 
policy proposals. This is usually done either by consulting 
ministries or the European Affairs Committee of the national 
parliament. Latvian legislation requires the responsible 
ministries to inform CSOs about the start of the national 
                                                        
6 For additional information on the method, see EC (2018), “The European 
Citizens’ Initative. Basic Facts”. 
7 For additional information on the method, see EC (2018), “Citizens’ 
Dialogues”. 
8 For additional information on the method, see EP (2018), “Hearings”. 
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policy development process and how they can engage in 
working out a national position. In most cases, organisations 
participate either by submitting written comments or by 
taking part in working groups and meetings. The most 
important positions are submitted to the European Affairs 
Committee of the parliament, which is generally open to 
participation by CSOs (PROVIDUS, 2014). 
6.2.2 Survey design 
For the purpose of this survey, organisations were provided with a 
list of the methods identified previously. In the first part of the 
survey, participants were asked to 
identify whether they were familiar 
with each of the methods, and whether 
they considered the method to be an 
effective or an ineffective form of 
engagement. In the second part, 
organisations were asked to identify the methods they had used 
before and to say whether the method they used was effective or 
ineffective. Lastly, organisations were asked to comment on the 
most and least effective methods of participation based on their 
experience. The survey was conducted during June-August of 2018; 
a full list of questions is available in Annex 2. 
The results of this survey have some important limitations. 
First, the survey was voluntary therefore the organisations that 
chose to fill it in did not constitute a perfectly representative sample 
of CSOs in Latvia. Second, while this report refers to the opinion 
and experience of organisations, it is necessarily limited by the 
expertise and experience of the individuals providing answers on 
behalf of the organisations. Nonetheless, the survey is an 
opportunity to examine the perspective of a diverse range of CSOs 
and offers valuable insights into the overall CSOs sector in Latvia 
and its perspective on democratic participation on an EU level.  
6.2.3 Profile of the survey participants 
More than 200 active organisations that had contact details or social 
media pages were invited to participate in the survey; 46 
organisations responded. Eighteen main activity areas were 
For the purpose of this 
survey, organisations were 
provided with a list of the 
methods identified previously 
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identified, with most organisations working in healthcare, social 
issues, development, business interests, education, civil society, 
social services and technology.  
The organisations’ membership is quite evenly distributed, 
yet most organisations have only a small number of employees. 
Around 24% of organisations represent up to ten member (either 
legal entities or individuals), 26% represent between ten and 50 
members, 19.6% represent between 50 and 100 and 30.4% represent 
more than 100 members. As for the capacity of these organisations, 
63% employ between one and five full or part-time employees, 
while 13% employ between five and ten and 22% employ more than 
ten.  
The organisations were also 
profiled on their policymaking 
activities. A majority expressed a keen 
interest in advocacy to influence 
national policy, but only a few were 
actively involved with advocacy on an 
EU-level. About 45% considered it to 
be either their main or one of the main 
functions of the organisation, while 37% tended to be involved and 
around 17% are barely involved or not involved in policymaking at 
all. Regarding EU-level policymaking, a clear majority was either 
never involved (28%) or hardly ever involved (48%). Only a few said 
they were often involved (9%) or considered it to be one of the key 
functions of the organisation (15%).  
Despite this, when enquiring about general interest to 
participate on an EU level, most organisations expressed some 
interest. Some 32% were slightly interested, 30% were interested 
and 24% expressed great interest in being involved in discussions 
on EU issues and EU policymaking. Additionally, 63% of all 
organisations were also members of transnational organisations 
that operate on an EU level. This suggests that despite a lack of 
activism, most organisations have an interest in increasing their 
activities on an EU level.9 
                                                        
9 Full profile of the organisations is available in Annex 1. 
A majority expressed a keen 
interest in advocacy to 
influence national policy, 
but only a few were actively 
involved with advocacy on 
an EU-level. 
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6.3 Survey results 
6.3.1 Knowledge and experience of using the methods 
Figure 6.1 Latvian CSOs experience of EU-level participation methods 
 
When evaluating overall knowledge of participatory methods, 
participation in expert groups, public consultations with the EC and 
in shaping national policies seemed to be the most recognised 
methods (Figure 6.1). Consultations with umbrella organisations, 
ECI and public consultations with MEPs all seemed to be known by 
around 60% of organisations, while the least recognised methods 
were public hearings, consultations with the EESC, Citizens’ 
dialogues and the ‘Debating Europe’ platform. 
Experience of using these methods varied. Generally, 
organisations had the most experience in shaping national policies, 
participation in expert groups, and consultations with EU 
institutions in cooperation with umbrella organisations. While most 
CSOs had heard of public consultations, only about 30% had 
actually used them. Organisations responding to this question 
remarked that public consultations usually involved long and 
complicated questionnaires that discouraged participation. A 
similar gap between knowledge and experience seemed to exist for 
public EP hearings, the ECI, and consultations with MEPs. 
When commenting on why organisations did not use the 
available methods, most respondents referred to the capacity and 
financing that was available to them; a lack of information on how 
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to participate; or the organisation’s specific focus on national rather 
than EU-level politics. Organisations tended to view this type of 
participation as resource heavy and did not see that activism or 
participation would necessarily result in any tangible benefits. 
Other comments referred to the disproportionate influence of larger 
member states; the fact that EU-level participation is mostly 
conducted through umbrella organisations or that their efforts to 
contact Latvian MEPs for assistance had been dismissed.   
There is also a marked difference between the levels of 
knowledge and an active use of participatory methods for most 
CSOs (Figure 6.2). While about 40% of organisations were barely 
informed or knew about three or fewer methods, another 40% were 
well informed and knew of eight or more methods of participation. 
Yet most organisations were also very inactive – two-thirds only 
had experience of using three or fewer methods, and less than one-
fifth had experience of using more than eight methods. The average 
CSO knew five and had experience of two methods of EU-level 
participation.10 
Figure 6.2 Level of involvement among Latvian CSOs 
 
                                                        
10 Median for the participations of the survey. 
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6.3.2 Effectiveness of methods 
Figure 6.3 Latvian CSOs: effectiveness of various methods of EU-level 
participation 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Latvian CSOs: ineffectiveness of various methods of EU-level 
participation 
 
 
Latvian CSOs view participation in expert groups, as well as 
involvement in umbrella organisations, as the most effective forms 
or participation (Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4). Both of these are rated 
favourably by the majority of CSOs, and both received only a few 
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negative ratings. Additional comments on this offered little detail as 
to why this might be the case, yet the overwhelmingly positive 
opinion and other comments in the 
survey seem to suggest that 
participation in expert groups and 
umbrella organisations has allowed 
Latvian CSOs to achieve the type of 
impact that CSOs seem to be looking 
for. Similarly, it could be the case that 
they are viewed particularly 
favourably because they provide the 
most direct access to EU decision-makers, as is suggested by the fact 
that most organisations that view expert groups as effective have 
not actually used the method. 
The biggest differences in opinion about efficacy relate to 
shaping national positions and consultations with Latvian MEPs. 
Both of them are viewed either 
positively or negatively by similar 
numbers of CSOs, and additional 
comments also contain mixed 
opinions on their effectiveness.  
Consultations with MEPs 
received both praise and criticism; 
some respondents highlighted a strong desire on the part of certain 
politicians to assist their organisation, while others said that MEPs 
only dismissed or ignored their concerns.  
Participation in shaping national positions reveals similar 
comments. Some organisations indicated that the time and resource 
investment in this method produced no results; that significant 
effort to provide commentaries is ignored by the responsible 
institutions or that the method is employed by the ministries as a 
token rather than out of a genuine interest to ensure CSOs’ 
participation. Other organisations indicated that this method was 
the easiest way to communicate information to decision-makers. 
Latvian CSOs view 
participation in expert groups, 
as well as involvement in 
umbrella organisations, as the 
most effective forms or 
participation. 
The biggest differences in 
opinion about efficacy relate 
to shaping national 
positions and consultations 
with Latvian MEPs. 
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Additional assessment of data suggests that size of the 
organisation could be a contributing factor.11 Larger organisations 
with more than five employees were more likely to rate shaping 
national policies as effective compared to smaller organisations, and 
smaller organisations were more likely to view consultations with 
national MEPs as ineffective.12 Again, comments from organisations 
suggest that resources available to organisations could be a 
contributing factor, especially when it comes to access to MEPs or 
the ability to influence individuals responsible for developing 
national policies. 
The ECI, consultations with the European Economic and 
Social Affairs Committee (EESC) and online consultations with the 
EC returned similarly mixed reviews, but are recognised or have 
been used by far fewer organisations. Furthermore, methods such 
as the ECI or consulting the EESC seemed to be more popular 
among larger organisations, while smaller organisations were more 
aware of citizens’ dialogues. Public hearings by the EP and Debating 
Europe platform were the only methods to be viewed more 
negatively, yet they were also among the least recognised and least 
used methods of participation.  
6.3.3 Opinion on increasing civil society involvement 
Most of the responses received suggested ways in which CSOs 
could be incentivised to use more 
participatory methods. Specific 
invitations to use certain methods or 
to state the organisation’s opinion is 
the best way to incentivise more 
participation. Similarly, additional 
financing and budgeting support 
were mentioned often, as lack of 
adequate staff seems to prohibit 
organisations from using these 
methods. These comments also reflect a more general sentiment 
                                                        
11 Organisations were also asked how many full and part-time employees 
they had. Some 63% of organisations were classified as small (between 1 
and 5 employees) and 34.8% as large (5+ employees).  
12 In both cases, the difference was by about 15 percentage points. 
Specific invitations to use 
certain methods or to state 
the organisation’s opinion is 
the best way to incentivise 
more participation. 
Additional financing and 
budgeting support were 
mentioned frequently. 
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among Latvian CSOs; the lack of long-term and consistent funding 
from the government is viewed as one of the biggest issues currently 
facing organisations. As such, some organisations thought that 
financial rewards could be a good incentive to boost participation.  
Additional comments requested more opportunities to meet 
Latvian MEPs, suggesting that there should be more direct pressure 
from the EP to achieve this. Similarly, more consistent outreach 
from the EESC could be helpful, in which Latvian organisations 
receive more formal recognition, as well as campaigns to inform 
them about the available participation methods or easy-to-read 
resources that could be distributed to members of organisations 
inviting them to participate. A lack of information and events in the 
Latvian language is also mentioned a few times, since organisations 
tend to have longstanding members with no knowledge of English. 
Conclusions 
This chapter provides a brief assessment of a select group of CSOs 
in Latvia. Feedback from national organisations can be helpful 
when trying to improve both representative and participatory 
democracy on an EU level.  
The average Latvian CSO is 
informed about five methods and has 
experience of using two means of EU- 
level participation; while CSOs are 
generally informed about the available 
methods of participation, they have 
very limited experience in using them. 
Participation in shaping national 
policies, and expert groups organised 
by the EC are the most recognised and 
used methods, while public 
consultations offered by the EC are as 
popular but used far less. Other 
popular and frequently used methods of participation include 
consultations with the EU through transnational organisations, 
consultations with national MEPs and the ECI. 
Generally, participation in expert groups, as well as 
consultations through transnational organisations, are recognised 
While CSOs are generally 
informed about the available 
methods of participation, they 
have limited experience in 
using them. Participation in 
shaping national policies, and 
expert groups organised by 
the EC are the most 
recognised and used methods, 
while public consultations 
offered by the EC are as 
popular but used far less. 
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as the most effective forms of participation. Views on shaping 
national policies and consultations with MEPs vary – some 
organisations see them as being particularly effective, while others 
reported that their experience had been mostly negative. Only 
public hearings by the EP and online discussion platforms elicit a 
more negative response, and they are also among the least popular 
methods of participation. 
Some valuable insights for policymakers can be derived from 
the responses provided by the Latvian CSOs: 
1) There should be a focus on low-cost and low-effort methods 
of participation. While public consultations have the 
potential to be more widely used by organisations, the 
complexity of questionnaires seems to be a considerable 
disincentive. Because of resource constraints, less established 
and smaller CSOs whose main focus is not EU-level 
policymaking might otherwise never choose to use these 
methods, even if there is some desire to do so. 
2) More systematic incentives to organise individual meetings 
with MEPs should be created. While these are generally at 
the discretion of MEPs themselves, our survey results indicate 
that this approach has the most potential to boost the 
participation of CSOs. Despite some of the negative 
perspectives, detailed comments received during the survey 
mostly praised this method; providing more organisations 
with access to MEPs could thus be useful.  
3) Initiatives that specifically reach out to CSOs could boost 
overall levels of participation. The current methods of 
promoting different forms of participation are more 
rewarding for CSOs that seek out participation themselves. 
Yet some organisations whose perspective on overall issues 
could be valuable seem to indicate that they will not commit 
to participatory methods unless directly engaged. While this 
kind of approach might be more resource-intensive for EU 
bodies, it also has the potential to boost the participation of 
local CSOs in member states.  
4) Transnational organisations are still an important channel 
but this leaves behind organisations that might not be 
members. The survey indicates that Latvian CSOs that are 
already active in transnational umbrella organisations view 
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this type of participation as very positive, and this could be 
particularly valuable for smaller CSOs. Since a number of the 
CSOs surveyed claimed that policy in their area of expertise 
is only developed at a national level, efforts to boost their 
participation in transnational organisations could change that 
perspective and facilitate their EU-level engagement.  
5) Despite high levels of awareness, public consultations with 
the EC do not have a good reputation among CSOs. Since 
this seems to be one of the most recognised methods of 
participation, additional efforts to simplify ways for 
organisations to provide input might be valuable in boosting 
participation, especially for smaller organisations whose 
ability to participate on an EU level will always be limited. 
6) Financial incentives could boost involvement from CSOs 
that are more financially constrained. This seems to be 
particularly relevant for environments in which CSOs 
systematically lack access to funding. In such cases, even 
small incentives could play a big role in boosting 
participation. 
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Annex 1 to Chapter 6: Profile of CSOs in the survey 
 
Main area of focus Number of organisations 
Did not specify 15 
Health care 5 
Social issues 4 
Development 3 
Business interests 2 
Civil Society 2 
Education 2 
Professional association 2 
Technology 2 
Agriculture 1 
Environment 1 
Environmental 1 
Foreign Affairs 1 
Human Rights 1 
Interest representation 1 
Migration 1 
Politics 1 
Sports 1 
 
 
Regional scope of activities 
(organisations could specify several answers)  
City 8.7% 
Regional 10.9% 
Several regions 8.7% 
National 78.3% 
International 45.7% 
 
 Total employees (full or part time) 
1-5 63.0% 
5-10 13.0% 
10-20 8.7% 
20+ 13.0% 
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 Total members (legal persons or individuals) 
0-10 23.9% 
10-25 13.0% 
25-50 13.0% 
50-100 19.6% 
100+ 30.4% 
 
 
To what extent is your organisation 
involved in legislation on a national level? 
Not at all 6.5% 
Barely involved 10.9% 
Sometimes 37.0% 
One of the key objectives 39.1% 
Main objective 6.5% 
 
 
To what extent is your organisation 
involved in legislation on an EU level? 
Not at all 28.3% 
Barely involved 47.8% 
Sometimes 8.7% 
One of the key objectives 15.2% 
Main objective 0.0% 
 
 
To what extent is your organisation interested in discussing 
important EU issues and participating in EU legislation 
(1 - not interested at all, 5 – very interested) 
1 0.0% 
2 13.0% 
3 32.6% 
4 30.4% 
5 23.9% 
 
 
Is your organisation a member of a transnational umbrella 
organisation in the EU? 
Yes 63.0% 
No 37.0% 
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Annex 2 to Chapter 6: Survey Questions 
 
1. Please list the main area in which your organisation is working. 
2. What is the geographical scope of the activities of your 
organisation? 
- City 
- Regional 
- Several regions 
- National 
- International 
3. What is the total number of employees in your organisation (full 
or part time)?  
- 1-5 
- 5-10 
- 10-20 
- 20+ 
4. What is the approximate total number of members is your 
organisation (legal entities and individuals)? 
- Mark if no individuals 
- 0-10 
- 10-25 
- 25-50 
- 50-100 
- 100+ 
5. To what extent is your organisation involved in legislation on a 
national level? 
- Not at all 
- Barely involved 
- Sometimes 
- One of the key objectives 
- Main objective 
6. To what extent is your organisation involved in legislation on an 
EU level? 
- Not at all 
- Barely involved 
- Sometimes 
- One of the key objectives 
- Main objective 
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7. Please rate the extent to which your organisation interested in 
discussing important EU issues and participate in EU legislation. 
- 1 (not interested at all) to 5 (very interested) 
8. Is your organisation a member of an international umbrella 
organisation or coalition of organisations that is involved in 
interest representation on an EU level? 
- Yes 
- No 
9. Please mark all of the methods of participation on an EU level 
that you are informed about! After that mark all of the methods 
that you consider to be effective (if any) and methods that you 
consider to be ineffective (if any). You are not required to mark 
every method, but only ones that you are informed about. 
- List of the 10 methods specified in the main body of the paper. 
- Each method has a tick box for (‘We know this method’; ‘We 
think this is an effective method’; ‘We think this is not an 
effective method’) 
10. Please mark all of the methods of participation on an EU level 
that you or your organisation has used! After that mark all of the 
methods that based on your experience were either effective (if 
any) or ineffective (if any). You are not required to mark every 
method, but only ones that you have experience in using. 
- List of the 10 methods specified in the main body of the paper. 
- Each method has a tick box for (‘We have used this method’; 
‘In our experience, this was an effective method’; ‘In our 
experience, this was not an effective method’). 
11. If your organisation has been involved in discussing issues on an 
EU level, which method of participation did you find to be the 
most effective? Why? 
12. If your organisation has been involved in discussing issues on an 
EU level, which method of participation did you find to be the 
least effective? Why? 
13. If your organisation is not often involved in participating on an 
EU level, what are the main reasons? 
14. What could national or EU level institutions and organisations 
do to facilitate a more active involvement from your organisation 
in discussing EU level issues or developing EU legislation? 
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7. DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN 
AUSTRIA: JUST A TOOL FOR THE 
OPPOSITION? 
STEFAN SCHALLER, PAUL SCHMIDT & 
CHRISTOPH BREINSCHMID 
There are several forms of direct democracy in Austria: legally 
binding referendums, non-binding popular initiatives, people’s 
consultations, parliamentary citizens’ initiatives and parliamentary 
petitions – all are regulated by the Austrian Federal Constitution 
and appear in the parliamentary rules of procedure. On the regional 
level the state constitutions of the nine federal provinces also allow 
for direct democracy, albeit to a different extent.  
EU matters are regularly the subject of direct democratic 
instruments, even though the prospects of success remain rather 
low. Political parties – especially when in opposition – frequently 
use them to stimulate public debate and mobilise voters. In recent 
years, calls to strengthen direct democracy à la suisse have grown 
louder. This is also reflected in the coalition agreement of the 
current Austrian government. 
Introduction 
It is nearly 100 years since direct democracy instruments were 
introduced in Austria. The Federal Constitutional Law of 1920 
allowed for the possibility of holding referendums or popular 
initiatives.1 Even one year earlier we can find such regulations in the 
state constitution of Austria’s westernmost federal province of 
                                                        
1 Gesetz vom 1. Oktober 1920, womit die Republik Österreich als 
Bundesstaat eingerichtet wird (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz) [Law of 1 
October 1920 establishing the Republic of Austria as a Federal State] 
(www.verfassungen.de/at/at18-34/oesterreich20.htm). 
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Vorarlberg.2 Despite this long legal tradition, it was not until 1964 
that the first nationwide popular initiative was held, and the first 
referendum took place in 1978. 
As a result of the multiple 
internal and external crises the EU 
has had to cope with, the 
fragmentation of Austria’s party 
system and the overall impact of 
globalisation and digitalisation, there 
is growing scepticism about the 
ability of traditional parties, 
representative democracy and the 
EU decision-making process to deal 
with the challenges ahead. 
Consequently, calls for more ‘direct democracy’ have gained 
prominence in the national political debate. 
7.1 The national context 
Several forms of direct democracy are regulated by the Austrian 
Federal Constitution and appear in the parliamentary rules of 
procedure: referendums (Volksabstimmung), popular initiatives 
(Volksbegehren), consultations of the people (Volksbefragung), 
parliamentary citizens’ initiatives (Bürgerinitiative im Nationalrat) 
and parliamentary petitions (Petition im Nationalrat / Bundesrat). 
On the regional level the state constitutions of the nine federal 
provinces3 all allow for direct democracy, but to differing extents.4 
                                                        
2 Historisches Gesetz vom 14. März 1919 über die Verfassung des Landes 
Vorarlberg [Historic law of 14 March 1919 on the State Constitution of the 
federal province of Vorarlberg] (www.mehr-demokratie.at/de/ 
vorarlberg-historische-landesverfassung-1919).  
3 See www.help.gv.at/Portal.Node/hlpd/public/content/223/ 
Seite.2230001.html. 
4 Kommunalwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft (2014), „Direkte Demokratie 
und Partizipation in den österreichischen Gemeinden“ [Direct Democracy 
and Participation in the Austrian communities], pp. 5-23 
(www.gemeindebund.at/website2016/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ 
Due to the multiple internal 
and external crises the EU has 
faced, the fragmentation of 
Austria’s party system and the 
impact of globalisation and 
digitalisation, there is 
scepticism about whether 
traditional parties, 
representative democracy and 
the EU decision-making process 
can deal with all the challenges. 
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In some provinces communities have the right to initiate 
referendums on intended federal state laws.5 They also allow for 
citizens’ assessments (Bürgerbegutachtungen) of bills as well as the 
right to launch petitions. In 2013, the province of Vorarlberg 
enshrined ‘direct democracy’ as well as ‘other forms of participative 
democracy’ in its state constitution6 and promoted its model of 
‘wisdom councils’ (Bürgerräte) in which a small group of randomly 
selected citizens of a community deliberate over one or two days on 
community issues and develop ideas and recommendations for 
policymakers.7 
7.1.1 Referendums 
The regulations to hold a referendum are defined in the Federal 
Constitutional Law8 and in the Referendum act of 1972.9 If the 
National Council – the Austrian Parliament – so resolves, or if the 
majority of members of the National Council so demands, every 
National Council enactment can be put to a referendum. Any total 
revision of the Federal Constitution must be made the subject of a 
national referendum; any partial revision requires this only if one 
third of the members of the National Council or the Federal Council 
                                                        
RFG_4-2015-Direkte-Demokratie-und-Partizipation-in-den-
oesterreichischen-Gemeinden.pdf). 
5 See www.parlament.gv.at/PERK/BOE/DD/. 
6 Verfassungsgesetz über die Verfassung des Landes Vorarlberg 
[Constitutional Law on the State Constitution of the federal province of 
Vorarlberg], Art. 1.4 (www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage= 
LrVbg&Gesetzesnummer=20000001). 
7 Büro für Zukunftsfragen, Amt der Vorarlberger Landesregierung (2014), 
„Bürgerräte in Vorarlberg – Eine Zwischenbilanz“ [Wisdom councils in 
Vorarlberg – a mid-term evaluation] (www.vorarlberg.at/pdf/ 
kurzfassungbuergerraetezw.pdf). 
8 Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [Federal Constitutional Law], Art. 43 and 44(3) 
resp. Art. 60 (6) (www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_1930_1/ 
ERV_1930_1.pdf). 
9 Volksabstimmungsgesetz von 1972 [Referendum Act of 1972] 
(www.bmi.gv.at/410/files/Volksabstimmungsgesetz_1972_Kunsttext_20
13.pdf).  
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so demands. A national referendum can also be used to depose the 
federal president before expiry of his term of office. Such a 
referendum can be held if the Federal Assembly so demands. All 
Austrian citizens eligible to vote aged 
16 years10 and over are entitled to 
take part in a national referendum.   
Two nationwide referendums 
have been held so far: in November 
1978 Austrians were asked whether 
they approved a law allowing for the 
peaceful use of nuclear power – an 
issue which was rejected by 50.47% of 
voters in a turnout of 64.1%. In June 
1994 Austrians voted to join the 
European Union with the consent of 
66.6% of voters, in a turnout of 82.3%. 
7.1.2 Popular initiatives 
The popular initiative instrument is regulated in the Federal 
Constitutional Law [Article 41] and the Act on popular initiatives.11 
To start a popular initiative, signatures of support from one-
thousandth of the overall population (according to the latest 
population census) are required, in this case 8,401 signatures. For a 
popular initiative to be dealt with by the National Council, either a 
threshold of 100,000 signatures on the national level (including 
those already obtained in the initiating phase) or the signatures of 
one-sixth of the eligible voters of three federal provinces are 
required. This number can already be reached in the initiating phase 
(whose duration is not regulated) but at the latest during the official 
registration week (eight consecutive days) set up by the Ministry of 
Interior. Since 30 January 2018, citizens can sign a popular initiative 
in every municipality (regardless of their own place of residence) or 
online via a ‘qualified electronic signature’ (‘Handy-Signatur’).12 A 
                                                        
10 In 2007, the voting age in Austria was lowered from 18 to 16 years of age. 
11 Volksbegehrengesetz 2018 [Act on popular initiatives 2018] 
(www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Ges
etzesnummer=20009719). 
12 See www.bmi.gv.at/news.aspx?id=4330656F32336438727A413D. 
Two nationwide referendums 
have been held: in November 
1978 Austrians were asked 
whether they approved a law 
allowing the peaceful use of 
nuclear power – an issue 
rejected by 50.47% of voters in 
a turnout of 64.1%. In June 
1994 Austrians voted to join 
the European Union with the 
consent of 66.6% of voters, in a 
turnout of 82.3%. 
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‘successful’ popular initiative is dealt with in the responsible 
parliamentary committee that reports within four months to the 
plenary, which further discusses the issue. As the popular initiative 
is non-binding, members of the National Council can decide if (or 
in which way) its contents will be implemented.  
By April 2018, 38 Austria-wide popular initiatives had been 
‘officially’ started,13 albeit with varying degrees of frequency and 
success. In the first six years (1964-69) three initiatives were 
launched, which all attained the required number of signatures to 
be dealt with in Parliament. In the 1970s, only one fulfilled all 
requirements. The instrument gained momentum in the following 
decades: in the 1980s ten initiatives passed the threshold to be 
started and nine to be dealt with in Parliament. This trend continued 
during the 1990s (ten started /nine dealt with in Parliament) and 
the 2000s (nine started and dealt with in Parliament). Between 2011 
and 2017 six popular initiatives were started, of which three were 
debated in Parliament. The current debate about more direct 
democracy is reflected in the fact that only in the first half of 2018 
had two popular initiatives gained sufficient support to be dealt 
with by the National Council, although the official registration 
period had not even started when a third initiative already passed 
the 8,401 signatures necessary to qualify for registration week. 
The requirements to initiate or register a popular initiative 
have been lowered continuously: at the first attempt in 1964, the 
signatures of 30,000 citizens [eligible voting population 1962: 
4,805,351 / =0.62%) or of 15 members of the National Council or one-
fifth of three state parliaments (Landtage) were needed to start an 
initiative. To be dealt with in Parliament, 200,000 signatures had to 
be collected (=4.16%). In 1972 the Act on Popular Initiatives decreed 
that only 10,000 signatures (eligible voting population 1971: 
4,984.448 / = 0.20%); or eight signatures of members of the National 
Council, or four members of three state parliaments were needed to 
launch a popular initiative. In 1981 the threshold of 200,000 was 
reduced to 100,000 (eligible voting population 1979: 5,186.735 / = 
1.93%). In 1998 the current regulation entered into force, eliminating 
                                                        
13 In April 2018 (at the time of writing), two popular initiatives had already 
gained sufficient support to be dealt with by the National Council, 
although the official registration had not yet started. 
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the possibility for members of the National Council or the state 
parliaments to ‘officially’ support the launch of a popular initiative.  
The popular initiatives instrument is also codified on the 
regional level, although it has rarely been used in practice. In 1986, 
Styria held a popular initiative against the deployment of the 
Draken interceptors in the federal province (turnout: 28.63%). 
Vorarlberg’s citizens were able to cast their vote in four popular 
initiatives since 1962 – although turnout was extremely low.14 
7.1.3 Consultations 
The people’s consultation instrument is regulated in Article 49b of 
the Federal Constitutional Law and in a corresponding act of 1989.15 
It is non-binding and can be started if the National Council or the 
government so decides, to gauge people’s opinion on matters of 
“fundamental or overall national 
importance”. Elections and matters 
subject to a decision by court or an 
administrative authority cannot be the 
topic of a people’s consultation. The 
instrument has so far only been used 
once, in 2013, on the question of whether 
to introduce a professional army and a 
voluntary social year or to keep 
compulsory military service and civilian 
service. 
At regional level, people’s consultations are a much more 
common tool to gauge public opinion: Vorarlberg was the first 
province to hold such a consultation in 1972 on shops’ closing time, 
a second consultation on banning lorries at night followed in 1989.16 
To cite other examples, in March 1986 citizens of Lower Austria 
could decide on whether Lower Austria should have its own capital 
city (Vienna being the seat of the Lower Austria’s state parliament 
                                                        
14 See www.vorarlberg.at/pdf/uebersicht-teil-vbeg.pdf.  
15 Volksbefragungsgesetz 1989 [Act on consultations of the people 1989] 
(www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Ges
etzesnummer=10001008). 
16 See http://www.vorarlberg.at/pdf/uebersicht-teil-vbef.pdf. 
The people’s consultation 
instrument has so far only 
been used once, in 2013, on 
whether to introduce a 
professional army and a 
voluntary social year or to 
keep compulsory military 
service and civilian service. 
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until then), which was supported by 56% of those polled (turnout: 
61.3%).17 Viennese citizens have already taken part in eight (partly 
multiple-question) consultations since 1973, for example in 1991 on 
the question of the joint organisation of the EXPO with Budapest 
(which was rejected by 64.85%, with a turnout of 43.7%), or in 2013 
on the subject of hosting the Olympic Summer Games (which was 
rejected by 72% with a turnout of 38.83%).18 A potential candidature 
to host the Olympic Winter Games was also the subject of 
consultations in Tyrol (twice in 1997 and in 2017) and in the 
province of Salzburg (twice in 1997 and 2006). In recent years, some 
provinces reduced the threshold to initiate direct democracy 
instruments, notably to make them more attractive (e.g. Upper 
Austria in 2015, Carinthia in 2017, Lower Austria in 2018). 
At the local level of Austrian communities, direct democratic 
instruments are also very common, although exact figures are hard 
to find. As a study of the Kommunalwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft 
(Municipal Science Society) shows, until October 2014 about 150 
referendums, 554 public initiatives and 172 consultations of the 
people (preliminary data) have been held at community level.19 
7.1.4 Further forms of direct democracy 
Other means of regulated direct democracy are the parliamentary 
citizens’ initiative20 and the parliamentary petition.21 A parliament-
tary citizens’ initiative has to be supported (also online) by 500 
Austrian citizens (16 years and older) and can formulate a citizens’ 
concern that is within the jurisdiction of the legislative or executive 
                                                        
17 See www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/LgblNO/LRNI_1986001/ 
LRNI_1986001.pdf. 
18 See www.wien.gv.at/vbefergeb/internet/.  
19 Kommunalwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft (2014), „Direkte Demokratie 
und Partizipation in den österreichischen Gemeinden“ [Direct Democracy 
and Participation in the Austrian communities], p. 35 
(www.gemeindebund.at/website2016/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ 
RFG_4-2015-Direkte-Demokratie-und-Partizipation-in-den-
oesterreichischen-Gemeinden.pdf). 
20 See www.parlament.gv.at/PERK/BET/BII/INFOBLATT/. 
21 See www.parlament.gv.at/PERK/BET/PET/. 
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branches at federal level. With a parliamentary petition a member 
of the National Council or the Federal Council (Bundesrat)22 
introduces a concrete citizens’ concern to the plenary. Citizens can 
register their support for a parliamentary petition at the Austrian 
Parliament’s website, which is however only of an informative 
nature. In both cases the parliamentary committee on petitions and 
citizens’ initiatives can simply take note of it, request the opinion of 
ministries and/or institutions or forward it to the Austrian 
Ombudsman Board or another parliamentary committee. The 
committee’s reports are published on the Austrian parliament’s 
website.23 There have also been calls to give citizens the possibility 
to propose a parliamentary citizens’ initiative online or allow 
initiators the right to speak in the committee if their concern is 
supported by 5,000 signatures of support, for example, in order to 
increase the efficiency of these instruments.24  
Levels of participation as drivers of voter mobilisation have 
varied depending on the subjects of the plebiscites, which 
themselves were manifold and covered 
both national and EU-related affairs. 
While the referendum on Austria’s 
accession to the EU reached the highest 
turnout (82.3%) only 0.9% supported the 
popular initiative on ‘church privileges’ 
and 1.1% a popular initiative on more 
direct democracy (!).25  
 
                                                        
22 The chamber representing the interests of the nine federal provinces. 
23 See www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXVI/I/I_00022/index.shtml. 
24 See www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20180227_OTS0104/neos-
bekraeftigen-reformwillen-zum-start-des-petitionsausschusses. 
25 Furthermore, there are citizens’ initiatives on a regional or local level and 
private online petition websites that are able to assemble a relevant number 
of supporters. 
Levels of participation as 
drivers of voter mobilisation 
have varied depending on 
the subjects of the 
plebiscites, which 
themselves were manifold 
and covered both national 
and EU-related affairs. 
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7.2 The EU dimension 
7.2.1 Referendums 
The most important direct democratic decision on EU matters was 
the Austrian national referendum on joining the European Union 
on 12 June 1994. It was also the only nationwide EU-related 
referendum so far and was compulsory as it entailed a total revision 
of the Austrian Federal Constitution. The remarkably high support 
for EU membership was partly the result of a nationwide 
information campaign supported by the federal government, the 
Austrian social partners, other major societal players, and the 
commitment of Austria’s biggest daily newspaper, Kronen Zeitung. 
The most notable groups opposing Austria’s membership were the 
Freedom Party and the Green Party, which criticised the pro-EU 
accession campaigns as a propaganda tool raising unrealistic 
expectations. 
Table 7.1 Referendum on Austria’s accession to the EU26 
Date In favour Against Turnout 
12 June 1994 66.6% 
(3,145,981 votes) 
33.4% 
(1,578,850 votes) 
82.3% 
 
Although the instrument has only been used twice so far, it has 
nevertheless been demanded often by political parties as a means of 
reacting to European developments. This holds true especially for 
opposition parties, first and foremost, the Freedom Party. Since the 
year 2000, the demand for a nationwide referendum has been 
expressed by FPÖ representatives in connection with the eastern 
enlargement of the European Union; the Treaty of Nice; Turkey’s 
possible EU membership; the ratification of an EU constitution; the 
Treaty of Lisbon; the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); the EU 
as a social union; Austria’s membership of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) and the reintroduction of the Schilling as 
the national currency; Austria’s banking secrecy; leaving the 
Schengen zone; financial aid for Greece; ratification of TTIP and 
CETA; and closing the borders against ‘mass migration’, among 
                                                        
26 www.bmi.gv.at/410/Ergebnisse_bisheriger_Volksabstimmungen.aspx.  
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others. On several occasions FPÖ representatives have also 
examined the possibility of an ‘ÖXIT’-referendum – which in 2012 
party leader Heinz-Christian Strache called “a last resort”.27 FPÖ 
presidential candidate Norbert Hofer in 2016 would have 
considered this “if Turkey joined the European Union”.28 Following 
the popular initiative on Austria’s EU exit (2015) the Freedom Party 
filed a motion to consult the people on this matter.29 The day after 
the British decision to leave the EU, the FPÖ stated that direct 
democracy should become more important in Europe and even 
stand above EU law. In its statement the FPÖ also called for a 
referendum on EU membership if the EU was unwilling to 
implement reforms or if Turkey became an EU member.30 31 Due to 
                                                        
27 Freiheitlicher Parlamentsklub (2012), “FPÖ: Strache sieht Schilling und 
EU-Austritt als letzte Möglichkeit” [FPÖ: Strache sees Schilling and EU exit 
as a last resort], 29 January (www.ots.at/presseaussendung/ 
OTS_20120129_OTS0043/fpoe-strache-sieht-schilling-und-eu-austritt-als-
letzte-moeglichkeit).  
28 Freiheitlicher Parlamentsklub (2016), „FPÖ-Präsidentschaftskandidat 
Hofer: Schutz der Österreicher steht im Zentrum” [FPÖ presidential 
candidate Hofer: Safety of Austrians is key], 14 March 
(www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20160314_OTS0092/fpoe-
praesidentschaftskandidat-hofer-schutz-der-oesterreicher-steht-im-
zentrum).  
29 Pressedienst der Parlamentsdirektion Parlamentskorrespondenz (2016), 
„Europäische Union besteht Feuerprobe im Parlament” [European Union 
passes the acid test in Parliament], 27 January (www.ots.at/ 
presseaussendung/OTS_20160127_OTS0237/europaeischen-union-
besteht-feuerprobe-im-parlament). 
30 Freiheitlicher Parlamentsklub (2016), „Strache, Vilimsky: Brexit ist 
Weichenstellung für Demokratie sowie gegen Zentralismus und 
Migrationswahn” [Strache, Vilimsky: Brexit sets the course for democracy 
and against centralism and ‘migration mania‘], 24 June (www.ots.at/ 
presseaussendung/OTS_20160624_OTS0011/strache-vilimsky-brexit-ist-
weichenstellung-fuer-demokratie-sowie-gegen-zentralismus-und-
migrationswahnimpl). 
31 Freiheitlicher Parlamentsklub (2016), „Krise der Europäischen Union: 
FPÖ-Bundespräsidentschaftskandidat Hofer mahnt Vorsicht ein und 
wünscht sich Großbritannien im EWR“ [Crisis of the European Union: FPÖ 
presidential candidate Hofer calls for watchfulness and wants the UK to be 
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changes in public opinion – Austrians’ support for EU membership 
has been growing since Brexit32 – these opinions were duly toned 
down. 
Direct democratic votes in neighbouring 
Switzerland were taken by the FPÖ 
several times as an occasion to praise the 
Swiss model and portray it as an example 
worthy of imitation. This was the case 
following the successful Swiss federal popular initiative "against the 
construction of minarets" in 2009 as well as an initiative for the 
“deportation of criminal foreigners” in 2010 and the initiative 
“against mass migration” in 2014. 
Claims to hold nationwide referendums were also expressed, 
though to a lesser extent, by other opposition parties, e.g. recently 
on CETA by the Greens,33 the Social Democrats and the Liste Pilz in 
Parliament.34 
The claim to hold referendums on EU matters has also partly 
been supported by Austria’s tabloid press, especially by the most 
widely read daily newspaper Kronen Zeitung, which campaigned 
loudly against the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, TTIP and CETA, 
for example. To illustrate just how influential politicians perceive 
the Kronen Zeitung to be, one should look back at the summer of 2008 
                                                        
part of the EEA], 4 July (www.ots.at/presseaussendung/ 
OTS_20160704_OTS0068/krise-der-europaeischen-union-fpoe-
bundespraesidentschaftskandidat-hofer-mahnt-vorsicht-ein-und-
wuenscht-sich-grossbritannien-im-ewr).  
32 Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik (2017), „ÖGfE-Survey: 
High support for EU-membership in Austria“, 21 December 
(www.oegfe.at/2017/12/oegfe-survey-clear-majority-of-austrians-in-
favour-of-eu-membership-2/).  
33 Die Grünen (2018), „CETA: Türöffner für weitere Handelsverträge” 
[CETA: Door opener for other ‘trade agreements’], 15 June 
(https://www.gruene.at/themen/europa/ceta-wo-bleibt-die-
volksabstimmung).  
34 Parlamentskorrespondenz (2018), „Handelsabkommen CETA nimmt 
erste parlamentarische Hürde“ [Free Trade Agreement CETA clears the 
first hurdle], 5 June (https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/ 
JAHR_2018/PK0643/index.shtml). 
Austrians’ support for EU 
membership has been 
growing since Brexit. 
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when both the incumbent and the 
designated federal chancellors Alfred 
Gusenbauer and Werner Faymann 
(both SPÖ) wrote a joint open letter to 
the ‘Krone’ editor declaring that due to 
growing public discomfort with the EU 
and its politics prior to the ratification of 
the Treaty of Lisbon “future changes in EU treaties affecting the 
Austrian interest” should be put to a nationwide referendum.35 This 
letter received harsh criticism from both the coalition partner ÖVP 
and the opposition Green Party, who saw it as a sign of submission 
to the Kronen Zeitung media power. The FPÖ in turn noted that the 
letter just included empty phrases and was without tangible 
consequences. 
7.2.2 Popular initiatives 
EU-related items have also accounted for 13 popular initiatives 
since 1991. Since this date, nearly half of all popular initiatives were 
launched to broach an issue related to EU matters, e.g. the claim for 
a referendum on EEA-accession, keeping the Schilling as the 
national currency, exiting the EU and EURATOM, opposing nuclear 
energy in Austria and Europe, genetic engineering and Austrian 
neutrality.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
35 Der Standard (2008), „Der SPÖ-Brief an Dichand im Wortlaut“ [Wording 
of the SPÖ letter to Dichand], 1 July (www.derstandard.at/3393035/Der-
SPOe-Brief-an-Dichand-im-Wortlaut-). 
The claim to hold 
referendums on EU matters 
has also partly been 
supported by Austria’s 
tabloid press. 
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Table 7.2 EU-related popular initiatives36 
Year Subject Valid 
signatures 
of support 
Turnout Ranking 
(corresponding 
turnout in %) 
1991 To hold a referendum on 
Austria’s accession to the 
European Economic Area 
(EEA) 
126,834 2.25% 33 
1993 Austria First 416,531 7.35% 14 
1996 Neutrality 358,156 6.21% 15 
1997 Genetic engineering 1,225,790 21.23% 2 
1997 To hold a referendum 
before introducing the 
euro (‘Schilling-
Volksbegehren’) 
253,949 4.43% 20 
1997 Non-nuclear Austria 248,787 4.34% 21 
2000 New referendum on EU 
membership 
193,901 3.35% 26 
2002 Veto against Temelin* 914,973 15.53% 6 
2003 Non-nuclear Europe 131,772 2.23% 30 
2006 Austria stay free!** 258,281 4.28% 23 
2011 Out of EURATOM 98,678 1.56% 35 
2015 EU-exit of Austria 261,056 4.12% 22 
2017 Against CETA and TTIP 562,389 8.87% 11 
* Nuclear plant in the Czech Republic near the Austrian border. 
** Guarantee of neutrality, ratification of EU convention and EU accession of 
Turkey only after referendum. 
 
Most of these initiatives focused on fundamental and far-reaching 
aspects of EU integration and can be seen as a protest against 
developments regarded as not being in Austria’s interest and 
endangering national identity and sovereignty. They also express 
the desire to protest against the harmful effects of globalisation. 
Often supported by – mostly opposition – political parties, these 
initiatives have often portrayed an image of an all-dominant EU 
forcing a small country like Austria to obey to its rules – rules 
                                                        
36 See www.bmi.gv.at/411/Alle_Volksbegehren_der_zweiten_ 
Republik.aspx.  
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criticised as undemocratic and driven by business interests rather 
than the will of ’ordinary people’. Consequently, mobilisation was 
often accompanied by fierce debates and polarisation – a 
characteristic that we can generally observe in the Austria’s EU 
discourse. 
One can argue that non-binding popular initiatives are a blunt 
instrument that can be easily pigeonholed by politics. Most popular 
initiatives on EU matters did not in fact 
address the initiators’ concerns. These 
experiences clearly constitute one 
explanation for the overall low turnout. 
Nevertheless, popular initiatives can be a 
useful tool for political campaigning, 
especially if mass media support them. By abolishing the possibility 
for members of the National Council to start a popular initiative in 
1998, the direct democratic character of this instrument was 
strengthened. Nevertheless, the limited prospects of success for 
popular initiatives remain a major downside – an aspect that shifted 
to the core of debate in recent years.  
7.2.3 Consultations 
The instrument of non-binding people’s consultations was also 
regularly promoted – mainly by opposition parties, although since 
its introduction in 1989 only one Austria-wide consultation has been 
held. Yet the proposed subjects for potential consultations rarely 
differed from those proposed for national referendums: Turkey’s 
accession to the EU, non-participation in a European transfer union, 
the right to reintroduce controls at the national borders, TTIP and 
CETA (the latter also promoted by the Green Party), the national 
government’s migration and asylum policy, and indeed the system 
of direct democracy itself as a topic that should be submitted to the 
Austrian public. Propositions that could not reach the necessary 
support for further implementation though. 
As a consequence of the bilateral measures imposed by 14 EU 
member states against Austria following the participation of the 
Freedom Party in the government, the Austrian government 
decided to launch a consultation covering the following issues: the 
immediate suspension of the ‘sanctions’ imposed by the other 
member states; further development of the European Union as a 
Popular initiatives can be a 
useful tool for political 
campaigning, especially if 
mass media support them. 
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community of equal member states “that grants all members equal 
rights and duties and prevents bigger EU members dominating 
smaller ones”,37 ensuring that the EU grants a country’s 
fundamental right to decide its own government on the basis of free 
elections and respects the rights of democratically elected political 
parties and instruments of direct democracy; a clear division of 
tasks between the European and the national level, as well as a 
reinforced role of the regions; the commitment of all EU institutions 
to comply with the basic rule of law and human rights; integration 
of constitutional procedures, including a judicial review of any 
alleged violation of human rights in a new EU treaty.38 
This controversial intention never became reality, however, as 
the bilateral measures were suspended in September 2000. 
7.2.4 The European level 
Besides ideas to strengthen direct democracy at the national level, 
calls for an EU-wide equivalent can also be heard in Austrian 
political discourse, albeit to a lesser extent. Proposals for EU-wide 
referendums were brought forward by different political parties on 
various matters, e.g. the EU constitution, the Treaty of Lisbon, a 
European financial transaction tax or TTIP. Although keen to foster 
direct democratic participation at the national level, members of the 
Freedom Party were rather cautious to promote the same on the EU 
level, arguing that a European referendum would undermine 
national sovereignty.  
Looking at the existing instruments of direct democracy at 
European level, three out of the four successful European citizens’ 
                                                        
37 See “which guarantees equal rights and obligations for all Member States 
and does not allow the dominance of a few larger states over the others” 
(https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/ 
JAHR_2000/PK0437/). 
38 Parlamentskorrespondenz (2000), „Hauptausschuss beschließt 
mehrheitlich EU-Volksbefragung“ [Main committee by a majority decides 
consultation of the people on the EU“, 11 July 
(www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2000/PK0437/). 
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initiatives (ECI) so far reached the minimum 
number of signatures required for Austria 
(14,250 before 1 July 2014 / 13,500 thereafter). 
Interestingly, Austria is the only EU country 
where citizens can participate in an ECI from 
the age of 16. 
Table 7.3 Successful European citizens’ initiatives and signatures 
collected in Austria39 
Title Year of 
registration 
Total 
number of 
signatures 
Number of 
Austrians 
signatures 
Water and sanitation 
are a human right! 
Water is a public good, 
not a commodity! 
2012 1,659,543 57,643 
One of us! 2012 1,721,626 24,973 
Stop vivisection! 2012 1,173,130 9,208 
Ban glyphosate and 
protect people and the 
environment from 
toxic pesticides 
2017 1,070,865 41,099 
 
Austrians’ knowledge of ECI remains rather limited, however, as a 
survey of the Austrian Society for European Politics (ÖGfE) shows: 
63% said they had not heard of the European Citizen’s Initiative. 
Only 30% did know about it, while 7% did not respond. 
Nevertheless, 52% thought that the ECI could be a meaningful 
instrument to provide EU citizens with more means of direct 
democratic participation. Some 31% doubted that the ECI could 
strengthen citizens’ involvement in EU decision making.40 
                                                        
39 www.ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/successful. 
40 Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik (2018), “ÖGfE-Survey: 6 
Years European Citizens‘ Initiative – little knowledge among Austrians“, 3 
April  (www.oegfe.at/2018/04/06-eci-survey/).  
Austria is the only EU 
country where citizens 
can participate in an 
ECI from the age of 16. 
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7.3 Influence of direct democratic mechanisms on 
political realities at national level 
The Austrian 2017 national elections are a good example of how the 
topic of more direct democracy was picked up by nearly all political 
parties – though to differing degrees – with the Eurosceptic 
Freedom Party (FPÖ) being the strongest supporter. In its 2017 
national election programme, the FPÖ criticised the current 
democratic system as unfair, arguing that representative democracy 
was being abused to implement laws against the majoritarian will 
of the people; that decisions were being taken over peoples’ heads; 
that election promises were being broken and that the concerns of 
politically active citizens expressed in the form of parliamentary 
petitions or citizens’ initiatives were consequently being ignored. To 
re-establish trust in politics, the FPÖ called for the creation of a 
constitutional basis for legislation by the people 
(‘Volksgesetzgebung’) following the Swiss example; compulsory 
referendums if successful popular initiatives (= 256,000 signatures 
of support, or 4% of eligible voters) are not implemented by 
Parliament; veto referendums against laws adopted by Parliament; 
the right of parliamentary minorities to initiate people’s 
consultations and the greater involvement of young people in direct 
democratic procedures.41  
The conservative People’s Party (ÖVP) also called for more 
direct democracy in its election programme, criticising the Austrian 
political system for being dominated by political parties and for 
neglecting direct democratic participation.42 The ÖVP therefore 
proposed that every year one or two days be designated for citizens 
to vote on their concerns in the form of referendums or 
                                                        
41 Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (2017), „Österreicher verdienen Fairness. 
Freiheitliches Wahlprogramm zur Nationalratswahl” [“Austrians deserve 
fairness. Programme of the Freedom Party for the national elections], p. 10 
(www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Wahlprogramm_8_9_low.pdf).  
42 Österreichische Volkspartei (2017), “Das Programm der Liste Sebastian 
Kurz – die neue Volkspartei – zur Nationalratswahl 2017. 3/3” 
[Programme of the Liste Sebastian Kurz – the new People’s Party for the 
National elections 2017. 3/3], pp. 37-39 (https://mitmachen.sebastian-
kurz.at/page/-/Teil%203_Ordnung%20%26%20Sicherheit.pdf).  
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consultations of the people. If a public initiative gains the support 
of 10% of the population but has not attained parliamentary 
approval, citizens should decide on it in a nationwide referendum. 
This would apply only if the initiative is not in conflict with 
fundamental and human rights or international law, however. 
In the Social Democrats (SPÖ) election programme, direct 
democracy is not mentioned once. Instead, the SPÖ calls for the 
faster formation of a government after an election, for reducing the 
number of ministries and for strengthening parliamentary 
democracy by flexible majorities in parliament to pass laws.43 The 
Social Democrats already had their own experiences with a recent 
attempt at direct democracy:  in 2016 they organised a survey 
amongst their members (non-members could also participate) to 
settle the party’s official line on the subject of CETA. However, this 
campaign only saw a turnout of approximately 7% of SPÖ-members 
(=14,387 votes), which rejected CETA by a majority of 88%. While 
the SPÖ interpreted this result44 as a strong mandate to advocate 
changes in the treaty agreement, others concluded45 that there was 
no massive opposition of SPÖ-members. Others still raised the 
question of the representativeness of a vote in which only a minority 
took part.  
For the Green Party, which in the end failed to get into 
Parliament, direct democratic instruments can be an opportunity – 
                                                        
43 Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (2017), “Plan A für Österreich” 
[Plan A for Austria], p. 213 (https://christian-kern.at/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/Plan-A_SPOe-Wahlprogramm-2017.pdf). 
44 SPÖ-Bundesorganisation (2016), “Niedermühlbichler: Erste bundesweite 
Mitgliederbefragung zu CETA und TTIP ein voller Erfolg“ 
[Niedermühlbichler: First nationwide member survey on CETA and TTIP 
complete success], 20 September (www.ots.at/presseaussendung/ 
OTS_20160920_OTS0002/niedermuehlbichler-erste-bundesweite-spoe-
mitgliederbefragung-zu-ceta-und-ttip-voller-erfolg). 
45 Vertretung der EU-Kommission in Österreich (2016), „CETA: Deutliche 
Botschaft der SPÖ-Mitglieder zu Kanada-Abkommen“ [CETA: Clear 
message of SPÖ-members on Canada-agreement], 20 September 
(www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20160920_OTS0170/ceta-deutliche-
botschaft-der-spoe-mitglieder-zu-kanada-abkommen).  
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if they are used “wisely”.46 The Green election programme states 
that they can contribute significantly to people’s involvement and 
to policymaking but can also be misused for populist purposes. If a 
public initiative (not being in conflict with fundamental and human 
rights or international law) is well supported but not taken into 
account by Parliament, citizens should decide on it in a referendum 
or at least have a say in a non-binding consultation of the people. 
Additionally, the Green manifesto also promotes EU-wide 
referendums on major integration steps. 
Finally, the view of liberal NEOS Party, as expressed in its 
manifesto, is that a democracy close to citizens and citizens’ 
participation entails both opportunities and responsibilities, but 
they do not go into detail on these points.47 
Beside these attempts to regain trust and demonstrate a 
willingness to strengthen the instruments of direct democracy, the 
2017 Austrian election campaign was also characterised by the 
efforts of political parties to (re)brand 
themselves as movements, unlike 
traditional party politics which have 
been perceived as remote and removed 
from people. This was the case with the 
ÖVP that presented itself as the ‘New 
People’s Party’; it largely refrained from 
using its name on election billboards 
but concentrated instead on their lead 
candidate, Sebastian Kurz. Another 
example of a highly personalised list is 
the Liste Pilz that was founded – due to 
a split in the Green party – by the end of 
July 2017. The Liste Pilz has only 
marginal organisational structures and no official party programme 
                                                        
46 Die Grünen (2017), „Wahlprogramm der Grünen – Nationalratswahl 
2017“ [Green Party Election Programme  - national elections 2017], pp. 51-
52 (https://www.gruene.at/partei/programm/wahlprogramme).  
47 NEOS (2017), „Das Zukunftsmanifest für ein neues Österreich“ [The 
manifesto for the future of a new Austria] (https://cdn2.hubspot.net/ 
hubfs/2359661/NEOS_Manifest_RGBweb.pdf?t=1527245784173). 
Beside these attempts to 
regain trust and demonstrate 
a willingness to strengthen 
direct democracy, the 2017 
Austrian election campaign 
also saw efforts by political 
parties to (re)brand 
themselves as movements, 
unlike traditional party 
politics which have been 
perceived as removed from 
people. 
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but managed to pass the threshold to get into Parliament. It chooses 
to strengthen representative democracy by suggesting to voters that 
they cast ‘minus votes’48 to show their discontent and vote political 
parties out of parliament. 
7.4 Influence of direct democratic mechanisms on 
European/EU political realities  
In the 2017 coalition agreement49 of the Austrian government 
between the ÖVP and the FPÖ, the importance of more direct 
democracy is highlighted. It is stated that political participation 
cannot be decreed unilaterally but has to grow by itself. The 
government parties call for step-by-step development of direct 
democratic elements “together with the citizens”. Two main 
reforms are addressed in detail.  
First, the advancement of popular initiatives: 100,000 eligible 
voters can start a ‘real’ legislative initiative on an equal footing with 
(hitherto existing possibilities to bring in) government bills or 
motions. This can also be done online. To prevent a successful 
popular initiative from being sidelined, it will be dealt with in 
parliamentary committees and a plenary session and broadcast on 
TV where the organisers have the right to speak. Additionally, the 
minister in charge is obliged to comment on the initiative and an 
obligatory assessment of concrete legislative initiatives is 
envisaged. After three years this procedure should be evaluated.  
As a second step, the government programme envisages 
binding referendums by 2022 if a popular initiative is supported by 
more than 900,000 eligible voters (=14%) and has not been 
implemented by Parliament within one year. To be valid, at least 
one-third of eligible voters must cast their vote in the referendum 
that is decided by absolute majority. The National Council has the 
                                                        
48 A purely hypothetical proposal in which plus or minus options might 
appear on the ballot paper. 
49 Austrian Federal Government (2017), „Zusammen. Für unser Österreich 
– Regierungsprogramm 2017-2022” [Together: For our Austria. 
Governmental Programme 2017-2022] (www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/ 
documents/131008/569203/Regierungsprogramm_2017%e2%80%932022.
pdf/b2fe3f65-5a04-47b6-913d-2fe512ff4ce6).  
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right to bring in a counterproposal to be voted upon. If this new 
procedure stands the test, the number of signatures necessary to 
launch it could be reduced gradually.  
To become reality, however, that 900,000 votes would 
automatically lead to binding referendums has yet to be accepted 
by a two-thirds majority in the Austrian Parliament because it 
would mean a change to the Austrian Constitution.50 At least one 
opposition party would have to support it, which at present seems 
rather unlikely. In the event of no sufficient parliamentary backing, 
the government wants to hold a consultation of the people on this 
issue, which again would be non-binding but could at least put 
pressure on the opposition parties if voter support is high.51 
The measures proposed differ 
greatly from those initially intended by the 
Freedom Party mentioned above, which 
also withdrew its former demand for a 
people’s vote on the ratification of CETA. 
The government programme also 
states that the constitutional court has to confirm that a consultation 
of the people does not contradict obligations Austria has assumed 
in terms of basic rights, international and European law. Any 
referendum on Austria’s membership of international 
institutions is explicitly excluded, as is Austria’s membership of 
the European Union. One can assume that Austria wants to avoid 
the experience the UK has had with the emotionally charged 
referendum on EU membership and its as yet unpredictable 
consequences.  
                                                        
50 Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [Federal Constitutional Law], Art. 44 (1) 
(https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung/Bundesnormen/10000138
/B-VG%2c%20Fassung%20vom%2017.04.2018.pdf). 
51 There has been one precedent in the case of the only consultation of the 
people held so far in 2013 on the question of introducing a professional 
army and a voluntary social year or keeping compulsory military service 
and civilian service. Following the rejection of the introduction of a 
professional army by 59.7% of voters (turnout: 52.4%), the SPÖ/ÖVP 
government decided to keep the original regulation. 
The measures proposed differ 
greatly from those initially 
intended by the Freedom 
Party. 
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Besides, a plebiscitary system as desired by the Freedom 
Party could also strengthen the parliamentary opposition, which 
would regularly launch popular 
initiatives to counter governmental 
proposals. The latter was the case with 
the popular initiative ‘Don’t smoke’52 
that was started by the Vienna Chamber 
of Physicians and Austrian Cancer Aid 
after the ÖVP/FPÖ coalition had 
repealed a law adopted by the former 
government on banning smoking in bars 
and restaurants, due to enter into force in spring 2018. Only within 
the initiating phase were 591,146 signatures of support collected – 
nearly six times more than required to be debated in parliament – 
with the official registration week and the possibility to collect 
further signatures still ahead in October 2018. Against this 
background, those advocating the ‘Don’t smoke’ initiative – 
supported by the parliamentary opposition, the Green Party and 
several organisations of civil society, for example – called on the 
government parties to remember their self-proclaimed appraisal for 
direct democratic instruments and reconsider scrapping the 
intended smoking ban or to put this question to an Austria-wide 
referendum. The Freedom Party, as the fiercest opponent of a total 
smoking ban – even making it a condition to enter the government 
– criticised the popular initiative as not being serious. It made the 
point that a referendum could only be started by 2022, as envisaged 
in the coalition agreement after passing the threshold of 900,000 
signatures of support. FPÖ leader Heinz-Christian Strache again 
stated that he personally would be ready to introduce such a 
referendum at once – combining it with other referendums on 
CETA, the EU as a transfer (debt) union and the compulsory licence 
fee for the Austrian broadcaster ORF.53  
                                                        
52 See www.dontsmoke.at/. 
53 See www.kurier.at/politik/inland/strache-will-ganzes-paket-
volksabstimmungen-oevp-sei-dagegen/311.853.173. 
A plebiscitary system as 
desired by the Freedom Party 
could strengthen the 
parliamentary opposition, 
which would regularly launch 
popular initiatives to counter 
governmental proposals. 
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Conclusions 
Various direct democracy instruments exist in Austria at the 
national, regional and local level. Yet, calls to strengthen direct 
democracy have grown steadily as an expression of doubt about the 
ability and legitimacy of representative democracy to tackle global 
challenges and defend the people’s will. This is especially true of 
citizens’ involvement at the national level and issues related to the 
European integration process. EU-related issues have rarely been a 
matter of direct citizen involvement: the referendum on EU 
membership was the only time Austrians had a legally binding say 
and the non-binding instrument of a people’s consultation has not 
been used once. Popular initiatives have been conducted more often 
but have proved to be a rather blunt instrument, easily sidelined by 
politics. 
Against this background, one could argue that calls for more 
direct democracy are justified. Indeed, stronger citizen involvement 
via direct democracy instruments can represent a meaningful 
supplement to the system of representative democracy. However, 
experience shows that non-binding direct democratic instruments 
have had little impact and serve more as a tool for mobilisation – 
often for opposition parties; as a placebo to keep up the pretence of 
citizens’ involvement. Debates on how to take successful initiatives 
more seriously should thus be intensified – not only at the national 
but also at the European level in the case of the European citizens’ 
initiative.   
Yet it would be neither wise nor simple for Austria to copy-
paste the Swiss system, given the differences in political systems of 
the two countries, the long-term experiences with direct democracy 
of Austria’s western neighbour and the challenges that even 
Switzerland faces regarding the implementation of the results of 
popular votes. 
Direct democracy can be a useful instrument when citizens 
are directly involved and can evaluate the concrete implications of 
their decision, as is often the case at local or regional level. But 
considering the complexity of most EU matters – take for example 
the topics of free trade agreements – and the possible implications 
for related areas, it is questionable whether such broad topics 
should be decided by a simple Yes or No vote. Experience shows 
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that such votes can also be easily influenced by political and (social) 
media campaigning, e.g. in the case of the Brexit referendum or the 
Netherlands vote on Ukraine’s EU accession, and are used as an 
opportunity to protest against the 
government or by the government itself 
to campaign for an issue, e.g. the 
instrument of national consultations in 
Hungary. They are characterised by 
polarisation and emotion rather than an 
unbiased assessment of the pros and 
cons. The argument that ‘the people’ 
have the right instinct about what is 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’ and that their will is 
therefore more relevant than that of a 
group of experts, as is often argued by those advocating more 
referendums, cannot be regarded as valid. It is in fact a deliberate 
attempt to weaken and delegitimise the system of representative 
democracy. The political art of compromise and the attempt to 
guarantee minority rights can also be challenged by the tools of 
direct democracy. 
A wiser way to incorporate citizens’ views into the political 
decision-making process would be broad and open citizens’ 
dialogues well ahead of major decisions to explain and discuss 
possible implications. A better exchange between citizens and 
politicians could counter perceptions of a political elite not aware of 
‘ordinary’ citizens’ concerns.  Such a policy approach could increase 
trust in political decision-making and democracy in general and 
would be more effective than launching campaigns where emotions 
run high.  
A wiser way to incorporate 
citizens’ views into the 
political decision-making 
process would be broad and 
open citizens’ dialogues well 
ahead of major decisions to 
explain and discuss possible 
implications. 
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8. DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE 
POPULIST ZEITGEIST: BULGARIA 
DANIEL SMILOV & 
ANTOINETTE PRIMATAROVA 
The Bulgarian case study does not support the widespread 
hypothesis that direct democracy might be the answer to today’s 
crisis of confidence in politicians, political parties and institutions. 
Rather, the use of direct democracy in Bulgaria could be interpreted 
as a combination of the following three factors: i) party politics 
using referendums to gain competitive advantage; ii) initiatives by 
media personalities with ambitions to enter politics; iii) plebiscites 
organised by the government or head of state to rubberstamp 
particular policies. In all three instances, the demand for 
referendums has been generated strategically by specific structures 
of representative democracy or by aspiring politicians/parties. 
Introduction 
In common with other democracies, Bulgaria is seeing an increased 
demand by the public for referendums and other instruments of 
direct democracy. This demand is accompanied by significant levels 
of distrust in politicians, political parties and the Parliament – the 
key institutions of representative democracy. In these 
circumstances, it is easy to jump to the conclusion that direct 
democracy is the answer to the contemporary crisis of confidence: 
direct democracy seems to provide hope for restoring trust in 
politics more generally. The Bulgarian case study will challenge this 
bold hypothesis. 
Growing demand for direct democracy could be just the 
flipside of the populist Zeitgeist. The advent of populist politics in 
Europe has been characterised by the emergence of politicians who 
claim to reflect the will of the people as it is – without distortion or 
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any pretension to educate the electorate. The populist politician 
promises to follow the wishes of the people no matter what – 
constitutional, economic or even 
sometimes ethical constraints are to be 
overcome in the name of democracy. 
Yet on most political questions a great 
majority of people actually do need to 
rely on authority and leadership in order 
to form an opinion. Therefore, there is 
a considerable gap between the 
populist claim that politicians just 
follow the will of the people, and the 
fact that people form their views by 
relying on political authority – be it 
partisan, expert or mixed. This gap 
provides ample opportunities for 
manipulation and strategic use by 
public figures and politicians of direct 
democracy instruments. 
The chapter also looks at the 
effect of the populist Zeitgeist on the media environment and the 
challenge it presents for direct democracy. In general, a populist 
party is hardly different from a media outlet – it claims that it 
reflects, represents and transmits the opinion and preferences of 
other people – ‘the people’. Increased media influence makes the 
media crucial for the operation and the survival of politicians. When 
government decisions are announced (and probably taken) in real 
time on Twitter, it is not surprising that the line between politicians 
and media personalities is thinning, as is the line between political 
parties and TV shows. Overall, key representatives – both from the 
political and the media spheres – have been the primary users of 
instruments of direct democracy. 
8.1 The national context 
8.1.1 Historical view: referendums do not necessarily 
imply democratic rule  
Paradoxically, the first referendum (not nominally but 
substantially) in Bulgaria was held during the period of Ottoman 
On most political questions 
most people need to rely on 
authority and leadership in 
order to form an opinion. 
Therefore, there is a considerable 
gap between the populist claim 
that politicians just follow the 
will of the people, and the fact 
that people form their views by 
relying on political authority – 
be it partisan, expert or mixed. 
This gap provides ample 
opportunities for manipulation 
and strategic use by public 
figures and politicians of direct 
democracy instruments. 
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rule, prior to the proclamation of the country’s independence in 
1908, as argued by Peycheva (1996). It was decreed in 1873 by Sultan 
Abdülaziz and facilitated the legal status of the Bulgarian Exarchate 
and thus, Bulgaria’s cultural autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. 
The referendum was held in 1873-74 under the control of the 
Ottoman authorities and the ecumenical Patriarchate of 
Constantinople. Two-thirds of the Christian population in the 
territories designated by the Sultan’s decree considered themselves 
as Bulgarians. The recognition of the Bulgarian Exarchate played an 
important role in the establishment of the modern Bulgarian state 
and the proclamation of Bulgaria’s independence in 1908.  
In the wake of World War II, the Yalta Agreement facilitated 
the establishment of totalitarian rule in Bulgaria. Prior to remaining 
behind the Iron Curtain the country didn’t manage to establish a 
track record of consolidated democracy either. All three 
referendums in the period 1908-89 were held at a time of non-
democratic regimes – a semi-dictatorship in 1922 and the 
communist totalitarian regime in 1946 and 1971. None of them was 
initiated by citizens or can be considered as democratic. All three 
were held on the basis of a special law adopted for the purposes of 
the respective referendum and were initiated by the governing 
political elites. All three aimed to legitimise the position and power 
of the governing politicians. Slavov (2010) considers the three 
referendums as plebiscites on the basis of a typology distinguishing 
between referendums (initiated by citizens) and plebiscites 
(initiated by politicians).   
 The purpose of the 19 November 1922 referendum, initiated 
by the government of the agrarian populist leader Alexander 
Stambolijski, was to authorise criminal charges against 
members of the government and politicians with regard to 
their alleged involvement in the national catastrophes of 1913 
and 1918.   
 The purpose of the 8 September 1946 referendum was to 
abolish the monarchy and to proclaim the People’s Republic 
of Bulgaria – a communist state set up under Soviet 
supervision. 
 The purpose of the 16 May 1971 referendum was to endorse 
Zhivkov’s constitution (Zhivkov being the Bulgarian 
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communist dictator) with its Article 1 enshrining the leading 
role of the Communist Party.  
Considerations about the role of direct democracy at the level of 
municipalities resulted in the early adoption, in 1909, of a law on 
consulting the people on local (municipal) issues, but this law was 
abolished after the coup d’état in 1934. Every citizen had the right 
to initiate a referendum and this very liberal provision allowed the 
launch of many local referendums on rather minor issues. 
The first Bulgarian law with regard to direct democracy, 
either at the national or local level, was adopted in 1983 and 
published in State Gazette (1983).  For the first time Article 5 (3) 
allowed citizens to take the initiative (the quorum being 30,000 
citizens) but during the 13 years the law was in effect (until 1996) 
the provision was never used at the national level.  
8.1.2 Direct democracy in post-communist democratic 
Bulgaria 
The Bulgarian Constitution does not provide for mandatory 
referendums. 
In post-communist Bulgaria the first attempt to introduce 
direct democracy was the new law on consulting the people, as 
published in the State Gazette (1996). It backtracked on the right of 
citizens to initiate a national referendum. This right was preserved 
for the Council of Ministers, the president or a minimum of 60 
members of parliament.   
NGOs and some politicians made several attempts to put the 
adoption of substantial amendments to the 1996 law on the agenda 
of the 39th National Assembly (2001-05) but no amendments 
towards facilitating direct democracy were introduced. In 2006 
Balkan Assist (a Bulgarian association for partnership and citizen 
action) started drafting a new law in close cooperation with several 
Bulgarian local authority associations. Their work was based on 
research of legislation and practice in other countries, mainly 
Switzerland. In early 2008 a group of MPs agreed to submit the draft 
law to the National Assembly. On 3 July 2008 the law was adopted 
at first reading but the finally approved and published law in the 
State Gazette (2009) introduced major amendments that distorted 
its philosophy (according to the authors of the draft): 
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 A threshold of 200,000 signatures (instead of 150,000) in order 
to let the National Assembly consider a citizens’ initiative for 
a national referendum;  
 A threshold of 500,000 signatures (instead of 300,000) to make 
the holding of a national referendum mandatory (in 2017 the 
number of eligible voters was 6,810,341); 
 Introducing a quorum (in relation to the turnout at preceding 
national and local elections) to consider the results of a 
referendum binding;  
 Broadening the scope of issues that cannot be subject to a 
referendum (i.e. issues that would require a decision by a 
Grand National Assembly; international treaties that have 
been ratified by the National Assembly, taxation, financial 
issues, etc.).    
Supporters of direct democracy consider as obstacles to its 
functioning the relatively high threshold of signatures needed to 
make a referendum compulsory, the relatively short period of time 
(three months) to collect the required number of signatures, and the 
high quorum for considering the 
results of a referendum binding. 
A new Article 14 (2), an 
amendment enshrined in the State 
Gazette (2015), provides for easier 
merging of referendum initiatives 
with general, local or presidential 
elections. This is to encourage higher 
turnout at referendums to reach the 
high quorum required for making the 
outcome of a referendum binding.  
The 2009 law on the direct 
participation of citizens in the governance of the state and locally 
provides for four different instruments of direct democracy: 
 Referendum (can be applied both at the national and 
municipal level)  
 Citizens’ initiative (can be applied both at the national and 
municipal level) 
Supporters of direct democracy 
consider as obstacles to its 
functioning the relatively high 
threshold of signatures needed 
to make a referendum 
compulsory, the relatively short 
period of time (three months) to 
collect the required number of 
signatures, and the high 
quorum for considering the 
results of a referendum binding. 
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 European Citizens’ Initiative (provisions for the participation 
of Bulgarians in the ECI were introduced in 2012, after the 
adoption of Regulation(EU) No 211/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council) 
 Common assembly of the population (can be applied at the 
municipal level only). 
A ‘parliamentary petition’ as an instrument of direct democracy is 
not explicitly included in Bulgaria’s legislation. Under the law on 
direct participation of citizens in the governance of the state and 
locally the citizens’ initiative has a much 
broader scope (it can be an initiative 
addressing proposals not only to the 
Parliament but also to other national or 
municipal institutions). In order to be 
considered by the Parliament or any 
other relevant national institution, the 
citizens’ initiative has to be launched by an assembly of 50 eligible 
voters and conducted by an ‘initiative committee’ elected by the 
same assembly and composed of seven members, including a 
chairperson. A committee in Parliament is in charge of relations 
with NGOs and citizens’ complaints but, depending upon the scope 
of the citizens’ initiative, they might be addressed to individual 
parliamentary committees. 
Recently, the internet and social media have allowed a 
mushrooming of petitions that function more as publicity 
instruments than instruments of direct democracy. The websites 
https://www.peticiq.com and http://grajdanskapeticia.com 
enable any individual to launch a petition and facilitate the 
collection of signatures in support of that petition. Social media 
offers great publicity opportunities for any petition launched on 
these two websites. But petitions launched through these websites 
do not meet the legal requirements for an eligible citizens’ initiative. 
Regardless of the easy outreach provided by the internet and social 
media, support for the petitions launched on these two websites 
mostly remains in the thousands. Furthermore, a number of 
petitions are not compatible with democratic standards (e.g. to ban 
the annual LGBT Pride parade in Sofia, or to ban the Bulgarian 
Helsinki Committee etc.). 
A ‘parliamentary petition’ 
as an instrument of direct 
democracy is not explicitly 
included in Bulgaria’s 
legislation.  
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Awareness of petitions addressed to the European Parliament 
is growing but this is not accompanied by a growing confidence in 
the effectiveness of the instrument, especially when the subject of a 
petition falls within the competence of member states themselves. 
A recent case well covered by Bulgarian media was a petition from 
the Association of Bulgarian Schools Abroad. The petition was 
avidly supported by all Bulgarian MEPs. Its charge was the fact that 
most EU countries do not provide opportunities for language exams 
at graduation from secondary school in any other than language 
than the main ones studied (i.e. English, French, German, Spanish 
and Italian), which it considered to be a hindrance to pupils’ 
mobility. It therefore called for the option for language exams to be 
held in so-called minor languages (such as Bulgarian). Given that 
educational issues fall under national competences, it was clear that 
there could not be any binding EU solution to the problem. Another 
petition to the European Parliament promoted by Bulgarian ALDE 
MEP Ilhan Kyuchyuk was closed after a short period of time. It 
asked for support to campaign in 
Turkish during elections in Bulgaria, 
which contradicts the constitutional 
provision that political campaigns have 
to be conducted in the official language 
of the country, i.e. Bulgarian, (although 
under the ECHR Bulgaria has to provide 
opportunities for campaigning in languages other than Bulgarian). 
Bulgarian legislation does not provide for a recall of 
parliamentarians/executives as an instrument of direct democracy. 
At a time of growing distrust in politicians this has been a recurring 
issue but its introduction would require constitutional 
amendments.  
National referendums 
On the basis of the 2009 law on the direct participation of citizens in 
national and local governance, 24 proposals for a referendum have 
been registered, seven of them including more than one question 
and several of them overlapping in substance (e.g. introducing the 
possibility for citizens to vote online; abolishing or lowering 
subsidies for political parties; questions related to energy 
production and supply).  
Bulgarian legislation does 
not provide for a recall of 
parliamentarians/executives 
as an instrument of direct 
democracy.  
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Most initiatives failed to reach the threshold required to make 
a referendum compulsory (e.g. a proposal in 2010 to hold a 
referendum opposing Turkey’s membership in the EU). Some 
initiatives were registered but the Initiative Committee did not 
submit any signatures (e.g. for a proposal in 2010 to oblige the 
Bulgarian government to renegotiate agricultural subsidies with the 
EU a proposal in 2013 to question landownership by foreigners or 
foreign-owned businesses).  
Three national referendums have been held so far on the basis 
of the 2009 law, the first and the third marked by numerous scandals 
both before and afterwards. None reached the quorum required to 
make the results binding. The 2016 referendum missed the quorum 
by just 11,500 votes, which meant that the results were contested by 
the initiators but there was no public outcry. The three referendums 
were: 
– In January 2013, on the construction of a new nuclear power 
plant (turnout 20.22%; 60.60% ‘for’; 37.96% ‘against’); the 
referendum was held without being linked to another 
election; 
– In October 2015, on the introduction of online voting (69.5% 
‘for’; 25.99% ‘against’); the referendum was held alongside 
municipal elections (turnout for the referendum 39.67%; 
turnout for the municipal elections 53.60%) 
– In November 2016, with three questions on the introduction 
of i) a majoritarian voting system with absolute majority in 
two rounds (71.95% ‘for’; 16.05% ‘against’); ii) compulsory 
voting in elections and referendums (61.89% ‘for’; 25.96% 
‘against’), and iii) setting the subsidy for political parties to 
one Bulgarian lev, i.e. down from 11 (72.16% ‘for’, 15.02% 
‘against’); the referendum was held in parallel with the 
presidential elections (turnout in the referendum 50.86%; 
turnout in the presidential elections 57.47%). 
The 2013 referendum was the first national referendum to be held 
in post-communist democratic Bulgaria. It started as an initiative of 
the Bulgarian Socialist Party and remained closely linked to one of 
the few controversial issues on the eve of Bulgaria’s accession to the 
EU – the early closure of units 1-4 of the nuclear power plant 
Kozloduy, which was deemed by many to be a huge economic 
setback for the country. In order to make the Kozloduy ‘sacrifice’ 
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more acceptable, in 2002 the Saxecoburgotski government decided 
to relaunch the project for a second nuclear power plant in Belene – 
a project abandoned in 1991 because of safety concerns in the wake 
of the Chernobyl disaster. In early 2012, ten years after the relaunch 
of Belene, Borisov’s government decided once again to abandon 
Belene as an economically unsustainable project. The Socialists 
opposed the decision. They regarded it as an opportunity to revive 
pro-Russian sentiments and old fears of high electricity prices. More 
than 500,000 signatures were collected, which made the holding of 
the referendum mandatory. In order to defeat Borisov and his party 
GERB managed to modify the question in a way that blurred its 
meaning so that a Yes or No answer was subject to different 
interpretations.  
The media and biased experts compounded the confusion.  
The referendum was held on a factual question: whether or not NPP 
Belene could be profitable. The experts of one of the main parties 
(BSP) argued that it would be profitable, while the experts of the 
other party (GERB) argued precisely the opposite. Thus, the public 
was asked to decide on a complex matter on which they could have 
no authoritative knowledge. 
Most Bulgarians thus 
decided that the best way to avoid 
being misused by the main 
political players was to invalidate 
the referendum through low 
turnout (if turnout was below 20% 
Parliament would have no 
obligation to consider the 
outcome). The 20.22% turnout obliged Parliament only to discuss 
the issue without being bound by the outcome of the referendum. 
Consequently, the National Assembly duly discussed the issue 
without changing its mind. Instead of convincing people of the 
advantages or direct democracy, the Belene referendum was thus a 
big flop. 
Extremely low levels of trust in politicians and political 
institutions and rather low levels of turnout in elections confirm 
analyses that there is a crisis of representative democracy in 
Bulgaria. This is the backdrop to understanding many of the 
proposals and discussions around introducing some kind of 
Most Bulgarians decided that the 
best way to avoid being misused by 
the main political players was to 
invalidate the referendum through 
low turnout (if turnout was below 
20% Parliament would have no 
obligation to consider the outcome). 
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majoritarian vote, compulsory voting, and voting online (that 
would facilitate participation for the Bulgarian diaspora) etc. 
On 30 January 2014, President Plevneliev used his right to 
propose a referendum with three questions related to the 
introduction of majoritarian voting, compulsory voting and online 
voting. Furthermore, he proposed to hold the referendum on the 
same day as the European elections. No agreement was reached in 
Parliament to merge the referendum with the European elections, 
partly because of speculation about the advantages and 
disadvantages for the different political players.  
The reluctance of Parliament to decide on a referendum 
provoked the only case of genuine mobilisation of civil society with 
regard to referendum initiatives. Politicians were involved in the 
Initiative Committee as well but civil society was really active. In 
early 2014, 570,029 signatures were collected in under three months 
in support of a referendum on the three questions suggested by 
President Plevneliev. Yet, even in this case one of the main parties – 
GERB – was actively involved in the collection of signatures. After 
all necessary checking of data, 463,326 signatures were declared 
valid, i.e. below the threshold of 500,000 (a year later, in July 2015, 
the threshold was lowered to 400,000). Because of mounting 
pressure parliament finally decided to hold a referendum on just the 
question of online voting simultaneously with the municipal 
elections in October 2015. Although support remained below the 
quorum needed to make the result binding, Parliament adopted a 
decision to work towards introducing online voting. Technical and 
security arguments have so far prevented this, however. It is still 
doubtful whether the 2019 European election will provide such a 
possibility – most probably not.    
The 2016 referendum on the introduction of a majoritarian 
electoral system in Bulgaria is an example of the huge potential of 
media and aspiring politicians to form public opinion while at the 
same time claiming to be only the mouthpiece for people’s beliefs. 
Slavi Trifonov, the host of a popular TV show (broadcast on the bTV 
channel since 2000 every weekday evening), picked this issue, along 
with other popular themes such as the reduction of the number of 
MPs and the abolition of public funding for political parties. These 
issues were then discussed for months on end on his primetime TV 
programme and the message was unambiguous: the introduction of 
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such measures would solve most of the problems of Bulgarian 
democracy – from corruption to widespread distrust in politicians. 
In essence, Trifonov used the resources of the biggest commercial 
television in the country to form – and indeed manipulate – public 
attitudes in a specific direction.   
Trifonov has never denied allegations that he might enter 
politics proper. His popularity, his show and the mood of protest 
among citizens facilitated the collection of the necessary signatures. 
Trifonov envisaged a profound overhaul of the political system on 
the basis of six legislative changes, one being online voting (already 
subject to the 2015 referendum), two being in conflict with the 
Constitution and the rest subject to well-argued criticism. Because 
of Trifonov’s media power, MPs 
preferred not to get on the wrong side 
of him. They tried to prevent holding 
the referendum at the same time as 
the presidential elections but 
endorsed all six questions submitted 
by Trifonov and his team. President 
Plevneliev however referred the 
questions to the Constitutional Court, 
which found three of them 
unconstitutional (most notably, the 
reduction of the number of MPs and 
the direct election of police directors). 
After numerous scandals, three out of 
the six original questions were 
subjected to a referendum alongside the presidential elections. 
Public support for all three issues was a clear anti-system protest 
vote and put pressure on the government to consider a reform of 
the electoral law. Trifonov and his team staged several protests 
against Parliament for its alleged ‘neglect of the people’s vote’ but 
didn’t manage to mobilise people to protest themselves.  
The 2009 law allows a consideration of the issue at stake on 
the basis of the number of Yes responses. This has repeatedly 
resulted in odd formulations or reformulations of the questions. 
More recent initiatives for national referendums in Bulgaria 
continue to follow the line of populist abuse of the referendum idea 
by politicians and wannabe politicians.  
TV show host Slavi Trifonov 
envisaged a profound overhaul 
of the political system on the 
basis of six legislative changes, 
one being online voting 
(already subject to the 2015 
referendum), two being in 
conflict with the Constitution 
and the rest subject to well-
argued criticism. Because of 
Trifonov’s media power, MPs 
preferred not to get on the 
wrong side of him. 
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On 25 January 2018, a group of Socialists MPs (headed by the 
chairwoman of the party) registered an 
initiative to put to a referendum the 
question: “Do you support a ratification 
of the Council of Europe ‘Convention on 
preventing and combating violence 
against women and domestic violence’?” 
A few days later the same group 
withdrew the question and registered an 
initiative with the reformulation: “Are 
you against the ratification of the so-called Istanbul Convention of 
11th May 2011?” As its official name suggests, this Convention is a 
Council of Europe instrument for the prevention of violence against 
women and domestic violence. The Socialists argued, however, that 
its use of the terms ‘gender and ‘gender identity’ were problematic 
and could lead, among other things, to the legalisation of a ‘third 
sex’ or ‘same-sex marriages’. Despite experts’ arguments that the 
conventions did not require any such legislation, the Socialists 
argued vehemently against it as an instrument peddling ‘gender 
ideology’. This initiative represents an apparent paradox – a 
Socialist Party member of the PES attempted to prevent the 
ratification of a landmark piece of legislation on the basis of 
essentially homophobic arguments. This paradox is explained by 
the sharp turn of the Bulgarian Socialist Party towards conservative, 
national-populist positions, which make it only nominally a 
European centre-left party. 
8.1.3 Experience with participatory democracy 
The desire to hold a referendum is closely linked to divisions in 
society. Deliberative polling – a unique form of political 
consultation that combines public opinion research techniques and 
public deliberation to construct hypothetical representations of 
what opinion on a particularly divisive issue might be if citizens 
were more informed – was conducted in Bulgaria by the Centre for 
Liberal Strategies on two occasions: in 2002 (on policies to fight 
crime), and in 2007 (on policies towards Roma in Bulgaria). 
This form of participatory democracy demonstrated that 
opposition and prejudices against reasonable policies can be 
More recent initiatives for 
national referendums in 
Bulgaria continue to follow 
the populist abuse of the 
referendum idea by 
politicians and wannabe 
politicians.  
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decisively softened on the basis of 
proper information and profound 
debate between proponents and 
opponents.  
Inspired by the two national 
deliberative polls, in 2008 Bulgarian 
national TV adopted a modified form, 
a kind of ‘deliberative polling lite’, and 
designed a programme (running 
weekly except during winter and 
summer holidays) with the title 
‘Referendum’. The programme is 
conducted in cooperation with the 
well-established polling agency Alpha Research. The ‘Referendum’ 
team chose a hot topic every week and invited proponents and 
opponents, experts and politicians, for debate in the studio. Alpha 
Research polls a representative sample of people on the discussion 
topic both before and towards the end of the programme and any 
shift of opinion is discussed at the end of the programme. Politicians 
of course have no obligation to take account of the results of the TV 
‘referendum’ but for ten years it has developed into a forum for ‘the 
voice of the people’.    
8.2 The EU dimension 
Bulgaria joined the European Union in 2007 without holding a pre-
accession referendum.  
The start of accession negotiations in 2000 was formulated by 
the Prime Minister Ivan Kostov as representing the second most 
important shift in Bulgaria’s modern history after the proclamation 
of independence in 1908. From late 1989 onwards, virtually all 
Bulgarian politicians paid lip service to EU membership as a top-
priority matter of national interest. But before 1997 Bulgaria was 
rather slow to introduce economic reforms on its own. Because of 
the stop-and-go national policies between 1990 and 1997, Bulgaria’s 
transition agenda was shaped in parallel with its EU accession 
agenda between 1997 and accession in 2007. The EU accession 
agenda became Bulgaria’s modernisation tool and was thus highly 
important. Mobilisation to comply with EU membership 
requirements resulted in a certain neglect of policies that are more 
Deliberative polling – a unique 
form of political consultation 
that combines public opinion 
research techniques and public 
deliberation to construct 
hypothetical representations of 
what opinion on a particularly 
divisive issue might be if 
citizens were more informed – 
was conducted in Bulgaria by 
the Centre for Liberal 
Strategies on two occasions. 
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of a national than a European competence (namely education, 
culture, health, pensions, and social security etc.) during the pre-
accession period. Naturally, after accession all these issues moved 
to the top of the political agenda and came to dominate both 
national and EU elections. 
One of Bulgaria’s paradoxes is that Bulgarians seem to be 
unhappy with the transition but are rather happy with the country’s 
EU membership. According to Eurobarometer (2017), 57% of 
Bulgarians have a positive image of the 
European Union (much higher than 
the EU28 average of 40% and as high as 
82% among people under 24!). Only 
14% have a negative image of the EU. 
Moreover, Bulgarians tend to support 
deeper integration within the 
European Union (with regard to a common defence and security 
policy: 75%; a common migration policy: 68%; a common foreign 
and security policy: 66%; and further enlargement: 52.5%). Alpha 
Research (2014) registered rather high levels of appreciation of life 
before 1989 and low levels of appreciation of social and economic 
life post-1989.  For many Bulgarians the EU represents a beacon of 
democratic standards and successful economic policies. According 
to Eurobarometer (2017), 61% of Bulgarians consider the economic 
situation in the European Union to be positive but only 18% 
consider the situation in their own country positively. However, 
Alpha Research (2017) registers a cautious optimism with regard to 
economic developments in Bulgaria itself.  
High support for Bulgaria’s EU 
membership did not and does not go 
hand in hand with a high level of 
knowledge about the different EU 
policies and the rationale behind 
them. These circumstances allowed 
virtually all small anti-system 
populist players (and even 
mainstream players) to use and abuse the opportunity to dispute 
certain provisions in Bulgaria’s Accession Treaty after the country 
joined  the EU. In most cases the EU and its institutions were not so 
much the target of populist criticism as the Bulgarian politicians that 
One of Bulgaria’s paradoxes is 
that Bulgarians seem to be 
unhappy with the transition 
but are rather happy with the 
country’s EU membership. 
High support for Bulgaria’s EU 
membership did not and does 
not go hand in hand with a 
high level of knowledge about 
the different EU policies and 
the rationale behind them. 
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negotiated the Accession Treaty. Some of the issues being 
repeatedly taken up are the early closure of units 1-4 of the nuclear 
power plant Kozloduy, levels of payments for agricultural 
producers, rates of excise duties for alcohol produced by small 
breweries, Bulgaria’s post-accession EU monitoring under the 
Cooperation and Verification of Progress Mechanism (CVM), and 
land ownership regulation.  
Lack of information about which policies fall within the 
competence of the EU can be easily used and abused to foster 
unsustainable hopes. In early 2014 Bulgaria’s trade union, CITOB, 
succeeded in mobilising 30,000 Bulgarians to sign the European 
Citizens’ Initiative for an Unconditional Basic Income (UBI). 
Bulgaria exceeded the national eligible target level of participation 
but since the UBI initiative fell far short of the one million signatures 
required for consideration by the Commission, there was no official 
European reaction to the initiative. The organisers were enthusiastic 
about the level of mobilisation but in a country like Bulgaria an 
initiative with an unrealistic goal can undermine trust in the EU. 
Grassroots initiatives to mobilise support for other European 
Citizens’ Initiatives had little success, as illustrated by the level of 
support for the four successful ECIs.   
Table 8.1 Levels of support in Bulgaria for four successful ECIs 
Title of the successful ECI Number of 
signatories 
from Bulgaria 
Threshold counted 
among the required 
seven member states 
Water and sanitation are a 
human right! Water is a 
public good, not a 
commodity! 
1,406 13, 500 
 
One of us 906 13, 500 
Stop vivisection 12, 598 13, 500 
Ban glyphosate and protect 
people and the 
environment from toxic 
pesticides 
552 12, 750 
 
In general, EU issues trigger political party positioning, attract 
media coverage and play a role in national elections only when they 
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have a real or perceived impact on Bulgaria and its citizens. As an 
external border of the EU, Bulgaria has high stakes in the EU’s 
migration and common border 
control policies. Although Bulgaria 
was hardly affected by the 2015 
refugee crisis, the way the crisis was 
handled fuelled nationalist and 
populist reactions. Nevertheless, 
the government did not join the 
Visegrad countries in their open 
opposition to a common European solution of the crisis.   
With populism and anti-globalism on the rise all over Europe, 
tense relations between the EU and Russia, and hybrid threats 
against the EU, there is an increase of EU issues that are represented 
in the public discourse as threats for Bulgaria. The Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the EU-Canada Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and last but not least 
sanctions against Russia have provoked serious political 
polarisation in Bulgaria. 
EU policies and decisions that could be interpreted as 
applying ‘double standards’ (justifiably or not) have the potential to 
stoke up political and public 
scepticism. Instances of perceived 
double standards include the EU’s 
reluctance to admit Bulgaria to the 
Schengen area and to the ERM II as a 
first step to joining the euro (being 
outside Schengen and outside the euro 
raises the possible danger of drifting 
away to the marginalised political periphery), but more recently 
also discussions on the Posted Workers Directive (especially the 
application of the ‘Mobility package’ to drivers and transport 
companies) and different ingredients in food stuffs of the same 
brand. 
EU issues trigger political party 
positioning, attract media 
coverage and play a role in 
national elections only when they 
have a real or perceived impact 
on Bulgaria and its citizens. 
EU policies and decisions that 
could be interpreted as 
applying ‘double standards’ 
(justifiably or not) have the 
potential to stoke up political 
and public scepticism. 
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8.3 Influence of direct democracy on national 
political realities 
Direct democracy doesn’t play a formal role in the shaping of 
political realities in Bulgaria but populist and nationalist players 
that are part of it often instrumentalise people’s discontent with the 
current political system. 
In general, accession to the EU has played a decisive role in 
shaping the political landscape of Bulgaria. Early on, the main 
political players were eager to seek affiliation with the three big 
political families – EPP, PES and ALDE. The incumbent 
government, a coalition between GERB (EPP member) and the 
United Patriots (itself a coalition between three nationalist parties) 
is the first government since Bulgaria’s accession to the EU in 2007 
that does not have a full affiliation to one or more of the three big 
pro-European political families. Both PES and ALDE have, on 
several occasions, criticised GERB for entering into coalition with 
the United Patriots, whereas EPP has preferred to adopt a low 
profile on this coalition format. 
The painful transition and the perception that the Bulgarian 
political elite is corrupt provided fertile ground for populist and 
nationalist anti-establishment players of different colours, even in 
the late 1990s, as discussed by Krastev (2007) and Krasteva (2013). 
Since 2001, general elections in Bulgaria have been marked by a 
succession of new political players promoted by the Europe-wide 
populist movement. As outsiders to the political establishment, they 
benefited from creating an image of siding with ordinary people 
against the incumbent political elites but, in most cases, this image 
started to wear thin as soon as they made it into Parliament or into 
government. The soft populists among them were easily and 
eagerly integrated into the pro-European mainstream. Into this 
category falls the former King of Bulgaria, Simeon Saxecoburgotski, 
the new political star in 2001, replaced in 2009 by his former 
bodyguard, Boyko Borisov. Back in 2001, Simeon Saxecoburgotski 
won a landslide victory with his ‘National Movement Simeon the 
Second’ (NDSV) (winning 120 out of 240 seats) on a wave of soft 
populism, but without stirring either nationalism or 
Euroscepticism. On the contrary, his government continued and 
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concluded the EU accession negotiations and his party joined the 
ALDE political family.  
In the 2009 general elections, GERB, the party emerging from 
Boyko Borisov’s ‘Citizens for the European development of 
Bulgaria’ movement narrowly missed the majority (117 out of 240 
seats) and was eagerly admitted to the EPP. After serving as 
Bulgaria’s prime minister in 2009-13, Borisov once again became 
head of the government from November 2014 to January 2017 and 
since May 2017 is prime minister for 
the third time.   
In a political landscape that 
increasingly calls for coalition-
building, in recent years political 
engineering has produced a number 
of small anti-establishment players 
with a vague ideology but strong 
economic interests in political 
brokering. Most of these parties are 
hybrid media-political structures. 
Two such parties have emerged on the 
basis of a single TV company SKAT – namely Ataka and the 
National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria. Another television 
company, TV7, produced a party of its own by turning its executive 
director into a party leader (Barekov’s ‘Bulgaria without 
Censorship’). At the time of writing another TV personality: Slavi 
Trifonov, is in the process of entering politics. 
Just one month after the signing of Bulgaria’s accession treaty 
in May 2005, the June 2005 general elections catapulted the first hard 
populist party associated with Euroscepticism in Bulgaria into the 
National Assembly (with 21 out of 240 seats in the parliament). A 
proponent of anti-globalism and anti-capitalism, Ataka is a typical 
protest party - xenophobic, homophobic, anti-Turkish, anti-Semitic, 
anti-NATO and Eurosceptic. It is one of the partners in the United 
Patriots coalition involved in the incumbent government. Ataka 
was not in formal coalition with the Socialists in the minority 
government 2013-14 (built with the mandate of ALDE member DPS) 
but was dependent upon its support. 
In the 2014 European election a populist coalition sent two 
MEPs to the European Parliament (without running on an explicitly 
In a political landscape that 
increasingly calls for 
coalition-building, in recent 
years political engineering has 
produced a number of small 
anti-establishment players 
with a vague ideology but 
strong economic interests in 
political brokering.  
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Eurosceptic ballot) that were eagerly accepted into the European 
Conservatives and Reformists Group. 
The most recent populist newcomer to the Bulgarian 
Parliament, Mareshki with his Volya party, claimed to be on the 
way to apply for EPP membership in spring 2017 but on 1 May 2018 
attended a rally of far-right European partners in southern France, 
led by Marine Le Pen. 
In the first post-communist years the main cleavage in 
Bulgaria was between communists and anti-communists. With 
populism and nationalism on the rise, current splits tend to form 
along the liberals vs conservatives line, which sometimes overlap 
with the pro- vs anti-European division.  
8.4 Influence of direct democratic mechanisms on 
EU political realities 
Bulgaria joined NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007 without holding 
a referendum. Since referendums were held in virtually all acceding 
EU members that were part of the fifth enlargement (except in 
Cyprus and in Romania), the issue was occasionally discussed in 
Bulgaria.  
Most persistent on the issue of holding a referendum on 
Bulgaria’s EU membership was President Parvanov, having first 
raised it in January 2004 and then again even after the ratification of 
Bulgaria’s accession treaty on 11 May 2005, with 231 votes ‘for’, two 
abstentions, and one single vote ‘against’.1  
President Parvanov insisted not simply on holding a 
referendum but on holding it on the eve of Bulgaria’s accession to 
the EU, i.e. in the autumn of 2006, after signing and ratifying the 
accession treaty. He was immediately suspected of either wanting 
to sabotage Bulgaria’s accession to the EU or aiming to hold the 
referendum simultaneously with the 2006 presidential elections, 
thereby facilitating his own re-election for a second mandate.  
In January 2004 Parvanov’s proposal for the referendum was 
turned down by all political parties except the Socialists, but later 
that year several of them took up the idea themselves. They each 
made different calculations to facilitate their own re-election in the 
                                                        
1 The Bulgarian Parliament has 240 members. 
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2005 general elections. The Socialists didn’t oppose Parvanov’s 
initial proposal in January 2004, but later they did oppose holding a 
referendum on Bulgaria’s EU accession without a prior referendum 
on the early closure of NPP Kozloduy’s units 1-4 – a precondition 
for the start of negotiations in 2000. All in all, because of partisan 
wrangling, there was no referendum on Bulgaria’s EU accession in 
the end. The main reason for this was that there could be few doubts 
about the positive outcome of such a referendum. Neither could 
there be any doubt that a national referendum on the early closure 
of units 1-4 of the Kozloduy NPP would result in a No for the 
agreement. Holding the two referendums would therefore make it 
clear that one cannot have one’s cake and eat it.  
Yet the political debates around the different options did a lot 
of harm to citizens’ trust in politicians. Furthermore, the way 
politicians shunned the responsibility of explaining the rationale 
behind the EU’s insistence on the Kozloduy issue paved the way for 
continuing debates around nuclear power and energy in general, in 
an irrational and populist way. The first-ever referendum in post-
communist Bulgaria cannot be properly understood without taking 
into account the use and abuse of the Kozloduy card in the run-up 
to Bulgaria’s EU accession. 
Recent referendums in other EU member states have not 
triggered a debate on the advantages or disadvantages of direct 
democracy. They were mainly considered from the point of view of 
Bulgaria’s national interest as an EU member: namely, the country’s 
aspirations to join the eurozone or the right to free movement for 
Bulgarian citizens.  
The Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty in 2001 and the 
Dutch and the French referendums on the European Constitution in 
2005 were considered in Bulgaria mainly as potentially endangering 
Bulgaria’s accession to the EU. The spectre of the ‘Polish plumber’ 
during the campaign in France was perceived as an instance of 
hostility towards new member states and candidate countries alike. 
The July 2015 Greek bailout referendum (and the Greek crisis 
in general) has been perceived mainly from the perspective of 
whether it could have a negative economic and financial impact on 
Bulgaria because of the Greek ownership of some Bulgarian banks.  
With regard to the Brexit referendum, the Leave campaign 
was presented in Bulgaria as very much a populist one based on 
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fake data, manipulation and outright lies, not least with regard to 
citizens moving to the UK from Eastern Europe in general, and 
Bulgaria in particular. No serious demands to follow in the UK’s 
footsteps were registered in Bulgaria. In 
the eventuality of a referendum on 
remaining in or leaving the EU, 82% of 
Bulgarians would have voted Remain 
and 18% Leave, according to Gallup 
International (2015), compared to the 
EU14 average of 68% for Remain and 
32% for Leave in the 14 countries polled 
(Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Sweden, UK).   
After the Brexit referendum in June 2016, the same question 
provoked more uncertainty – 75% of Bulgarians would have voted 
Remain and 25% Leave; a result that proves that attitudes towards 
the EU are determined not only by national circumstances but also 
by international developments and discourse. 
As regards the Hungarian 2016 referendum on the 
reallocation of refugees, it was the marginal Bulgarian Union for 
Direct Democracy that suggested that Bulgaria should organise a 
similar referendum but they used the opportunity to criticise the 
high threshold and quorum under the current law that does not 
facilitate the holding of such a referendum.  
8.4.1 Level of (dis)alignment with political families in 
the European Parliament 
Membership of the political families in the European Parliament 
was first made possible after Bulgaria’s Accession Treaty was 
signed in April 2005. The parties with representatives in the 
Bulgarian Parliament obtained observer status in the EP in autumn 
2005. Out of 18 observers only one did not join any of the three big 
political families. Seven joined the ALDE group, six joined the 
Socialists, and four the EPP group. 
In May 2007 Bulgarians were able to vote for ordinary MEPs 
for the remaining period of the EP’s mandate. The turnout was 
rather low: 28.69%. Fifteen MEPs joined the three mainstream 
The Brexit Leave campaign was 
presented in Bulgaria as a 
populist one based on fake data, 
manipulation and outright lies, 
not least with regard to citizens 
moving to the UK from Eastern 
Europe in general, and 
Bulgaria in particular. 
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parties (EPP, the Socialists and ALDE gained five Bulgarian 
members each). Three Ataka members joined the Identity, 
Tradition, Sovereignty group (that ceased to exist on 14 November 
2007). 
Turnout in the 2009 elections and the 2014 elections was 
higher – respectively 37.49% and 35.84% because both elections 
were perceived as a rehearsal for the general elections. European 
issues played a rather marginal role. Once again, the majority of 
elected Bulgarian MEPs joined the pro-European mainstream. In 
2009, out of 18 Bulgarian MEPs seven joined the EPP, five – ALDE, 
and four – the Socialists. In 2014 seven Bulgarian MEPs joined the 
EPP, four – ALDE, four – S&D, and two – the Eurosceptic ECRF.  
The fact that the major Bulgarian political parties are affiliated 
to the pro-European mainstream of EPP, PES (Bulgarian Sergey 
Stanishev being their president) and ALDE should not be 
overestimated and taken as a guarantee that Bulgaria’s political elite 
is immune to populism and Euroscepticism. The pro-European 
political groups in the European Parliament are not homogeneous. 
More and more of their members seem to be tempted to fight the 
far-left and the far-right by adopting populist positions themselves. 
A ready demonstratioin of the discrepancy between a European 
political family and its national members can be provided by the 
Bulgarian experience – on the one hand, support within PES and 
S&D for the ratification of CETA and the Council of Europe 
“Convention on preventing and combating violence against women 
and domestic violence”, on the other 
hand fierce resistance against both 
ratifications by the leadership of the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party. In a situation 
where there are no homogeneous 
political families, any discussions on 
transnational lists and the 
Spitzenkandidaten procedure won’t 
convince Bulgarian citizens that this is 
the way to increase the democratic 
legitimacy of the European Union.  
Where there are no 
homogeneous political 
families, any discussions on 
transnational lists and the 
Spitzenkandidaten procedure 
won’t convince Bulgarian 
citizens that this is the way to 
increase the democratic 
legitimacy of the European 
Union.  
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Conclusions 
The Bulgarian case study does not support the bold and widespread 
hypothesis that direct democracy might be the answer to the 
contemporary crisis of confidence in 
politicians, political parties and 
institutions. Rather, the use of direct 
democracy in Bulgaria could be 
interpreted as a combination of the 
following three factors: i) party politics 
using referendums to gain competitive 
advantage; ii) initiatives by media 
personalities with ambitions to enter 
politics; iii) plebiscites organised by 
the government or head of state to rubberstamp particular policies. 
In all three instances the demand for referendums has been 
generated strategically by specific structures of representative 
democracy or by aspiring politicians/parties. In each case the use of 
referendums has not reversed the growing trend of distrust in 
politicians. 
In Bulgaria, direct democracy instruments have been 
successfully used by two types of actors – large parties and 
influential TV shows. Both have a huge 
potential to form public opinion, which 
they do by hiding behind public 
opinion. The Bulgarian experience with 
the referendum on electoral reform 
allows us to interpret direct democracy 
instruments as a form of manipulation 
of public opinion by those with access 
to key resources, rather than as a 
triumph of the voice of the people. 
Indeed, political scientists understand that electoral reform cannot 
remedy deeply entrenched problems such as structural corruption, 
clientelism – nor could they avert oligarchic tendencies.  
Scaling down public funding is another dubious measure 
because it could increase the dependence of politicians on corporate 
interests. But if a popular TV show thinks otherwise, public opinion 
could easily become less sensitive to the complex arguments of 
political pundits. 
The Bulgarian case study does 
not support the bold and 
widespread hypothesis that 
direct democracy might be the 
answer to the contemporary 
crisis of confidence in 
politicians, political parties 
and institutions. 
In Bulgaria, direct democracy 
instruments have been 
successfully used by two types 
of actors – large parties and 
influential TV shows. Both have 
a huge potential to form public 
opinion, which they do by 
hiding behind public opinion. 
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This brings us to a more 
general point. In circumstances 
where society can rely on trusted, 
non-partisan authorities and experts 
to form opinions and preferences, 
direct democracy could be a useful 
addition to representative, partisan 
politics. But if the media and the 
expert community are also partisan, 
or people are convinced that they 
are partisan, direct democracy 
becomes yet another instrument for 
the partisan mobilisation of voters. 
Unfortunately, the populist zeitgeist suggests that Europe in 
general and Bulgaria in particular find themselves rather more in 
the second scenario. The fashionable term ‘post-truth’ is yet another 
symptom of the politicisation along partisan lines of the media, 
academia, and the expert community. This politicisation could be 
either real or perceived – crucially, the public is convinced that this 
is the case. This belief is the product of strategic actions by specific 
players. ‘Fake news’, ‘biased experts’ and attacks on meritocratic 
elites have been used as arguments to undermine most of the 
independent authorities in the public sphere. 
This ambiguity around the uses of direct democracy is a cause 
for concern in itself. It suggests that the successful introduction of 
direct democracy instruments requires improvements to the 
functioning of closely related areas such as the media, academia, the 
expert community, etc. Direct democracy is not a panacea for 
problems in these related areas – actually, it could easily become 
prey to such problems. 
All these complications underline an obvious point: direct 
democracy is no substitute for a functioning representative 
democracy. Responsible, competent representatives are key to 
present-day democracy: if they have been replaced by skilful 
manipulators, direct democracy could hardly remedy the situation. 
The hope is that societies draw the right lessons from their 
experience with direct democracy and use it in more meaningful 
ways in the future. In this regard the Bulgarian case study is not 
Where society can rely on trusted, 
non-partisan authorities and 
experts to form opinions and 
preferences, direct democracy 
could be a useful addition to 
representative, partisan politics. 
But if the media and the expert 
community are also partisan, or 
people are convinced that they are 
partisan, direct democracy becomes 
yet another instrument for the 
partisan mobilisation of voters. 
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devoid of hope for the proper use of direct democracy at the 
national level. 
As far as direct democracy at the EU level is concerned, 
experience with referendums held in the last two decades support 
Krastev’s (2017) view that: 
… in a political construction like the EU, where you have 
a lot of common policies, you have far fewer common 
politics. Where nobody can prevent member states voting 
on issues that can dramatically affect other states in the 
union, an explosion of national referendums is the fastest 
way to make the union 
ungovernable. Such an 
explosion could even trigger a 
“bank run” that could catalyse 
the breakup of the union. 
Europe can’t exist as a union of 
referendums because the EU is 
a space for negotiation while 
referendums are the final 
word of the people that preclude further negotiations. 
Referendums are therefore political instruments that can 
be easily misused by both Eurosceptic minorities and 
euro-pessimistic governments to 
block the work of the union. If the 
EU commits suicide, the weapon 
used will quite likely be a popular 
referendum or a series of popular 
referendums.  
  
Europe can’t exist as a union of 
referendums because the EU is a 
space for negotiation while 
referendums are the final word of 
the people that preclude further 
negotiations.  
If the EU commits suicide, the 
weapon used will quite likely 
be a popular referendum or a 
series of popular referendums. 
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9. CZECHIA DIRECT DEMOCRACY: 
FROM THE SHADOWS TO THE 
LIMELIGHT 
JAN KOVÁŘ, PETR KRATOCHVÍL & 
ZDENĚK SYCHRA 
Czechia has limited experience of direct democracy. While petitions 
are in use and referendums can be organised at the local and 
regional level, Czech citizens cannot vote in nationwide 
referendums and have no other direct democracy tools at their 
disposal. Calls for the wider use of direct democracy have 
multiplied, however, especially in the past five years. Direct 
democracy is promoted by challenger parties to gain electoral 
advantage and achieve political goals thought to be unachievable 
via representative democracy (namely ‘Czech-out’ – a Czech exit 
from the EU) rather than as a means to improve the quality of 
democracy and increase citizens’ involvement.  
Introduction 
As Czechia has been a typical representative democracy until 
recently, direct democracy instruments were few and their usage 
rather rare. Yet during the last five years 
direct democracy has been the subject of 
increasing attention; in some political 
circles it has come to be presented as a 
panacea for all political legitimacy 
problems. Since the wider use of direct 
democracy has been taken up 
enthusiastically by Czech populists as a 
cause célèbre, experts’ misgivings about it 
in the Czech context have only increased.   
During the last five years 
direct democracy has been 
the subject of increasing 
attention; in some political 
circles it has come to be 
presented as a panacea for all 
political legitimacy problems. 
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Even though several direct democracy instruments exist in 
the country’s legal system, they are generally considered to be 
merely additional tools that should not fundamentally shift the 
balance away from the representative aspects of democracy. This 
does not entirely preclude the possibility of new direct democracy 
instruments from being introduced, however. The country’s 
constitution defines the simple condition under which a direct 
democracy instrument (more specifically, a general referendum) 
can be adopted in its Article 2: “A constitutional law can define 
when the people exert state authority directly” (Constitution of the 
Czech Republic, 1992).  
9.1 The national context  
9.1.1 Direct democracy instruments 
Referendums 
In Article 10a, the Constitution also mentions the possibility to ratify 
an international treaty by  referendum which, again, has to be 
defined by special constitutional law (Constitution of the Czech 
Republic, 1992). Paradoxically, the special law on a general 
referendum has been discussed with remarkable frequency and 
more than a dozen legislative proposals were tabled during its 
introduction, but none has been successful. But the general 
referendum’s moment might finally have come: the current political 
climate clearly favours passing a law on a general referendum and 
the coalition partners in the new government all support this step. 
Having said this, Czechia’s only experience of national 
referendums so far is the EU accession referendum. This binding 
referendum was based on the constitutional law no. 515/2002, 
whose sole purpose was to introduce the possibility of a one-time 
referendum. However, the possibility of the law’s repeated 
application resurfaced once again in 2008 during a heated political 
debate surrounding the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. The then 
President Václav Klaus asked the Constitutional Court if a) the law 
on the referendum on EU accession could be used in the ratification 
process of the Lisbon Treaty and b) if a referendum was really 
necessary in this case, as his clearly stated preference was a positive 
answer to both questions. The Court refused the necessity of 
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ratification by referendum, even though it did not exclude the 
possibility of doing so (Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, 
2009).  
Unlike the general referendum, local referendums are 
common, usually run simultaneously with other types of elections. 
While the local referendum is not explicitly mentioned in the 
Constitution, there is a reference in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms that is part of the constitutional order. The 
conditions and criteria for local referendums were set in law no. 
22/2004 and later updated by decreasing the necessary quorum for 
the referendum’s validity (law 169/2008).  
Finally, a regional referendum is also possible: it was legally 
defined once law 129/2000 was adopted, and regional referendums 
could be held from January 2011. 
Petitions 
Another direct democracy instrument is the right of petition. This 
right is guaranteed in the constitutional order and enshrined in the 
law on petitions (85/1990): every citizen has the right to petition 
state organs or local and regional authorities with respect to 
proposals, requirements and complaints. Citizens can petition 
individually or by forming a petition committee. The petitions 
addressed to the central state institutions has varied widely but in 
general they have decreased in number. For instance, the lower 
chamber of Parliament received hundreds of petitions a year 20 
years ago but only around 30 in the last five years (Chamber of 
Deputies, 2017b). In the second half of 2017 only five petitions were 
submitted, which were signed by a total of 21, 287 citizens 
(Chamber of Deputies, 2017c). No other traditional direct 
democracy tools such as civilian assemblies, civilian juries or 
various types of recall are in use. 
9.1.2 Participation in citizen involvement instruments 
Low levels of political participation are often cited as one of the 
main problems of Czech politics. Yet while there has clearly been a 
decline in political participation in all its aspects, comparative 
research shows that the Czech situation is far from being the worst. 
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In fact, studies conducted around the 
time of the country’s EU accession 
(2004) show that the level of political 
participation placed Czechia exactly in 
the middle (fifth) of the post-
communist countries analysed. At that 
time, the most politically active 
societies were those of East Germany 
and Slovakia and the least active were 
Romania, Bulgaria, and particularly 
Hungary and Poland. The tendency to 
evaluate post-communist countries on a different scale from that of 
established Western democracies is misconceived. For instance, 
although lagging behind Slovakia or Eastern Germany, Czechia 
fared similarly to the United Kingdom in terms of electoral 
participation, demonstrations, internet discussions and several 
other criteria (Vráblíková, 2009). 
As direct democracy tools are seldom used, it is extremely 
difficult to assess how active citizens would be if new direct 
democracy instruments were introduced. In the single existing case 
of a nationwide referendum (the EU accession), participation stood 
at just above 55%, with 77% in favour of accession. As regards 
petitions, their overall number has been decreasing for years but the 
numbers of petitioners remain relatively high (Chamber of 
Deputies, 2017c).  
A specific problem arises with local referendums. The law on 
the local referendum was amended several times and the main 
controversy stemmed from the required threshold for the 
referendum’s validity. The law’s 1992 version required the 
participation of at least 25% of all voters for it to be valid, and 
adoption would depend on a majority of voting citizens choosing 
that option. In 2004 the threshold was raised to 50% and in 2008 
lowered again to 35%. Hence, even the biggest local referendum 
held in the second-largest city (Brno), with a turnout of almost 25%, 
was not considered valid. In other words, local referendums are far 
more likely to succeed in small municipalities than in large cities 
because the high threshold discourages politicians from even 
considering the referendum, and discourages citizens from voting.  
Low levels of political 
participation are often cited as 
one of the main problems of 
Czech politics. Yet while there 
has clearly been a decline in 
political participation in all its 
aspects, comparative research 
shows that the Czech situation 
is far from being the worst. 
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9.1.3 The main drivers of voter mobilisation 
In the last five years, voter mobilisation has taken on a populist hue, 
accompanied by a shift towards rhetorical support for direct 
democracy. The year 2013 can be 
considered as a turning point: the first 
direct presidential election brought 
Miloš Zeman to power, with a 
distinctly nativist, anti-migration and 
even anti-German rhetoric. In the same 
year, two new populist parties entered 
Parliament, the technocratic one-man 
ANO movement of Prime Minister 
Andrej Babiš (18.65%, in second place) 
and the Eurosceptic anti-immigration 
Dawn of Direct Democracy of Tomio 
Okamura (6.88%, in sixth place).  
These two parties represent the 
two branches of populism that have been gaining ground ever since. 
The first, and clearly more widespread, is the populism driven by 
the neoliberal rhetoric of anti-bureaucratic efficiency (‘manage the 
state like a firm’). Its success can be understood as emerging from 
the post-communist era because communism plays no role in its 
political narrative (either positive or negative). Rather, this 
movement managed to channel protest against liberal elites and the 
ongoing disparities between the living standards of agricultural 
blue collar workers and the mainly Prague-based elite. In this sense, 
voter mobilisation does not follow a traditional left-right cleavage 
but simply evokes the image of an efficient businessman with great 
expertise and no political ideology (which is of course an illusion). 
The ANO movement later became the stronger political party in the 
country and its leader, Andrej Babiš, is the current prime minister.  
The second type of populism is the nativist, strongly anti-EU, 
anti-Muslim variant, which is weaker but growing nonetheless. It is 
openly xenophobic, borderline racist and more radical in its 
discourse than the supposedly non-ideological first type of 
populism. It is this nativist populism that has made direct 
democracy one of its slogans. Indeed, the most influential extreme-
right party uses direct democracy in its name (the above-mentioned 
Dawn of Direct Democracy and its later incarnation Freedom and 
In the last five years, voter 
mobilisation has taken on a 
populist hue, accompanied by 
a shift towards rhetorical 
support for direct democracy. 
The year 2013 can be 
considered as a turning point: 
the first direct presidential 
election brought Miloš Zeman 
to power, with a distinctly 
nativist, anti-migration and 
even anti-German rhetoric. 
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Direct Democracy (SPD)). The leader of this party, Tomio Okamura, 
became known for the knee-jerk repetition of the ‘direct election and 
removal of politicians’ campaign mantra. For this reason, direct 
democracy – already regarded with suspicion by analysts and 
political scientists alike since the direct election of the president, has 
become even more dubious due to its connection to the extreme 
right. 
9.2 The EU dimension 
9.2.1 Significance of EU affairs for citizens, media and 
political parties 
Political party discourse 
Over the course of its EU membership, of almost 15 years, there has 
been a substantial development in terms of the significance 
accorded to EU issues by Czech media, political parties and citizens. 
For political parties, this has been the case since 2002 (Kovář, 2016). 
The trend is non-linear, however, as there was a slight decrease in 
the salience of EU issues between 2004 and 2009. Following the EU 
crises, the importance of EU issues grew again and reached hitherto 
unprecedented levels across all parties. Virtually no relevant 
political party could avoid discussing the EU refugee and migration 
crisis. Much of this discussion focused on the EU’s role in the crisis. 
Notwithstanding the increasing salience of EU issues in 
Czech party discourse, EU issues are still chiefly mentioned in terms 
of the general direction of the EU or as a framework reference that 
Czechia can utilise to become a fully fledged member. At the same 
time, the EU is commonly discussed in terms of a source of financial 
support (EU funds to be used at national level). Nevertheless, party 
discourse still pays very little attention 
to specific issues such as the adoption of 
the single currency in Czechia and even 
less to the role and reform of EU 
institutions. Despite the increased 
attention to EU issues in Czechia, 
especially since 2010, they are still not of 
first-order importance in political 
discourse. 
Despite the increased 
attention to EU issues in 
Czechia, especially since 
2010, they are still not of 
first-order importance in 
political discourse. 
172  CZECHIA DIRECT DEMOCRACY: FROM THE SHADOWS TO THE LIMELIGHT 
 
Media discourse 
A similar trend can be observed in the media. The salience of EU 
issues in news media was low until the EU sovereign debt crisis. 
Before 2010, EU topics were covered only marginally, except for key 
events such as European Council summits and the EU presidency 
etc. Moreover, coverage of EU affairs was only selectively 
prioritised by the public service broadcaster and a small number of 
the broadsheet newspapers. In other outlets coverage was usually 
limited, even during key events. There has been a trend of 
increasing media coverage of European issues since 2010 and the 
EU sovereign debt crisis (Kovář, 2016). The most significant increase 
can be traced, however, to the refugee/migration crisis of 2015 and 
later.  
Even today, the EU is given more prominence by public 
service broadcasters and broadsheet newspapers than by private 
television or the tabloids, where it is subject to sensationalist 
reporting.1 The main focus is still on national political actors; EU 
issues are more often portrayed as national matters with an EU 
dimension than as EU matters in their own right (Kovář, 2016). 
Relevance of EU issues for voters 
EU issues are not among the main determinants of voting choice in 
Czechia, but in EP elections the relevance of EU issues for voters has 
been increasing since 2004 and was most evident in the 2014 EP 
elections. However, national political issues still remain the most 
important determinants of vote choice and the decision (or not) to 
turn out.  
In the 2013 national elections, EU issues were not among the 
top 15 that citizens considered important; only about 2% of voters 
saw EU-related issues as important in the election (CVVM, 2017). 
This changed in 2017, however, as a reflection of the intense 
politicisation around the migration crisis. While national political 
issues were still more important for voters, EU issues were 
considered important for almost 10% of them. Moreover, for voters 
of particular parties such as the openly pro-EU TOP09 and the 
                                                        
1 Part of the media landscape is in the hands of politicians, which may 
explain the uneven coverage of certain parties and politicians. 
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highly Eurosceptic SPD, EU issues 
were more relevant. Yet even here 
they were of secondary importance 
(CVVM, 2017). It remains to be seen 
whether EU issues retain their 
relevance once the sensitive question 
of immigration is no longer so 
politicised in the public sphere.  
The relevance of EU affairs for 
referendums 
The only nationwide referendum held so far on EU membership 
was made possible by the adoption of an ad hoc constitution law. It 
was held as the conclusion of a long process of Czechia’s ‘return to 
Europe’. This meant that practically all parties (except the 
communists) were in favour of Czech membership of the EU (even 
the Eurosceptic ODS, the Civic Democratic Party led by Václav 
Klaus). Given the strong cross-party consensus, there was little 
contention surrounding the move and EU issues in general caused 
no real division in domestic politics. Available research shows that 
most voters followed their favoured party’s position. Some 77% 
backed EU membership in the referendum, with a 55% turnout. For 
most voters, the EU represented longstanding democracy, market 
reform and indeed Czech identity, as most voters tend to identify 
themselves as belonging to (Western) Europe and thus accession to 
the EU was seen as the logical next step in the post-communist 
modernisation process. 
For the next decade or so, there were no demands for 
nationwide referendums on EU issues except for occasional 
requests from the ODS and SSO (Free Citizens’ Party) to hold a 
referendum on the adoption of a common currency. These requests 
were usually countered by pointing to the obligation in the 
accession treaty to adopt the common currency. A referendum on 
eurozone membership was thus seen as redundant by most political 
parties as Czechs had already agreed to join it in the EU accession 
referendum. The ODS countered these arguments by pointing to the 
change in the structure of the eurozone since Czech accession, 
which required a new referendum. The call for a referendum on 
membership of the eurozone was later joined by the SPD, a 
This changed in 2017, however, 
as a reflection of the intense 
politicisation around the 
migration crisis. While national 
political issues were still more 
important for voters, EU issues 
were considered important for 
almost 10% of them. 
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Eurosceptic party established around the issue of direct democracy. 
In fact, the requests of ODS and other political actors to hold such a 
referendum did not reflect any desire to ensure citizens’ deeper 
involvement in the political process. It rather reflected their 
opposition to membership; they saw that the public were becoming 
more sceptical about adopting the euro and exploited this 
opportunity as a means of blocking membership. By calling for a 
referendum, political entrepreneurs would show that they cared 
about people’s wishes and at the same time hoped that the Czechs 
would decide not to adopt the common currency, thus achieving 
their political goals. 
Finally, political parties started to campaign widely for the 
adoption of a constitutional amendment on nationwide 
referendums. Already before the 2013 national elections, at least 
seven relevant parties advocated the adoption of such a 
constitutional law. However, only two of them explicitly connected 
a national referendum to EU issues. The ODS has maintained that it 
would insist on such a referendum for Czech accession to the 
eurozone. The SPD demanded a national referendum if any 
competences were transferred to the EU level. No party at this time 
called for a referendum on Czech membership of the EU. The 
situation changed ahead of the general elections of 2017. Perhaps 
inspired by the Brexit referendum, several parties – namely the SPD, 
Communists (KSČM) explicitly called for the adoption of a 
constitutional law on referendums in order to hold a referendum on 
Czech-out. Representatives of two other parties – the Pirate Party, 
and Mayors and Independents (STAN) – pointed out that they 
would allow the question of EU membership to be the subject of a 
referendum following rather strict procedural requirements. 
However, the pro-European party TOP09 explicitly stated in their 
programme that they would not allow a referendum on such a 
question. Other parties have been rather sceptical about the 
possibility of deciding upon membership of an international 
organisation by referendum. 
The constitutional amendment was submitted to Parliament 
following the 2017 national elections. But it is not clear whether it 
will be passed and what its procedural requirements will be at this 
point. In any case, while the call for direct democracy and greater 
citizen involvement is usually used as a reason to adopt a 
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constitutional referendum bill, it 
appears that the main reason 
certain parties, in particular the 
Communists and SPD, lobby to 
allow citizens to decide on Czech 
membership of the EU/NATO by 
referendum is more driven by their 
political goals than by a concern for 
the quality of democracy. Both 
parties represent extremes of the 
political spectrum, both are anti-
establishment and anti-EU. The 
long-term pro-EU consensus 
among major parties created a 
space for these parties to exploit growing Euroscepticism. 
The ‘mobilisation’ of EU issues 
Using the distinction between vertical and horizontal 
Europeanisation, we can observe some nascent horizontal 
Europeanisation where national media cover issues in other EU 
member states and national actors address issues or actors in 
another EU member state. However, there is very limited vertical 
Europeanisation where national actors address European actors and 
EU issues, and European actors partake in national debates on EU 
issues. Media reporting thus clearly indicates a domestication of EU 
matters rather than a burgeoning European(-ised) public sphere 
(Kovář, 2016). 
Political parties’ mobilisation of EU affairs reveals a very 
similar pattern. Despite the notable increases of EU-related 
references in party discourse since the pre-accession period, the 
quantitative increase is not matched by a ‘qualitative’ exploration of 
substantive EU issues. Often, EU references in party discourse relate 
to European funding and the EU as an easy source of cash to fulfil 
national political promises. 
  
While the call for direct 
democracy and greater citizen 
involvement is usually used as a 
reason to adopt a constitutional 
referendum bill, it appears that 
the main reason certain parties, in 
particular the Communists and 
SPD, lobby to allow citizens to 
decide on Czech membership of 
the EU/NATO by referendum is 
more driven by their political 
goals than by a concern for the 
quality of democracy. 
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This further underlines the view of the 
EU as something detached, resembling 
an us vs. them understanding of EU 
politics where the EU and Brussels are 
external to Czechia. EU issues have 
never played a role in the formation of 
a governing coalition, except possibly 
in 2002, just before EU accession.   
European Citizens Initiative 
Looking first at the requirements for the European Citizens’ 
Initiative (ECI), the eligibility age to sign initiatives in Czechia is 18 
years, as this is the voting age for elections to the EP. The national 
minimum threshold for the number of signatures to be collected is 
15,750 for initiatives registered after 1 July 2014 and 16,500 
signatures for initiatives registered before this date. The Czech 
experience with the ECI so far can be described as ‘lukewarm’. 
While signatures were collected for each of the four successful 
initiatives so far, in none of them did the number of signatures reach 
the minimum threshold (see the table below). 
Table 9.1 Successful ECIs in Czechia  
Name Number of 
Signatures  
Water and sanitation are a human right! Water is a 
public good, not a commodity 
7,575 
One of us 11,468 
Stop vivisection 4,075 
Ban glyphosate and protect people and the 
environment from toxic pesticides 
9,9012 
 
Moreover, looking at participation in the citizens’ committees that 
propose an initiative and must be composed of at least seven EU 
citizens old enough to vote in EP elections, we see that out of more 
than 50 initiatives so far (including successful, unsuccessful, 
                                                        
2 The signatures were submitted after the deadline and therefore not 
counted as eligible. 
The EU is viewed as 
something detached, 
resembling an us vs. them 
understanding of EU politics 
where the EU and Brussels are 
external to Czechia. 
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withdrawn by organisers and rejected by the Commission but not 
ongoing), Czech citizens were members of a citizens’ committee in 
only four cases (two withdrawn and two unsuccessful, i.e. 
‘Suspension of the EU Climate & Energy Package’, ‘New Deal 4 
Europe’, ‘EU Directive on Dairy Cow Welfare’, and ‘For Only One 
Time’ (i.e. abandoning summer/winter time changes). Czechs have 
not been members of a citizens’ committee of any successful 
initiative so far. The only ECI initiated in Czechia, the ‘For Only One 
Time’ initiative, underlines the lack of enthusiasm for this 
mechanism. After registering the initiative with the Commission 
and launching the collection of signatures, the organisers decided to 
pursue other avenues, such as the domestic level and Czech MEPs.  
Research on the Czech experience and ECI’s shortcomings 
highlights several points. Perhaps given the limited experience with 
participatory mechanisms, Czech citizens rarely initiate ECI and 
rather join others once an initiative is registered. Several 
problematic elements in the eyes of citizens were also identified, 
namely: a) little time to collect signatures, b) lack of assistance 
instruments (translation, web-design support) leading to excessive 
administrative and financial burden, c) age limit of 18 years, d) final 
assessment of successful initiatives by the Commission, which 
makes the instrument rather dull, not participatory. Problems at the 
national level were identified as well. Most importantly, unlike in 
some other EU member states, Czech legislation requires supporters 
of an initiative to include their personal identification number, 
which organisers and supporters of past initiatives saw as a 
disincentive. In addition, there is a lack of dissemination and 
mediatisation of initiatives among public service broadcasters. 
However, it also appears that Czechs have little interest in pursuing 
citizen’s initiatives at the EU level, perhaps due to a high level of 
Euroscepticism and low trust in EU institutions (Pitrová and 
Manosoglu, 2014).  
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9.3 The influence of direct democratic instruments 
on political realities 
9.3.1 Manifestos, campaigns and characteristics of the 
party system 
Assessment of the extent of party-system advocacy for direct 
democracy instruments reveals several trends. The first relates to 
the introduction of legislation for local referendums, which was 
adopted originally in 1992 and replaced in 2004 by new legislation 
(later amended in 2006 and 2008), and the legislation for regional 
referendums that was adopted in 2010. Ever since the adoption of 
new legislation for local referendums in 2004, only one mainstream 
political party (the Greens) discussed the issue before 2006 
legislative elections and highlighted the need to revise the 
legislation on local referendums. The turnout threshold for validity 
set at 50% of eligible voters and the threshold to be binding set at 
25% of eligible voters were seen as too high. The Greens therefore 
advocated abandoning both thresholds to make local referendums 
valid and binding with no thresholds on minimal participation. 
Before the 2010 legislative elections, the number of parties 
explicitly mentioning a revision of rules on local referendums in a 
bid to make them more useful has increased. Five relevant parties,3 
two of which gained seats in the Parliament, advocated the 
simplification of calls for referendums and/or the easing of 
conditions for the validity and binding force of a local referendum. 
The same situation occurred before the 2013 legislative elections 
when five parties4 advocated the better use of local and regional 
referendums and two of these parties were elected to Parliament. 
Moreover, one of these parties established shortly before the 
elections had direct democracy in its name and its main policy 
priority – the Dawn of Direct Democracy. The situation recurred 
before the 2017 national elections, showing that since 2010 there are 
consistently five relevant parties advocating the greater and easier 
                                                        
3 Communist Party, Green Party (SZ), Public affairs (VV), Pirate Party 
(Piráti), and Party of Civic Rights – Zeman’s People (SPOZ). 
4 The same parties as in 2010 supported the issue with the exception of VV, 
which ceased to exist. The fifth party was the Dawn of Direct Democracy.  
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use of referendums at local/regional level. Three of these parties 
were elected to parliament at the election. Although the (electoral) 
strength of these parties has increased over time, there were no 
changes to the legislation on local/regional referendums. 
Support for the adoption of legislation on a national (general) 
referendum was even greater after 2004. Article 2(2) of the Czech 
Constitution stipulates that a constitutional act may designate the 
conditions under which people may exercise state authority directly 
and is understood by many parties to mean that direct democracy 
instruments at national level should be an integral part of the 
constitutional order. During the first post-accession legislative 
elections in 2006, three major parties (ČSSD, KSČM, and SZ) 
advocated the speedy adoption of a constitutional law on a general 
referendum. Failure to do so in the past was seen as an attempt to 
prevent the fulfilment of the 
presumption of the Czech Constitution, 
whereby its Article 2 states that law 
should be adopted to define when the 
people can exert state authority directly. 
Six relevant political parties advocated 
the adoption of a constitutional law on a 
general referendum in the campaign for 
2010 legislative elections (ČSSD, KSČM, Pirate Party, SPOZ, SZ, and 
VV).5 In their manifestos and election promises the newly created 
Pirate Party and VV criticised the political mainstream and the 
clientelism connected to representative democracy. They hoped to 
change the political culture by direct democracy instruments. 
The main parties’ growing support for a national referendum 
was visible before the 2013 legislative elections. There were six 
parties calling for the introduction of nationwide referendum 
(ČSSD, KSČM, Pirate Party, SPOZ, SZ, and Dawn of Direct 
Democracy). The Pirate Party maintained that a referendum would 
be mandatory to amend the Constitution and for binding 
international treaties. Moreover, the newly created (in May 2013) 
Dawn of Direct Democracy party even made direct democracy its 
                                                        
5 Czech Social Democratic Party (ČCSD), Communist Party (KSČM), Pirate 
Party (Piráti), Party of Civic Rights – Zeman’s People (SPOZ), Green Party 
(SZ), and Public Affairs (VV). 
Six relevant political parties 
advocated the adoption of a 
constitutional law on a 
general referendum in the 
campaign for 2010 
legislative elections. 
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main political agenda. Their campaign was based on criticism of the 
political mainstream and the disconnect between politicians and 
citizens that, as they saw it, could only be remedied by the direct 
involvement of people in politics. They maintained that citizens 
should have the option to initiate, amend or block legislation and 
remove politicians from office via referendum. Given the growing 
support for a nationwide referendum, the constitutional 
amendment was discussed, albeit without success, during the 2013-
17 parliamentary term of office.  
In the last legislative elections, the question of a national 
referendum became an important issue in the campaign for the first 
time. Given the Brexit vote and previous failures to adopt the 
required constitutional amendment, a number of parties advocated 
amendment of the Constitution before holding the EU membership 
referendum. In particular, SPD (the informal successor of Dawn of 
Direct Democracy), demanded that citizens be given the 
opportunity to vote on Czechia’s EU membership in a referendum. 
It became their main campaign issue and, after election, their 
condition for support of any government coalition. The call to hold 
a referendum on EU membership was countered by other parties 
which, while supporting legislation for a national referendum, 
argued that a referendum could not be called for membership of 
international organisations. TOP09 even maintained that they 
would prevent holding an EU membership referendum at all costs. 
In any case, the growing support for a national referendum and the 
intensification of public and political debate about direct democracy 
resulted in a new proposal to Parliament by the SPD in December 
2017, the details of which are being discussed by both chambers. 
However, as the bill needs three-fifths majority in both chambers it 
is unclear if and under what conditions it will be adopted. But it 
appears to be closer to adoption than all previous attempts. 
Over the last 15 years or so, certain parties also made other 
proposals concerning direct democracy. Already in 2006, SZ 
proposed the direct election of mayors, regional governors, and the 
president. The call for the direct election of the president was also 
supported by other parties and resulted in the first direct election of 
a president in 2013. Other parties later also supported the direct 
election of mayors and hetmans (such as TOP09, Pirate Party, VV, 
Dawn of Direct Democracy). At the same time, the Pirate Party, 
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SPOZ, Dawn of Direct Democracy and later on SPD advocated 
allowing citizens to remove politicians from office via direct 
democracy instruments (either petition or referendum). The Green 
Party and the Pirate Party also made the case for a citizens’ 
legislative initiative to be introduced. And the Greens espoused the 
lowering of the voting age from 18 to 16 years to increase citizens’ 
participation in politics. However, none of these measures gained 
support in the political arena and have not made it beyond 
campaign pledges. 
Overall, direct democracy instruments, in particular 
referendums, have increased in popularity over the last decade. 
This trend is mainly driven by smaller parties (SZ) and newly 
created parties (Dawn of Direct Democracy, SPD, Pirate Party, and 
SPOZ) rather than traditional parties (KSČM as the only 
unreformed Communist Party in Europe being an exception). The 
main arguments parties make in favour of direct democracy are to 
a) increase the involvement of citizens in public affairs and political 
decisions, and b) to protect and promote those citizens’ interests that 
are ignored by mainstream political parties. Direct democracy is 
assumed to improve the quality of 
representative democracy in this 
sense. Looking at the arguments in 
favour of direct democracy more 
closely, it appears that direct 
democracy is promoted by smaller 
and newly created challenger parties 
to gain electoral advantage and to 
achieve political goals unachievable 
via representative democracy rather 
than as a means to improve the 
quality of democracy and increase 
citizen involvement.  
Concerning the latter, parties promoting direct democracy 
often advocate exiting the EU (Dawn of Direct Democracy, SPD) 
and NATO (KSČM), neither of which is easily achievable via 
Parliament. As regards the former, parties try to gain electoral 
advantage by criticising the fact that mainstream parties do not 
represent ordinary citizens. Given the growing dissatisfaction with 
the political mainstream, new parties argue that mainstream 
It appears that direct democracy 
is promoted by smaller and 
newly created challenger parties 
to gain electoral advantage and 
achieve political goals 
unachievable via representative 
democracy rather than as a 
means to improve the quality of 
democracy and increase citizen 
involvement. 
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parties’ unwillingness to adopt legislation on a national referendum 
and other direct democracy instruments is an attempt to prevent 
people from having more influence over politics. To have a greater 
say in political decisions, argue the newer parties, people should 
vote for those that advocate direct democracy.  
9.4 The influence of direct democracy on Europe’s 
political realities 
9.4.1 Resonance with elections and referendums 
elsewhere in Europe  
Election results in other European countries have only a limited and 
indirect impact on Czech perceptions of political affairs in Europe. 
Slightly more attention is devoted to elections in neighbouring 
countries, i.e. Germany, Austria and the Visegrad countries. One 
exception that has substantially influenced Czechia’s discussion 
about the EU was the Brexit referendum. Czech political and public 
discourse was already critical of Europe even before the financial 
crisis and the migration crisis but the Brexit referendum has further 
strengthened the negative voices. This pertains to both the 
mainstream parties (ČSSD, ANO, KDU-ČSL, TOP 09, and ODS) and 
to anti-systemic and anti-European parties (the Communists and, 
above all, the Dawn of Direct Democracy, and SPD led by Tomio 
Okamura), but also to the increasingly critical President Miloš 
Zeman. Brexit has further highlighted the problems related to the 
EU’s legitimacy and has eroded the fragile consensus around the 
once indisputable benefits of European integration. This was more 
significant than the EU accession referendum in 2003, which was 
part of the then narrative about a return to Europe, accompanied by 
an intensive information campaign, but not an in-depth public 
debate about the membership’s impact. 
Although political elites see EU membership as indisputable, 
the debate on EU politics has now been substantially transformed. 
An increase in Euroscepticism has been strengthened by external 
factors such as a wider Euroscepticism across the EU, the crises in 
the EU’s recent history and the disunity of the member states in 
addressing them. In the eyes of Czech Eurosceptics, Brexit offers the 
ultimate evidence that their criticism of the EU is justified and the 
EU’s reform necessary. Public discourse has even shifted towards 
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the possibility of a Czech-out 
referendum as a solution to current 
problems. The likelihood of this 
strategy increased after the election 
in October 2017. The fragmentation 
of the Chamber of Deputies and the 
difficulties with the formation of a 
majority government have 
strengthened those political forces 
(the Communists, SPD and partially 
the Pirates) that favour the adoption of a law on a general 
referendum which could be used even for the vote on the country’s 
EU membership. If such a law is adopted, the likelihood of a 
referendum would substantially increase as no parliamentary 
majority would be needed for a special law on an EU referendum, 
requiring instead the basic conditions of a general referendum and 
the collection of a sufficient number of citizens’ signatures. Given 
the rise of populism and the country’s strong Euroscepticism, such 
a referendum would be very risky. Czech-out would thus cease to 
be a purely hypothetical issue, especially as it is likely to be used in 
internal political conflicts.  
EU-related referendums are highly unpredictable 
phenomena. Emotional arguments often trump rational arguments, 
as was clearly the case during the Brexit campaign (Hobolt, 2016). 
Paradoxically, any analogy with Brexit should be nuanced by the 
fact that an EU exit would constitute a far greater risk for Czechia 
as a small landlocked European state surrounded by other EU 
members, and a country largely dependent on the trade exchange 
with the EU. The low level of satisfaction with the EU closely 
corresponds with the low numbers of those who supported 
membership. There is a vicious circle of mutually reinforcing 
negative attitudes towards the EU between the political elites and 
the public. As a result, the EU is considered “a good thing” by 34% 
of Czechs (April 2018), which is the lowest figure in the Union.  
9.4.2 The uptake of EU matters by government 
Recently, Czechia has been going through a politically unstable 
period as the strongest political actor (ANO) has not been able to 
form a majority government. Nonetheless, this rather peculiar 
In the eyes of Czech 
Eurosceptics, Brexit offers the 
ultimate evidence that their 
criticism of the EU is justified 
and the EU’s reform necessary. 
Public discourse has even 
shifted towards the possibility of 
a Czech-out referendum as a 
solution to current problems. 
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situation has not substantially influenced Czech EU policy as its 
hallmark is continuity with the previous period. In its EU policy, 
however, the government has not (yet) formally used any direct 
democracy tools. Despite the growing 
demand for these tools, the 
government has so far rejected the 
notion that the referendum could be 
applied to Czech EU/NATO 
memberships. Similarly, it refuses a 
referendum on the adoption of the 
common currency, which is 
advocated by the strongest opposition party ODS.   
The official programme of Andrej Babiš’s government from 
January 2018 underlines active EU membership as its priority, 
which can be understood as a response to the previously reactive 
nature of Czech EU policy. The government’s declaration stresses 
Euro-Atlantic structures but also elements of keeping a distance 
from the EU, ranging from an emphasis on the necessity of EU 
reform, the rejection of further integration (“the aim is that the EU 
does less, but more effectively”) to migration policy. The 
government does not aim for eurozone membership either, mainly 
due to fears about a loss of control over monetary policy and 
incomplete convergence (Government of the Czech Republic, 2018). 
Taken together, these priorities clearly reflect the critical public 
mood in the country. Active EU membership is thus supposed to 
become a means of promoting national interests more forcefully, 
which would be more intelligible both for the Czech public and for 
the external EU partners.  
Practically, however, this strategy has two weaknesses: first, 
the apparent distinction between the domestic and European levels 
means that they are seen as being competitive rather than 
complementary. Second, the EU-critical tone may go down well 
with the domestic audience, but it makes coalition-building with 
other EU partners more difficult. 
In terms of proposed EU reform, the government advocates a 
longstanding Czech position that underlines the unity of the EU and 
a preference for cooperation in those areas where consensus is 
possible and where EU-wide cooperation has clear added value. 
The main concern revolves around the division of the EU into a core 
Despite the growing demand 
for direct democracy tools, the 
government has so far rejected 
the notion that the referendum 
could be applied to Czech 
EU/NATO memberships. 
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and a periphery, which – given that the government does not want 
to join the deepening eurozone – would clearly not play out well for 
Czechs. Rather, the government’s priority is the continuation and 
strengthening of other key projects, such as the single market and 
the Schengen area (Chamber of Deputies, 2017a). The government 
also believes that flexible integration should take place in a 
contractual institutional framework (such as the treaty-based 
mechanism of enhanced cooperation). The government finds it 
important to have a stable eurozone based on a united institutional 
framework, non-discrimination of member states on the grounds of 
currency and respect for the authority of the Council and states’ 
financial autonomy. Furthermore, the Czech position stresses 
intensifying the external dimension of migration policy and further 
cooperation in the realm of internal security.  
Last but not least, Czechia also continues to call for increasing 
the legitimacy of the decision-making process in the EU, 
particularly by strengthening the role of the European Council and 
national parliaments (Government of the Czech Republic, 2017).  
Conclusions 
Although direct democracy tools are 
neither frequently used nor well 
developed in Czechia, their 
popularity has been growing. A 
number of factors have contributed to 
this development: first, the overall 
dissatisfaction with the functioning of 
the political system and growing 
alienation of voters from the political 
‘elites’ has led to an (almost obsessive) 
search for alternative instruments that 
could reconnect the popular will with policymaking.  
Second, the inability of the ruling class to acknowledge how 
deep-rooted this problem was led to voters deserting established 
parties (right-wing ODS, left-wing ČSSD, etc.) and the emergence of 
several populist parties/movements whose slogans centre on 
removing corrupt politicians from office and replacing non-
functioning institutions with a supposedly more transparent form 
of direct democracy. Third, the continuing inability of the strongest 
Overall dissatisfaction with the 
functioning of the political 
system and growing alienation 
of voters from the political 
‘elites’ has led to an (almost 
obsessive) search for alternative 
instruments that could 
reconnect the popular will with 
policymaking. 
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political movement to create a stable majority government further 
reinforces the view that direct democracy is also more efficient. 
External factors such as the alleged legitimacy crisis of the EU 
and the Brexit referendum have further strengthened the advocates 
of direct democracy. The introduction of direct election for the 
president has further polarised views: both sides believe that 
subsequent events confirm their positions. Advocates of greater 
direct democracy claim that the election is a success as the president 
was brought to office by dissatisfied voters who had a voice. Critics 
see the activities of the suddenly more legitimate president as 
verging on a violation of the constitution; his populist agenda is 
seen as harmful to liberal democracy at large.  
As regards possible new direct democracy tools, the 
referendum is most frequently mentioned as a suitable instrument. 
While the country has no law on a general referendum, virtually all 
political parties agree that it should be introduced. Disagreements 
are not about ‘if’ but about ‘in what form’. In all likelihood, draft 
legislation will be on the table in the coming years, but it remains 
unclear whether the law will contain a 
provision on its applicability (or the 
rejection thereof) on EU and NATO 
membership. With new populist 
forces in parliament, the debate on 
Czech-out has shifted from a purely 
hypothetical analogy with Brexit to a 
substantive discussion about the 
possibility of such a referendum. 
Hence, direct democracy is no 
panacea as its effects may be 
unpredictable, and in some cases 
catastrophic. It can lead to the 
strengthening of the democratic ethos, but also to the legitimisation 
of the greatest enemies of liberal democratic order.  
Finally, as regards the potential of direct democracy 
instruments for EU politics, they cannot be seen as a solution either, 
for several reasons. First, EU issues still only play a minor role in the 
voting choices of citizens across all types of elections. Those who 
vote on EU issues usually vote for parties critical of the EU whose 
EU-criticism is a part of a wider strategy to capitalise on growing 
With new populist forces in 
Parliament, the debate on 
Czech-out has shifted from a 
purely hypothetical analogy 
with Brexit to a substantive 
discussion about the possibility 
of such a referendum. Hence, 
direct democracy is no panacea 
as its effects may be 
unpredictable, and in some 
cases catastrophic. 
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dissatisfaction with the political system and the growing alienation 
of voters from political elites. Second, when EU issues generate 
mobilisation, only rarely are they seen as purely EU issues; they are 
rather national political issues that are domestically framed. Third, 
a number of parties promoting direct democracy are either newly 
created (populist) parties and/or fringe parties that, by and large, 
promote direct democracy to gain electoral advantage over 
mainstream parties and/or achieve political goals unachievable via 
representative democracy (such as Czech-out). They are rarely a 
means to improve the quality of democracy or increase citizen 
involvement. It is therefore likely that EU-related referendums will 
lead to even deeper polarisation in society and risk being about 
everything but EU politics.  
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10. DENMARK AND DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY: FRONTRUNNER 
AND LAGGARD 
CATHARINA SØRENSEN 
Denmark makes extensive use of direct democracy instruments to 
determine its political approach to Europe. This is due to a 
constitutional requirement to hold referendums under certain 
circumstances and the longstanding practice of involving the public 
in EU decision-making. Since the 1972 referendum on membership, 
Denmark has held seven additional referendums on EU-related 
issues, a number only exceeded by Ireland. All have seen 
remarkably high turnout. The public debates ahead of referendums 
have generally been fierce and three polls have resulted in a no-vote: 
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992; the introduction of the euro in 2000; 
and the Danish EU-opt out on justice and home affairs in 2015. 
Denmark’s referendums have had a major impact on EU politics, 
most notably the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty, which directly 
inspired the French plebiscite, led to wide-ranging EU opt-outs for 
Denmark, and started a wave of democratisation efforts at the EU 
level. Danes strongly support the practice of EU referendums, and 
the high turnout points to its obvious democratic merits; however, 
we argue that the answer to the question of how meaningful the 
Danish EU referendums have been in influencing EU politics is not 
as clear-cut as these merits would suggest. This is due to the 
referendum’s concomitant tendency to promote and sustain black 
and white debates about yes or no to the EU, rather than to serve as 
a catalyst for nuanced debate about the nature of EU politics.  
10.1 Danish direct democracy 
Denmark has two direct democracy instruments with a potential to 
influence EU politics: the referendum and the citizens’ initiative. 
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Whilst the former has been deployed eight times on EU-related 
issues since 1972, the latter was only made available to the public in 
early 2018 and has not yet been used with respect to European 
issues. In addition to these national-level initiatives, the European 
Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) is the other formal direct democracy 
instrument available to Danes. There is no procedure in place in 
Denmark to recall members of parliament, or any tradition of 
petitions.  
In order to evaluate how meaningful these instruments are in 
influencing EU politics, this chapter first considers Danish 
mobilisation for the ECIs. We then look at the intentions behind the 
two national instruments and the functions they serve, how 
Denmark’s history of EU-referendums, with traditionally high 
levels of participation and high public salience, has influenced the 
role and position of ‘Europe’ in Danish political debates, and 
consider the broader impact of Danish direct democracy on national 
and European political realities. We conclude by drawing some 
lessons from the Danish experience with referendums as an 
instrument to influence EU politics. 
10.1.1 Danish mobilisation for the ECI 
Eight well-attended EU referendums have earned Denmark a 
reputation as a proponent of direct democracy. Examining the 
experience with the main European-level instrument of direct 
democracy, the ECI, however, mitigates that reputation. Only 16% 
of Danes say that they are likely to make use of the ECI – the lowest 
figure in the entire EU (Eurobarometer 86). This public reticence 
explains Denmark’s poor mobilisation for open ECIs. In only one of 
the four successful European 
initiatives to date was 
Denmark able to reach the 
threshold of 9,750 signatures 
and count as one of the 
backing countries (the 
glyphosate initiative of 2017), 
and very few Danes have 
been involved in the steering 
groups behind the various 
Eight well-attended EU referendums 
have earned Denmark a reputation as a 
proponent of direct democracy. 
Examining the experience with the main 
European-level instrument of direct 
democracy, the ECI, however, mitigates 
that reputation. Only 16% of Danes say 
that they are likely to make use of the 
ECI – the lowest figure in the entire EU. 
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attempted proposals (Hjøllund et al., 2015).  
The lack of Danish enthusiasm for the ECI can be explained 
by a combination of three factors. First, until recently there has been 
no experience with citizens’ initiatives in Denmark; as such, it is not 
part of ‘Danish culture’. Second, according to Danish campaigners, 
Euroscepticism is a barrier as many people allegedly refrain from 
supporting a proposal if they realise the campaign is part of an ‘EU-
initiative’ (Hjøllund et al 2015). Consequently, widespread support 
for EU referendums may say more about Danes’ wish to put brakes 
on the integration process than 
about a desire for instruments of 
direct democracy. At the very least, 
Danes’ experience with direct 
democracy as a means to influence 
EU politics shows that they are 
frontrunners when it comes to 
referendums but laggards when it 
comes to ECI. 
10.1.2 The Citizen’s Initiative 
In January 2018, a new tool for direct democracy, called the citizen’s 
initiative, was introduced in Denmark after a cross-party proposal 
was approved by parliament on a two-year trial basis. The new 
initiative, similar to the ECI, was triggered by a wish to enhance 
democratic participation (Folketingsbeslutning). It takes the form of a 
website that gives Danes the opportunity to send political proposals 
to parliament. It enables any citizen who is entitled to vote at Danish 
parliamentary elections, and who can get at least three persons on 
board as co-proposers, to put an item of interest online (provided it 
fulfils the rules of the initiative). If 50,000 enfranchised people 
support the proposal within a time period of six months it will be 
put on the parliamentary agenda (Danish Parliament, 2018; 
according to the Ministry of the Interior, 4,146,602 people were 
eligible to vote at the latest Danish parliamentary election in June 
2015). Thus far, two proposals have been successful in gathering the 
necessary signatures – on reducing ministers’ pensions and on 
education. Both were subsequently rejected in parliament.  
In connection with its launch, the speaker of the parliament, 
Pia Kjærsgaard of the Danish People’s Party stated that the 
Danes’ experience with direct 
democracy as a means to 
influence EU politics shows that 
they are frontrunners when it 
comes to referendums but 
laggards when it comes to ECI. 
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instrument represented a new form of civic engagement in 
Denmark, which would “give democracy an extra dimension” 
(ibid). A search among the 1,000 or 
so citizens’ initiatives proposed to 
date shows five initiatives that 
have the EU in the title, three of 
which call for Denmark’s 
withdrawal. At the time of 
writing, none of these EU-related 
proposals looks likely to come close to receiving the number of 
signatures required (Borgerforslag, 2018). 
The introduction of a new instrument of direct democracy in 
Danish politics, on top of the widespread referendum practice 
discussed below, underpins the prominence of ‘the people’ in 
Danish politics (Østergaard, 2000). However, given the low number 
of, and support for, Danish citizens’ initiatives on the EU, and as 
this direct democratic instrument still only exists on a trial basis in 
Denmark, it is not considered further in this chapter.  
10.1.3 Denmark’s referendum practice 
To understand the role played by referendums in shaping Danish 
debates on Europe, a key starting point is their link to Denmark’s 
Constitution. One of its most publicly well-known sections is 
‘section 20’, which stipulates the conditions under which Denmark 
can ‘transfer competencies’ to international authorities, such as the 
EU. The section determines that unless a 5/6 majority in the Danish 
parliament – by all standards a high figure – votes in favour of a 
proposed handover of competencies, there has to be a binding 
referendum on the matter. In media and public debates, this section 
is referred to – with a subtle, yet critical, nuance in the wording – as 
regulating the ‘handover of Danish sovereignty’ (Sørensen et al, 
2017). Given the strong presence of sovereignty-based 
Euroscepticism in Denmark, described in more detail below, the 
very activation of section 20 is thus, in itself, highly sensitive. 
The formal legal definition of what is meant by ‘transfer of 
competencies’, defined by the Ministry of Justice, is, however, rather 
technical, surprisingly apolitical, and completely unknown to the 
wider public (Sørensen et al., 2017). It has been specified, including 
through lawsuits against the Danish government for illegally ceding 
A search among the 1,000 or so 
citizens’ initiatives proposed to 
date shows five initiatives that have 
the EU in the title, three of which 
call for Denmark’s withdrawal. 
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sovereignty to the EU (e.g. the Supreme Court, 2013), as what 
happens when Denmark grants an international authority new 
powers to legislate with direct effect for citizens and companies.  
Table 10.1 Denmark’s eight EU referendums 
Topic Date Turnout Yes No 
Accession 02.10.1972 90.1% 63.4% 36.6% 
Single European Act 27.02.1986 75.4% 56.2% 43.8% 
Maastricht Treaty 02.06.1992 83.1% 49.3% 50.7% 
Maastricht Treaty + 
Edinburgh Agreement 
18.05.1993 86.5% 56.7% 43.3% 
Amsterdam Treaty 28.05.1998 76.2% 55.1% 44.9% 
The euro 28.09.2000 87.6% 46.8% 53.2% 
Patent court 25.05.2014 55.85% 62.5% 37.5% 
Change to the justice and 
home affairs opt-out 
03.12.2015  71.9%  46.9%  53.1%  
Source: Translated by the author from Folketingets EU-Oplysning (www.eu.dk).  
Since the entry into force of Denmark’s present constitution in 1953, 
section 20 has been activated solely for affairs relating to the EU, as 
other international commitments such as the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 
or the United Nations (UN), are not considered to have a direct effect 
on citizens or companies. Section 20 was the reason for six out of 
Denmark’s eight EU referendums, the two exceptions being a vote 
on the Single European Act in 1986, and the 1993 vote on accessing 
the Maastricht Treaty, with four Danish opt-outs. The latter two 
referendums did not formally require a referendum and were called 
for political reasons: the Single European Act was not deemed to 
involve new transfers of competencies, but large-scale EU 
ambivalence in the Danish parliament 
provoked a referendum for domestic 
reasons (Den Store Danske, 2012). The re-
vote on accessing the Maastricht Treaty, 
with its protocol listing four Danish opt-
outs, formally entailed a transfer of 
competences but not a new public vote, 
The parties behind this 
large majority made a joint 
political pledge to always 
consult Danes on the opt-
outs in a referendum. 
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as more than 5/6 of members of parliament favoured the 
agreement. However, the parties behind this large majority made a 
joint political pledge to always consult Danes on the opt-outs in a 
referendum. 
10.2 Voter participation 
10.2.1 The positive contribution of referendums to EU-
debates in Denmark 
Danish EU referendums are popular with the electorate; they 
generate considerable public debate and boast high turnouts. This 
is in contrast to the prevailing assumption 
in much EU literature that EU votes 
typically assume second-order status to 
national votes (e.g. Franklin et al., 1994; 
Garry et al., 2005).  
Four of Denmark’s eight EU polls 
have attracted more than 80% of the 
electorate (see Table 10.1). Although a slightly lower figure than at 
Denmark’s national elections, where participation is consistently 
above 80%, turnout on this scale does suggest that, at least at 
‘referendum times’, the EU is highly salient for Danes. There is 
much to suggest that this is directly due to the practice of holding 
referendums, which receive much more intensive coverage across 
most media outlets than an average EU news story in Denmark. 
While public funding sources and broadcasters operate on the 
principle that both sides of the argument 
should have equal access/exposure, there 
tends to be ample exposure for both sides 
in the media. Perhaps as a result of these 
referendum campaigns, many Danes tend 
to feel well-informed about EU issues (we 
return to this finding below). 
Another key hypothesis of the ‘second-order thesis’ is that EU 
polls tend to trigger a high ‘protest vote’. Protest voting at an EU 
referendum would be where many voters use their vote to 
demonstrate dissatisfaction with the incumbent national 
government (e.g. Franklin et al, 1994). Yet Danish EU referendums 
Danish EU referendums 
are popular with the 
electorate; they generate 
considerable public debate 
and boast high turnouts. 
Perhaps as a result of 
these referendum 
campaigns, many Danes 
tend to feel well-informed 
about EU issues. 
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show little evidence of protest voting. While 
many Danes certainly do vote against the 
recommendation of their government-of-the-
day, or against the party they normally vote for 
at a general election (i.e. low party loyalty at EU 
polls), studies of Danish public opinion suggest 
that, rather than a domestic protest unrelated to the EU, this 
phenomenon has more to do with a difference in stance because 
many citizens on both sides of the political spectrum perceive 
themselves as more Eurosceptic than their party (Sørensen et al., 
2017).  
Moreover, as illustrated in Table 10.2, referendums are 
popular with the Danes. In a poll asking respondents to position 
themselves on a scale between 0 and 10 as to whether EU 
referendums are a negative or a positive thing, the most frequently 
chosen response – by 20% of respondents – is 10 (‘very positive’). 
Some 61% position themselves somewhere on the positive half of 
the scale, with only 12% figuring in its negative half (Sørensen et al., 
2017; 18% replied ‘don’t know’).  
The Danes also appear to take the subject matter – the EU – 
seriously: when asked about their intentions to seek information 
prior to a referendum, only 4% stated that they would “not be 
looking for information” (YouGov for Think Tank EUROPA, 2014). 
Table 10.2 Denmark’s EU referendums: a popular instrument  
Attitude to 
‘Referendums 
on EU issues’  
0 – Very 
negative 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – 
Very 
positive 
Per cent 2 1 3 3 3 11 9 12 13 7 20 
Source: Sørensen et al., 2017 (own translation). Number of respondents: 2,056. 
Looking at Eurobarometer data across the 28 populations in the 
Union, there are several indications 
that the referendum practice may have 
heightened Danes’ awareness of 
Europe. Danes are among the EU 
populations that indicate the greatest 
interest in European affairs: 76% say 
they are “interested”, compared to 
Yet Danish EU 
referendums show 
little evidence of 
protest voting. 
Danes are among the EU 
populations that indicate the 
greatest interest in European 
affairs: 76% say they are 
“interested”, compared to 54% 
on average in the EU28. 
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54% on average in the EU28 (Parlemeter, 2018). In addition, six out 
of ten Danes (61%) say that they “feel well informed” about 
European matters, also well above the EU average of 42% and only 
exceeded by 68% in Luxembourg (Parlemeter, 2017). 
It is also a remarkable feature of 
Danish EU attitudes that these are 
relatively evenly represented across 
social divides. While Danish 
Eurosceptics tend to be slightly less 
well-educated than Danish pro-EU 
citizens, income, gender and 
geographical location do not explain the scepticism of society in 
general (Sørensen et al, 2017).  
10.2.2 The other side of the story: referendums as a 
polarising instrument 
There is, however, a less obvious, but nonetheless critical, aspect to 
Denmark’s referendum practice that nuances the merits of the 
referendums as meaningful instruments to influence EU politics. It 
has to do with the tendency of 
referendums to boil down highly 
complex and nuanced arguments to 
simplistic and monochrome Yes or No 
decisions. Rather than automatically 
serve as a tool for democratic debate, 
referendums can therefore also 
polarise opinion and force voters into boxes. 
Analyses of Danish EU referendums show that few Danes on 
either side of the issue have been able to communicate what was at 
stake in a given referendum (Sørensen, 2015). An exit-poll from the 
most recent referendum, on the opt-out from justice and home 
affairs in 2015, suggested that a staggering two-thirds of voters felt 
unable to explain what the referendum was about, and more than 
one-third reported that they were more confused by the campaign 
than they were before it started (Winther, 2015).  
Another way in which Danish referendums can be said to 
polarise Danish EU debate is that Danes only tend to think about 
EU issues around the time of a referendum. On a day-to-day basis, 
It is also a remarkable 
feature of Danish EU 
attitudes that these are 
relatively evenly represented 
across social divides. 
Rather than automatically 
serve as a tool for democratic 
debate, referendums can 
therefore also polarise opinion 
and force voters into boxes. 
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EU affairs have very modest saliency in the public mind: when 
asked about the degree to which the EU impacted daily life, for 
instance, only 8% believed that the EU had a very strong impact 
(YouGov for Think Tank EUROPA, 2014). In connection with 
referendums, however, the EU surges forward from its backseat role 
to become a highly charged and polarising topic, which many even 
fear impacts on the very independence of Denmark as a country 
(Sørensen et al., 2017). 
This has led to some extreme 
events. The EU is the only issue in 
peacetime that has provoked a 
situation where the Danish police 
force opened fire, with real bullets, on 
civilians, wounding 11. This happened 
after the 1993 referendum when public 
acceptance of the Maastricht Treaty, with the Danish opt-outs, led 
to violent demonstrations in Copenhagen. While violence on this 
scale was a one-off occurrence, analysis of social media campaigns 
shows that the Danish referendums continue to provoke highly 
charged rhetoric on the part of the Danish electorate (Sørensen and 
Vormsby, 2016). 
Arguably, the harshness of the EU debate during 
referendums has provoked a situation whereby pro-European civil 
society leaders, including business representatives, have become 
reluctant to engage in debate on European issues. As one top-level 
CEO put it recently, seemingly 
reflecting a much broader sentiment, 
Danish EU debate is perceived as being 
simply “too negative” to get involved 
(Aabo, 2018). This absence of important 
actors in EU discourse is a by-product 
of Denmark’s referendum experience, 
and one that arguably reduces its role 
as a meaningful instrument to facilitate 
Danish EU politics. 
10.2.3 Main drivers of voter mobilisation 
Confirming a common trend for Danish EU referendums (Sørensen, 
2007), an exit poll after the 2015 referendum on the justice and home 
The EU is the only issue in 
peacetime that has provoked a 
situation where the Danish 
police force opened fire, with 
real bullets, on civilians. 
The harshness of the EU 
debate during referendums 
has provoked a situation 
whereby pro-European civil 
society leaders, including 
business representatives, have 
become reluctant to engage in 
debate on European issues. 
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affairs opt-out showed that the most important reason why voters 
voted no – decisive for 68% of no-voters – was the wish to safeguard 
Denmark’s sovereignty from EU interference (Winther, 2015) – not 
actual opposition to the concrete policy issue(s) at stake. In fact, 
more than eight out of ten Danes supported Denmark’s continued 
participation in the EU police agency Europol, which was 
jeopardised by a no-vote (YouGov for Think Tank Europa, 2015).  
Research on the nature of Danish Euroscepticism suggests 
that, at a referendum, the most important EU question in the public 
mind is how integration affects national sovereignty; how to 
safeguard control and national identity (Sørensen, 2016). 
Sovereignty-based scepticism is the 
main form of Euroscepticism in 
Denmark, and it is strong enough to 
decide the outcome of Danish EU 
referendums, as shown by the above-
mentioned exit poll from 2015. The 
close link in many Danes’ minds 
between the EU and Danish 
sovereignty means that EU referendums are highly sensitive events: 
what is perceived to be at stake when there is a referendum is 
nothing less than the survival of Denmark as an independent 
country, which trumps most other arguments (Sørensen et al, 2017). 
Sovereignty-based Euroscepticism coexists with very low 
degrees of other types of scepticism, both in actual figures and 
relative to the EU average. The Danes are not characterised by 
significant degrees of ‘hard’ scepticism towards membership itself; 
‘economic’ Euroscepticism towards the EU’s perceived utility; or 
‘democratic’ Euroscepticism about 
flaws in the EU’s institutional set-up 
(Sørensen, 2007). This suggests that 
the main drivers of voter 
mobilisation ahead of a referendum 
are not campaigns informing voters 
about the EU’s economic 
advantages for Denmark, but rather 
campaigns that play on the EU’s role 
in affecting the Danish ‘way of life’.  
Sovereignty-based scepticism 
is the main form of 
Euroscepticism in Denmark, 
and it is strong enough to 
decide the outcome of Danish 
EU referendums. 
The main drivers of voter 
mobilisation ahead of a 
referendum are not campaigns 
informing voters about the EU’s 
economic advantages for 
Denmark, but rather campaigns 
that play on the EU’s role in 
affecting the Danish ‘way of life’. 
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Studies of the yes- and no-campaigns ahead of the 2015 
referendum document that sovereignty-based concerns were purely 
tackled by the no-side. Contrary to the argumentation in other parts 
of Europe, where the EU is presented as a means to strengthen 
national sovereignty (Macron, 2017), the story in Denmark is one of 
how the EU diminishes Danish sovereignty: a quantitative study of 
all comments about ‘sovereignty’ made by the public on the 
Facebook pages of Danish party leaders and MEPs in the month 
leading up to the referendum found that only 6% of these comments 
focused on how the EU could strengthen Danish sovereignty 
(Sørensen et al, 2016). The rest made a connection between the EU 
and losing sovereignty.  
As mentioned above, Danish no-
voters are remarkably well represented 
across societal divides, including across 
income groups and the political left/right 
scale (Sørensen et al, 2017). Danish no-
voters at EU referendums thus bear little 
resemblance to the typical ‘globalisation 
loser’, or less-advantaged citizen that 
some studies on European public opinion 
have suggested as an explanation of 
Euroscepticism across many parts of 
Europe (Kriesi et al, 2006).  
Of the nine parties currently represented in the Danish 
parliament, three advocated a ‘no’ at the 2015 referendum: the far-
left Unity List (8% of the vote); the libertarian centre-right Liberal 
Alliance (8% of the vote): and the far-right Danish People’s Party 
(21% of the vote). Despite representing markedly different positions 
on the left-right political spectrum, all three had in common the 
argument of not ‘handing over control’ to the EU (Sørensen, 2017A).  
As the three parties’ combined share of the vote at the latest 
general election – 37% – suggests, many no-votes at the referendum 
will have come from supporters of so-called ‘yes-parties’. This again 
underlines the finding that many Danes perceive themselves as 
being more Eurosceptic than the majority in parliament (Sørensen 
et al, 2017). The exit poll showed that a staggering 42% claimed not 
to have followed the recommendation of their usual party (Winther, 
2015). The majority of non-party organisations involved in the 
Danish no-voters at EU 
referendums thus bear little 
resemblance to the typical 
‘globalisation loser’, or less-
advantaged citizen that 
some studies on European 
public opinion have 
suggested as an explanation 
of Euroscepticism across 
many parts of Europe. 
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campaign, including trade unions and employers’ organisations, 
favoured a ‘yes’ vote, but their engagement was deemed to be very 
weak (Christensen et al, 2015). This may be a consequence of the 
aforementioned sensitivity of the EU issue in Denmark.  
10.3 Impact 
10.3.1 National-level impact 
The marked difference between the low salience of EU issues when 
there is no referendum on the agenda, and the strong emotive 
potential of these issues during a referendum campaign means that 
the outcome is usually difficult to predict for the government. At 
the two ‘failed’ Danish EU referendums, on the euro in 2000 and on 
JHA in 2015, the yes-side enjoyed a comfortable advantage in the 
polls at the time of calling the referendum: in 2015 it even led by 
some 20 percentage points.  
Marked by this experience, pro-European politicians in 
Denmark have attempted to ‘come together’ on EU politics. This has 
had a tangible impact on Danish political realities. For years, for 
example, EU politics in Denmark have been informed by large 
cross-party ‘EU agreements’ setting out the major lines of 
Denmark’s engagement (Folketingets EU-Oplysning), rather than 
by ‘normal’ political contestation. Moreover, prior to participating 
in a Council meeting in Brussels, Danish ministers have to obtain a 
parliamentary mandate for their negotiating position in a powerful 
EU committee of the Danish parliament. 
This helps to create a large support base for the government’s 
EU policy positions, whilst also ensuring broad parliamentary 
oversight of the government’s engagement in Brussels. 
Nonetheless, it also sustains a view that ‘EU politics’ are 
fundamentally different from ‘national politics’, despite growing 
findings that this line is now blurred, as various Europeanisation 
processes have meant that the EU impacts most national policy 
areas in one way or another (Lauridsen, 2015). The social democrats 
and the liberals, for instance, rarely make prior alliances on Danish 
agricultural policy, which is debated in the specialist agricultural 
committee in the Danish parliament. But when the topic is the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy, these parties usually refer to the EU 
agreement and discussions take place in the separate EU committee. 
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In a ‘chicken and egg’ fashion, 
the fact that EU policy matters 
are isolated in this way is both a 
product of EU issues being so 
sensitive in Denmark and a 
contributing factor to the Danes’ 
understanding that EU politics is 
not normal politics. The EU has 
become a disproportionately 
sensitive issue.  
10.3.2 European-level impact 
Another impact of Denmark’s EU referendums concerns not just the 
political realities in the country, but in the EU as a whole. It comes 
in the shape of the Danish opt-outs from justice and home affairs, 
the euro and defence – key parts of the European integration 
process.1  
A ‘failed’ national referendum can pose a huge legal problem, 
not just for the country concerned but also for the future of the EU 
as a whole. When Danes rejected the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, it 
left ratification of the entire treaty in limbo. In such a situation there 
is usually great pressure for a solution to be found quickly. In a 
rather spontaneous reaction to the referendum outcome, Danish 
politicians drew up four opt-outs that centred on the EU’s 
supranational, ‘state-like’ aspects: the single currency, defence, 
justice and home affairs, and citizenship (DIIS, 2008). The opt-outs 
were subsequently incorporated in the 1993 Edinburgh Agreement 
and added as an annex to the Maastricht Treaty. They were 
intended to be temporary (ibid), and all subsequent Danish 
governments (at the left and right of the political spectrum) have 
been in favour of abolishing them. The two attempts made – the 
aforementioned euro-referendum in 2000, and the JHA-referendum 
in 2015 – failed, however, and the present government has ruled out 
a new referendum during its mandate (Rasmussen, 2018).  
                                                        
1 As for the euro, Denmark will be the only member state with a formal opt-
out when the UK leaves the EU; on justice and home affairs Denmark is the 
only country with a block opt-out; and on defence policy Denmark is the 
only country in the EU with an opt-out.  
In a ‘chicken and egg’ fashion, the 
fact that EU policy matters are 
isolated in this way is both a product 
of EU issues being so sensitive in 
Denmark and a contributing factor 
to the Danes’ understanding that EU 
politics is not normal politics. 
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The opt-outs are proof that 
Danish direct democracy has 
significant, long-term policy 
consequences for Denmark that 
go against the wishes of a broad 
parliamentary majority, but are 
popular among citizens. It 
serves as a tangible reminder 
that even the public in a small country can strongly impact EU 
politics. 
Denmark’s non-participation in key aspects of the integration 
process naturally influences EU politics. One key impact of Danish 
direct democracy has been to contribute to a Europe of different 
speeds. Denmark’s referendums 
have imposed differentiated 
integration upon the EU and 
sparked debates between those who 
support the need to respect national 
specificities, those who value EU unity, and those who feel unfairly 
treated simply because they have not produced a ‘failed’ 
referendum.  
10.3.3 Danish referendums as agenda setters 
The broader impact of the Danish 1992 referendum on EU politics 
was that it introduced Euroscepticism to Europe’s political 
discourse (for instance Dinan 1994; Hix 1998), where it has since 
remained a major factor (Sørensen 2007). There is widespread 
consensus in the literature on European integration that it was the 
ratification crisis surrounding the Maastricht Treaty that ended 
(perceptions of) the so-called ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and 
Scheingold, 1970), i.e. that European leaders, at least on the 
continent in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, could rely on what was seen 
as positive prevailing attitudes towards integration, or simply a lack 
of interest, to allow developments to happen without much 
opposition.  
The gap that the Danish referendum seems to have revealed 
between the ‘public’ and the ‘elite’ on EU issues put normative 
pressure on other EU leaders to pay more attention to public 
opinion in their own countries – and public pressure for 
The opt-outs are proof that Danish 
direct democracy has significant, 
long-term policy consequences for 
Denmark that go against the wishes 
of a broad parliamentary majority, 
but are popular among citizens. 
One key impact of Danish direct 
democracy has been to contribute 
to a Europe of different speeds. 
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referendums started to grow. In a confident gesture, then French 
President François Mitterrand offered to reassure European leaders 
of the public’s dedication to the EU by letting the French 
demonstrate their support for the Treaty in a referendum in the 
autumn of 1992. The narrow ‘yes’ that resulted (51%) only served to 
cement the political realisation that Euroscepticism was both more 
prevalent and more powerful than had hitherto been realised. And, 
more ominously, that instruments of direct democracy could pose 
new and far-reaching challenges to the integration process. The 
British referendum in 2016 showed just how far this could be taken. 
Danish referendums have also set the agenda in terms of the 
EU’s attempted response to Euroscepticism. The Danish ‘no’ in 1992 
inspired the ‘democratic deficit’ thesis, which holds that 
Euroscepticism is largely due to 
democratic shortcomings in the EU’s 
institutional set-up (e.g. Hix & 
Føllesdal, 2006), which – compared to 
a well-established fully fledged 
democracy such as Denmark’s – had 
obvious flaws. Arguably, had the first 
‘failed’ EU-referendum to shock 
Europe been in a country with weaker democratic standards, this 
immediate interpretation of Euroscepticism as the critique of the 
EU’s democratic credentials would not have been made. 
The most prominent political consequence of this 
understanding has been the gradual strengthening of the European 
Parliament to improve the EU’s democratic standing (Sørensen, 
2007). As Stefan Goetze and Berthold Rittberger argue, increasing 
the powers of the European Parliament was an automatic reaction 
of EU leaders seeking to boost public support for the Union (Goetze 
and Rittberger, 2010). We argue that this process has its roots in the 
Danish referendum of 1992, and that the main cause of the 
Euroscepticism voiced at this referendum did not in fact involve a 
critique of the EU’s democratic shortcomings, but rather the concern 
that the EU went too far in terms of challenging the Danish way of 
life. Ironically, the process of actually strenghtening EU democracy 
would entail far greater encroachments on national sovereignty, 
thus engendering more Danish euroscepticism. 
The Danish ‘no’ in 1992 
inspired the ‘democratic deficit’ 
thesis, which holds that 
Euroscepticism is largely due to 
democratic shortcomings in the 
EU’s institutional set-up. 
204  DENMARK AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY: FRONTRUNNER AND LAGGARD 
 
Conversely, expressions of direct democracy in other member 
states may also impact Denmark’s EU debate. Polls show that 
Brexit, as it is currently playing out, is perceived by a majority of 
Danes to be negative for Britain (YouGov for Think Tank EUROPA, 
2018).  The biannual Eurobarometer polls suggest that support for 
EU membership has been on the rise in Denmark since late 2016, 
and it is possible to speculate that one contributing factor may be 
that Brexit has served as a reminder to many Danes that leaving the 
EU would not be a simple or painless endeavour for a small country. 
Conclusion 
Denmark’s use of direct democratic instruments to influence EU 
politics is limited to referendums, but in this respect the Danes have 
only been outstripped in number by the Irish, having held eight 
polls between 1972 and 2015. In terms 
of impact, Denmark is in a class of its 
own, as its opt-outs, and the normative 
implications of the failed referendums, 
have had far-reaching consequences for 
European integration.  
We have argued that the answer 
to the research question posed by the 
present volume, namely ‘How 
meaningful are direct democratic 
instruments in influencing EU politics?’ 
has two sides. On the one hand, high levels of public awareness of, 
and support for, EU referendums in Denmark, and the high voter 
turnout, point to the obvious democratic merits of this instrument: 
by definition, an engaged public who 
takes voting seriously is a positive 
feature of a democracy. If the very act of 
having referendums is a helpful tool to 
ensure that EU p olitics receive broad 
public attention and debate, the 
referendum instrument can be said to 
represent a meaningful means of 
influencing Denmark’s EU politics.  
However, the fact that the 
referendums are only called on EU 
If the very act of having 
referendums is a helpful tool 
to ensure that EU politics 
receive broad public attention 
and debate, the referendum 
instrument can be said to 
represent a meaningful 
means of influencing 
Denmark’s EU politics. 
However, the fact that the 
referendums are only called 
on EU issues, and demand a 
yes or a no response, has 
meant that this direct 
democracy instrument has in 
practice removed nuances 
from Danish debates about 
EU politics – by definition a 
complex subject. 
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issues, and demand a yes or a no response, has meant that this direct 
democracy instrument has in practice removed nuances from 
Danish debates about EU politics – by definition a complex subject. 
Denmark’s referendum debates have triggered existential questions 
about national independence where the EU is only discussed as a 
threat. This has polarised society, with the result that key actors 
explicitly refrain from EU debates, and pro-EU parties seek recourse 
to an increasingly artificial distinction between EU politics and 
domestic politics.   
In this sense, a more meaningful way of influencing EU 
politics could be to ‘normalise’ it – either by introducing 
referendums also on national policy matters, for those wishing to 
maintain a strong role for instruments of direct democracy, or, for 
those content with representative democracy, by treating all policy 
issues according to ‘normal’ political lines of contestation, whether 
EU-related or not.  
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11. FINLAND: DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
AND THE REPRESENTATIONAL 
SYSTEM 
JUHA JOKELA & TUOMAS ISO-MARKKU 
New tools to enable the direct engagement of citizens in democratic 
policymaking have been introduced in Finland. This has taken place 
within the representational political system, and with the explicit 
aim of strengthening it. While the EU referendum in 1994 
constituted a key moment in the country’s political history in 
general, and in terms of direct democracy in particular, the ensuing 
direct engagement of citizens in EU affairs has been limited. The 
introduction of the national citizens’ initiative is, however, linked to 
the European one, and the re-politicisation of EU affairs in light of 
several EU crises has been partly reflected in the use of direct 
democracy tools in Finland. The national citizens’ initiative has duly 
proved to be both accessible and popular, and has resulted in some 
novel political dynamics in Finland. 
Introduction 
The decreasing turnout for elections an d increasing alienation of 
citizens from political decision-making have highlighted the 
importance of direct democracy instruments in enhancing citizens’ 
democratic participation in Finland. 
In this context, a national citizens’ 
initiative, which enables citizens to 
propose new legislation, was 
introduced in 2012 through a 
constitutional amendment and 
secondary legislation. In a similar 
vein, the new Local Government Act 
of 2015 aimed to enhance and 
The decreasing turnout for 
elections and increasing 
alienation of citizens from 
political decision-making have 
highlighted the importance of 
direct democracy instruments in 
enhancing citizens’ democratic 
participation in Finland. 
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streamline residents’ opportunities to engage directly at the local 
level. The national and local administrations have also aimed to 
provide new pathways to collect input from citizens in 
policymaking. The user-friendly digital ‘e-platforms’ that have been 
used to implement these tools have served to increase accessibility, 
yet Finland has shied away from increasing the number of national 
referendums (of an advisory nature) as well as moving towards 
legally binding mechanisms of direct democracy.  
This chapter begins by outlining the key elements and trends 
related to direct democracy in Finland. It then maps out the 
significance of EU affairs in the utilisation of direct democracy tools, 
and concludes by analysing the role of direct democracy in Finnish 
politics and EU affairs. 
11.1 Key trends and instruments of direct 
democracy in Finland 
The Finnish constitution underwent a major reform in the late 1990s, 
an important element of which were efforts towards a 
parliamentary political system, and a move away from a 
presidential or semi-presidential system 
(Raunio and Tiilikainen, 2003: 79). In this 
context, referendums and other direct 
democracy tools have often been 
resisted in Finnish political discourse on 
the grounds that they would weaken 
representational democracy (Setälä, 
2010: 120) and the parliamentary system. 
Finnish citizens have viewed 
referendums rather positively, however (Pesonen, 1994: 192; see 
also Setälä, 2010: 121). Decreasing turnouts in elections – albeit 
70.1% in the most recent parliamentary election in 2015, and 66.9% 
in the presidential election in 2018 – have nonetheless steered 
political debate in Finland towards the question of citizen 
participation and, in this context, to the opportunities embedded in 
direct democracy.  
Yet aspirations towards parliamentarism and an emphasis on 
representational democracy largely explain why the recent key 
reforms and new mechanisms to enhance direct democracy in 
Referendums and other 
direct democracy tools have 
often been resisted in 
Finnish political discourse 
on the grounds that they 
would weaken 
representational democracy. 
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Finland have taken place within the 
representational system at national and 
local levels.  
The most notable new instrument 
is the citizens’ initiative at the national 
level, which was introduced in 2012. In 
addition, new digital platforms have 
been established to gather citizens’ input 
into the policymaking processes, while 
the parliamentary committees 
(convening behind closed doors) have 
decided to organise open hearings in 
which citizens can participle in person or follow the discussion via 
webcasts. In developing decision-making at the local level, 
residents’ direct engagement has also been taken into account in the 
recent reforms.  
Discussion on ‘harder’ forms of direct 
democracy, such as legally binding 
referendums or other mechanisms aiming to 
bypass the representational system, has 
been decidedly limited in Finland’s policy 
circles, however. It is academics, for the 
most part, who have called for a more open-
minded approach towards novel tools (e.g. 
Herne et al., 2018). Their research have been 
mostly related to participatory democracy 
and deliberation (Grönlund et al., 2014; 
Christensen et al., 2017). 
11.1.1 Instruments of direct democracy: old and new 
There are currently two principal instruments of ‘soft’ direct 
democracy at the national level and three instruments of ‘soft’ direct 
democracy at the local level. The concept of soft direct democracy 
refers here to non-binding referendum motions and advisory 
referendums (see Jäske, 2012). We include different forms of 
citizens’ initiatives in this category, as they are in essence non-
binding and aim to shape the decision-making agenda rather than 
reach legally binding decisions. 
Aspirations towards 
parliamentarism and an 
emphasis on 
representational democracy 
largely explain why the 
recent key reforms and new 
mechanisms to enhance 
direct democracy in Finland 
have taken place within the 
representational system at 
national and local levels. 
Discussion on ‘harder’ 
forms of direct democracy, 
such as legally binding 
referendums or other 
mechanisms aiming to 
bypass the representational 
system, has been decidedly 
limited in Finland’s policy 
circles. 
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In addition, the Finnish constitution allows consultative 
referendums (legally non-binding, and of an advisory nature) at the 
national level. National referendums are not a common practice in 
Finland, however. As they require a legislative act by parliament, 
broad political support is needed to call one. In the history of 
independent Finland, two consultative referendums have been 
called, including one on prohibition in 1931 and another on EU 
membership in 1994. The ultimate power to implement (or not) the 
outcome of a national referendum lies with the executive(s) and the 
parliament. Although referendums have largely been seen as 
politically binding, this does not necessarily translate into a smooth 
implementation of the outcome. In the context of the EU 
membership referendum in 1994, some MPs who resisted 
membership used the tools at their disposal to stop or at least hinder 
the legislative accession process, despite the decisive referendum 
outcome. 
In recent years, a consultative 
referendum has mainly been discussed 
in light of possible membership of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). The leaders of the political 
parties, as well as most of the 
presidential candidates in the last presidential election in 2018, have 
tended to point out that membership would require a successful 
outcome in a consultative referendum.  
While the worsening European security environment has led 
to some discussion in Finland on this matter, the President of the 
Republic nonetheless recently stated that NATO membership is a 
card to be held rather than played: “It’s a security weapon in itself. 
Finns do not support it and I am a Finn” (Hancock, 2018). 
Meanwhile, popular support for NATO membership has remained 
relatively low, fluctuating between 18 and 30% since 2005, and 
standing at 22% in the most recent poll conducted in 2017 (The 
Advisory Board for Defence Information, 2017: 11).  
After Finland’s EU accession, a consultative referendum on 
the adoption of the single currency gained some notable political 
support as the then main party in opposition (the Centre Party) 
resisted membership and supported a referendum on the matter. 
Subsequent Danish and Swedish referendums on this issue, and the 
In recent years, a 
consultative referendum has 
mainly been discussed in 
light of possible membership 
of NATO. 
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euro crisis, have prompted some political debate in Finland about 
the government’s decision not to call a referendum on the euro in 
the late 1990s. A new EU referendum has been called for with 
varying degrees of intensity by some key figures in the Finns Party 
and in light of the developments in the UK. However, these calls 
have gained neither political nor popular support in Finland, and 
according to several polls the Brexit vote led to an immediate and 
significant decrease in popular support for a new EU referendum.  
The election manifestos of three (out of eight) parties in the 
Finnish parliament for the European Parliament elections in 2014 
mentioned referendums. While the Finns Party (CER) was 
supportive of a UK-style renegotiation and referendum, the Left 
Alliance (GUE/NGL) suggested a “multi-option referendum” to 
politicise the EU, which it felt should be organised as an EU-wide 
plebiscite. It also suggested that if the euro crisis were not resolved, 
the single currency should be dismantled in an orderly fashion and 
euro membership should be put to a referendum. The Green League 
argued that the European Citizens’ Initiative should be streamlined 
and made easier, and supported the idea of EU-wide referendums. 
The other parties did not push for more referendums in the EU 
context, however, and mainly focused on transparency in EU 
decision-making (e.g. the Social Democrats and Swedish People’s 
Party) and decision-making as close to citizens as possible (e.g. the 
Centre Party and Christian Democratic Party). 
In light of reservations about 
calling referendums, direct democracy 
tools have been discussed in Finland 
during the past decade predominately in 
terms of the national citizens’ initiative 
introduced in 2012. The introduction of 
this new instrument resulted from a 
broad political consensus concerning the 
need to improve citizens’ engagement in 
policymaking in view of the longer-term 
trend of decreasing interest in national elections (in terms of 
turnout). It was also inspired by the negotiations related to the EU’s 
constitutional treaty and ensuing Lisbon Treaty, which introduced 
the European Citizens’ Initiative (Government of Finland, 2010).  
Given reservations about 
calling referendums, direct 
democracy tools have been 
discussed in Finland during 
the past decade in terms of 
the national citizens’ 
initiative introduced in 
2012. 
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The specific working group tasked with reviewing the 
functioning of the 2000 constitutional reform, and proposing 
amendments if deemed necessary, suggested that in principle the 
citizens’ initiative could be a more 
effective way to increase citizen 
participation than a move towards 
legally binding referendums. It was 
argued that the latter option would not 
change the current situation in practice, 
as referendums are often treated as 
politically binding in Finland and 
elsewhere, and they have been few and 
far between in Finland. Importantly, the working group reasoned 
that developing direct democracy should also aim to strengthen the 
representational system in Finland (Perustuslaki 2008 -työryhmän 
muistio 2008 [Constitution 2008, working group memorandum 
2008]).  
The national citizens’ initiative requires 50,000 signatures 
within a six-month period for a legislative proposal to be submitted 
to the Finnish parliament (Parliament of Finland n. d.). The initiative 
may include a draft act or a decision to commence legislative 
drafting. It may also propose an amendment to, or the repeal of, an 
act. Moreover, the initiative must be limited to one issue and 
relevant grounds have to be provided.  
Crucially, initiatives cannot be used to change Finland’s 
international commitments such as membership of international 
organisations or treaties. The constitution stipulates that an 
initiative can only be used to propose 
acts that fall within the legislative powers 
of the parliament. While the parliament 
approves Finland’s international 
commitments, as well as withdrawing 
from them, these matters do not fall 
under the definition of the legislative 
powers of the parliament. Hence, the 
government’s proposal to amend the constitution and allow the 
citizens’ initiative explicitly notes that these matters (as well as 
budgetary issues) remain outside the realm of the citizens’ initiative 
(Government of Finland, 2010).  
Importantly, the working 
group reasoned that 
developing direct democracy 
should also aim to 
strengthen the 
representational system in 
Finland. 
Initiatives cannot be used to 
change Finland’s 
international commitments 
such as membership of 
international organisations 
or treaties. 
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One citizens’ initiative has so far required consideration of the 
parliament’s Constitutional Committee in this respect, because its 
subject was Finland’s membership of the euro area. It proposed a 
consultative referendum as a legal act, which is potentially within 
the remit of the parliament’s legislative powers. As the initiative 
gained more than 50,000 signatures, it was received by the 
parliament. However, the constitutional committee of the 
parliament decided not to advance this citizens’ initiative, on two 
main grounds. In addition to the above-mentioned limitation of it 
being potentially unconstitutional, the committee stated that the 
initiative did not propose a legal act that could be advanced in 
parliament without thorough preparation by the government. This 
suggests that the complexity of the matter at hand, and difficulties 
in assessing its implications without the usual government-led 
legislative preparation and impact assessment processes, might 
impose significant limitations on citizens’ initiatives. It also suggests 
that proposed acts must be well prepared and implementable.   
Nonetheless, the citizens’ initiative has proved to be highly 
popular and widely used. As such, it has introduced new dynamics 
into the Finnish political system, which will be further analysed in 
the next section of this chapter. Notwithstanding its importance in 
providing a direct channel to engage in policymaking, the new 
mechanism can be seen as a way to develop rather than challenge 
the Finnish representational system insomuch as the direct 
engagement of citizens takes place within the parliamentary system. 
At the local (i.e. municipal) level, the key focus of governance 
reforms has also been largely on well-functioning representational 
democracy. The more than 300 
municipalities in Finland enjoy 
strong autonomy entrenched in the 
constitution, and have responsibility 
for organising several key services 
such as education, healthcare, and 
levying taxes. Currently, the 
government is proposing a major overhaul of the healthcare and 
social service system, including the introduction of 18 autonomous 
and elected regional councils. The potential implications of this 
reform as far as the direct influence of residents is concerned are still 
largely unknown. 
At the local (i.e. municipal) 
level, the key focus of 
governance reforms has also 
been largely on well-functioning 
representational democracy. 
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Enhancing citizens’ opportunities to have a direct say in 
municipal decision-making started in the 1970s, and the 
municipality initiative was adopted as early as 1976 (Christensen et 
al., 2016: 9). Moreover, the legislation has allowed municipal 
consultative referendums. When preparing the Local Government 
Act of 2015, special emphasis was placed on the direct democratic 
influence of residents, however, and the new act duly clarified and 
streamlined the direct democracy mechanism at the local level. 
According to the current legislation (Local Government Act 
2015), residents have the right to submit initiatives to the local 
authority on policy areas related to its functions. Citizens 
submitting initiatives should be informed of any action taken as a 
result of a municipal initiative. If the initiative is supported by at 
least two per cent of residents entitled to vote in the municipal 
elections, the municipal council must consider the initiative within 
a six-month timeframe. The municipal council can also decide to 
organise a consultative referendum in the municipality on a matter 
belonging to its competences. The referendum can address an issue 
related to the entire municipality, or a specific area within a 
municipality. Residents of a municipality also have the right to 
initiate a consultative referendum, providing that a minimum of 
five per cent of residents over the age of 15 support it. In this case, 
the council must decide without delay whether it will organise a 
referendum on the matter (Parliament of Finland, n. d.).  
11.1.2 Level of participation in direct democracy and 
mobilisation 
Figures showing voter participation in the two referendums, the use 
of citizens’ initiative instruments, and elections at the municipal, 
national and EU level provide a mixed picture of the importance of 
direct democracy instruments in Finland. Importantly, the turnout 
in direct presidential elections (since 1994) has generally been 
higher than in parliamentary elections based on the d'Hondt 
method of proportional representation, as well as local and 
European parliament elections. 
The level of participation in the consultative referendum on 
prohibition in 1931 was 44.4% of those entitled to vote (Suomen 
virallinen tilasto [Official statistics of Finland], 1932). The level of 
participation was lower than in the national parliamentary elections 
216  FINLAND: DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE REPRESENTATIONAL SYSTEM 
 
at that time, but higher than in municipal elections of the period. 
The voters were offered three choices: the continuation of 
prohibition, a change in the prohibition rules allowing for the 
production and sale of mild alcoholic drinks, and an overturn of the 
prohibition legislation. The first proposal received 28% of the votes, 
the second a mere 1.4% and the third 70.6%.  
The turnout in the consultative referendum on Finnish EU 
membership in 1994 (see Pesonen, 1994: 183) was 74%, which was a 
few points higher than in the parliamentary elections in 1991 and 
1995, yet lower than in the first round of the presidential elections 
in 1994 (82%). In the referendum, 56.9% of voters were in favour of 
joining the EU, while 43.1% voted against. In a separate referendum 
on the autonomous Åland Islands, 73.7% of voters were in favour of 
EU membership and 26.3% against, with a turnout of 49%. 
Citizens’ initiatives at the national level have proved highly 
popular. As of September 2018, a total of 794 initiatives have been 
filed since the introduction of this mechanism (kansalaisaloite.fi e-
platform 2018). There are currently 40 initiatives pending, two of 
which have so far obtained the required 50,000 signatures, and the 
731 that failed to reach the required number were subsequently 
withdrawn. Twenty-three initiatives have fulfilled the formal 
criteria and been handled by parliament.  
The strong public interest in directly influencing parliament 
can also be partly explained by parliament’s supportive approach 
towards the new initiative. The political 
parliamentary groupings agreed that 
those initiatives that fulfil the criteria 
will be subject to swift yet thorough 
scrutiny, and should be voted upon in a 
plenary session. Yet parliament has 
likewise reserved itself the right to 
decide whether an initiative should be 
carried forward to a vote or not.  
At the time of the introduction of this new initiative, 
researchers and civil society actors were concerned that proposals 
made under this new move might receive a lukewarm reception in 
parliament. This, in turn, could have led to citizens’ initiatives being 
treated in much the same way as legislative initiatives by individual 
members of parliament (MPs). In addition to the government, an 
The strong public interest in 
directly influencing 
parliament can also be partly 
explained by parliament’s 
supportive approach towards 
the tool of citizens’ 
initiatives. 
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MP has the right to propose legislation, but many of these so-called 
MPs’ initiatives have been buried in the parliamentary committees, 
even if some have been undersigned by the majority of MPs. This 
could be partly explained by the majority government tradition 
since the mid-1980s. As the parties in the government also hold a 
majority in the parliamentary committees, they have tended to 
highlight the government’s (rather than MPs’) role in initiating new 
legislation.  
To highlight the importance of citizens’ initiatives, a practice 
has been created whereby those citizens who have launched the 
initiative will hand over eligible proposals to the speaker of the 
parliament. This short ceremony often captures media attention, 
which has also highlighted the importance of the initiatives. 
Further, filing such an initiative and 
collecting signatures for it have been 
made user-friendly via a digital e-
platform. This reflects the aspiration 
highlighted by the parliament’s 
Constitutional Committee, for instance, 
that formal requirements should not 
make the initiative too complicated for 
citizens to carry out.  
According to an evaluation by the 
Ministry of Justice, the opportunity to 
collect signatures for a citizens’ initiative electronically, as well as 
the cost-free platform provided by the ministry for registering them, 
has lowered the threshold when it comes to campaigning for and 
launching an initiative. Researchers have also suggested that the 
platform provided by the state appears to be a unique practice 
compared to other countries (Nurminen, 2017: 16). Hence, s 
uccessfully increasing direct citizen engagement in Finland has 
been linked to the new opportunities afforded by technological 
development. Cyber-security considerations are taken into account 
even in the preparation stage of the legislation. The citizens’ 
initiative is therefore based on so-called strong e-identification, 
namely the use of online banking identification, an electronic ID or 
a mobile certificate provided by tele-operators, for example. 
Direct democracy instruments have also been used fairly 
widely at the local level. Based on a review of the digital platform, 
The opportunity to collect 
signatures for a citizens’ 
initiative electronically, as 
well as the cost-free platform 
provided by the ministry for 
registering them, has 
lowered the threshold when 
it comes to campaigning for 
and launching an initiative. 
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which has been available since 2013 and which covered around 70% 
of the Finnish municipalities in 2017, 2,906 municipal initiatives 
have been filed since September 2013, along with 64 proposals for 
municipal referendums.  On average, there have been seven 
municipal initiatives per year and per municipality, with figures 
ranging from 0 to 126 (Kuntaliitto 2017). Added to this, a total of 61 
municipal referendums were organised between 1991 and 2016 
(Oikeusministeriö 2015). The lowest recorded turnout was 38.9% in 
a referendum organised in 1992, and the highest 87.2% in 2003, with 
an average turnout of 67.1%. Based on a review of referendums 
between 1991 and 2016, in 80% of cases, the municipal council acted 
according to the result of the referendum, whereas in 20% of cases 
the municipal council chose to act differently. 
National citizens’ initiatives have dealt with a broad spectrum 
of topics, the most common of which seem to be health, welfare and 
housing, as well as civil rights and law enforcement. The latter 
theme has also gained the most notable 
support, which might stem in part from 
the overwhelming number of signatures 
for the initiative proposing same-sex 
marriage (for more, see Christiansen, 
2017: 14). At the local level, the merger of 
municipalities, themes concerning 
health, education, the environment, and 
traffic arrangements are among the most 
popular in terms of municipality referendums and initiatives (ibid.: 
16–18). 
In light of the topics, citizens become mobilised for various 
reasons. Recent research on citizens’ initiatives suggests that socio-
demographic factors play a minor role in mobilisation 
(Christiansen, 2007: 28), yet for the most part organisers and 
campaigners tend to be active in political parties. However, this is 
not the case at the local level (ibid.: 33). Moreover, the available data 
suggest that the citizens’ initiative is not widely used by the smallest 
parties without a single MP, or by parties in opposition (ibid.: 29). 
Moreover, civil society organisations seem to have taken citizens’ 
initiatives more seriously than traditional interest groups (ibid.: 30). 
Recently, however, labour unions have also campaigned for an 
initiative to try to repeal recent changes to the unemployment 
National citizens’ initiatives 
have dealt with a broad 
spectrum of topics, the most 
common of which seem to be 
health, welfare and housing, 
as well as civil rights and 
law enforcement. 
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benefit system by the centre-right government. Moreover, the Social 
Democrats (currently the main party in opposition) lend their 
support, at least indirectly, for the initiative.   
11.2 Significance of EU affairs in direct democracy 
The EU has played a significant role in the development related to 
direct democracy in Finland. First, the only post-war national 
referendum was called to settle the EU 
membership question in 1994. Second, 
the European Citizens’ Initiative 
discussed in the Convention on the 
Future of Europe and included in the 
Lisbon Treaty was one of the drivers of 
the national citizens’ initiative adopted 
in 2012. Third, the re-politicisation of EU 
affairs in Finland has been reflected in 
the use of this new national mechanism.  
In the membership debate and referendum, the yes and no 
camps focused largely on the same topics and issues, and the 
membership question divided both the political parties and the 
people (Bäck, 2017: 33; Raunio and Tiilikainen, 2003). Whereas the 
yes camp saw the economic benefits and Finland’s influence in 
Europe and the world as the most important reasons for 
membership, the no campaigners saw this differently and provided 
counter-arguments. However, security considerations and identity 
questions were equally decisive in the vote. Moreover, the question 
of belonging to the West and the consolidation of Finland’s 
international position have been seen as key factors in the 
membership decision and referendum. 
The overall assessment of the EU referendum in Finland in 
1994 has been quite positive. Importantly, research carried out after 
the referendum (Pesonen, 1994) suggests that the related 
information campaigns succeeded reasonably well. Interestingly, 
citizens suggested that they received information mainly from the 
state (institutions) and the media. The role played by the parties and 
campaigns was felt to be less significant. It has been concluded that 
in comparison to the corresponding information policies of Austria, 
Norway and Sweden, Finland’s performance appeared rather 
impartial. The Finnish state ran its largest-ever information 
The ECI discussed in the 
Convention on the Future of 
Europe and included in the 
Lisbon Treaty was one of 
the drivers of the national 
citizens’ initiative adopted 
in 2012. 
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campaign and, unlike in other countries, it disseminated material 
produced by the no campaigns (Pesonen, 1994: 191). However, 
notwithstanding the fact that plenty of information was available, 
factual information was partly treated as ‘opinion’ and hence it has 
been noted that “no ‘truth’ existed” in the information related to the 
referendum (ibid.).  
While the 1994 referendum clearly positioned EU affairs as a 
matter of primary concern in Finnish politics, it can also be seen as 
a factor affecting the de-politicisation of EU affairs in the longer-
term perspective. A broad national 
political consensus was established on 
EU affairs during the early years of EU 
membership, which has broken down 
only twice since Finland’s accession – 
firstly in the late 1990s over the adoption 
of the single currency, and then in the 
late 2000s over the management of the 
euro crisis. However, as a result of the 
euro crisis, migration pressure and 
Brexit, EU affairs have become re-politicised in Finland as well, 
which has been partly reflected in the use of direct democracy tools. 
According to the e-platform data (kansalaisaloite.fi), 13 citizens’ 
initiatives to date have either dealt directly with the EU or with EU 
matters, most of them demanding a referendum on Finland’s 
membership of the EU (six initiatives) or the eurozone (three 
initiatives); so far, only one (demanding a referendum on Finland 
leaving the eurozone) has managed to collect the requisite 50,000 
signatures. Others have obtained from 34 to 33,743 signatures. 
Importantly, all of these initiatives 
reflect the re-politicisation of EU 
membership or the euro membership 
question in Finland.  
National citizens’ initiatives can 
also be ‘EU-related’ in that they touch 
upon existing EU legislation. An 
example of this is the initiative suggesting that the government 
should abolish daylight saving time (i.e. the switch to summer and 
winter times). The initiative gained more than 70,000 signatures and 
was hence received by parliament. It was rejected, however, as the 
While the 1994 referendum 
clearly positioned EU affairs 
as a matter of primary 
concern in Finnish politics, it 
can also be seen as a factor 
affecting the de-politicisation 
of EU affairs in the longer-
term perspective. 
National citizens’ initiatives 
can also be ‘EU-related’ in 
that they touch upon 
existing EU legislation. 
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daylight saving practice results from an EU directive, and 
consequently falls outside the legislative powers of parliament. Yet 
parliament tasked the government with exploring the possibilities 
for abolishing this at the EU level. The European Commission first 
launched a public consultation on this matter due to a request to 
review the practice by civil society, the European Parliament and 
some member states (including Finland), and then proposed to let 
member states decide whether they want to live in summer or 
winter time. 
Even if the European Citizens’ Initiative is one of the drivers 
behind the national version in Finland, Finns have been much more 
enthusiastic about the latter than the former. In Finland, the 
required minimum number of signatures for a European Citizens’ 
Initiative is 9,750. Out of the four European initiatives that have 
reached the required threshold at the EU level, only two have 
reached the national limit (European Commission, 2018). The ‘Stop 
vivisection’ initiative secured 12,495 signatures in Finland, while the 
‘Water and sanitation are a human right’ initiative was signed by 
14,589 Finns. The initiative to ban glyphosate gained 3,786 
signatures, while the ’One of us’ initiative obtained 1,230 signatures 
in Finland. Two Finnish citizens are among the organisers of the 
water and sanitation initiative, and one Finnish citizen is among the 
organisers of the ‘Stop TTIP’ initiative, which is currently open.  
Rather limited public and media attention has been paid to 
the European Citizens’ Initiative in general, and the individual 
initiatives and their campaigns. In terms of the national debate, the 
focus has clearly been on the national citizens’ initiative, and the 
available data suggest that Finnish citizens have been actively 
engaged on the domestic front, but less so in European terms.  
11.3 Implications of direct democracy in Finland 
The EU membership referendum constitutes a key development in 
Finland’s recent political history, and particularly in terms of the use 
of direct democracy tools. As such, it has had significant 
implications for the management of EU affairs in Finland.  
The referendum did not settle the matter immediately, 
however. Its non-binding nature enabled some members of 
parliament to continue working against membership, while others 
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also referred to their constituencies in their attempts to form a 
blocking one-third minority in parliament. In the longer-term 
perspective, the outcome of the referendum can be seen as central 
to the evolution of the Finnish EU policy and the distinctly broad 
consensus upon it. Despite the divisive nature of the referendum, a 
broad consensus on Finland’s EU policy at the elite level was 
established during the early years of membership, and the decisive 
outcome of the referendum can be seen as lending political 
legitimacy to this.  
In short, Finland is often referred to as the most integrationist 
Nordic EU member, which has aimed to gain political capital 
through constructive rather than obstructive engagement in EU 
decision-making. While the early years of Finnish EU membership 
have been understood in terms of overcoming a peripheral 
geographic location through full participation in the core projects of 
the EU, including the third phase of the EMU, a rather more 
managerial approach has arguably emerged over time. Similarly, 
the Finnish representatives in EU decision-making do not accept the 
view that Finns are regarded as ‘model pupils’ in the ‘EU 
classroom’. Rather, they have suggested that the political capital 
gained through constructive engagement should be used sparingly 
for issues in which significant national interests are at stake (Store, 
2014). 
Importantly, Finland did not call a referendum when it 
decided to sign up for the third phase of the EMU in 1997, and to 
adopt the euro in 1999-2002. The Centre Party, which is one of the 
country’s largest parties (then in opposition), positioned itself 
against membership and supported a referendum on the issue. 
Accordingly, the broad national political consensus broke down 
temporarily. The government, a coalition led by the other two main 
parties – the Social Democrats and the centre-right National 
Coalition Party – argued that as Finland had accepted the 
Maastricht Treaty in full when it joined the EU in 1995, and as 
citizens had voted in a referendum on membership in 1994, there 
was no need for another one, as Finland had already committed 
itself to the formation of the euro. The counter-argument claimed 
that the euro had not really been debated or understood in 1994 
because the single currency was merely a political aspiration 
enshrined in the treaties at that time. 
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While the government’s reluctance to hold an EMU 
referendum is also consistent with the unenthusiastic approach 
towards referendums in general among Finnish political elites, the 
fact that Sweden opted for an EMU referendum, which delivered a 
negative result, revived this old debate at the height of the eurozone 
crisis. However, this has not led to any serious discussion among 
the traditional political parties about increasing the number of 
referendums in Finland. The only citizens’ initiative calling for an 
EU-related referendum (on euro membership) which secured the 
necessary 50,000 signatures was rejected 
outright in parliament, as discussed 
above. While the Finns Party has 
highlighted the possibility of organising 
an EU referendum in Finland in the 
aftermath of the Brexit vote, the UK case 
has been just as often used as an example 
of the democratic complications that can 
arise with referendums. First, there is the 
question about the usefulness of a 
simple yes/no response in the context of 
highly complicated matters such as an 
exit from the EU. Second, the discussion in Finland has also referred 
to the research findings that analyse the drivers and motives of 
voting behaviour in referendums. Third, Finnish politicians have 
also reminded their audiences of the key characteristics of 
representational democracy and the legitimacy ideals that underpin 
them, suggesting that referendums might be problematic in terms 
of accountability, and might obscure this key feature of 
representational democracy.  
In light of all this, the consequences of direct democratic 
mechanisms in Finland have taken place within the representational 
political system and are predominantly related to the national 
citizens’ initiative.  
To date, only one citizens’ initiative has been successful in 
Finland. Yet the instrument has been seen to carry political 
While the Finns Party has 
highlighted the possibility of 
organising an EU 
referendum in Finland in 
the aftermath of the Brexit 
vote, the UK case has been 
just as often used as an 
example of the democratic 
complications that can arise 
with referendums. 
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relevance for both citizens and policymakers. Importantly, several 
of the eligible but unsuccessful initiatives that reached Parliament 
have had legislative implications. In other words, some have been 
followed up in the government’s 
legislative proposals on a related matter, 
or have influenced the parliamentary 
proceedings of related legislation. In 
addition, the accepted initiative to 
legalise same-sex marriage required 
additional legislative work prepared and 
proposed by the government after the 
parliament’s decision.   
Moreover, the successful citizens’ 
initiative was related to a major political debate during the 2011-15 
electoral period, namely the one on the ‘equal marriage act’, which 
proposed opening up marriage to same-sex couples. A very similar 
act with almost identical effects had already come into force in 
Finland in 2002. However, this law created a separate institution of 
registered partnership. The key practical difference between the 
latter and marriage was the absence of the right to adopt a child as 
a couple in registered partnership.1 
Political pressure to open up marriage to same-sex couples 
mounted in the run-up to the 2011 parliamentary election, and 
expectations ran high that the new government would take this on 
board. International and European developments also played a role, 
especially the fact that all the other Nordic countries had already 
moved in this direction. However, the inclusion of the Christian 
Democratic Party as a junior coalition partner (albeit with only a 
4.03% support in the 2011 election) prevented the government from 
including the amendment to the marriage act in the government’s 
programme. Most of the other parties attempted to overcome this 
obstacle by proceeding with an MP’s initiative filed by a Green 
League MP. However, due to the political balance in the 
parliamentary Law Committee, this initiative was not taken 
forward and voted on in the plenary.  
                                                        
1 Adoption was, however, open for individuals (also in registered 
partnership), and the so-called internal adoption within a family was made 
possible in 2009 for same-sex couples.  
To date, only one citizens’ 
initiative has been 
successful in Finland. 
 
Several of the eligible but 
unsuccessful initiatives that 
reached Parliament have 
had legislative implications. 
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The introduction of the citizens’ initiative nevertheless 
provided a new pathway for surmounting obstacles in both the 
government and the parliament. Arguably, the landslide number of 
signatures (some 166,000) for this initiative in record time 
underlined the political weight of the issue for the electorate, and 
led to a real parliamentary process and contentious but clear 
outcome with the passing of the initiative. The campaigning for, and 
to some extent against, the initiative also energised society, leading 
to peaceful demonstrations and a heated parliamentary debate.  
The successful outcome also generated a ‘real marriage’ 
counter-initiative aiming to repeal the new marriage act before it 
could come into force in 2017. As this initiative also gathered the 
required number of signatures, it was voted on in the ensuing 
parliament in 2017, but failed to garner a majority. This has led to 
some political discussion about whether this type of counter 
initiatives should be banned to avoid incoherence in the legislative 
process.  
Against this background, the 
first successful citizens’ initiative has 
clearly highlighted the importance 
of the new direct instrument 
available to the electorate. It 
provided a pathway to overcome the 
political bargaining typical of the 
formation of coalition governments, 
at times criticised by the public and 
labelled as a form of ‘dirty politics’. Moreover, the record number 
of signatures registered in a short period of time elevated the 
importance of the issue on the national political agenda. This led to 
the kind of political mobilisation – in terms of demonstrations and 
campaigns – that has rarely been seen over a single issue in Finland. 
During the decisive vote in the plenary, more than 5,000 supporters 
of the motion gathered in the Citizens’ Square in front of the 
parliament building. This highly charged political moment, widely 
reported in the media and social media, also served to highlight the 
role of the new direct democracy tool for citizens. As the 
mobilisation is partly related to the active part played by various 
civil society organisations (old and new, formal and informal), their 
role in the Finnish political system, characterised as it is by strong 
The first successful citizens’ 
initiative has provided a 
pathway to overcome the 
political bargaining typical of 
the formation of coalition 
governments, at times criticised 
by the public and labelled as a 
form of ‘dirty politics’. 
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and influential interest groups (labour, business and agriculture, for 
instance), could also be on the rise, due in part to the new 
mechanism.  
Conclusions 
The analysis of direct democracy trends and instruments in Finland 
allows us to draw some conclusions of a potentially broader 
significance. First, the political pressure to enhance direct 
democracy in Finland is linked to the domestic trend of diminishing 
participation in national elections, which has been observed in 
several Western liberal democracies. Yet the EU developments and 
the introduction of the European Citizens’ Initiative have also 
contributed to the reasoning and developments in the country. 
Second, the EU has featured strongly in the utilisation of direct 
democracy tools in Finland. The EU membership question led to the 
only post-war national (advisory) referendum in the country. While 
direct engagements in the form of referendums did not take place 
in conjunction with the adoption of the single currency or major EU 
treaty changes, the re-politicisation of EU affairs in light of several 
major EU crises has been partly reflected in the use of direct 
democracy tools.  
The national citizens’ initiative has been used 13 times vis-à-
vis EU membership, euro or other EU issues, yet only one initiative 
(on organising a referendum on Finland’s euro membership) has 
secured the required number of signatures. It was nonetheless 
rejected at the outset of parliamentary proceedings due to 
constitutional reservations and on grounds related to its incoherent 
substance. The failure of these initiatives points to a lack of popular 
and political support for EU-related referendums in Finland, also 
reflected in recent polls. On the other hand, the only successful 
citizens’ initiative to date, on opening up the institution of marriage 
to same-sex couples, provides an example of the new political 
dynamics and mobilisation at work in the country. The citizens’ 
initiative has offered a tool to overcome political bargaining related 
to the formation of a coalition government, through which a minor 
conservative party managed to block a reform which was widely 
supported in society and by the majority of political parties alike. 
The attendant campaign mobilised citizens, civil society 
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organisations and also private businesses to some extent, and led to 
a vibrant public debate in the media and social media.  
Finally, the analysis suggests that direct democracy in Finland 
has been used to strengthen the primacy of representational 
democracy as the foundation of the country’s political system. 
Importantly, the national citizens’ initiative and the enhancement of 
direct democracy at the local level is subordinate to the 
representational system and its institutions. The introduction of 
these tools can also be seen to partly counter calls to increase the 
number of national advisory referendums, or potentially to move 
towards legally binding ones.  
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12. DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN 
GERMANY 
ERIK BRANDES, NICOLAI VON ONDARZA & 
FELIX SCHENUIT 
The story of direct democracy at the national level in Germany is 
rather short: there have been no national referendums on European 
questions in the country. Yet elements of direct democracy come 
into play in three areas: at the local and regional level, through the 
European Citizen’s Initiative and the burgeoning discussion about 
whether direct democracy should be used at the national level. Even 
though an advisory referendum on EU issues is theoretically 
possible, the German political system remains, for the foreseeable 
future, characterised by representative democracy, with very 
limited scope for direct democratic elements. 
Introduction 
On a state visit to Switzerland in April 2018, Germany’s Federal 
President Frank-Walter Steinmeier took part in a panel discussion 
at the University of Fribourg about the future of democracy. 
Prompted to give his take on direct democracy, Steinmeier asserted 
that Switzerland’s model could not be exported easily, as Germany 
had a “different political DNA”. The German Grundgesetz, he 
argued, has been the result of lessons learned from the failure of 
Germany’s first democratic system between 1918 and 1933 – and 
excludes binding referendums on a 
national level. 
The story of direct democracy in 
Germany and its European dimension 
could therefore be rather short – there 
have been no national referendums in 
the Federal Republic of Germany. There 
The story of direct democracy 
in Germany and its 
European dimension could 
therefore be rather short – 
there have been no national 
referendums in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
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are therefore no empirical cases of instruments of direct democracy 
used in Germany to influence EU politics.  
Nevertheless, there are three areas where elements of direct 
democracy might come into play in Germany’s European 
policymaking. First, it is relevant to look at the legal situation today 
and the circumstances under which instruments of direct 
democracy are and can be used in Germany. Second, the European 
Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) is currently the only instrument of direct 
democracy used on a national level in Germany. Despite its limited 
use so far it merits special attention. Finally, both among the current 
governing parties and the Eurosceptic Alternative für Deutschland 
there are growing calls for the introduction of more direct 
democratic elements into the German political system. This poses 
questions about the circumstances under which a referendum on 
EU-related issues could be conceivable in Germany.  
12.1 History and situation today 
President Steinmeier’s stance in Switzerland reflects a well-
established attitude in German politics. The Grundgesetz 
(Germany’s Constitution), drawn up under the auspices of the allied 
forces four years after the end of World War II, is often lauded as 
having created a “well-fortified democracy” as opposed to the 
“most democratic democracy” (Eduard David) of the Weimar 
constitution of 1919. It is seen as a means of stabilising and 
protecting democratic order against anti-democratic unrest. The 
Grundgesetz (or GG) therefore not only introduced legal measures to 
ban unconstitutional political groups, but also established a five-
percent threshold in parliamentary elections, transformed the office 
of president into a solely representative role without a popular 
mandate, and largely abolished referendums at national level. All 
these measures served to strengthen the German Parliament as the 
main bearer of political legitimacy. 
Previously, there had been six national referendums in 
Germany: two based on popular initiative during the Weimar 
Republic – on expropriating the princes and on stopping the Young 
Plan (both rejected) – and four unfree ex post referendums arranged 
by the Nazi regime to legitimise decisions already taken – on exiting 
the League of Nations; on merging the offices of president and 
chancellor; on the military occupation of the Rhineland; and on 
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annexing Austria. The instrumentalisation of manipulated 
plebiscites for propaganda purposes continued in the Eastern 
German Democratic Republic after World War II, whereas the 
Western Republic distanced itself from this method almost entirely 
(Jung 1994). In practice, there has never been a nationwide 
referendum in the Federal Republic of Germany – not even for 
enacting the Grundgesetz. 
The case is somewhat different at the level of states 
(Bundesländer). Eight of the Länder constitutions drawn up after 1945 
were adopted by referendum and most of them incorporated 
plebiscitary mechanisms, some obligatory and some citizen-
demanded referendums. However, the hurdles for such processes 
were high at first, so that until 1990 there were only a few cases of 
public votes at state level, including plebiscites on restructuring 
Länder territory, constitutional referendums in Bavaria and Hesse, 
and citizen-demanded plebiscites in Bavaria and Baden-
Württemberg. 
The situation began to change with Germany’s reunification. 
The Joint Constitutional Commission offered an opportunity to 
revisit direct democracy at federal level, but the necessary two-
thirds majority for the introduction of a plebiscitary procedure at 
federal level was not attained. Since 1992, several legislative 
initiatives to introduce nationwide referendums have been debated 
in the Bundestag. A constitution-changing majority has, however, 
never been achieved – not even in 2002, when the governing SPD 
and the Greens put their own initiative to the vote. With 63.38% 
support in the Bundestag, the two-thirds majority was missed again 
– albeit by a small margin (Decker, 2017, p. 140). 
At Länder and municipal level, a constitutional reform in 
Schleswig-Holstein in 1990 led to a new dynamic across the states: 
the three-step procedure established there (see below) was adopted 
by all eastern German states in their new constitutions. Lower 
Saxony, Berlin and Hamburg subsequently also adopted this rule 
and Bremen, North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate 
reformed their state constitutions. During the 1990s, all federal 
states – albeit in different forms – also anchored citizens' decisions 
at local level. 
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12.2 Legal framework for direct democracy and its 
use in Germany 
Direct democratic instruments are often differentiated in terms of 
legal necessity and of legal liability. A referendum can be 
(constitutionally) required or non-required and it can be binding or 
non-binding (advisory). These distinctions refer to judicial 
circumstances and thus to the degree to which the trigger or 
outcome of a referendum can be legally enforced. 
At federal level, direct democracy instruments are very 
limited. The Grundgesetz cites two cases in which a referendum 
becomes mandatory: first, for re-arranging the federal territory (Art. 
29, GG) and second, for enacting a new constitution (Art. 146, GG). 
While the former prerequisite has led to regional referendums, the 
second situation, although in discussion during German 
reunification, has not yet occurred. The Grundgesetz articles on 
federal legislation (Art. 70ff., GG) do not envisage a role for 
plebiscitary elements; binding referendums on other political 
decisions would therefore be unconstitutional, if only because they 
bypass Länder participation in law-making. Whether non-binding 
plebiscites are covered by the constitution is disputed. Citing the 
Grundgesetz’s claim that “all state power […] shall be exercised by 
the people through elections and other votes” (Art. 20, GG), a large 
number of legal experts now believe that advisory referendums 
(Volksbefragung) could be called without a change to the constitution 
(Wissenschaftlicher Dienst des Deutschen Bundestages, 2010). 
Another form of public participation in federal decision-
making is petitioning the Bundestag, as set out in Art. 17 and 45c GG. 
The petitions committee discusses notable entries publicly if they 
attain 50,000 signatures or more. This mechanism can be used to 
influence German EU policy, as a recent petition on EU democracy 
attempted to do.1 However, Bundestag petitioning rarely manages to 
create substantial political pressure. 
At state and municipal level, by contrast, several forms of 
plebiscites exist. While the complete revision of the Länder 
                                                        
1 Petition 73232 to the German Bundestag, November 2017 
(https://epetitionen.bundestag.de/petitionen/_2017/_08/_22/Petition_7
3232.nc.html). 
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constitutions require referendums in most states, in Bavaria, Hesse, 
Bremen and Berlin, even (certain) changes in Länder constitutions 
necessitate referendums. In addition to these required referendums, 
there are several forms of non-required but binding referendums, 
usually called Volksentscheid (people’s decision) on state level or 
Bürgerentscheid (citizens’ decision) at municipal level. In Baden-
Württemberg, Lower Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate and Hamburg, 
a passed state law can be put to a confirmative Volksentscheid. Most 
of the time, however, referendums on state or municipal level are 
the result of public initiative. The three-step procedure (Volks-
/Bürgerinitiative; Volks-/Bürgerbegehren; and Volks-/Bürgerentscheid) 
requires citizens to collect a specific number of signatures before 
their case can be put to a referendum. How restrictive the provisions 
for such plebiscitary procedures are and which issues they can cover 
differs enormously from state to state. Advisory, non-binding 
referendums are only possible in Berlin, Hamburg and Schleswig-
Holstein, as their constitutions allow plebiscites on any issue of 
political will formation.  
In practice, over 50 Länder-level referendums have been called 
since 1990, 22 of which at the initiative of citizens (Mehr 
Demokratie, 2017). Notable examples include non-smoker 
protection in Bavaria (2010); school 
reform in Hamburg (2010); on the 
construction project ‘Stuttgart 21’; in 
Baden-Württemberg (2011); and the re-
municipalisation of energy supply in 
Hamburg and Berlin (2013). 
Participation ranges from 23 to almost 80 percent, averaging at 
around 50 percent. At local level, Baden-Württemberg had long 
been a frontrunner in plebiscitary participation, while use is 
nowadays particularly frequent in the Länder Berlin, North Rhine-
Westphalia, Bavaria, and Hesse (Schiller, 2011, Kost 2010: 400). 
In practice, over 50 Länder-
level referendums have been 
called since 1990, 22 of which 
at the initiative of citizens. 
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With European affairs being 
mostly a national government 
responsibility, local and state-level 
direct democracy can rarely touch 
upon European politics. A 
constitutional referendum in Bavaria 
in 2013 was one of the few plebiscites 
with relevance to EU policymaking: 
the adopted change gives the 
Bavarian parliament the right to bind 
the government on questions of 
power transfer to the EU level and 
demands that the Bavarian 
government seek the parliament’s 
opinion on EU initiatives with impact on Bavarian legislation. 
12.3 The ECI in Germany – a largely abandoned 
experiment 
Incidentally, there is one major exception to the current lack of 
direct democratic instruments on a national level in Germany – the 
European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). Introduced under the Treaty of 
Lisbon and made operational in April 2012, the ECI’s objective is to 
ensure “that every [EU] citizen is to have the right to participate in 
the democratic life of the Union” (Regulation 211/2011) – including 
all EU citizens living in Germany. In essence, the ECI allows 
European citizens to call upon the Commission to make a proposal 
for a legal act of the EU that could, at least in theory, then be enacted 
by the Council and, if applicable, the European Parliament. Neither 
the Commission nor the Council or Parliament are bound in any 
legal sense to follow an ECI, however. In legal terms, the ECI 
therefore comes closest to the popular initiatives possible at regional 
or local level in parts of Germany, although the Commission may 
completely refuse to act upon ECIs and has already done so in the 
past (Regulation 211/2011).2  
There are two additional important hurdles to an ECI. First, 
the EU treaty limits ECIs to initiatives for legal acts that fall under 
the competence of the European Commission. The Commission 
                                                        
2 See chapter 2. 
A constitutional referendum in 
Bavaria in 2013 was one of the 
few plebiscites with relevance to 
EU policymaking: the adopted 
change gives the Bavarian 
parliament the right to bind the 
government on questions of 
power transfer to the EU level 
and demands that the Bavarian 
government seek the 
parliament’s opinion on EU 
initiatives with impact on 
Bavarian legislation. 
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therefore initially checks every initiative on admissibility. This not 
only rules out any initiatives beyond the realm of the EU, but also 
any initiatives that would be directed towards German EU policies 
or that are outside the narrow definition of “proposals for legal acts 
of the Union”. For instance, the Commission rejected the ECI ‘Stop 
TTIP’, initiated inter alia by civil society groups from Germany, on 
the grounds that EU free trade agreements do no constitute legal 
acts of the Union.3 
Secondly, in order to be successful, an ECI needs to gain the 
support of one million EU citizens while at the same time meeting a 
quorum in at least a quarter of EU member states. This quorum 
relates to the number of MEP seats per inhabitant, and thus the 
principle of degressive proportionality. As Germany is the largest 
member state, the largest number of signatures need to be collected 
for it to count, i.e. 72,000. This contrasts to, for instance, 55,500 in 
France, 15,000 in Sweden or 4,500 in Estonia. The flipside of this is 
that it constitutes only 0.09% of the German population, which is the 
smallest ratio across the EU, together with France, Italy, Spain and 
the UK.4 Despite the higher threshold, this should, in theory, make 
it easier for initiatives to gain the requisite number of signatures in 
Germany. 
The use of ECI in Germany, however, largely mirrors that in 
the EU overall. After its initial introduction, there was keen interest 
on the part of both civil society groups to test this new instrument 
and that of citizens to participate. In 2012 there were 20 ECIs 
launched in quick succession, which gained over 5 million 
signatures in 2013 across the EU.5 After this initial wave of support, 
                                                        
3 In 2017 the European Court of Justice ruled that the Commission’s refusal 
of the ‘Stop TTIP’ ECI was wrong. By that time, however, CETA was 
already ratified in the EU and TTIP negotiations frozen after the election of 
Donald Trump, so that the initiative has not (yet) been revived 
(https://euobserver.com/institutional/137855). 
4 Thresholds for the signatures were lightly reduced downwards in 2014; 
previously the threshold was 74,250 for Germany.  
5 Official figures from the public information of the European Commission 
on the ECI. Unfortunately, the Commission only published the signatures 
for the successful ECIs, so that no overall data on the amount of signatures 
for all ECIs from Germany are available (http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-
initiative/).  
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disillusionment kicked in as the ECIs did not gain enough 
signatures, the procedure proved too unwieldly and the EU 
institutions reacted to the successful initiatives very reluctantly. 
Consequently, the amount of new ECIs dropped off to only six in 
2015, collecting only 8,500 signatures across the whole of the EU 
(Berg 2016). That is a drop-off of 99%. Overall, since 2012, over 60 
ECIs have been launched, of which only four have been successful 
in reaching the threshold of one million signatures.  
Nevertheless, two points stand out in the use of the ECI in 
Germany. First, signatures from Germany have been crucial to the 
few ECIs that have been successful. As demonstrated in Table 12.1, 
in three of the four successful ECIs the 
largest or second largest number of 
signatures originated in Germany. In 
the most prominent ECI so far, the 
‘Right 2 Water’-initiative, more than 
one million signatures alone came 
from Germany, amounting to 75% of 
all signatures. It could therefore be argued that any successful ECI 
almost invariably needs at least some support from Germany to 
reach the one million signatures. 
Table 12.1 Share of German signatures in ECIs that gathered 1 million 
signatures 
Year Name Total 
signatures 
Signatures 
from 
Germany 
Share Rank 
2014 Right 2 Water 1,659,543 1,236,455 75% 1st 
2014 One of Us 1,721,626 137,874 8% 4th 
2015 Stop 
vivisection 
1,173,130 16,304 14% 2nd 
2017 Ban 
Glyphosate 
1,070,865 663,867 62% 1st 
Source: Own compilation from data provided by the EU Commission. Share = 
share of German signatures from total; Rank = rank of German signatures 
compared to other EU member states.  
Second, the most recent successful ECI concerned the ban of 
glyphosate in the EU. It not only achieved more than one million 
It could therefore be argued that 
any successful ECI almost 
invariably needs at least some 
support from Germany to reach 
the one million signatures. 
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signatures, but also over 600,000 from Germany. Despite this, the 
German government representative at the same time voted within 
the relevant EU committee for the extension of the use of glyphosate 
in the EU. This triggered a heated public debate in Germany, as the 
minister responsible cast the vote during the time of the caretaker 
government after the 2017 elections, without properly consulting 
the SPD coalition partner. The ECI for the ban of glyphosate barely 
figured in the German debate. Overall, therefore, it has to be argued 
that in terms of its impact on German EU politics, the ECI has been 
a largely irrelevant instrument. 
12.4 Possible scenarios in the future 
Although we have not yet seen a German EU referendum, political 
signs point to more plebiscitary democracy in the future. Polls 
suggest that over 70% of German citizens favour holding 
referendums on political issues at federal level, while less than 30% 
are against this move (Infratest Dimap, 2017). Germany is, together 
with Belgium, Portugal, Cyprus and 
Bulgaria, one of five EU member 
states that have never held a 
referendum on EU matters (EPRS, 
2016, p. 4). Today, calls for a stronger 
role of plebiscitary mechanisms at 
federal level can be heard across 
parties and the coalition agreement from February 2018 actually 
promises to task an expert commission with looking into ways to 
introduce direct democratic mechanisms. In light of this general 
thrust towards direct democracy and past discussions on whether 
EU integration should be put to a popular vote in Germany (e.g. for 
the Maastricht Treaty or the Constitutional Treaty), and amid a 
Europe-wide increase in EU-related referendums (EPRS, 2016), a 
future referendum on European integration is also conceivable in 
Germany. 
Typically, one can differentiate three types of EU 
referendums (Hobolt, 2009): membership referendums (e.g. Polish 
accession vote in 2003 or the Brexit referendum in 2016), treaty 
referendums (e.g. Dutch, French, Luxembourg and Spanish votes 
on the Constitutional Treaty in 2005), and single-issue referendums 
(e.g. Greek bailout vote in 2015 or Dutch EU-Ukraine Association 
Germany is, together with 
Belgium, Portugal, Cyprus and 
Bulgaria, one of five EU member 
states that have never held a 
referendum on EU matters. 
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Agreement vote in 2016). The likelihood of such referendums in 
Germany depends both on legal circumstances and on political 
developments. 
12.4.1 Legal perspective 
The narrowly defined legal basis of referendums in the German 
constitution does not – for now – provide opportunities for binding 
referendums on EU membership, treaties or single issues. 
Establishing such a binding vote 
would therefore require a change of 
the Grundgesetz and thus a two-thirds 
majority, as legal evaluations have 
concluded for the case of a possible 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty 
(Wissenschaftlicher Dienst des 
Deutschen Bundestages, 2009). 
Consultative referendums, however, 
could be implemented through a 
federal act. This kind of public vote would "have no legally binding 
effect, but would merely be a political decision-making aid" (ibid.). 
Although such a “political decision-making aid” is legally non-
binding, the political implications could be quite far-reaching, as the 
Brexit vote in 2016, legally a consultative referendum, 
demonstrated.  
Members of the right-wing populist party AfD have attracted 
attention by calling for a plebiscite on EU membership – explicitly 
referring to the ‘British model’. Notwithstanding the legal 
difficulties of direct democracy on a federal level in general, such a 
vote would also come into conflict with the ‘EU-friendly’ parts of 
the Grundgesetz. The constitution’s preamble and Article 23 of the 
GG insist that Germany take part in European integration. Apart 
from establishing mechanisms for direct democracy at federal level, 
German legislators would likely also have to change these parts of 
the constitution to allow enacting a possible leave vote (Thiele, 
2016). 
Similarly, a single-issue referendum would also face the 
above-mentioned constitutional hurdles. While a binding vote 
would require a two-thirds majority, a consultative referendum 
might be implemented with a simple majority. However, the 
The narrowly defined legal 
basis of referendums in the 
German Constitution does not 
– for now – provide 
opportunities for binding 
referendums on EU 
membership, treaties or single 
issues. 
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introduction of the latter type of plebiscite would nevertheless be a 
major political novelty and might thus be challenged before the 
Constitutional Court. Given their political impact, some kind of 
limit on which matters could be legally covered by advisory 
referendums are likely, for instance on international obligations.  
In contrast to a referendum on EU membership and single 
issues, the idea of adopting a new treaty by public vote has been the 
subject of legal and political debate in Germany. In the famous 
judgment by the Federal Constitutional Court on the conditions for 
the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, judges argued that a 
referendum on the treaty would be necessary if the reforms reached 
the limit of "integration authorisation". In this case, Article 146, GG 
would be a legal basis for a referendum on a new treaty – by 
establishing a new, European constitution in the place of the 
Grundgesetz. For the Lisbon Treaty itself, however, the Federal 
Constitutional Court did not identify the creation of a European 
federal state with integration authorisation, but argued that the EU 
is still a “Staatenverbund” [a union or association of states] 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2009). A referendum was therefore not 
necessary. The legal necessity of a referendum on a new treaty was 
explicitly discussed during the euro crisis in 2012. By then, Finance 
Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, his predecessor Peer Steinbrück, and 
other politicians expected a referendum in Germany. The 
implementation of the Fiscal Pact and the European Stability 
Mechanism raised the question of whether the EU’s responses to the 
financial crisis crossed red lines formerly set by the Federal 
Constitutional Court in its judgment on the Lisbon Treaty. The 
largest constitutional complaint in German history (joined by ca. 
37,000 claimants) questioned the constitutional conformity of the 
Fiscal Pact and ESM. The judges, however, declared in March 2014 
that Germany’s participation in the mechanism was compatible 
with the German Basic Law. 
12.4.2 Political conditions 
A membership referendum, as we saw in Britain in 2016, would not 
only be difficult from a legal perspective in Germany, but also 
unlikely from a political perspective. Polls suggest an 
overwhelming and consistent support for EU membership among 
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the German population.6 This is reflected in the positions of the 
leading political parties: currently six out of seven parties in the 
Bundestag do not back leaving the EU (cf. 2017 election manifestos). 
Not even the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), Germany’s rising 
eurosceptic party, has a clear anti-EU stance, since it calls for an EU 
membership referendum only “if necessary” (“gegebenenfalls”, AfD 
election manifesto 2017, p. 8). As most of the major parties on the 
left and the right pride themselves on their pro-European heritage, 
general support for European integration remains the political 
consensus in Germany. Consequently, although a significant 
number of Germans favour an EU membership referendum (Der 
Spiegel, 16.03.2017), reflecting general support for more direct 
democracy, such a vote remains highly improbable. It could likely 
only be caused by a major event such as an economic or political 
crisis that would shift public opinion or the political landscape 
significantly. 
Single-issue referendums, an increasingly prominent feature in 
European politics, are somewhat more likely in Germany. As such 
a vote would pre-suppose the introduction of direct democratic 
mechanisms at federal level, much would depend on the specific 
legal implementation. Yet even an open and accessible procedure 
would probably exclude referendums that run counter to EU law, 
ruling out solely regressive votes such as on leaving the eurozone.7 
Nonetheless, Eurosceptic forces could employ such mechanisms, 
whatever their form, to try and stop specific policies or measures at 
European level. Also possible would be the political 
instrumentalisation of consultative referendums on EU affairs by 
the government to improve its negotiating hand (cf. Greek bailout 
referendum or Hungarian referendum on refugee quotas). 
Considering Germany’s powerful position within the EU system, 
however, such a move seems unnecessary and would constitute a 
major change from established German political tradition. In the 
                                                        
6 Asked whether Germany would fare better inside or outside the EU a 
couple of weeks after the Brexit vote, 78% of respondents answered that 
Germany would fare better inside the EU. In the latest Eurobarometer 
polls, 79% of German respondents said they deemed EU membership to be 
a good thing (Eurobarometer 88, Der Spiegel, 16.03.2017). 
7 A referendum on leaving the eurozone is also one of the AfD’s political 
goals (AfD, 2017, p. 8). 
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realm of political possibility and legal admissibility are also regional 
referendums employed at the Länder level to counter EU policies. 
But so far no such proposal has been tabled in any of the German 
Bundesländer. 
The most likely form for a public vote on European 
integration in Germany is a treaty referendum. Past treaty reforms, 
particularly the Maastricht Treaty and the Constitutional or later 
Lisbon Treaty, have sparked discussions on the necessity and 
desirability of legitimising further European integration through a 
public vote. Such a discussion is likely to arise again should there 
be another treaty reform in the future. Several of the German 
parties’ proposals for reforming the EU system – such as a simple 
majority vote in the EP for dismissing the Commission (Greens) – 
would require a treaty change. The Social-Democrats and Die Linke 
openly endorse treaty reform, the former aiming at a European 
constitution. Whether these amendments would require a 
referendum in Germany is open for legal debate. Politically, there 
could be increasing pressure to consult the public, particularly with 
the AfD as a new and vocal political force. Die Linke, too, actively 
calls for referendums across European states to legitimise their 
desired treaty reform. With rising pressure from the political fringes 
and high expectations from the public, a referendum on the next 
European treaty appears entirely possible. The simplest legal way 
in such a case would be an advisory Volksbefragung – which still 
could have, as we know from the British ‘advisory’ EU referendum, 
significant politically binding consequences. 
Conclusions 
The use of direct democratic instruments on EU issues remains a 
very remote possibility for Germany. The analysis of the legal 
framework has shown that at least binding referendums are not 
envisaged in the constitution – and while their introduction is 
currently under discussion, there is no strong commitment to do so 
in the foreseeable future. Direct democratic instruments ranging 
from popular initiatives over advisory referendums to binding and, 
in select cases, obligatory referendums are possible on the local and 
regional level. They are also limited to local and regional 
competences. There have been very few cases where they were 
linked to EU issues.  
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Secondly, the only nationwide direct democratic instrument 
currently in use in Germany is the European Citizens Initiative, 
which directly concerns EU policies. Like the ECI overall, however, 
interest in the instrument fell in Germany after it proved too 
cumbersome and the EU institutions chose either to ignore it or to 
react very slowly, even upon the few ECIs that were successful in 
gathering more than one million signatures. The ECI therefore had 
no discernible impact on Germany’s EU policies, even if it was 
directly applicable, such as those on TTIP or the banning of 
glyphosate. 
Finally, on the question of whether the use of referendums on 
EU issues is possible in the future, it is first important to state that 
legal constraints remain in place. In addition, a membership 
referendum appears unlikely in Germany, even if legal barriers 
were removed. Even under the current legal framework, however, 
non-binding consultative referendums are possible, for instance on 
single issues. These might be used to halt specific European policy 
projects and would thus mostly be 
employed by Eurosceptics. Last but 
not least, a plebiscite on treaty 
reform, on the other hand, might find 
support even among pro-
integrationists, as it would add 
legitimacy and accountability to the 
new foundation of the EU system. 
Due to the lack of experience with direct democracy on the federal 
level in Germany, the outcome of such referendums cannot be 
anticipated and would thus further increase the political risks 
already inherent in EU treaty reform. For the foreseeable future, 
however, Germany’s political system remains characterised by 
representative democracy, with very little scope for direct 
democratic elements. 
  
A plebiscite on treaty reform 
might find support even among 
pro-integrationists, as it would 
add legitimacy and 
accountability to the new 
foundation of the EU system. 
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13. MOBILISING FOR DEMOCRACY 
DURING AUSTERITY IN GREECE 
FILIPPA CHATZISTAVROU1 
This chapter assesses the state of direct democracy in Greece since 
the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis in 2008. 
Throughout its long history, Greece has oscillated between two 
narratives: the timeless reference to the legacy of Athenian 
democracy in the classical era and the modern and post-modern 
reference to an incomplete (immature) representative democracy 
combining personalistic leadership, governmental favouritism and 
political partiality.  
Introduction 
Since its liberation in the early 19th century, the country has had a 
long way to go in trying to adapt to Western democratic standards 
of the French Enlightenment and Anglo-Saxon empiricism. This 
difficulty has been the subject of various explanations, such as the 
Byzantine patrimonialism of the state, the Ottoman approach to 
governing and the Greek elites’ obedience to the great powers, as 
well as the de facto satellisation of the country justified by an 
underdog culture.2 
The two key elements of Greek narrative identity – the 
Athenian civic democratic ethos and the sense of belonging to the 
West – have been transformed through biased stories, thus creating 
                                                        
1 Valuable research assistance was provided by Konstantinos 
Papanikolaou, ELIAMEP Junior Research Assistant. 
2 In 1994, Nikiforos Diamandouros discerned two cultural political 
prototypes in Greece, the reformist one and the underdog (i.e. clientelism, 
corruption, individualism, lack of meritocracy and professionalism, 
obstructive foreign policy, ottomanism etc.) (Diamantouros, 1994).  
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well-established and holistic although inaccurate beliefs about 
normative guarantees for (direct and indirect) democracy.  
While the invocation of ancient democracy was supposed to 
play a major role in the battle against the monarchy in Europe and 
in favour of citizens’ rights in the West, in fact it served as a decisive 
metaphor for modern liberal democracy, i.e. individualist liberalism 
in the full sense of the term (Castoriadis, 2008). 
Ancient Greeks sought to share social power among all 
citizens in the open (public) space where freedom was central. 
However, the free world of the Athenian polity was based on a 
series of exclusions, namely of women, slaves and metics; 
furthermore, the social and economic conditions of citizens were not 
part of the discussion (Castoriadis, 2008). The aim of the ‘Moderns’ 
(17th century) has always been to safeguard their private pleasures 
and they have viewed the freedom offered by institutions as a 
guarantee of these pleasures (Constant, 1819). The industrialisation 
of the economy, the rise of the bourgeoisie and then the 
internationalisation of capitalism promoted a value system that 
emphasises the liberal variable of the democratic pattern, as an 
(unequal) combination of a normative Rousseauist conception of the 
role of the people and an empiricist Lockean conception of the role 
of the state.3 Liberal democracy established the economic and social 
conditions within societies as structuring elements of a system 
where the dominant democratic ethos stems from the principle of 
representativeness. The fact that the two models – Rousseauist and 
Lockean – consider political participation in different ways (the first 
as a means and the second as a goal) 
did not obstruct the establishment 
or prevent the deleterious effects of 
mass democracy, through which 
political participation progressively 
became a formalistic option for 
electing small minorities.  
Western interpretations of 
classical Greek democracy as well as 
the Greek ruling elites’ faith in the 
                                                        
3 The conceptual distinction between the two standards suggests that 
liberalism and political democracy do not necessarily coincide. 
Western interpretations of 
classical Greek democracy as well 
as the Greek ruling elites’ faith in 
the value system of modern liberal 
democracy contributed to a 
‘historical’ misunderstanding of a 
certain continuity between the old 
and new democratic ethos. 
248  MOBILISING FOR DEMOCRACY DURING AUSTERITY IN GREECE 
 
value system of modern liberal democracy contributed to a 
‘historical’ misunderstanding of a certain continuity between the 
old and new democratic ethos. In these terms, the country imported 
an anachronistic, simplistic and moralist Western interpretation of 
its own invention of democracy as it engaged in the process of 
integrating into the West and later into the European Communities.  
In light of the historical traumas of dictatorships (junta) and 
civil war, the country opted for an occasional use of referendums 
only at critical moments of modern Greek history, while at the same 
time a culture of resistance towards foreign interventionism 
flourished.  
During the post-dictatorial (metapolitefsi) era, Greece 
imported the institutional-social model of mass democracy, whose 
main features are broad government intervention in the economy 
for developmental and redistributive purposes, the organisation of 
citizens into mass parties, trade unions and social organisations, and 
development of the welfare state (Manitakis, 2012). The economic 
crisis caused a serious break in this process, exacerbating confusion 
about the country’s existential identity while increasing attempts to 
seemingly (re)claim the fundamentals of a (direct) democratic 
process.  
13.1 The reappraisal of more direct forms of 
participation and mobilisation against 
contentious politics 
In comparison with other European countries, Greece is the only 
one that consents to living under an eight-year regime of 
memorandums of understanding (MoUs).4 Αt a time of crisis and 
high political volatility, with positions on austerity, immigration 
                                                        
4 Greece concluded three MoUs that set out the economic adjustment 
policies the country was called to implement in the context of its request 
for financial support from the euro-area EU countries and the IMF. The first 
programme was based on bilateral loans, and the second and the third were 
financed by the European Financial Stability Facility and the European 
Stability Mechanism respectively. The European Commission, the 
European Central Bank, the IMF and, at a later stage, the European Stability 
Mechanism (the so-called troika, which then became a ‘quadriga’) 
monitored the implementation of adjustment policies.  
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  249 
 
and European integration moving to centre stage, Greece has been 
led to a more or less forced Europeanisation of its national policies. 
That in turn has contributed to the entanglement of economic issues 
with the refugee crisis and (national) security concerns (over the 
Balkans and Turkey). In this context, eurozone requirements for 
budgetary discipline and structural reforms have been closely 
intertwined with national political considerations, making it 
difficult to distinguish national from European issues. Yet, in 
contrast with other countries where the refugee question has 
monopolised public debate, economic and social issues related to 
socioeconomic decline and social fragmentation have been more 
prevalent in Greece. The refugee issue has received far less popular 
attention, being mainly instrumentalised by the neo-fascist, extreme 
right-wing Golden Dawn party.  
Since Greece’s engagement in the first economic adjustment 
programme, there has been a reappraisal of more direct forms of 
civilian mobilisation and social movements. Economic crisis policies 
and the MoUs have brought out new politicised forms of active 
public participation. In this context, the 
repertoires of contention of these broad 
and progressively cross-class coalitions 
of anti-austerity protesters have 
combined different types of action: i) 
demonstrative, confrontational and 
sometimes violent actions (unconventional forms of both legal and 
illegal political participation, i.e. threats, symbolic violence or 
destruction of property); and ii) direct democratic tools and action 
(conventional forms of legal political participation).  
Actually, the different forms of civilian mobilisation started 
to spread after the December 2008 events, which contributed to the 
reinvigoration of various grassroots groups. Meanwhile, following 
his death, the teenager Alexandros Grigoropoulos became a new 
icon of resistance for Greek youth against what they perceived as 
state authoritarianism. For the period 2010 to 2015, the literature 
distinguishes three waves of anti-austerity mass mobilisation while 
various local movements were also active. More or less loosely 
organised and unconventional legal forms of political participation, 
including new social movements, strikes and protests, reached their 
climax with the holding of the 2015 referendum on the bailout.  
Economic crisis policies and 
the MoUs have brought out 
new politicised forms of 
active public participation. 
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The mobilisation took the form of local demonstrations, some 
simultaneously in more than one city, with occupations of public 
buildings, encampment in squares (such as Syntagma Square) and 
participation in assemblies. The frequency and size of 
demonstrations had no precedent in the metapolitefsi (Sotiropoulos, 
2017).  
It is clear that while the expansion 
and the intensity of these movements 
was significant, their main motive was 
neither revolutionary nor to contribute to 
formulating a new political project for 
Greece and Europe. In principle, 
revolutionary movements are composed 
not of deprived, oppressed, annihilated 
people but of a powerful, highly 
intellectual minority that cannot stand to see other people suffering 
(Arendt, 1970). These movements – less in their identitarian form 
and more in their protestatory form – potentially could have 
represented an opportunity for a favourable political structure 
(Tilly, 1997); yet they were taken over in large part by partisan 
politics. The direct democracy process should enable or restore 
popular channels for expressing and outlining a new system of 
political beliefs, ideas and proposals, not just as a mode for 
‘questioning’ people, but as a mode for articulating a new socio-
political demand (Laclau, 2005). Instead, Greeks mobilised 
themselves over what they considered to be political mistakes that 
had caused an ‘exceptional’ situation. The main goal of mobilisation 
was to protest against the bad economic situation through two main 
channels of criticism.  
On the one hand, some of these forms of public expression 
were intended to condemn the core individualist, dysfunctional 
values of liberal democracy. At the beginning of the crisis, Greeks 
experienced the crisis as a means of imposing a new European 
order, i.e. interdependent economic and political systems where 
homo economicus prevails over homo politicus. The imposition of 
restrictive policies through the MoUs has been classified as an 
approach that exacerbates the liberal side and strengthens the 
authoritarian side of the regime (Barber, 2003). Initially, there was 
an attempt to recall the importance of the organic solidarity of 
While the expansion and the 
intensity of these 
movements was significant, 
their main motive was 
neither revolutionary nor to 
contribute to formulating a 
new political project for 
Greece and Europe. 
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Athenian democracy in contrast with the utilitarian culture of 
enlightened self-interest on which representative democracy has 
traditionally been based. Instead of the liberal individualist – and in 
this sense pluralist – and adversarial conception of modern politics, 
a more radical conception of the common interest, the steering role 
of the state and the primacy of the polity over people was even 
temporarily rehabilitated.  
On the other hand, the different waves of popular 
mobilisation expressed discontent towards the ruling elites that 
have exercised political power since the metapolitefsi and who have 
been considered responsible for the country’s subordination to the 
economic MoUs and subsequent policies. Here the criticism of the 
elite might be easily interpreted as an interest in the revival of direct 
democracy in the 21st century; nevertheless one should carefully 
evaluate to what extent these forms of participation and 
mobilisation represent an alternative or a complementary process to 
strengthen democracy. Undoubtedly, the Greek political system has 
been weakened by its embedded, idiosyncratic, confrontational 
political method and personalistic culture, which has elicited calls 
for reform since the outbreak of the crisis under a European regime 
of increasing economic asymmetries and unmutual political 
reciprocity between EU member states.  
One way or another, popular movements in all their variety 
put into question the loose foundations of liberal democracy in its 
southern paternalist version. Unsurprisingly, these movements in 
the new context of post-metapolitefsi have become the object of two 
quite contrasting academic analyses about their ‘populist’ nature 
and the prospects of their inner dynamics becoming tools of further 
democratic decline or renewal.  
On one side, there is a long academic tradition rejecting all 
forms of populism as “illiberal democratic forms” (Pappas, 2013), 
and which describes Greece’s metapolitefsi as a ‘populist’ one, thus 
challenging its liberal foundations.5 Scholars of this tradition, 
devotees of representative democracy, have analysed popular 
attitudes of resentment since 2008 as a phenomenon stemming from 
                                                        
5 Populist Greek political culture is dealt with exclusively within the post-
authoritarian period, as the “political culture of the petty bourgeoisie” 
(Elefantis, 1991) or as a “defensive political culture” (Katsoulis, 1988). 
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a populist underdog culture that is driven by clientelist demands 
against the rational domestic elite. The latter is presented as a 
regular part of modernising politics and as being confronted by 
these anti-establishment (populist) forces.  
On the other side, other scholars distinguish different kinds 
of populism and consider that a large part of these popular 
expressions represents excluded groups attempting to put forward 
an egalitarian agenda and hence combine the formal populist core 
with the legacy of the radical democratic tradition (Stavrakakis & 
Katsambekis, 2014). In this perspective, these forms of mobilisation 
can be seen as an integral part of democratic politics, as a source of 
renewal of democratic institutions and as a vehicle for a sought-after 
redemocratisation (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). 
Without denying Greeks’ propensity for personalistic 
authority and embedded clientelism (Featherstone, 1990), we pay 
more attention to the fact that populism as an embedded feature of 
Greek politics has artificially increased political polarisation and the 
adversarial nature of the system in order to heighten partisan 
identity. In this respect, Pappas (2013) talks about strategic and not 
ideological polarisation. Nevertheless, in the framework of this 
contextual analysis, the populist argument seems more useful not 
as a holistic but as a complementary explanation so that we can 
examine the extent to which these various forms of mobilisation 
have cultivated democratic reflexes. Therefore, we can go beyond 
those explanations that use populism generally to demonstrate why 
Greece has never reached the level of maturity of liberal democracy 
seen in other countries (Barber, 2003) and that merely analyse the 
Greek crisis as the result of a systemic compromise between the 
ruling parties which prevented the country from ‘effectively’ 
meeting its EU membership commitments, thus fostering anti-
austerity attitudes and protests.  
  
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  253 
 
13.2 Varieties and drivers of public participation 
and mobilisation 
During the first wave of mobilisation in 2010, there was an 
escalation of the traditional social movements of general strikes, 
demonstrations and intense protests. These involved ordinary full-
time employed people of all educational backgrounds and ages 
from the militant political Left who are most likely to be involved in 
strikes and demonstrations (Rüdig & Karyotis, 2014). The 
traditional networks of trade unions 
and voluntary group membership, as 
well as public sector employment, 
played a key role in recruiting 
protesters already engaged in 
organised political participation 
through their membership. Still, these 
networks exerted their influence 
through previous protest experience. 
In other words, those involved were 
people fully plugged into economic life, rather than people on the 
margins or outside the labour force. They were the main carriers of 
this protest movement, organisationally linked to a number of 
resilient extra-parliamentary leftist groups, trade unions and 
parliamentary parties of the Left, giving it an ‘old politics’ flavour 
(Kassimeris, 2005). As later discussed, the second wave of 
mobilisation during 2011 can be regarded as a new social 
movement, focused, however, on issues of material concern. 
In the third wave from mid-2012 onwards, a number of large 
protest events took place. Among them were three national general 
strikes by public and private sector workers, one workers’ rally, two 
national, general work stoppages (one of which was part of the first 
strike by the European Trade Union Confederation against 
austerity) and one march on the commemoration of the university 
student uprising against the military junta (Kousis & Karakioulafi, 
2013).  
Concerning trade union membership and density in Greece, 
it has been observed that there is an underrepresentation or no 
representation in trade unions of the most vulnerable categories of 
the workforce (Kretsos, 2012). Greece nonetheless remains high on 
The traditional networks of 
trade unions and voluntary 
group membership, as well as 
public sector employment, 
played a key role in recruiting 
protesters already engaged in 
organised political participation 
through their membership. 
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the list of strike-prone countries in Europe, with very conflictual 
industrial relations (see Figure 13.1 and Figure 13.2).  
Figure 13.1 Trade union membership in selected EU countries, 2015 (%) 
 
Source: OECD Statistics (2015). 
Figure 13.2 Trade union membersip, private and public sector in Greece, 
2007–13 (%) 
 
Source: Labour Institute, General Confederation of Greek Workers (INE–GSEE) 
(2014). 
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Trade unions have historically been dominated by the Socialist 
Pasok party and the Communist Party of Greece. In the pre-crisis 
period, Syriza had no real trade union, militant tradition (Tsakatika 
& Eleftheriou, 2013). Despite Syriza having limited influence in the 
two biggest trade unions in Greece, Syriza’s replacement of Pasok 
as the main centre-left party in the Greek political system has 
increased its connections with the main political groups of the trade 
unions (see Figure 13.3 and Figure 13.4). Yet, in the national 
parliamentary elections of January 2015, the negative effect of union 
membership on the Syriza vote indicates that it failed to steadily 
strengthen its ties with the trade unions. 
Figure 13.3 Election results by trade union political group, General 
Confederation of Greek Workers, 2016 (%) 
 
 
Notes: PASKE is affiliated with Pasok; PAME is affiliated with the Communist 
Party of Greece; DAKE is affiliated with New Democracy; and ΜΕΤΑ is 
affiliated with Syriza. Despite the breakup of Syriza during the summer of 2015, 
the trade union forces of the radical Left section of the party (which has been 
renamed LAE (Popular Unity)) remained in the same political group with 
Syriza until the end of 2016. 
Source: General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) (2016). 
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Figure 13.4 Election results by trade union political group, Civil 
Servants’ Confederation, 2016 (%) 
 
Notes: DAKE is affiliated with New Democracy; PASK is affiliated with Pasok; 
PAME is affiliated with the Communist Party of Greece; Paremvaseis is 
affiliated with the radical Left; and ΜΕΤΑ is affiliated with Syriza.  
Source: General Elections of the Civil Servants’ Confederation (ADEDY) (2016). 
The high degree of participation in strikes lasted mainly until 2013. 
Furthermore, what is interesting to observe is the inverse correlation 
between the toughening of austerity measures and the decrease in 
strike activity (see Figure 13.5 and Figure 13.6). 
Figure 13.5 Number of strikes and labour mobilisations in Greece during 
the crisis, 2011-16  
 
Source: Labour Institute, General Confederation of Greek Workers (INE–GSEE) 
(2017). 
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Figure 13.6 Number of public and private sector trade unions involved in 
strikes and labour mobilisations, 2011-16 
 
Source: Labour Institute, General Confederation of Greek Workers (INE–GSEE) 
(2017). 
During the first five years of increased fiscal oversight, a wide 
network of local movements entitled “I don’t pay” was created 
mainly to protest against the taxes and other fiscal burdens that 
Greek governments had successively imposed. The members of 
these movements organised a number of actions and gatherings 
objecting to the imposition of high taxes and fees (property tax, 
income tax, toll fees, etc.). Thousands of people participated in such 
collective actions in different parts of the country. Furthermore, 
local ecological movements in the Greek countryside constituted a 
significant share of the mobilisation of the Greek public (Lekakis & 
Kousis, 2013). Over 40 such local movements have developed in the 
last decade in Greece, opposing the placement of industrial wind 
and solar parks in environmentally protected areas as well as 
mining in several marine areas, and promoting the establishment of 
sustainable local communities. In the Attica region, civil protests by 
the majority of residents in the southern part of Athens (about the 
development of landfill facilities in Keratea), the (ongoing) 
mobilisation of people in the region of Chalcidice (over 
development of the Skouries mining site for gold extraction) and 
also in the region of Epirus (concerning development and 
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production facilities for oil or gas extraction) are among the most 
popular local movements in Greece. The basic demand of all such 
movements is to halt environmental degradation in the respective 
regions by fast-track privatisations and investment plans that, 
owing to heavy-duty industrial processes for the sake of economic 
viability and profitability, risk disaster through huge ecological, 
environmental and social changes. 
Similarly, the first successful European Citizens’ Initiative 
was organised in 2012 for the non-privatisation of water in EU 
member states (‘Right2Water’). In Greece, this initiative took the 
form of the ‘Save Greek Water Initiative’, which collected over 
33,000 signatures by individuals and social organisations. The 
second successful European Citizens’ Initiative was organised in 
2015 for a reduction in the use of animal testing (‘Stop Vivisection’), 
which gathered over 18,000 signatures in Greece. 
More generally, the level of participation in plebiscites and 
public involvement as well as more violent anti-systemic 
movements peaked just before the referendum of June 2015. Since 
the December 2008 events, it has been observed that initial protests 
or demonstrations could turn into unconventional and illegal 
actions, such as riots, squabbles, damage to foreign property, 
squatting and conflicts with the police or political opponents. These 
illegal forms of unconventional 
participation are signs of a rising 
‘uncivil’ society, giving birth to or 
reinvigorating anti-systemic or 
violent ‘shadow’ activism and 
vigilante movements (such as the 
militias of Golden Dawn), as well as 
para-state action, anarchist activity in 
the district of Exarcheia and initiatives 
by the Rouvikonas group. Rouvikonas is one of the main anarchist 
groups that emerged during the period of the ‘anti-austerity 
movements’ in Greece. From 2013 to 2018, the group carried out 
more than 50 acts against government and non-government 
facilities (foreign embassies, the representative offices of European 
institutions, multinational corporations, etc.). More specifically, the 
members of Rouvikonas – according to police sources, the group has 
approximately 120 to 150 members and many of them have been 
Illegal forms of unconventional 
participation are signs of a 
rising ‘uncivil’ society, giving 
birth to or reinvigorating anti-
systemic or violent ‘shadow’ 
activism and vigilante 
movements. 
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arrested – take mainly organised action to protest against the 
enforcement of austerity measures. The group’s operations have 
been characterised by a ‘violent symbolic’ activism that is a common 
feature of Greek anarchist organisations. Nevertheless, their 
activities have turned mainly against ‘non-grassroots’ targets with 
the aim of becoming more likeable to a section of Greek public 
opinion.6 
Riots can be a means used by anti-systemic movements to 
specific ends or an (irrational) eruption of mass behaviour (Drury 
and Reicher, 1999). In the Greek case, 
the crisis broke the longstanding 
unspoken compromise between the 
ruling elites and a (stagnant) society, 
which had legitimised policies that 
produce significant distributional 
asymmetries, and thus reinforced 
inequality and provoked self-
defensive reactions by young people 
and deviant attitudes. Among the 
causes of the riots have been the 
increasing feeling of social injustice, 
the absence of effective political institutions and the state’s 
decreasing legitimacy (Andronikidou, 2012).   
As we will see, after a first phase in which the ideological 
imperatives of anti-globalisation were raised, the political and 
cultural aspects of a long period of anti-systemic or anarchist 
activism within the country were replaced by more materialist 
concerns.  
In the second wave of mobilisation in 2011, there were 
escalating and intensive cross-class protests across the country. The 
social movements that were sparked included those with violent 
                                                        
6 The practices of Rouvikonas contrast with those of the majority of Greek 
anarchist groups, which often choose nihilistic tactics (such as Black Bloc 
anarchism, which is part of the wider political anarchism in Europe). The 
members of these groups focus on an anti-capitalist agenda based on 
nihilistic arguments and approaches without having an alternative, specific 
political plan to propose (unlike other currents of political anarchism, such 
as anarcho-syndicalism). Their actions gain minimal popular support since 
they are characterised by indiscriminate violence. 
The crisis broke the unspoken 
compromise between the ruling 
elites and a (stagnant) society, 
that had legitimised policies 
that produce significant 
distributional asymmetries, 
and thus reinforced inequality 
and provoked self-defensive 
reactions by young people and 
deviant attitudes. 
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repertoires. In Western democracies, the widely spreading 
credibility crisis of conventional channels for participation has led 
to the organisation and proliferation of new social movements. 
These grassroots, self-organised assemblies in central squares are 
defined by their inclusive and diverse nature, their fluid and 
leaderless structure and their use of and mobilisation via digital 
media (Castells, 2012). For some analysts, this has been the case in 
Greece too. In fact, according to this view, the second wave of 
mobilisation can be classified as a new social movement, which 
distinguishes it from the traditional/old social movements of strikes 
and demonstrations like those that took place extensively in 2010.  
Indeed, this classification appears useful in order to underline 
that these newer forms of mobilisation do not have a consistent or 
common class background and that is why they are less focused on 
political issues or ideology. Instead they comprise divergent 
ideological or political backgrounds of segmented, diffuse and 
decentralised groups of individuals rather than collective coherent 
movements. Thus, as far as the Greek case is concerned, new social 
movement scholars have rightly considered that the participants in 
these mobilisations politically identified themselves as outside the 
political system since they seemed unorganised and lacking in 
resources. But thereafter, scholars have extrapolated the new social 
movement explanation in order to support the idea that the 
participants were more concerned with post-materialist,7 cultural 
and symbolic issues, i.e. personal and intimate aspects of human life 
(Andronikidou, 2012). 
In fact, this Indignados-inspired movement called the 
Aganaktismeni,8 and no doubt more varied socially and politically 
                                                        
7 In the new social movement approach, the explanatory variables are 
linked to post-materialism, such as interpersonal trust and some political 
interest by a mainly middle class educational elite who are active in their 
spare time, while trade union membership is negatively associated (Rüdig 
& Karyotis, 2014). 
8 According to Rüdig & Karyotis (2014), a more detailed comparison of the 
different groups since 2010 suggests that the Aganaktismeni participants are 
older than those in other groups, are less likely to be members of voluntary 
organisations and have a lower degree of interpersonal trust. Rüdig & 
Karyotis claimed that the Aganaktismeni reached, at least marginally, a 
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than before, was focused on the occupation of public spaces 
primarily against austerity policies and their economic and social 
implications. Anti-austerity protests could be regarded as having 
some characteristics of a more recent wave of diverse mobilisation 
than new social movements, in which individuals are mobilised 
around personalised values to engage with multiple causes – such 
as economic justice (fair trade, inequality and development 
policies), environmental protection, 
and worker and human rights 
(Bennett, 2012). However, their main 
focus was on ‘material’ issues, such as 
cuts in public expenditure, 
unemployment and inequality. In this 
context, we observe that people 
expressed attitudes of estrangement 
from or rejection of the prevailing political system by taking 
controversial political action, which is quite different from civic 
engagement activities. The rise of civic voluntarism is mainly 
detected in the area of health and social protection/welfare given 
the dramatic decrease of state financial support pursuant to the 
MoUs; in this field, the extreme right-wing Golden Dawn took 
advantage of the situation by undertaking social work initiatives in 
order to build a ‘humanitarian profile’. 
Conventional mobilisation waned as a consequence of 
declining loyalty, distrust of programmatic promises and a 
considerable shrinking of ideological cleavages. Progressively from 
2012 and during the third wave from mid-2012 onwards, there was 
a further increase in participation and an expansion of mobilisation 
in the form of a new, resurgent apartisan protest.  
In more general terms, mobilisation during the years of crisis 
was motivated by cultural as well as socioeconomic factors. The 
drivers of mobilisation varied somewhat according to the period. 
Nonetheless, we see that there is a common set of them enabling 
analysis based on deprivation theory. This theory refers to the 
deterioration of living conditions explaining to a large extent 
popular mobilisation as a social phenomenon of anger and social 
                                                        
group of people who are not part of the usual Greek protest culture but 
clearly do not fit a ‘new social movement’ profile either. 
People expressed estrangement 
from or rejection of the 
prevailing political system by 
taking controversial political 
action, which is quite different 
from civic engagement.  
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aggressiveness towards the ruling elites (see Figure 13.7 and Figure 
13.8). 
Figure 13.7 Rates of poverty and social exclusion in Greece, 2005-16 (%) 
 
Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) (2017). 
Figure 13.8 Rates of extreme poverty and food insecurity in Greece, 
2011-16 (%) 
 
Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) (2017). 
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against the law, with representatives of public order/security being 
viewed as instruments of oppression. Through authoritarian and 
turbulent periods of a long confrontational history, this political 
culture of ‘resistance’ has marked the country, although it has 
mainly been linked to the extra-parliamentary and parliamentary 
Left and to trade unions. While this culture of resistance became a 
timeless way of expressing discontent, it has failed to transform 
itself into a political and social mode for forming and transforming 
collective structures. Similarly, protesters’ fervent socioeconomic 
demands have become ends in themselves rather than evolving into 
coherent ideas about the political and 
social transformation in Greece and in 
Europe. That is why the motive of 
relative deprivation (the fear of 
economic scarcity),9 which has 
transformed street socialisation into 
protests, has been expressed by groups 
of action with different political 
stances.  
13.3 Assessing direct democracy 
Does the increase of participation in conventional and 
unconventional forms of mobilisation equate with a kind of real 
democratic breadth that signals a ‘critical juncture’? According to 
the historic neo-institutionalist approach, if that were the case, it 
should produce a radical change of democratic conditions or the 
revision of established procedures in favour of direct democracy.  
Ιndeed, according to the ancient Greek conception, the social 
and economic condition of citizens was not part of the discussion. 
The establishment of freedom in the sense of social position was 
                                                        
9 The theory of ‘relative deprivation’ is focused on a range of conditions 
necessary to turn the stimulus of ‘absolute’ deprivation (poverty and 
inequality) into active protest. Relative deprivation theory was replaced as 
the dominant theory of protest in the 1960s and 1970s by approaches that 
focus on individuals’ resources and variables, such as education, 
occupation and income – their ‘socioeconomic status’ (SES approach). In 
the 1990s, the SES approach was supplemented to create an extended 
model known as ‘civic voluntarism’ (Rüdig & Karyotis, 2013). 
The motive of relative 
deprivation (the fear of 
economic scarcity),1 which has 
transformed street socialisation 
into protests, has been 
expressed by groups of action 
with different political stances. 
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completely separate from the granting of political and civil rights to 
all those considered free citizens (ισηγορία, equality in the right to 
speech; and παρρησίαν, the obligation to express oneself in public 
affairs). Nowadays, the globalisation of capitalism has privileged 
the consumerist rights of contemporary liberal democracies, 
pushing towards a more authoritative doctrine about economy and 
politics. While there are many definitions (and practices) of 
deliberation, we probably should accept that there is a common 
prerequisite in all cases that all participants must be free of the kinds 
of material deprivations that hinder participation, such as a lack of 
income or education (Mutz, 2006).  
The impact of the crisis on southern European democracies 
has been so great that this Great Recession has ended up affecting 
the quality of democracy at large. The worsening of the economy 
has mainly affected the rule of law, electoral accountability, 
participation, equality and responsiveness (Morlino & Quaranta, 
2016). In other terms, a representation crisis has also negatively 
affected the legitimacy standards of the democratic model itself.  
In relation to the distinction proposed by David Easton (1965; 
1975) between diffuse support for democracy as a principle and the 
specific support for the procedures and typical actors of democracy, 
the question is whether the economic crisis jeopardised support for 
democracy in Greece. In the Greek case, there was a decline of 
diffuse support, when comparing 2008 with 2012 (Freire et al., 2016). 
Studies have likewise found a decline in specific support for the 
incumbent political authorities, which may be related to the 
emergence of the economic crisis. Similar observations can be found 
on the decline in electoral turnout, the decay of mainstream parties, 
the growth of distrust in political institutions and the decreasing 
capacity of parties to channel and represent the preferences of 
voters (Freire et al., 2016; Hernandez & Kriesi, 2016). An ‘electoral 
epidemic’ affected all the regions of southern Europe during the 
first years of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, at its peak 
registering even higher levels of public dissatisfaction (Bosco & 
Verney, 2016). 
During those turbulent protest years, Greek citizens went 
beyond their main call for an end to austerity and demanded more 
accountable and direct models of democracy (Sotirakopoulos & 
Sotiropoulos, 2013; Diani & Kousis, 2014). The question again is 
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whether the incentives for participation and mobilisation proved to 
be capable of sufficiently bolstering direct democracy. Τhis 
observation is related not only to the outcome of the 2015 Greek 
referendum, but also to the prerequisites of direct democracy, which 
include some structural politicised features. There are various 
approaches that try to see whether these prerequisites were met in 
this specific historical period in Greece.  
The Aganaktismeni movement has been seen as an ideal type 
of populist, grassroots engagement in which the basic 
characteristics – such as a leaderless, self-organised mobilisation 
demanding direct democracy – could classify the participants as a 
‘multitude’.10 Or, since they claim to represent the whole 
community, they could be characterised as ‘the people’, who 
consider that any anti-populist attitude can be seen as a crucial 
aspect of post-democracy and as a way of marginalising any 
disagreement (Katsambekis, 2014a; 2014b). From such a 
perspective, this movement is seen as the engine of democratic 
revival.  
Others scholars have asserted that these movements 
established an antagonistic dichotomy that separates ‘the people’ 
from ‘the other’ (e.g. ‘the enemy’, ‘the establishment’ or in the recent 
period of financial recession, ‘the troika’, ‘the Memorandum 
defenders’ and ‘the global financial elites’). Anti-globalisation, anti-
Western and anti-imperialist rhetoric has had a long history in 
Greek political culture (Doxiadis & Matsaganis, 2012). In this 
context, populism tends to deny the legitimacy of any entrenched 
elite, however recruited (Mavrogordatos, 1997). These protesters 
believed that they were defending themselves, their rights and the 
Greek nation against various opponents: the markets, the banks, 
foreigners and the corrupted Greek political elites who betrayed 
Greece by not protecting national and popular interests. Indeed, 
according to this view, this point was exactly where social populism 
met national populism (Pantazopoulos, 2013). The enemy was no 
longer only at the top. The enemy was also on the other side and the 
                                                        
10 In the early 2000s, Antonio Negri introduced the term ‘multitude’ as a 
concept of emancipation from the old political designations of the masses. 
The ‘multitude’ does not refer to unity but to the common social and 
political capacity of a group of people to take decisions and act in common. 
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political elite was cooperating with the enemy against the people. 
The appearance of these Indignados, who perceived themselves as 
being the new National Liberation Front, initiated the 
transformation of social populism into national populism, breaking 
down the boundaries between the Left and the Right 
(Pantazopoulos, 2013).  
Supporting the idea that ideological and political boundaries 
have collapsed because of these newly formed street constituencies 
that seek in a simplistic way the ‘restoration of the previous regime’ 
cannot explain why, despite the increase of direct and 
unconventional mobilisation, the effectiveness in terms of reviving 
democratic reflexes in a long-term process has remained quite low. 
Populist strategies may involve, in a disruptive way, various 
elements of the above normative categories (referring either to a 
leaderless, grassroots democracy phenomenon or to a blind 
insurrection of manipulated people); and in this sense, it is not a 
sufficient, clear-cut explanation of the political and social 
ramifications.  
Undoubtedly, from 2011 onwards, the heterogeneous group 
of protesters included people from all kinds of ideologies and social 
strata. Even though no overall collective identity preceded the 
collective mobilisation or was constructed through collective 
protest, there were strong partial (collective) identities congregating 
in the two levels making up Syntagma Square (Right and Left 
stances, respectively), i.e. Ano and Kato Plateia (Simiti, 2014). 
Accepting the fact that political contestation is not reducible to a 
single ideological dimension (Freire et al., 2016), both Left and Right 
gained new ideological content. Particularly in the context of the 
Greek electorate, not only economic and social but also cultural(ist), 
nativist (especially those concerns derived from the issue of 
migrants and refugees) and territorial issues emerged, forming a 
multidimensional ideological space with new congruencies and 
incongruencies, new socio-political cleavages and preferences. 
Nevertheless, the protests in public places did not convert 
into venues of (democratic) deliberation, since people were not 
exposed to oppositional views and so there was no exposure to 
political disagreement. Although deliberation seemed completely 
appropriate for most participatory settings (open-dialogue thematic 
groups, popular assemblies, occupation of the city hall, 
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neighbourhood gatherings and information in workplaces),11 
interactions with others of differing views were not assumed to be 
essential to comprehend and come to appreciate the perspectives of 
others. Awareness of the 
rationales for oppositional views is 
a particularly important type of 
political knowledge because of its 
close ties to legitimacy (Mutz, 
2006). Those with high levels of 
exposure to political disagreement 
would thus have more balanced 
judgement.  
The above observations can better explain why the political 
recapture or recycling of social demands by Syriza has been so 
successful. With respect to the three waves, party affiliation shows 
that protesters did not radically detach from political parties and 
that they progressively identified with Syriza (Karyotis & Rüdig, 
2017). While they would have liked their actions to be more political, 
at the same time there was a fear of being instrumentalised by 
established or emerging political organisations seeking to gain 
political benefit. From 2012, the mobilisation phenomenon of 
decentralised, everyday forms of resistance12 transformed into an 
electoral opportunity for promoting Syriza to those in the centre of 
the political spectrum (Aslanidis & Marantzidis, 2016).  
The economic voting argument (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 
2007) explained quite well the outcome of the January 2015 
elections. Greek voters sanctioned the previous governing coalition 
of New Democracy and Pasok for its overall macroeconomic record 
                                                        
11 There were different kinds of meetings planning actions, which were 
surrounded by smaller groups (such as the “Audit Committee”) and 
subgroups preparing proposals and resolutions for the grand assembly, 
which was attended by 2,000–3,000 people each day and broadcasted live 
on the internet. 
12 The number of public protests was much higher in Greece than in 
Portugal. The absolute number of marches and demonstrations recorded 
in police data remained high, with 5,654 protest events taking place in 2012, 
6,231 in 2013 and 3,032 in the first six months of 2014 (Rüdig & Karyotis, 
2014). 
Although deliberation seemed 
completely appropriate for most 
participatory settings interactions 
with others of differing views were 
not assumed to be essential to 
comprehend and come to appreciate 
the perspectives of others. 
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and for the impact of its policies on individual economic well-being. 
But, in the September 2015 elections, the main motivation of New 
Democracy voters was to support the country staying in the 
eurozone, while that of Syriza voters was first to approve the 
personality of the prime minister and second to show their partisan 
support. Hence, it has been rightly pointed out that by voting for 
Syriza, the Greeks approved the government’s persistent and 
difficult efforts to bring about a better bailout agreement13 (Rori, 
2016). 
The 2015 referendum revealed an intergenerational divide, 
with young voters massively voting ‘No’ and older ones supporting 
‘Yes’. Still, the referendum served more as another ‘pre-electoral 
test’ and less as an autonomous 
device for recording popular 
preferences on eurozone policies. 
It helped to stabilise the contours 
of the ruling structure of Syriza, 
which thus gained governability. 
It did not serve its main purpose 
of increasing citizens’ capacity to 
intervene in the policy process in 
order to (re)clarify the frame of 
negotiation, empowering the incumbents to take appropriate action. 
Actually, participation in the referendum was about 62.15%, which 
was 2% lower than the turnout for the January 2015 elections and 
5% higher than the September 2015 elections. The above observation 
explains how, in the September elections, 77.62% of the vote 
supported parties that had endorsed the third bailout agreement 
(see Figure 13.9). 
                                                        
13 Source: Metron Analysis, common exit poll, 20 September 2015. 
The referendum served more as 
another ‘pre-electoral test’ and less 
as an autonomous device for 
recording popular preferences on 
eurozone policies. It helped to 
stabilise the contours of the ruling 
structure of Syriza, which thus 
gained governability. 
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Figure 13.9 Participation rates in Greek national elections, 2007-15 (%) 
 
Source: Greek Ministry of Interior Affairs (2016). 
The second wave of popular mobilisation was a mixture of 
spontaneous reaction and activation of established organisational 
structures. The capitulation of Syriza showed very clearly that it has 
been progressively instrumentalised by a growing political 
movement that builds its political power and recognition on it 
transforming protest into electoral promises. Voters opted for a 
radicalised political choice in the January 2015 elections, but the 
referendum ended up having the opposite effect. The strict 
oversight regime reinforced the weaknesses of the Greek political 
system instead of enhancing more direct forms of democracy. Since 
September 2015, we have observed that mobilisation and calls for 
direct democracy have been quashed. There has been a return to 
more traditional engagement and a decline in mobilisation (strikes 
and demonstrations), with the occasional eruption of illegal, violent 
political action, for instance by Rouvikonas.  
The MoUs brought a significant change in the nature and 
functioning of Greece’s economic and social model, i.e. the relations 
between the state and the economy as well as between society and 
the state. The politics of the crisis in Greece under the European 
Stability Mechanism endorsed the full dependence of Greece’s 
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economic and social development on the conditions and 
requirements of the leading powers of the EU (Manitakis, 2012). 
This is about a legal regime where a state is formally sovereign but 
is fiscally and economically substantially dependent. The Greek 
people realised quite late the country’s longstanding commitments 
to the EU and consequently the extent of the dependent relationship 
between Greece and the EU, where the imperatives of eurozone 
integration significantly limit the exercise of fiscal autonomy. The 
results of a national survey conducted by Dianeosis in 2018 to assess 
the impact of eurozone policies in Greece show that public opinion, 
while considering EU membership valuable, accepts more easily 
than before the structurally asymmetrical nature of the EU and its 
unequal consequences for the weakest member states (see Table 
13.1).  
Table 13.1 Greece and the EU 
Overall evaluation of EU 
membership 
Positive & Fairly Positive 67.6% 
Negative & Rather Negative 30.5% 
Has Greece today lost or gained 
from its participation in the EU? 
Lost 48.9% 
Gained 22.2% 
As a whole, from Greece’s 
participation in the EU, would 
you say that the EU has: 
Mostly benefited 58.2% 
Was the country’s entry into the 
eurozone ultimately the right or 
wrong decision? 
56.8% Sure & Rather Wrong 
41.7% Sure & Fairly Right 
Do you think the objective of 
Greece’s real convergence with 
the average of the most developed 
countries in the euro area in the 
next years is 
38.2% Not achievable 
30% Feasible 
29.3% The distance will grow 
Source: Dianeosis, Panhellenic survey research, “What do the Greeks think?”, 
January-February 2018. 
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In this sense, the 2015 Greek referendum was a point of no return 
for national and EU political realities, proving that direct democracy 
tools in democracies lacking maturity – against a backdrop of 
economic scarcity – can easily be diverted from their initial purpose. 
In this sense, it serves as a counter-paradigm in relation to the Brexit 
referendum.  
Indeed, the country shows little experience with 
referendums. Following the fall of the junta in 1974, the Karamanlis 
government held a referendum that abolished the monarchy and 
instated the constitution of 1975, which gave the president of the 
newly established democratic republic exclusive responsibility for 
the initiative to hold a referendum on critical national issues.14 The 
constitutional reform of 1986 widened the use of referendums on 
serious social issues, and the initiative to hold a referendum now 
belongs to the government. It was not until much later, in November 
2011, that Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou withdrew his 
proposal for holding a referendum on the creditors’ proposals at 
that time and resigned from office. Since then, particular subjects 
have been the object of (informal) local referendums (regarding the 
privatisation of the Thessaloniki water supply company in 2014, the 
privatisation of the four regional airports in the Ionian Islands 
region in 2015 or the Kallikratis reform of regional and local 
authorities).  
However, Greek citizens are not discouraged in their diffuse 
support for the idea of direct democracy (see Figure 13.10). 
                                                        
14 In the Greek constitutions until 1975 there was no reference to a 
referendum, with the exception of the constitution of 1927, which provided 
for an optional referendum.  
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Figure 13.10 Will the introduction of referendums make the political 
system more democratic? (%) 
 
Source: Dianeosis Survey (2016). 
In this context, the tool of local referendums, incompletely 
introduced in 2010, has been reinforced through the recent 
Kleisthenis decentralisation reform in 2018. Local referendums can 
be held on issues based on the initiative of municipal and regional 
bodies, but also on citizens’ initiatives. Furthermore, in 2016 the 
government announced its intention to undertake a constitutional 
reform. This reform is intended to reinforce direct democracy by 
introducing, among others, new referendum mechanisms on 
national issues or in the case of the transfer of sovereign powers of 
the state. It also introduces the possibility for citizens, after 
collecting more than a million signatures, to express an opinion on 
a law passed or even take a legislative initiative. This constitutional 
reform is currently subject to a public consultation; but while it is 
presented as a ‘democratic restart’, it is having difficulty attracting 
participants, especially young people.  
The capitulation of 2015 showed clearly that the negotiation 
process was based on an ever-more ‘constraining consensus’15: the 
                                                        
15 Inspiration for this term has been taken from Hooghe and Marks (2009) 
description on the shift from a “permissive consensus” to “constraining 
dissensus” towards the EU integration process since 1991. 
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more the economy of a country is dependent, the more the country 
must consent to the conditions proposed and accept external control 
of its socioeconomic model of production. Scholars have seized 
upon the issue of divisive referendums – plebiscites based on a 
monopolistic form of agenda setting that favours tribalism (division 
into non-communicating competitive groups in political and social 
life) while disregarding the political consequences – by proposing 
inclusive solutions (Tsebelis, 2018).  
Conclusions 
In the theoretical debate on democracy there are radical approaches 
that consider direct democracy to be only real form of democracy, 
thus opposing the representative model and promoting direct 
democracy as the alternative to liberal democracy (Barber, 2003; 
Castoriadis 2008). There are other holistic approaches that speak of 
‘big’ democracy, which includes both forms, indirect and direct 
(Heller [1985], 1990). Then, there are approaches that follow the 
tradition of Rawls, Dworkin and Pettit, which consider that 
constitutional equality is better ensured by representative 
institutions and not by occasional majorities in the name of a united 
people or nation (Alivizatos & Eleftheriades, 2002). For those 
defending indirect democracy, the problems are complex and 
technical and there are no simple answers; there is a danger of 
oversimplification and imaginary dilemmas that favour 
demagogues – as the public cannot be fully informed because there 
is no time for that, no real possibility of consultation, meditation and 
decision (Barber, 2003). Conventional and unconventional 
mobilisation through street protests, repeated elections and the 
referendum have shown that the Greek people do accept a 
combined use of direct and indirect democracy, while the elites 
show reluctance over the systematic use of referendums, basing 
their argument on the danger of populism.  
Athenian democracy was not a state of things but, as long as 
it remained fertile, a process of continual transformation 
(Castoriadis, 2008). Democracy was not regarded as the rule of law 
assuring citizens’ freedom or equality, but as a questioning of the 
traditional law. It was the first appearance of social autonomy in the 
sense of a society challenging its own institutions through reason, 
in other words, the confrontation of opinions (Castoriadis, 2008).  
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Protests have mainly operated as critiques against the 
economic performance of governments and against their political 
shortcomings without acquiring substantial political and social 
gains from active participation. In a context of structural inequality, 
to create citizens according to the Rousseauist conception is a big 
task. A public sphere dominated by like-minded discussants is not 
a good place for cultivating a civic culture; at the same time, 
oppositional views should not be an obstacle to reaching a 
consensus. John Stuart Mill ([1861], 2010) pointed out that a lack of 
contact with oppositional viewpoints diminishes the prospects for a 
public sphere; Hannah Arendt (1970) talked about “enlarged 
mentality”. A deliberative democracy legitimately should justify 
non-unanimous decisions and ultimately should lead from 
dissimilar views to a consensus by building agreements (the ideal 
speech situation of Jürgen Habermas (1973)).  
Recent grassroots mobilisation, participation in plebiscites 
and public involvement were an expression of a political and social 
perception of ‘no way out’ of Greece’s crisis. Yet this protest against 
the state of humanity did not evolve into 
a coherent and robust critical view of 
politics, or prove able to formulate the 
political demands to change it. These 
street movements have nothing in 
common with the post-materialist 
expectations of the 1960s. The 
intensification of grassroots movements 
has mostly been related to socioeconomic 
demands. Here, they are about neo-materialist claims confronting 
the fear of global capitalism as a force of continual uncertainty for 
individuals.  
A movement lasts a short time but has considerable effects on 
political development over long periods (Arendt, 1970). The civilian 
mobilisation brought a fundamental shift in political discourse and 
civic consciousness yet did not succeed in proposing a plan for 
political and democratic transformation in Greece or the EU. 
Despite the intensification of public mobilisation, its influence on 
EU politics is minor in political terms. The 2015 referendum affected 
the credibility, the effectiveness and the coherence of popular 
action. The vigour of these ‘conjunctural majorities’ has been 
This protest against the 
state of humanity did not 
evolve into a coherent and 
robust critical view of 
politics, or prove able to 
formulate the political 
demands to change it. 
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instrumentalised in order to restructure the partisan and strategic 
game at the national and to a certain extent the European level, and 
finally to legitimise specific policies for economic and social 
development. 
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14. ENGAGED BUT DISEMPOWERED: 
ITALIANS EXPERIENCE DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY 
ELEONORA POLI 
Italians are among the most active participants of European Citizens 
Initiatives (ECIs). Yet when it comes to national referendums or 
petitions there are fluctuating levels of involvement because these 
instruments are often perceived to be ineffective. And not without 
reason. Citizens’ legislative initiatives 
have rarely been converted into 
national laws and, according to the 
Italian Constitution, Italy’s obligations 
under international and EU treaties 
cannot be changed by public 
consultation anyway. Unlike the ECIs, 
which are thought to be an effective 
direct democratic instrument, the poor 
success rates of national direct 
democratic instruments have resulted in the latter being used more 
to protest against the government and the status quo than to 
influence the legislative process.  
14.1 National-level direct democracy 
14.1.1 Which instruments of direct democracy are there? 
Italians believe that direct democratic instruments can be 
fundamental to exerting their rights to influence the legislative 
process (Censis, an Italian socio-economic research institute). But 
since their trust in government and to some extent European 
institutions is quite low, they prefer to interact with the regulators 
to better control the decision-making process. Direct democratic 
Citizens’ legislative initiatives 
have rarely been converted into 
national laws and, according 
to the Italian Constitution, 
Italy’s obligations under 
international and EU treaties 
cannot be changed by public 
consultation anyway. 
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participation is a fundamental principle of 
Italy’s Constitution. As Article 3 of the 
Constitution clearly states, all citizens have 
equal “dignity and rights” when it comes to 
contributing to the political, economic and 
social organisation of their country.  
The most common direct democracy instrument is the 
referendum. However, as established by articles 50 and 71 of the 
Constitution, citizens can also access the decision-making process 
directly by proposing bills to Parliament to initiate legislation. 
Specifically, Article 50 sets out the possibility for any citizen to 
present petitions to parliament to request 
legislative measures or express a 
collective need. However, such an 
instrument is quite weak from an 
institutional point of view. As Article 109 
of the Chamber of Deputies’ regulation, 
and Articles 140 and 141 of the Senate’s 
regulation read, none of the Chambers 
has any obligation to decide on petitions 
(Cuocolo, 630). Nevertheless, since the 
role of petitions is to highlight socially 
relevant issues, they are a valid instrument for parliamentarians to 
understand the problems affecting their electorate (Gambale, 2).  
Article 71 allows a common citizen to propose a bill if the 
latter is supported and signed by at least 50,000 voters. Yet since the 
role of such a proposal is rather to trigger a discussion within 
Parliament, which has the exclusive competence of the final 
approval of the law, the Italian citizens’ legislative initiative is 
sometimes considered a poor direct democracy instrument (Barile, 
473; Allegretti, Bardazzi, Caramischi, Bova, 79). 
Referendums are regulated by Article 75 of the Constitution, 
which stipulates how public consultations can repeal a law, in 
whole or in part. To be effective, repealing referendums requires the 
support of at least 500,000 voters or of five regional councils. 
Moreover, Italy’s Constitution does not allow referendums on tax 
laws, budget laws, amnesty, or international treaties (Senate of the 
Republic, b). Finally, as stated in Article 138, public consultations to 
reform the Italian Constitution are allowed when requested by one-
Direct democratic 
participation is a 
fundamental principle of 
Italy’s Constitution. 
None of the Chambers has 
any obligation to decide on 
petitions. The role of 
petitions is to highlight 
socially relevant issues, they 
are a valid instrument for 
parliamentarians to 
understand the problems 
affecting their electorate 
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fifth of the members of a chamber of Parliament, 500,000 voters or 
five regional councils (Ibid.). 
14.1.2 Level of participation in (different forms of) citizen 
involvement 
Generally, Italians do not have the belief that their voices count for 
much. According to Eurobarometer, in 2017 four Italians out of five 
did not trust their national 
government (78% versus 17%) (EU 
Commission, 2017b, 44) and two 
Italians out of three were convinced 
that they could not influence the EU 
decision-making process (64% vs. 
29%) (EU Commission, 2017c). At the 
national level, the perception of 
impotence is somehow confirmed by 
the low number of bills proposed by 
citizens that have actually been made into laws by parliament.  
According to a study published by Openpolis, out of 260 bills 
presented by citizens from 1979 to 2014, only three became laws. 
These three succeeded because they were endorsed by members of 
parliament or merged with proposals developed by Parliament or the 
government, sometimes at the expense of not keeping anything of the 
original draft bill. For instance, out of 11 popular initiative bills 
proposed during the Renzi government (22 February 2014 - 12 
December 2016), only one popular initiative bill was approved as it 
was combined with the electoral law ‘Italicum’. However, the 
number of bills proposed by Parliament and then enacted as law is 
already quite low, if compared to those promoted by the government. 
There is a huge difference in the approval times; governmental 
proposals take only 77 days to pass on average, while parliamentary 
proposals take around 245 days (Bardazzi Caramaschi, Di Battista). 
Leaving aside citizens’ legislative initiatives, referendums 
should play an important role in challenging Italians’ negative 
perception of their negligible influence over national decision-
making processes. Yet until very recently, their use has been rather 
limited. According to data provided by the Italian Ministry of 
Interior, since the creation of the Italian Republic in 1945, there have 
According to Eurobarometer, in 
2017 four Italians out of five 
did not trust their national 
government (78% versus 17%) 
and two Italians out of three 
were convinced that they could 
not influence the EU decision-
making process (64% vs. 29%).  
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been 22 popular referendums, ten of which have been organised in 
the last 20 years, with widely varying levels of participation. 
In 2009, during a referendum on the Italian electoral law, only 
24% of the citizens eligible to vote actually went to vote. This was too 
few to reach the 34% threshold necessary to validate the consultation. 
In 2011, another referendum saw a higher turnout, with around 
55.5% of the electorate expressing their opinion. One of the issues 
voted, among those related to nuclear power and public water, was 
linked to the need to repeal the ‘Legitimate Impediment Law’, which 
would have directly affected Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.1 
Again, in April 2016 a referendum on oil drilling did not reach 
the quorum, with only 31% of the electorate expressing a view one 
way or the other. By contrast, the constitutional referendum 
supported by former Prime Minister Renzi a few months later, in 
December 2016, saw the participation of 65.47% of Italian voters, with 
the great majority opposing the proposed reforms.  
Table 14.1 Italian referendums, level of participation 
Year Turnout yes  no 
April 1999 50% 91% 9% 
May 2000 32%     
October 2001 34% 64% 36% 
June2003 26%     
June 2005 26%     
June 2006 52% 39% 61% 
June 2009 24%     
June 2011 55%     
April 2016 31% 86% 14% 
Dec. 2016 65% 41% 59% 
Source: Italian Ministry of Home Affairs (2017). 
                                                        
1 In 2010 the legitimate impediment law was approved by Italy’s lower 
house so that it could block trials against the prime minister. It allowed him 
or ministers of his cabinet to request that trial hearings be postponed on 
grounds that they would be too busy with government work to attend. The 
act was repealed after the 2011 referendum. 
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Figure 14.1 Italian referendums, participation trends 
 
Source: Italian Ministry of Home Affairs (2017). 
14.1.3 Main drivers of voter mobilisation 
If we analyse the mobilisation trends 
registered in the above-mentioned 
referendums, it is easy to maintain that 
the drivers pushing Italians to vote are 
first of all political. In other words, 
referendums or public consultations are 
often used by Italian voters to signal 
discontent with the government. The 
most recent example was the 
constitutional referendum of December 2016.  
Formally promoted by the opposition parties and minority 
groups within the Democratic Party to block what they saw as a 
distortion of the Italian system of checks and balances, set up back 
in 1948, the aim of the consultation was to undermine Renzi’s 
political legitimacy.2 Yet even Prime Minister Renzi called Italians 
                                                        
2 The reform proposed by the referendum aimed to overcome the equal 
bicameral system within Parliament whereby the Chamber of Deputies 
could maintain the main legislative power, while the Senate could see its 
legislative competences cut and the number of its members reduced from 
315 to 100. Moreover, it aimed to provide the government and not the 
regions with exclusive competences on strategic issues related to 
infrastructural, transport, energy, education, health and labour policies. 
The drivers pushing Italians 
to vote are firstly political. 
In other words, referendums 
or public consultations are 
often used by Italian voters 
to signal discontent with the 
government. 
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to the ballot box as a means of bolstering support for his 
government against the Five Star Movement (M5S), which in 2016 
won administrative elections in many Italian constituencies (e.g. 
Rome and Turin). Renzi repeatedly declared that he would step 
down as Prime Minister if the reforms proposed wwere rejected by 
the majority of citizens. 
Admittedly, part of the electorate did not vote on the 
substance of the reforms, but rather for ideological reasons, to 
register discontent with the government and Renzi. Similarly, the 
2011 referendum saw a very high level of participation because it 
was seen as a vote against the then Prime Minister, Silvio 
Berlusconi.  
On these two occasions, beyond any other economic or social 
motivations, voters’ mobilisation was based on opposition to the 
government. Indeed, social rights can be an 
important driver of participation and 
mobilisation. For instance, apart from 
protests against Berlusconi, high 
participation in the 2011 referendum was due 
to the two reforms dealing with water 
privatisation and nuclear plants, widely perceived as controversial. 
Similarly, in 1981 an unprecedented number of citizens (79.38% of 
the Italian electorate) expressed their views in the referendum on 
abortion and in 1974, 87.72% of Italian voters participated in the 
consultation on divorce (Ministry of Interior). Moreover, in May 
2016, an online petition organised by the Italian NGO ‘Riparte il 
Futuro’, collected more than 88,000 signatures and led to the 
enforcement of the Freedom of Information Act: FOIA (Ministry of 
Public Administration).  
                                                        
This could allow the government to carry out huge infrastructural projects. 
The constitutional reform also aimed to change the regulation on 
referendum and citizens’ legislative initiatives, and the voting system for 
electing the president of the Republic and to abolish the CNEL (Public 
Council), a national institute with an advisory role on economic and labour 
policies. 
Social rights can be an 
important driver of 
participation and 
mobilisation. 
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14.2 The EU dimension 
14.2.1 Are EU issues of first or second order? 
Italians used to trust European institutions more than their national 
government. Yet the multiple crises the EU has faced, the resulting 
austerity policies, and the mismanaged migration waves have 
fuelled anti-EU sentiment, turning the country into one of the most 
euro-critical member states. According to the European Council on 
Foreign Relations, Italy used to be ranked 10th in its show of support 
for the Union. Now, the country ranks 23rd out of 28 (Delcker, 
ECFR). This trend is indicative of how European affairs now play 
out in the national debate. 
While EU affairs are central to defining Italy’s economic, 
political and social development, information about Europe and the 
way it works is quite poor, resulting in the perception that the EU is 
a remote and technocratic set of institutions that can hardly be 
influenced (Bindi).   
At the same time, there is little or no opportunity for Italians 
to have a say on European policies through national channels of 
direct democracy. Indeed, according to Article 75 of the Italian 
Constitution referendums cannot modify the structure or content of 
an international (i.e. European) treaty or agreement. European 
issues were central to a public consultation only in 1989, when a 
non-binding advisory referendum on the European Economic 
Community was held to revive Italian popular support for the 
European integration process. Since the Italian Constitution did not 
foresee any type of consultative referendum, the latter was held 
through a special law. At the time, Italians were asked if they agreed 
to transform the European Economic Community into a political 
union, with a government and a European constitution drawn up 
by Parliament. The great majority (89.1% vs 10.9%) agreed in 
principle with this proposal and 81% of the citizens with voting 
rights took part in the referendum (Deloy, Ministry of Interior).  
Since Italians have not been called upon since to directly 
express their views on EU matters, the proposed referendum on 
eurozone membership, which was flagged before the 2018 electoral 
campaign for national elections by parties such as the League and 
the Five Star Movement, was welcomed by many citizens. Yet it is 
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evident to most that to hold such a consultation there would need 
to be a reform of the Constitution (Codogno 2018a).3 On the other 
hand, Italians seem keen to have a say on the EU legislative or 
decision-making process. They are indeed among the most active 
Europeans when it comes to voicing their opinions in European 
Citizens Initiatives (ECI). Italy was one of the few countries, 
together with Germany and Spain, where the last four successful 
ECIs managed to reach the required threshold. Italy provided 
25.79% of the vote (European Commission, 2017d).  
In particular, the ECI on Ban glyphosate and protect people and 
the environment from toxic pesticides launched in October 2017 to 
reform the pesticide approval procedure and set an EU-wide 
mandatory reduction of pesticides gathered the support of 1,070,865 
people, of whom 71,367 (6.6%) were Italians.  
Similarly, the ECI on Right2Water, submitted to the 
Commission on 20 December 2013, called for "legislation 
implementing the human right to water and sanitation" and saw the 
participation of 65,223 Italians, some 4% of the total voters.  
Again, in 2014 the ECI One of Us on the need for the EU to stop 
financing research activities that presupposed the destruction of 
human embryos saw a very high participation of Italians. Among 
the 1,721,626 who went to vote, around 36% were Italians (623,947). 
Finally, the ECI Stop vivisection, which called for the Commission to 
abrogate Directive 2010/63/EU, saw the participation of 690,325 
Italians, 59% of the total 1,173,130 (European Commission, 2015).  
In this respect, European issues are not considered to be of 
second-order by Italians, but the ineffectiveness of national direct 
democratic tools in giving Italians room to influence European 
policies and legislation means that EU matters are perceived as 
remote. However, when provided with workable channels, Italians 
seem keen to influence the European legislative process. 
                                                        
3 A number of Italians would probably express a negative view of the 
eurozone and the euro. Indeed, in the most recent Eurobarometer survey, 
only 59 Italians out of 100 were in favour of a European economic and 
monetary union with one single currency and the euro is often blamed for 
the worsening living standards in Italy. This was the most Eurosceptic 
outcome among the eurozone member countries. 
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Table 14.2 Participation in ECIs 
Ban glyphosate 
and protect people 
and the 
environment from 
toxic pesticides 
Total number of European vote 1,070,865 
Total number of Italian vote 71,367 
Percentage of the Italian vote 6,66% 
Right2Water 
Total number of European vote 1,659,543 
Total number of Italian vote 65,223 
Percentage of the Italian vote 3.93% 
One of Us 
Total number of European vote 1,721,626 
Total number of Italian vote 623.947 
Percentage of the Italian vote 36% 
Stop vivisection 
Total number of European vote 1,173,130 
Total number of Italian vote 690,325 
Percentage of the Italian vote 59% 
TOTAL ECIs 
Total number of vote for 4 ECI 
initiatives 
5,625,164 
Total number of Italian vote for 4 ECI 
initiatives 
1,450,862 
Percentage of the Italian vote 25,79% 
Source: European Commission (2018). 
14.2.2 How are EU issues mobilised – in their own right 
or as national matters with an EU dimension? 
Generally, EU issues are mobilised as national matters with an EU 
dimension. There is a poor understanding of how the EU works and 
what citizens can actually expect of EU institutions. This is largely 
but not entirely due to the downgraded legitimacy of the EU, which 
is perceived as completely detached from normal citizen 
ns and their everyday lives. Of course, the origin of this legitimacy 
deficit is not only in the multiple crises the Union has had to face. 
The crises have exacerbated a latent sense of disempowerment 
already widespread among citizens, favouring a disengagement 
from EU matters. For too long the EU has been used by national 
governments as a scapegoat to justify painful economic policies that 
have a detrimental effect on citizens’ welfare and lifestyle. As a 
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result, European issues are mostly perceived negatively by the 
general public and always filtered through the national lens. So far, 
for instance, the role of the 
European Union and its member 
countries in managing the 
migration crisis has been 
perceived critically and the EU is 
often accused of not doing enough 
to protect Italy. On the other hand, 
even in the recent electoral 
campaign, there was no detailed 
debate on the future of Italy within 
the EU. Ahead of important talks 
about the future of European 
economic governance, politicians 
neither discussed their ideas on 
how to reduce the national debt 
nor analysed the consequences of poor economic performance and 
how this could affect relations between Italy and the EU (Codogno 
2018b).  
14.3 Influence of participatory mechanisms on 
national political realities 
14.3.1 Characteristics / party programmes? 
According to CENSIS, poor trust in institutions has pushed Italian 
citizens to ask for direct involvement in the decision-making 
process and increasingly to refuse any sort of mediator so as to have 
at least a perception of having more influence vis-à-vis the 
government and legislative institutions. This trend increased in 
2013, when in the aftermath of Berlusconi’s government the need to 
rebuild trust in national institutions and politics, combined with the 
widespread use of the internet, resulted in more online platforms 
involving citizens in new forms of participatory democracy 
(Frediani).  
Online platforms became one of the main tools of the Five Star 
Movement (M5S), which understood how participatory democracy 
could satisfy Italians’ desire to be more politically involved. It was 
partly thanks to a calculated use of this instrument that the party 
The origin of this legitimacy deficit 
is not only in the multiple crises 
the Union has had to face. The 
crises have exacerbated a latent 
sense of disempowerment already 
widespread among citizens, 
favouring a disengagement from 
EU matters. For too long the EU 
has been used by national 
governments as a scapegoat to 
justify painful economic policies 
that have a detrimental effect on 
citizens’ welfare and lifestyle. 
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has been able to grow exponentially, becoming the number one 
political force in Italy. Online platforms are used by the M5S not 
only to involve citizens in political debates but also to define the 
internal decision-making of the party. At the same time, the tool has 
also allowed the Movement to ‘take the pulse’ of Italian society and 
change its political rhetoric accordingly.  
Since the direct involvement of citizens has so far allowed the 
party to be perceived as open, legitimate and democratic, the M5S 
is the only political force campaigning for an increased use of direct 
democratic tools. Beppe Grillo, the founder of the Movement, has 
also considered reducing the role of parliament and allowing 
citizens to decide on political issues by voting from their personal 
computers (De Sanctis). 
14.3.2 Cleavages in the political spectrum 
The majority of cleavages in the Italian political spectrum have been 
rightly identified by the SWG, a polling organisation based in 
Trieste, which carried out a survey on the topic in June 2017 (see 
also Hooghe Marks, Lipset Rokkan). Italians consider the split along 
the honest /dishonest axis as the most important one, scoring 8.2 
score on a scale of 1 to 10. The second rift is traced along the classic 
divide between rich/poor people. The gap between a minority of 
the wealthy privileged and the rest of society – the middle and 
lower classes who bear the burden of economic uncertainty – is felt 
by 8 citizens out of 10. Beyond these, the survey identifies at least 
three other social divisions. The first separates ‘steady job/flexible 
job’ (7.7 out of 10). This involves mainly the baby boomers (the fifty-
sixty-year-olds) who enjoyed better social welfare than the younger 
generation of workers. The others deal with the divides between 
‘migrants/Italians first’ (7.6 out of 10) and equity versus growing 
economic disparities (7.6 out of 10). The majority of Italians believe 
that austerity measures have caused more problems than they 
solved (65% in total, or 60% of voters of the League, 78% of voters 
of Forza Italia, 70% of the PD voters, 76% of the M5S). Similarly, 
lower labour costs to boost companies’ competitiveness is 
considered to be a poor strategy by 57% of voters (52% of the League 
voters, 56% of Forza Italia voters, 50% of the PD voters, and 72% of 
the M5S voters) (Faggiano, SWG).  
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14.4 Influence of participatory mechanisms on EU 
political realities 
14.4.1 Resonance with elections/referendums elsewhere in 
Europe 
Identity issues cause concern all over Europe. Most of the key 
referendums held in Europe over the last four years were related to 
independence (the Scottish independence referendum in 2014 and the 
referendum for independence held in Catalonia in 2017), or the 
Brexit referendum in 2016. All three referendums had considerable 
resonance for Italian political trends.  
For instance, building on the media attention around the UK’s 
vote, the Italian government and Prime Minister Renzi in particular 
used the opportunity to campaign for an Italian constitutional 
referendum. Although the referendum had to consult Italians on the 
above-mentioned constitutional reforms it was presented as a sort 
of ‘Italian Brexit’ as it would allow citizens to express their support 
for radical institutional change. Even the business community 
linked the Brexit referendum result to the Italian referendum, with 
the General Confederation of Italian Industry (Confindustria) 
maintaining that a rejection by Italians of the reforms proposed by 
the government had the potential to be more detrimental than 
Brexit.  
Similarly, on 1 October 2017, as soon as the referendum for 
independence in Catalonia was held, the Italian regions Lombardy 
and Veneto organised a ‘consultative referendum’ that aimed to 
strengthen the political mandate of regional leaders to demand 
more autonomy. In the case of Veneto, this referendum was not the 
first of its kind. An unofficial online referendum for regional 
independence was indeed organised it the aftermath of the Scottish 
referendum in 2014. The consultative referendum on 22 October 
2017 saw a turnout of 57.2% with 98.1% voting Yes, but this outcome 
has not produced any major consequences. 
14.4.2 The uptake of EU matters by government 
Italy has traditionally been among the worst EU law offenders. As 
a result, the number of sanctions imposed by the EU is quite high 
but the trend has declined in recent years. Although the 
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Commission opened 19 new infringement cases against Italy in 
2016, the country has increased its credibility on this score – passing 
from 89 cases in 2015 to 70 in 2016 and 58 in 2018 (ANSA, European 
Commission 2017a). 
The recently appointed Italian government, led by Lega and 
the Five Star Movement, could reverse this trend, however. 
Although the parties in government have shared quite Eurosceptic 
positions, it is not clear whether their stance towards the EU will 
now be critical or moderate. In other words, the new government 
might toe the EU line or conversely, challenge ‘Brussels’ wherever 
this is opportune. On the one hand, most of the appointed ministers 
are renowned experts or academics with no reputation for 
especially radical positions. On the other hand, the Minister of 
European Affairs is Prof. Savona, a well-known Eurosceptic 
economist who has promoted the idea of an Italian exit from the 
eurozone. In this respect, from once being a follower of Germany 
and France when it came to defining EU policies, Italy could adopt 
a more critical position towards the EU. On its relations with EU 
institutions, the populist Italian government has turned out to be, 
from time to time, more moderate or more radical than expected, 
adopting a somewhat schizophrenic approach (Morillas, Poli). 
Conclusions 
On the one hand, participatory instruments are crucial to 
democracy because they encourage citizens to become informed 
about the decision-making process. From an Italian institutional 
perspective, the promotion of participatory instruments and their 
application is considered to be fundamental to a functioning 
democracy – as long as they enhance and improve the decision-
making process. Yet the abuse of direct democracy can also 
jeopardise the stability of national institutions. For example, a 
referendum can call voters 
together to decide upon a socially 
relevant issue, thereby boosting 
the proactive involvement of 
citizens in everyday political life. 
But conversely, if a referendum is 
called to settle sensitive matters, a 
slight nuance in the referendum 
If a referendum is called to settle 
sensitive matters, a slight nuance 
in the referendum question or a 
misguided campaign can 
undermine the referendum itself, 
and lead to outcomes that harm 
society for a long time. 
292  ENGAGED BUT DISEMPOWERED: ITALIANS EXPERIENCE DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
 
question or a misguided campaign can undermine the referendum 
itself, and lead to outcomes that harm society for a long time.  
This is especially relevant when it comes to EU affairs. 
According to the Italian Constitution, citizens cannot use direct 
democracy instruments such as a referendum to change an 
international – and therefore a European – treaty. Although the new 
government has highlighted the need for EU member states to use 
instruments that will allow citizens a say on EU decisions, there has 
been very little debate in Italy about the tools that are already 
working such as the European Citizens Initiative, which would 
provide Italians with the channels to influence EU legislation. 
Italians have shown a keen interest in ECI and are among the 
nationals participating the most in these initiatives.  
It is evident that Italy’s participatory instruments are not 
among the most meaningful when it comes to influencing national 
dynamics. Yet when provided 
with an effective opportunity to 
have a say on both national and 
European legislation, Italians 
respond. Leaving aside the 
problems related to the possible 
misuse of direct democracy, it goes without saying that more direct 
democratic accountability could allow both the Italian government 
and the EU to overcome the perception that they do not take 
Italians’ views into consideration. This would in itself reduce 
citizens’ frustration at not being heard by national or European 
institutions.  
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15. THE EUROPEANISATION OF 
LATVIA’S DIRECT DEMOCRACY: 
NOT THERE YET 
KĀRLIS BUKOVSKIS & ELIZABETE VIZGUNOVA 
This chapter looks at attitudes towards and patterns of the use of 
direct democratic instruments in Latvia. The authors note an 
increased interest in various instruments of direct democracy, 
which is also indicates a transition towards liberal, democratic 
institutions and the shedding of the post-Soviet mindset. Yet it 
seems that on a national level, only issues revolving around 
corruption, the usurpation of power and identity are powerful 
enough to mobilise the eligible population to a protest vote. 
Between roughly 2007 and 2012, civil society in Latvia seemed to 
undergo an awakening – triggered by desperation, the global 
financial crisis, the distrust of institutions and high levels of 
corruption. However, mobilization of society was also supported by 
personalities (ex-presidents) and their confrontation with the 
political establishment.  Since the so-called Language referendum, 
the dynamics seems to have changed, giving space to e-democracy 
instruments (collective initiatives and public deliberation tools) and 
local referendums. 
Meanwhile, EU issues are largely absent from political party 
agendas, and the state administration is rarely proactive when it 
comes to EU issues, partly due to a lack of capacity. While the 
Latvian population is not by nature Eurosceptic, it does show signs 
of Euro-apathy, stemming largely from a lack of information about 
the prerogatives at the disposal of European passport-holders. 
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Introduction 
Despite the rapid democratic transition of Latvia, participation in 
public life remains low.1 While involvement in (supposedly) non-
political activities – i.e. charity – is high and denotes significant 
social solidarity, political participation is still relatively low.2 This is 
mostly due to a sense of alienation but it is key to understanding 
direct democracy in Latvia and its link to the EU. Transition to 
liberal democratic institutions is still ongoing in Latvia.3  
The attitudes and behaviour of Latvian citizens towards 
various instruments of direct democracy – referendums, plebiscites, 
citizens’ initiatives, popular initiatives and citizen-initiated 
referendums and recall procedures – seem to fall into the same 
category. Whereas the 2012 referendum ‘On Russian as the second 
official language’ (the Language referendum) gathered 71% of eligible 
voters, other referendums have had only modest success in 
mobilising the population (e.g. the 2011 ‘On the proposal on 
dissolution of the Saeima’ (the national parliament) which, despite the 
unprecedented circumstances, only gathered 46% of eligible 
voters).4 The low turnout was even more surprising in this context 
because trust in the Saeima and government is low (although this 
changes from government to government, the Saeima is trusted by 
roughly 16% of the population, and the cabinet of ministers by 
27%),5 pointing to an crisis in representative democracy.  
The use of referendums as an expression of protest against 
corruption, nepotism and oligarchy is established; the other 
recurrent theme of direct democracy practices relates to identity and 
                                                        
1 Ivars Ījabs, “Politiskā līdzdalība” in: Cik demokrātiska ir Latvija? 
Demokrātijas audits 2005-2014”, 2015, dspace.lu.lv/dspace/bitstream/ 
handle/7/31245/Demokratijas_audits_2014.pdf?sequence=1.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Filip Kostelka, “The State of Political Participation in Post-Communist 
Democracies: Low but Surprisingly Little Biased Citizen Engagement”, in: 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 66, No. 6, August 2014, 947. 
4 Centrālā Vēlēšanu Komisija, Referendums, https://www.cvk.lv/pub/ 
public/30629.html. 
5 “Pērn esto pieaugusi iedzīvotāju uzticība Saeimai”, 05.01.2018, 
http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/latvija/767545-pern_esot_pieaugusi_ 
iedzivotaju_uzticiba_saeimai.  
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the ethnic Latvian-ethnic Russian 
divide. Indeed, the first use of a 
direct democracy tool after 
Latvia’s independence revolved 
around a conflict that had a strong 
ethnic component (‘the 
independence referendum’ of 3 
March 1991). Now, despite 27 
years of intense democratic 
consolidation and nation-building, issues related to minority 
integration/assimilation in Latvia are still widely seen as damaging 
the quality of democracy and governance in the state. Domestically, 
and despite claiming cultural unity, the issue of including 
minorities in the democratic process is still a highly contentious one 
in Latvian politics. 
15.1 Between ethnicity and oligarchy 
Since 2007, interest in a variety of forms of direct democracy – 
referendums, popular initiatives, petitions and the recalling of 
officials – has increased. This clearly resonates from the 
aforementioned crisis of representative democracy, spurring the 
population to turn to direct democratic tools. However, despite the 
general approval of political parties and forces and the population 
itself, the Language referendum brought about fundamental 
changes in the legal framework.  
All types of referendum discussed in this chapter are binding 
for the state; Latvia’s constitution therefore has not established 
consultative referendums as a direct democracy tool.  
15.2 Mandatory constitutional referendums 
The mandatory constitutional referendum, concerning any changes 
to articles 1, 3, 4 and 6 of the Constitution (Satversme; see Table 1) 
requires a very high quorum (two-thirds of the parliament, and one-
half of the electorate having participated in the previous election), 
thereby serving as a limitation to direct democracy. 
Retrospectively, the 2004 accession to the EU modified the 
understanding of sovereignty and independence, as enshrined in 
articles 1 and 2 of the Satversme. The one-off referendum was held 
The use of referendums as an 
expression of protest against 
corruption, nepotism and oligarchy 
is established; the other recurrent 
theme of direct democracy practices 
relates to identity and the ethnic 
Latvian-ethnic Russian divide. 
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on 20 September 2003 with a turnout of 71.4 % (and with 66.97% 
voting for membership).6 This was the first referendum in which 
over a million eligible citizens took part, thereby giving a broad 
legitimacy to Latvia’s decision to become a member of the EU. 
Whereas the popularity of accession is undeniable – according to 
opinion polls prior to the referendum, support was above 50% of 
the whole electorate,78 despite certain fluctuations – this referendum 
is often referred to as a ‘non-referendum’, as the result was certain 
beforehand. 
In a deliberate move to facilitate Latvia’s accession to the EU 
(and for fear of a negative turnout/negative result), the Saeima 
amended articles 68 and 79 of the Satversme, alongside the law On 
the Referendum and the Proclamation of Laws as a pre-emptive step. 
The high quorum required for constitutional changes was thus 
decreased to one-half of voters having participated in the previous 
parliamentary elections.9  
This referendum has been subject to considerable criticism 
from experts and the civic society. The decision-making process is 
often described as “highly centralised”, “non-democratic and non-
transparent”. The elites were concerned by two issues: a) the 50% of 
the population claiming to support accession to the EU was not 
enough; and b) the risk of ‘ethnic voting’. Indeed, the latter proved 
                                                        
6 “Oficiālie referenduma rezultāti apliecina pārliecinošu atbalstu ES”, 
6.10.2003, http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/latvija/230695-oficialie_ 
referenduma_rezultati_apliecina_parliecinosu_atbalstu_es.  
7 “Mazinājjies iedzīvotāju atbalsts dalībai ES”, 18.03.2003, 
http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/latvija/230431-mazinajies_iedzivotaju_ 
atbalsts_latvijas_dalibai_es.  
8 [Importantly, this made Latvia the 4th most Euro-optimistic country in 
the EU, only after Lithuania (57,67%); Slovenia (54,02%) and Malta 48,78%.] 
Jānis Ikstens, “Referenduma skaitļos atskatoties”, 23.09.2003, 
http://providus.lv/article/referenduma-skaitlos-raugoties.  
9 Evren Somer, “Direct Democracy in the Baltic States: Institutions 
Procedures and Practice in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania”, C2D – Centre 
for Research on Direct Democracy, 42/2012, 32. 
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to impact the election: only 20% of the ethnic Russian population of 
Latvia voted for Latvia’s accession to the EU.10  
Indeed, the pre-referendum debates were over-simplified and 
dominated by identity issues rather than the actual changes EU 
accession would bring about legally, economically and politically. 
The electorate was invited to vote Yes even in official pre-
referendum campaigns rather than leaving the choice to the voter.11 
Due to the identity politics ‘card’ that was played by most parties, 
speculation about the legitimacy of the referendum was voiced by 
non-citizens particularly because, on separate occasions, there were 
accusations of falsifying votes.12  
Economic conditions also played a significant role in 
determining the no-vote of ethnic Russian speakers: the eastern-
most parts of Latvia – the regions of Krāslava, Ludza and 
Daugavpils that voted against – are in the eastern-most part of 
Latvia, which was (and still is) economically the least developed. As 
a result, these regions were more susceptible to Eurosceptic 
messages and Eurosceptic parties; messages along the lines of – the 
EU means higher prices, taxes, unemployment, immigration and 
shutting down of local businesses.13 However, ethnic voting is a 
phenomenon that has interwoven Latvia’s direct and indirect 
democratic processes since the country regained independence; it is 
a reflection of the segmentation of society in the 1980s and 1990s and 
therefore cannot be attributed to contemporary processes alone.  
 
                                                        
10 Inese Šūpule, “Vēlreiz par referendumu: etniskā šķelšanās balsojumā par 
Latvijas iestāšanos ES. Pētījumu rezultāti”, Providus, 25.02.2004, 
http://providus.lv/article/velreiz-par-referendumu-etniska-skelsanas-
balsojuma-par-latvijas-iestasanos-es-petijumu-rezultati.  
11 Daunis Auers, “Cik demokrātisks bija referendums?”, 14.10.2003, 
http://providus.lv/article/cik-demokratisks-bija-referendums.  
12 Inese Šūpule, “Vēlreiz par referendumu [..]” op. cit. 
13 Ibid. 
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Parliamentary plebiscite for changes in EU membership, semi-
plebiscites on repealing a law, the presidential plebiscite on 
recalling parliament 
The parliamentary plebiscite can be triggered (both proactively and 
reactively) when confirming legal changes to Latvia’s status as a 
member of the EU. As in the case of the referendum on EU 
membership, the constitution envisages that a referendum will only 
be deemed binding if “at least half of the number of electors that 
participated in the previous Saeima election and if majority has 
voted in favour of the draft law.”14 
Conversely, the semi-plebiscite on repealing a law deals with 
any laws which, in the Latvian legal system, are below Satversme.15 
The process of the semi-plebiscite is rather complex, as it first 
involves the president suspending (vetoing) the proclamation of a 
law after receiving a request from no less than one-third of the 
Saeima members. The population must then confirm the triggering 
of the referendum by collecting signatures from at least one-tenth of 
the electorate that took part in the previous election. This type of 
referendum can therefore be considered either as a plebiscite or as a 
facultative citizens’ referendum. 
The president can also trigger the dissolution of the Saeima 
which, if initiated, also puts him in a perilous position – if more than 
50% of voters decide against the dissolution, the president is 
dismissed from office. On the flipside, should the presidential 
initiative gain popular support, new national elections will be held 
no later than two months after the date of the dissolution of the 
Saeima.16  
 
 
                                                        
14 Evren Somer, “Direct Democracy in [..]”, op. cit., 32. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Juri Ruus, “Democratic participation at the local level in post-communist 
states: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania”, in: Local Direct Democracy in Europe, 
Theo Schiller (ed.), Vs Verlag, 2011, 273. 
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15.3 Citizen-initiated referendums 
There are two other types of referendum (to amend the constitution, 
and to create a law) that elicit a strong sense of ownership among 
citizens, as they are in complete control. However, and especially 
after 2012 and the amendments to the law ‘On popular voting, 
creating laws, and the European Citizens Initiative’ (”Par tautas 
nobalsošanu, likumu ierosināšanu un Eiropas pilsoņu iniciatīvu”) 
of 1 January 2015, the number of signatures required for a full draft 
or an amendment to the Constitution or a law increased almost five-
fold.1718 This system replaced the previous two-step signature 
collection system. Importantly, the process was already thought to 
be only moderately citizen-friendly due the high approval quorum 
(one half of the whole electorate), which makes it very difficult to 
arrive at valid referendum decisions. 
According to article 78 of the Satversme, if the initiative or 
draft law manages to gather the necessary number of valid 
signatures, the Saeima must consider the amendment. If it is not 
adopted without change, a national referendum must be called.19 
Importantly, and unlike the constitutional initiatives, a draft law 
will only be adopted if it gathers 50% support of the electorate 
having participated in the previous parliamentary election. 
Latvia’s citizens can also exercise the power to recall 
parliament, if one-tenth of the electorate proposes the dissolution of 
parliament. However, this form of initiative was only introduced 
after the ex-President Latvia Valdis Zatlers (2007-11) put his 
ultimatum to the Saeima, requesting, among other things, to amend 
                                                        
17 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia, The Amendments to the 
Law on Natinal Referendums, Legislative Initiatives and European 
Citizens’ Initiative comply with the Satversme, 12.02.2014, 
http://www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/en/press-release/the-amendments-to-the-
law-on-national-referendums-legislative-initiatives-and-european-
citizens-initiative-comply-with-the-satversme/.  
18 Edīte Brikmane, “Tautas rosināti referendumi: vai jaunais regulējums tos 
ierobežo?”, https://lvportals.lv/skaidrojumi/268528-tautas-rosinati-
referendumi-vai-jaunais-regulejums-tos-ierobezo-2015.  
19 Evren Somer, “Direct Democracy in [..]”, op. cit. 
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the Constitution, providing the people with a new tool to fire 
Saeima.  
Zatlers unsuccessfully launched a referendum on 2 August 
2008 with this objective (see Table 1). The negative outcome can 
partially be explained by the timing of the referendum (during the 
summer holidays) and the fact that other political party members 
urged people not to vote. Nevertheless, Zatlers’ activism finally 
paid off in 2009, when the Saeima responded to pressure from both 
Zatlers and the broader population and amended the Satversme. 
This gave “no less than one tenth of the voters” the possibility to recall 
parliament by popular vote, under article 14.20 In this instance a 
failed referendum managed to achieve its aim: it not only 
introduced the desired amendments but also rejected the policies of 
a government that was perceived as dishonest and corrupt.  
15.4 Recent developments: citizens’ participation in 
direct democracy mechanisms 
Latvian citizens are sceptical and passive21 about the level of 
political influence they can exercise at national level. Arguably, the 
population often lacks information about how to take part in 
political processes, which consequently leads to a marked lack of 
empowerment. Even in crises, such as the extraordinary 
parliamentary elections following the dismissal of parliament (2008 
and 2011, see Table 15.1) there is also a relatively low turn-out. 
The post-2007 period has been a particularly intense one for 
direct democracy instruments in Latvia. The reason is most likely 
linked to the global financial crisis (2007-10), which highlighted the 
crisis of representative democracy, namely oligarchy, corruption 
and the lack of appropriate supervision mechanisms; ‘the same old 
political faces’, for example.   
 
 
                                                        
20 Evren Somer, “Direct Democracy in [..]”, op. cit. 
21 Ivars Ījabs, “Politiskā līdzdalība” [..] op. cit. 
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Table 15.1 Direct democracy in action 
Tool Approved/Rejected Turnout 
Referendum of 3 March 1991, The 
Independence referendum* 
Approved 87.6 % 
Referendum of 3 October 1998 on 
the repeal of the facilitated 
naturalisation amendment 
Rejected 69.2 % 
Referendum of 13 November 1999 
on the repeal of the pension 
system reform amendment 
Rejected (no quorum) 35.2 % 
Referendum of 21 September 
2003 on the accession to the 
European Union (the ‘non-
referendum’) 
Approved 71.5 % 
Referendum of 8 July 2007 on the 
repeal of amendments to the law 
on state security authorities 
Rejected (no quorum) 37.3 % 
Referendum of 2 August 2008 on 
the dissolution of parliament by 
popular vote  
Rejected (no quorum) 38.2 % 
Referendum of 23 August 2008 on 
a limited increase of public 
pensions 
Rejected (no quorum) 38.2 % 
Referendum of 23 July 2011 on 
the early dissolution of the 
Parliament  
Approved 44.7 % 
Referendum of 18 February 2012 
on Russian as the second official 
langue (the Language 
referendum) 
Rejected 70.7 % 
Note: In one case, the amendments, suggested by a popular initiative, were 
adopted without referendum, namely, to the ‘Law on Electric Power Industry’, 
to prohibiting the privatisation of ‘Latvenergo’. 
**Referendums took place under Soviet law. 
Source: compiled by the authors from the homepage of the Central Electoral 
Committee. 
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In this context, and despite the modest track-record of the success 
of referendums, another referendum has managed to achieve the set 
goal, even when losing the ballot. The referendum of 8 July 2007 ‘On 
the Repeal of Amendments to the Law on State Security 
Authorities’, triggered by ex-President Vaira Vīķe-Freibergas 
vetoing the law on ‘State Security Services and State Security 
Authorities’ was a retaliation against the attempt to provide the 
Saeima with extensive rights to information retained by the secret 
services (which might, in turn, damage Latvia’s ties with NATO). 
As a result, on 29 March 2007, prior to the referendum (which was 
still triggered as the constitutional arrangements foresaw it), the 
Saeima withdrew the amendments.22 Despite the lack of quorum, 
Vīķe-Freibergas’ initiative attracted the overwhelming support of 
the voters (97%), showing the government of Prime Minister Aigars 
Kalvītis (2004-07) that Latvia’s security would not be subject to 
political manipulation. 
On 28 May 2011, shortly before the end of his tenure, Vīķa-
Freibergas’ successor Zatlers called for a referendum on the 
dissolution of parliament after receiving an application from the 
Latvian Free Trade Union Association. This came as most 
parliamentary deputies had blocked a corruption inquest by the 
Latvia’s anti-corruption agency (Korupcijas Novēršanas un 
Apkarošanas birojs) into one of the country's most powerful oligarchs 
and the former Minister of Transport/Member of Saeima Ainārs 
Šlesers. Zatlers saw a clear conflict between the parliament and the 
state judiciary.23  
This time, the referendum garnered the overwhelming 
support of the population. Immediately, new elections followed on 
17 September 2011. This clearly showed that it was not only Zatlers 
                                                        
22 “Referendums par Valsts prezidentes Vairas Vīķes-Freibergas 
apturētajiem grozījumiem drošības likumos. Kvoruma trūkuma dēļ 
referendums uzskatāms par nenotikušu”, http://providus.lv/article/ 
referendums-par-valsts-prezidentes-vairas-vikes-freibergas-apturetajiem-
grozijumiem-drosibas-likumos-kvoruma-trukuma-del-referendums-
uzskatams-par-nenotikusu.  
23 Guntars Laganovis, “Prezidenta V. Zatlera rīkojumam Nr. 2 – 5 gadi. Ko 
panāca 10. Saeimas atlaišana?”, 06.09.2016, https://lvportals.lv/viedokli/ 
281492-prezidenta-v-zatlera-rikojumam-nr-2-5-gadi-ko-panaca-10-
saeimas-atlaisana-2016.  
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who was ‘punished’ (his tenure as president was not renewed for a 
second term, instead electing former President Andris Bērziņš 
(2012-16), who adopted a more passive stance throughout his 
presidency). The vote for the dissolution of parliament meant that 
people had clearly rejected state corruption. Direct democracy ‘from 
above’ helped protest the lack of transparency and therefore became 
a corrective mechanism. Further, it was a tool to caution against 
corrupt developments in the establishment and to combat the 
power of the oligarchs. Importantly, Zatler’s epithet – ‘state 
capture’ – still lingers in the recent ‘Hotel “Rīdze” conversations 
(a.k.a. the ‘Oligarch conversations’) involving a number of 
Latvia’s politicians and businessmen. Leaked records of 
conversations between the previously mentioned Šlesers and 
Aivars Lembergs, the mayor of port city Ventspils (and a well-
known oligarch) and other high-ranking figures clearly spoke of 
buying off the main media outlets in Latvia, as well as disposing of 
Zatlers and choosing a “proper president that would pave the way 
for government change”.24  
In Latvia, roughly 25% of the population is ethnically Russian, 
on top of other Russian-speaking groups (38% in total).25 Due to the 
restrictive nature of the ‘law on citizenship’26 and no regulation on 
non-citizens taking part in local elections, as well as the gradual 
changes introduced by the ‘Law on general education’2728 de facto 
                                                        
24 BNN, “Oligarchs in Latvia have been building up influence by distorting 
media for years”, 29.06.2017, http://bnn-news.com/oligarchs-in-latvia-
have-been-building-up-influence-by-distorting-media-for-years-167790.  
25 Ieva Bērziņa, Jānis Bārziņš et al., “Sabiedrības destabilizācijas 
iespējamība Latvijā: potenciālie nacionālās drošības apdraudējumi”, 2016, 
http://www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/WP%2004-
2016.ashx, 3. 
26 Likumi.lv, Pilsonības likums, 22.07.1995, https://likumi.lv/ 
doc.php?id=57512.  
27 “Kārtējā parakstu vākšanā mēģina aizstāvēt krievu valodas pozīcijas 
izglītībā Latvijas skolās”, 08.11.2017, http://www.delfi.lv/news/ 
national/politics/karteja-parakstu-vaksana-megina-aizstavet-krievu-
valodas-pozicijas-izglitiba-latvijas-skolas.d?id=49422515.  
28 “Saeima turpina atbalstīt likumus par izglītību skolās tikai latviešu 
valodā”, 08.03.2018, https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/latvija/saeima-
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liquidating Russian schools, the civil society organisation ‘Mother 
tongue’ succeeded in collecting the 10% quorum of signatures for 
citizens to launch the referendum of 18 February 2012, on Russian 
being the second official language. Even more importantly, the 
‘Harmony’ party, representing the interests of the ethically Russian 
population of Latvia, had gathered a significant number of 
followers (at that point in time, Harmony had 31/100 seats in 
parliament) who were increasingly disappointed with 
governmental politics. Whereas Harmony did not officially support 
the referendum, it did not prevent individual members from doing 
so. Nils Ušakovs, the Mayor of Riga and the Chairman of Harmony, 
famously said that despite the fact that he agreed that the Latvian 
language needed protection, “he is nothing without his electorate” 
and therefore stood with the silent minority.29 Meanwhile, all other 
Latvian parties urged people to vote against Russian as the second 
state language.30 The No camp succeeded by a landslide (see Table 
1). The period before and after the referendum was characterised by 
extreme intimidation; the Security Police announced that ‘Mother 
Tongue’ was funded by Russia.31 In this way, via the proxy of the 
referendum, direct democracy became a threat to Latvia’s 
constitutional order as an external actor tried to use direct 
democracy tools to weaken social cohesion in Latvia.    
Indeed, the épopée started by the Language referendum did 
not stop there. Its direct tangible effect was the amendment to the 
law ‘On popular voting, creating laws, and the European Citizens 
Initiative’. The high threshold of required signatures has resulted in 
a virtual bursting of the referendum bubble in Latvia. However, the 
                                                        
turpina-atbalstit-likumus-par-izglitibu-skolas-tikai-latviesu-
valoda.a270641/.  
29 “Ušakovs: Latviešu valodu nepieciešams aizstāvēt”, 28.04.2015, 
https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/latvija/usakovs-latviesu-valodu-
nepieciesams-aizstavet.a127360/.  
30 “Vīķe-Freiberga: galvenie impulsi valodas referendumam nākuši no 
Krievijas”, 1302.2012, http://nra.lv/latvija/politika/66007-vike-freiberga-
galvenie-impulsi-valodas-referendumam-nakusi-no-krievijas.htm.  
31 “DP: Valodas referendumu finansēja arī Krievijas iedzīvotāji”, 
22.02.2014, http://www.la.lv/dp-valodas-referendumu-finanseja-ari-
krievijas-iedzivotaji/.  
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narrowed direct democracy space has now been partially filled by 
direct democracy e-platforms, as described below. 
Only recently has the right to hold local referendums been 
added to the list of instruments of direct democracy that could 
potentially be available to the citizens of Latvia. The NGO that 
conceived of the proposal, Jūrmalas aizsardzības biedrība, recently 
expressed disappointment with the unfinished outcome. It claims 
that the new law ‘On local referendums’, which is scheduled to 
come into force on 1 July 2019 (but is still stuck in the Saeima), lacks 
the power to call a referendum on amendments to the local town 
planning.32 Indeed, the passing of the law has been taking a long 
time; the interests of powerful municipalities cannot be excluded as 
one of the primary reasons for this. Lembergs was among the 
authorities speaking against the referendum, claiming that the law 
already provided a variety of consultative mechanisms for 
citizens;33  authorities from the Association of the Big Cities of Latvia 
(Latvijas Lielo pilsētu asociācija) claimed that such referendums could 
hamper development,34 using the argument of security.35  
Overall, the empowerment of citizens on a local level could 
be a major positive change. This is particularly important because 
the Latvian electorate’s trust in regional authorities is comparatively 
                                                        
32 [Nonetheless, the law is currently ‘stuck’ again, as the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection and Regional Development is questioning the 
relevance of the reform.] Anete Bērtule, „Pašvaldību referendumu 
iniciatori apšauba pašreizējā likumprojekta jēgu”, 19.09.2017, 
https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/latvija/pasvaldibu-referendumu-
iniciatori-apsauba-pasreizeja-likumprojekta-jegu.a250729/.  
33 Egons Mudulis, “Lembergs: pašvaldību referendumu likumprojekts nav 
atbalstāms”, 06.02.2012, http://www.db.lv/zinas/lembergs-pasvaldibu-
referendumu-likumprojekts-nav-atbalstams-251737.  
34 Irliepaja.lv, “Sesks: Attīstība bremzēsies, ja par katru rūpnīcu būs 
referendums”, 07.02.2012, https://www.irliepaja.lv/lv/raksti/bizness/ 
sesks-attistiba-bremzesies-ja-par-katru-rupnicu-bus-referendums/.  
35 Latvijas Lielo pilsētu asociācija, http://www.llpa.lv/index.php? 
option=com_content&view=article&id=358:llpa-aicina-atlikt-
likumprojekta-vietejo-pasvaldibu-referenduma-likums-iesniegsanu-
saeima-un-izvertet-ta-iespejamos-drosibas-riskus&catid= 
58:uncategorised&Itemid=88.  
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high, with 48% of residents trusting the local government.36 But this 
novelty is yet to bear fruit. Given the low levels of civic activity in 
the country overall, it remains unclear how effective it will be. 
15.5 E-digital direct democracy tools – non-binding 
collective initiatives and digital feed-back 
mechanisms 
Manabalss.lv. Non-governmental e-democracy platforms are 
becoming increasing popular in Latvia. The development of such e-
democracy platforms was only possible because the Saeima 
amended its rules of order, envisaging that ten thousand citizens 
(having reached the age of 16) had the right to hand in a collective 
petition, which would then be reviewed by the Saeima. The 
amendments only came in the aftermath of the ‘Let’s open the 
Parliament!’ initiative which gathered 10,000 signatures on 
Manabalss.lv homepage. Importantly, it was also former President 
Zatlers who urged society to vote for this petition. 37  
Despite the overall lacklustre civic activity in Latvia, over the 
seven years of ManaBalss.lv existence, it has gathered more than 
1, 015,791 signatures and 1,327 initiatives have been submitted.38 
Overall, 19 collective petitions have been incorporated into law,39 
for example on the progressive taxation system; on the 
responsibility of MEPs for breaking their oath; on carrying out a 
technical inspection of motor vehicles once every two years; on 
finding a cure for cancer, inter alia. The platform has enabled 
citizens to mobilise on a broad spectrum of issues that relate to 
transparency, corruption and justice.  
                                                        
36 Lilita Seimuskane, Inga Vilka, “Local Referendums as a Paradigm for 
Transformation of Citizens’ Participation in Latvia”, in: Social Research, 
Nr. 3(28), 2012, 76-78. 
37 Indra Mangule, “E-Democracy in Action”, https://www.kogu.ee/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/E-democracy-in-Action_case-studies-from-
Estonia-Latvia-Finland_2016.pdf, 16-18. 
38 Manabalss.lv, Paveiktais, https://manabalss.lv/page/progress.  
39 Interview with Manabalss.lv, 06.07.2018. 
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Mazasslogs.gov.lv. In November 2013, the State Chancellery 
launched the project to receive feedback from citizens with two 
purposes: a) to improve the legislation and reduce the ‘red tape’ of 
public service; b) to improve the quality of public service. The 
homepage allows complaints and suggestions to be submitted.40 
Importantly, the portal operates in parallel with the application 
‘Futbols’, which allowed on-the-spot evaluation of the work of 
public authorities.  
Mazinamslogu.lv has attracted much less public support 
(arguably, because it is still a state-run initiative). However, some 
achievements have found favour with the public – for instance, 
changes to real estate tax legislation; changes to legislation on 
bookkeeping in micro-sized companies; reduced administrative 
burden for the home-schooling of children; investigations into 
institutions not replying to formal complaints and investigations of 
building safety and legality, etc.41 
15.6 Main drivers of voter mobilisation 
Slowly, a picture of Latvia’s mobilisation patterns starts to emerge. 
By looking at the age breakdown of voters, it becomes apparent that 
people in the 18-24 age group are the least likely to vote (e.g., in the 
elections of 2011, 34.7% did not participate), whereas the 35-44 age 
group shows a slightly higher activity (only 20.1% did not 
participate in 2011).42 However, the interest of all age groups is 
fairly similar, indicating that the cliché about politics being a dirty 
business still engenders apathy and apoliticism. When asked about 
the reasons for mobilisation, voters usually mention ‘citizen’s duty’ 
(41.5%) rather than any real hope of changing the future (22%) or a 
willingness to support a particular candidate/party (11.6%).43 
Importantly, when the question was reversed and put to those who 
                                                        
40 Lvportals.lv, Aicina ziņot par birokrātiskām nejēdzībām, 7.06.2018, 
https://lvportals.lv/norises/296357-aicina-zinot-par-birokratiskam-
nejedzibam-2018.  
41 Mazinamslogu.lv, https://mazaksslogs.gov.lv/slogs/par-iniciativu/.  
42 Centrālā vēlēšanu komiteja, “Vēlētāju attieksmju pētījums 2011: Latvijas 
iedzīvotāju aptauja”, Tirgus un sabiedriskās domas pētījumu centrs, 2011, 
https://www.cvk.lv/pub/upload_file/atskaite_CVK_102011.pdf.  
43 Ibid. 
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did not vote, they said that “there was no point” or “I didn’t know 
who to vote for”.  
Secondly, single-issue politics is on the rise in Latvia. The best 
illustration of this is what occurred 
during the financial crisis: a more 
ancient form of direct democracy 
emerged. For instance, in 2009, the 
‘Farmers’ Saeima’ and the ‘Farmers’ 
Cooperation Council’ not only set out 
specific requirements and arranged 
remarkable protests against the 
austerity measures that damaged their 
business, they also created networks to 
subsidise what the government could not provide. Disruptive 
cooperatives and farmers' markets, as well as civic resistance to 
bureaucratic obstacles, became part of their tactics to deal with the 
repercussions of the crisis. Similarly, business associations, trade 
unions and the ‘Union of Local and Regional Governments’ became 
more active, sometimes joining the ‘Farmers’ Saeima’ coalition and 
‘Farmers’ Cooperation Council’. Remarkable solidarity networks 
were formed around the 2009-11 period but they also dissolved 
quickly as the crisis abated. Neverthless, they served to demonstrate 
that socio-economic issues and the widespread oligarchy were 
enough to generate discontent and mobilise voters. 
Thirdly, party membership in Latvia is 
the lowest in the EU-28.44 Currently, only 
1.1% of the population (or roughly 21,000 
people) are members of the party. 
Harmony, which is Latvia’s biggest party, 
is still relatively small: with 2, 400 
members, it ranks 15th among the three 
Baltic states’ parties.45 Low participation 
                                                        
44 Ingrid van Biezen, “The decline in party membership across Europe 
means that political parties need to reconsider how they engage with the 
electorate”, 05.06.2013, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/05/06/ 
decline-in-party-membership-europe-ingrid-van-biezen/.  
45 Māris Klūga, “Latvijā politiskās partijas daudzkārt mazāk biedru nekā 
Lietuvā un Igaunijā”, 02.01.2018, https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/ 
When asked about the reasons 
for mobilisation, voters 
usually mention ‘citizen’s 
duty’ (41.5%) rather than 
any real hope of changing the 
future (22%) or a willingness 
to support a particular 
candidate/party (11.6%). 
Low participation in political 
parties and other forms of 
societal organisation/mass 
organisation is not uncommon, 
also in other countries of the 
post-Soviet space. 
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in political parties and other forms of societal organisation/mass 
organisation is not uncommon, also in other countries of the post-
Soviet space. This also means that the “I didn’t know who to vote 
for” attitude clearly stems from the political parties’ inability to 
represent the beliefs, traditions and ideas of the Latvian population. 
It is also important to note that the non-governmental/civic sector 
does not enjoy high levels of trust and participation either. Yet while 
the latter sector seems preoccupied with the erosion of its 
membership, the political parties remain largely unconcerned. This 
means that other forms of ‘top down’ direct democracy are also 
unlikely to be motivated by a concern for voters. Despite their 
representative functions, the presidents of Latvia – mainly Vīķe-
Freiberga and Zatlers – have however been the most notable players 
in evoking people’s right to vote, protest, make a stand against 
corruption and correct the decisions of the Saeima.  
Ultimately, an analysis of national referendums and other 
direct democracy tools in Latvia reveals that nation-building and 
identity are crucial factors in 
determining voter activity and 
affiliation. Two referendums in 
particular were marked by ethnic voting: 
the referendum on joining the EU and the 
Language referendum on 2012. In the 
first case, 44% of the ethnic Russians with 
a right to vote in Latvia voted against 
Latvia joining the EU; 36% did not 
participate. This is a striking result if we 
consider that in the mid-1990s ethnic Russians in Latvia had a more 
positive attitude towards the EU than the Latvians themselves. One 
can argue that it could have been overall political discontent and 
political alienations that drove this decision. Additionally, the pre-
referendum campaign spoke about Latvia’s security interests, and 
supposedly marked a clear ‘break’ from Russia, Belarus and other 
states “on the wrong side of history”.46 The Language referendum 
epitomised ethnic voting. The referendum itself was a form of 
                                                        
latvija/latvija-partijas-daudzkart-mazak-biedru-neka-lietuva-un-
igaunija.-kapec-ta.a262825/.  
46 Inese Šūpule, “Vēlreiz par referendumu [..]”, op. cit. 
Ultimately, an analysis of 
national referendums and 
other direct democracy tools 
in Latvia reveals that 
nation-building and 
identity are crucial factors 
in determining voter 
activity and affiliation. 
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protest vote by long-suffering second class citizens. It followed the 
attempts of the National Alliance party to gather 10,000 signatures 
for the petition to end Russian state-funded schools. Importantly, 
the feeling of insecurity goes both ways: one can argue that there is 
an increasing number of ethnic Latvians who feel threatened by the 
educated ethnic Russians who are more competitive in the job 
market. Therefore, those who only speak Latvian are under 
pressure to learn at least basic Russian.  
15.7 EU affairs à la carte ? The absence of EU 
dimension to Latvian politics 
EU affairs are not a popular topic of discussion in Latvia; rather, 
they are mostly presented and discussed as national matters with 
an EU dimension. The uptake of EU issues is rather passive and 
technocratic – it does not entail popular deliberation but remains 
within the walls of the responsible line ministry. The ‘bastion’ of the 
EU’s norms, values and integration has traditionally been the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but even in this case, the capacity to 
respond to the numerous calls of EU bureaucracy is complicated by 
a shortage of staff. For this reason, Latvia’s EU policies are mostly 
reactive; it formulates positions after receiving information on 
European Commission proposals. Hence, internal discussion 
between the ministries with or without the involvement of civil 
society and social partners takes place after the proposal is 
submitted to the Council. 
Although the Latvian EU coordination scheme requires 
consultations with the social partners, i.e. the Employers' 
Confederation of Latvia and Free Trade Union Confederation, as 
well as civil society stakeholders, the general population is detached 
from deliberation on EU matters. Occasional discussions with 
stakeholders, experts, politicians and decision-makers are 
organised by think tanks, academia and state institutions. Having 
said that public interest is also very low, so decision-making and 
action is usually left to professionals – politicians, diplomats and 
bureaucrats. Only a handful of politicians tackle issues related to the 
EU’s future in depth. Most of them are members of the European 
Affairs Committee of the Saeima (a structure exercising significant 
power as a parliamentary scrutiny body on the EU affairs). In the 
public domain politicians tend to simplify EU matters, for instance 
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discussions on the completion of the Economic and Monetary Union 
only take place if they are organised by professional groups. 
Politicians tend to focus on increasing the standard of living in 
Latvia, with the EU serving as a source of security, welfare and 
international alignment for the small country.  
The Russo-Ukrainian war and the transatlantic relationship 
crisis shows that several political issues relating to the EU’s 
solidarity, values and unity, including the longevity of the Schengen 
area, have received increased attention from all stakeholders. The 
Multiannual Financial Framework is another issue that catches the 
attention of the media and the Latvian population. Since 2004, 
Latvia has been one of the main net recipients of EU funding and 
EU co-financing is estimated to contribute about 1.5-2% of 
additional GDP growth. Besides the ‘country envelopes’, the 
Common Agricultural Policy and agricultural subsidies are widely 
discussed as Latvian farmers receive disproportionately lower 
subsidies than their counterparts in other EU member states. 
The other ‘hot potato’ is the EU migration policy, although 
there are only a few members of parliament who are openly 
speaking in favour of a more migrant-friendly Europe, especially 
ahead of the October 2018 election. The topic may be less prominent 
than during the migration surge of 2015, but it has become highly 
politicised – once again underlining the strength of identity-related 
topics in Latvian politics. This is partly due to Latvians’ self-
perception as a disappearing ethnos: the Soviet deportations of 1941 
and 1949, the state-orchestrated russification of the population 
during the Soviet era and the massive exodus of Latvians to foreign 
labour markets since the accession to the EU (for instance, just since 
2010, Latvia has lost 170.000 thousand, or 8%, to migration) make 
Latvians more vary of foreign influence. Even though Latvia 
approved the European Commission plan to share refugees, 
agreeing to accept 776 refugees (more than it has accepted since the 
restauration of independence in 1991),47 this expression of solidarity 
                                                        
47 Leonig Ragozin, “Latvians find unity in rejecting refugees”, 25.09.2015, 
https://www.politico.eu/article/latvia-migration-asylum-crisis-baltics-
eu/.  
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has been received with a lot of resistance in the broader 
population.48   
These central societal narratives are taken account of and 
utilised by the political parties; politicians promise a ‘strong’ 
positioning of Latvia in the EU. At the same time, no political party 
represented in the parliament has called for Latvia’s exit from the 
EU or from the eurozone. The dominant position remains that 
Latvia is better off in the EU mostly because of security reasons and 
obvious economic gains.49  
Indeed, prior to the October 2018 election, the party 
programmes (in their traditionally popular form of 4000 characters) 
only indicate EU issues as present and the EU as important. Parties 
tend to emphasise that the EU guarantees Latvia’s prosperity, and 
that the parties will strongly defend the Latvia’s national interests: 
industry, the labour force and farmers in the EU. Party programmes 
do not address the shape of the EU institutions or visions for 
Latvia’s membership. Hence, debates on issues take place when the 
issues are formulated and presented as European Commission 
proposals or in preparation for European Council meetings. But 
those rarely gain public interest and moreover participation.  
The general homogeneity of the approach to EU issues is also 
explained by the fact that Latvia’s political scene is unusually 
divided not by economic principles, but by geopolitical and ethnical 
ones. ‘Latvian’ political parties tended 
towards cooperation with Western 
countries, and ‘Russian’ political parties 
are traditionally pro-Russian. Recent 
years have witnessed a slight 
reconfiguration, with parties becoming 
more embracing, if not catch-all. On 
some issues, one can even observe 
similarities between more liberal 
                                                        
48 Marija Goluveva, Marta Rikša, “Patvēruma meklētāji Latvijā”, 2015, 
http://providus.lv/article_files/3177/original/Patveruma_mekletaji_Lat
vija_PROVIDUS.pdf?1459941547.  
49 Karlis Bukovskis (ed.), “Euroscepticism in Small EU Member States”, 
Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2016, http://liia.lv/en/ 
publications/euroscepticism-in-small-eu-member-states-546.  
The general homogeneity of 
the approach to EU issues is 
also explained by the fact that 
Latvia’s political scene is 
unusually divided not by 
economic principles, but by 
geopolitical and ethnical ones. 
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political parties and more conservative ones on social issues, 
including sexual minority rights. It is unclear whether this 
reconfiguration is tied to bigger ideational shifts, as Latvian parties 
are continuously populist and catch-all in their behaviour. Among 
the issues that are becoming more popular, accepted and discussed 
across party divisions are not only rights of sexual minorities and 
status of non-citizens, but also attitudes towards the European 
Commission and Latvia’s relations with the EU as an organisation. 
This reality, which was also a recurring topic in the pre-accession 
debate – reflecting pro-arguments relating to increasing economic 
well-being, and the counter-arguments to culture – has remained 
relatively static for years. 
Ultimately, another unusual trend underpins Latvian society. 
Voter loyalty is almost non-existent in Latvian party politics since 
the re-establishment of the democratic system. Party ideologies 
have never mattered much, except for 
ethnical positioning and geopolitical 
positioning. Therefore, the relatively 
homogenous approach to EU affairs does 
not have the potential to change voter 
affiliations. Latvia’s party system is an 
ever-changing phenomenon. Although 
some parties have existed since the beginning of the 1990s and the 
Latvian Social Democratic Worker’s Party claims continuity since its 
establishment in 1905, none of the political parties have either 
survived in their original form and ideology or have been 
continuously present in the national parliament of Latvia. Before 
every election parties tend to die out and new ones are established. 
Many politicians seek to change the political parties and form new 
coalitions for the sole purpose of appealing to voters.  
Consequently (and perhaps curiously), Euroscepticism in 
Latvia is relatively limited;50 recent polls show that two-thirds of the 
population support membership of the EU. This shows that 
geopolitical realities are being acknowledged by the Latvian 
                                                        
50 See Kārlis Bukovskis, Aldis Austers (eds.), “Euroscepticism in the Baltic 
Sea States:  Uncovering Issues, People and Stereotypes”, Latvian Institute 
of International Affairs, 2017, http://liia.lv/en/publications/ 
euroscepticism-in-small-eu-member-states-546.  
Voter loyalty is almost 
non-existent in Latvian 
party politics since the re-
establishment of the 
democratic system. 
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population, diplomats and politicians. 
Additionally, 84% of the population 
supports a common EU defence and 
security policy; 71% supports a common 
EU energy policy; and 66% supports a 
common foreign policy.51 The official 
position of Latvian diplomats and 
decision-makers thus reflects the views 
of the general population, and has been 
openly pro-European and supportive of deepening and widening 
the EU.  
15.8 The ECI goes unnoticed 
Unsurprisingly, the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) has not 
attracted much interest among Latvian citizens; as stated above, 
interest in EU issues is very low. The ‘Right2Water’ only gathered 
393 signatures – the lowest number across the EU, and far behind 
both other Baltic states – due to almost non-existent media coverage 
and the lack of knowledge of the prerogatives, granted by ECI. The 
relatively weak trade unions (Trade union of Latvia’s societal 
services and transport workers and the Trade Union of Latvia’s 
Communication workers), as well as some political parties 
(Progresīvie)52 promoted the initiative’s cause online but it is hard 
to find traces of information besides these two sources in Latvian. 
Eventually, perhaps a banal – yet telling factor – is that Latvia is 
ranked fourth on an EU list of freshwater resource availability per 
inhabitant annually.53  
 
                                                        
51 Standarta Eirobarometrs 88, “Sabiedriskā doma Eiropas Savienībā: 
Latvija”, 2017. gada rudens, 10. 
52 Progresīvie, Cilvēkam ir tiesības lietot ūdeni, https://www.progresivie.lv/ 
kampanai-ir-nepieciesams-jusu-un-latvijas-atbalsts/.  
53 Eurostat, Freshwater resources per inhabitant – long-term annual 
average, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/ 
index.php?title=File:Freshwater_resources_per_inhabitant_%E2%80%94_l
ong-term_annual_average_(1_000_m%C2%B3_per_inhabitant).png.  
Consequently (and perhaps 
curiously), Euroscepticism 
in Latvia is relatively 
limited; recent polls show 
that two-thirds of the 
population support 
membership of the EU. 
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Table 15.2 Number of signatures gathered for all successful ECIs 
ECI Number of signatures gathered Threshold 
Right2Water  393 
6765 One of Us 9132 
Stop Vivisection 3167 
Ban glyphosate 1197 6000 
Source: European Commission, European Citizens’ Initiative, Successful Initiatives, 
http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/successful.  
A radically different picture is painted by the high number of 
signatures, gathered by the ‘One of Us’ initiative. Media attention 
was noticeably greater, as was the interest of the Association 
‘Family’ (an NGO defending traditional values), the Catholic 
Church of Latvia; the ‘Lutherans for life’ movement; Latvian 
Christian radio, inter alia. Some sources claim that church-goers 
were even asked to sign even during the service.54 This has become 
by far the most popular initiative in Latvia; however, despite the 
threshold reached – and exceeded – it does not point to a consistent 
rise in popularity of the ECI, but rather to a one-off success due to 
an active engagement of institutions that have a high number of 
loyal followers.  
Overall, Latvia’s apathy vis-à-vis the ECI is also illustrated by 
the fact that no Latvian citizens became committee members of 
registered ECIs.55 The lack of knowledge about the rights of EU 
citizens is therefore becoming a real impediment to democratising 
                                                        
54 “Ap 800 000 ES iedzīvotāju parakstījušies par cilvēka dzīvības 
aizsardzību no ieņemšanas brīža”, 26.06.2013,  http://www.delfi.lv/ 
news/national/politics/ap-800-000-es-iedzivotaju-parakstijusies-par-
cilveka-dzivibas-aizsardzibu-no-ienemsanas-briza.d?id=43513995.  
55 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council: Report on the Application of Regulation (EU) 
No 211/2911 on the citizens’ initiative, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2015/EN/1-2015-145-EN-F1-1.PDF, 5. 
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the EU itself. Whereas several public 
organisations (e.g. the centre for 
public policy ‘Providus’56 and the 
European Movement in Latvia) have 
engaged in public discussion of the 
reform of the ECI, it is still a non-topic 
in the Latvian public arena.  
Conclusion: the dos and don’ts 
In Latvia, as elsewhere, the prolonged distrust of the establishment 
– dismissed as a healthy, democratic phenomenon – is indicative of 
a prolonged crisis of representative democracy. The attempts of the 
EU to enhance its legitimacy via the promotion of ECI have not been 
successful; they only add to the lack of information and knowledge 
about the EU among the general population.  
Yet some mechanisms offer hope that the politically apathetic 
population will eventually reform into a fully fledged civil society. 
Here, two instruments of direct 
democratic practices seem to be 
particularly useful. First, the 
referendum rights put in place by an 
impartial authority can serve as a 
safeguard for a country suffering from 
the creeping influence of soviet-style 
pyramids of power and ‘special’ 
interests. Two Latvian presidents – 
Vīķe-Freiberga and Zatlers – became 
well-known to the broader population and seemingly represented 
its interests in the face of the corrupt establishment. Importantly, 
both serve as key figures on the domestic political scene even now, 
standing up for European values and solidarity (more vocally than 
the current President, Vējonis). 
Secondly, whereas the overall variety of political parties 
shows that a fully fledged representative democracy is in place, one 
cannot help but wonder if the lack of adequate representation 
(systemically) of all the population will backfire. This situation 
                                                        
56 “PROVIDUS atzinums par Eiropas pilsoņu iniciatīvu”, 30.01.2018, 
http://providus.lv/article/providus-atzinums-par-eiropas-pilsonu-iniciativu.  
The lack of knowledge about 
the rights of EU citizens is 
becoming a real impediment 
to democratising the EU 
itself. 
The attempts of the EU to 
enhance its legitimacy via the 
promotion of ECI have not 
been successful in Latvia; 
they only add to the lack of 
information and knowledge 
about the EU among the 
general population. 
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seems critical as several European democracies are now facing the 
repercussions of failing to create a multicultural and inclusive social 
fabric.  
The apparent stability of the status quo should not be taken 
for granted, especially with the rise of parties such as the ‘New 
Conservative Party’ (currently not in the Saeima), which openly 
presents itself as a Central-European party. Furthermore, right-
wing populism has been present in Latvia for much longer 
(‘National Alliance’) and in a sense has ‘normalized’ itself among 
political forces (the ‘them vs us’ narrative is often heard in the public 
space.  
Thirdly, the Language referendum was a crucial turning 
point that signalled that direct democracy can threaten the 
foundations of the state. However, whereas the referendum can be 
seen as part of Russia’s ‘soft power’ 
and a direct attempt to undermine the 
state, it was also a sign to the centrist, 
liberal forces that inter-ethnic relations 
in Latvia have an international 
dimension. The Language referendum, 
despite being a clear-cut protest (and a 
warning) played into the hands of the 
political forces instrumentalising the 
ethnic divide. There is something of a 
catch-22 situation here; on the one 
hand, by strengthening Latvia as a democratic, Western-oriented 
state, on the other it is also exposing its biggest vulnerability to its 
influential Eastern neighbour. 
One also needs to mention the fact that knowledge is a 
powerful tool that can be played out against those with it. The ECI 
‘One of Us’ campaign illustrates this: once an issue is mobilised 
through NGOs and their networks – and is intuitively 
understandable to the audience – it can draw considerable attention 
to an issue that rarely appears in the popular media domestically. 
Whereas this isolated case is insufficient to indicate a pattern, it is 
indicative of a certain set of values that can have a mobilising force.  
 
However, whereas the 
referendum can be seen as 
part of Russia’s ‘soft power’ 
and a direct attempt to 
undermine the state, it was 
also a sign to the centrist, 
liberal forces that inter-ethnic 
relations in Latvia have an 
international dimension. 
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16. POLITICS, IDEOLOGY AND 
VOTER APATHY: DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY IN POLAND 
JACEK KUCHARCZYK 
Poland’s experience with direct democracy instruments after the 
1989 transition is uneven and ambiguous. On the one hand, the 2003 
EU accession referendum provided strong democratic legitimation 
to Poland’s EU membership and is still an important reference in 
current debates about Poland’s relations with the EU. Local 
referendums have also become an important (and mostly positive 
element) of local democracy. But on the other hand, Poland has seen 
a number of referendums and citizens’ initiatives that have been 
more driven by political and institutional interests than grassroots 
citizen groups. Such initiatives tend to increase social and political 
polarisation and seldom resolve controversial socio-political issues. 
Importantly, there is no evidence that referendums and citizens’ 
initiatives increase civic participation in public and political life. 
Importantly, the recent political developments in Poland, namely 
the rise to power of the authoritarian populist PiS party (Fomina, 
Kucharczyk, 2016; Kucharczyk 2017), increase the likelihood of 
direct democracy instruments being misused and manipulated at 
the service of populist majoritarianism. 
16.1 State-wide referendums 
Any nationwide referendum in Poland, as opposed to local 
referendums, is ordered by the Sejm (the lower chamber of 
Parliament) or by the president, in the latter case with the consent 
of the Senate, in cases of “particular importance”. It is regulated by 
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Article 125 of the Constitution1 and a 2003 act on referendums.2 A 
referendum in Poland is optional; there is no legal obligation to hold 
it under any circumstances. In 2013, the Parliament rejected a 
proposal to make a referendum obligatory if it is proposed by one 
million citizens. If a referendum is held, voting can last one or two 
days and if the turnout exceeds 50% the result is binding. Otherwise, 
it has a consultative character only. 
A separate procedure has been implemented for the 
ratification of international agreements whereby certain state 
institution competences are transferred to an international 
organisation. The Sejm can determine whether ratification can be 
decided by referendum (Wyrozumska, 2002). This procedure was 
designed specifically for Poland’s accession to the European Union 
and was used once in 2003. 
The use of referendums has recently become very politicised. 
The most recent proposals, of Presidents Komorowski and Duda, 
were in fact part of their political campaigns and were perceived 
more as political self-interest than as an attempt to decide on a 
pressing or controversial political issue. It has not always been so. 
Since the democratic breakthrough in 1989 and before 2015, four 
country-wide referendums were held in Poland and significant 
decisions were taken directly by the citizens. 
The first two, both on 18 February 1996, related to the 
privatisation of state assets and property restitution. They came 
about as a consequence of heated discussions in the 1990s and the 
problem of overgrown state-owned companies and other assets 
inherited after the communist system, in which the state was the 
main owner in the economy and private ownership was perceived 
as unwanted and dubious. The referendums were non-binding, 
however, and only had a turnout of 32.44%. 
                                                        
1 “The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April” (1997), Dziennik 
Ustaw, No. 78, item 483 (http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/ 
angielski/kon1.htm). 
2 „Ustawa z dnia 14 marca 2003 r. o referendum ogólnokrajowym” [The Act 
of 14 March 2003 on a state-wide referendum] (http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/ 
isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20030570507). 
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In the following year, another referendum was held to accept 
the new Polish Constitution that replaced the so-called ‘Small 
Constitution’ of 1992,3 which in turn amended the communist 
constitution of 1952, but only in a limited scope. The referendum in 
1997, with a turnout of 42.86%, was valid but formally non-binding. 
The constitution was accepted, but only by 52.7% votes in favour 
(45.9% voted No). 
The last significant and successful referendum was organised 
six years later, in 2003, on membership of the European Union. It 
was also the first referendum conducted on the basis of the current 
Polish Constitution, according to which a referendum is binding “if 
more than half of the number of those having the right to vote have 
participated in it”. Otherwise it has a consultative character, and the 
decision is taken by Parliament (Wyrozumska, 2002). The vast 
majority of voters (77.45%) favoured accession. Importantly, it was 
the only referendum in democratic Poland in which a majority 
voted (with a 58.85% turnout) and as such it was not only valid, but 
also binding for the state institutions. 
The most recent referendum was organised in 2015 at the 
initiative of President Bronisław Komorowski. Its purpose was 
political. Komorowski proposed the referendum during the election 
campaign, after his poor performance in the first round of 
presidential elections and before the second, as a means of boosting 
his support among anti-establishment voters. The topics of the three 
questions reflected Komorowski’s party political programme, i.e. i) 
changing the parliamentary election system to single-seat 
constituencies, ii) abolishing the financing of political parties from 
the state budget and ii) the tax system. The referendum was 
organised a few months after Komorowski’s final defeat in the 
second round and without the support or interest of any political 
party or civil society group, including the anti-establishment 
Kukiz’15 party, for which the introduction of first-past-the-post 
                                                        
3 USTAWA KONSTYTUCYJNA z dnia 17 października 1992 r. o wzajemnych 
stosunkach między władzą ustawodawczą i wykonawczą Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 
oraz o samorządzie terytorialnym, ‘Dziennik Ustaw’ 1992. [The Constitutional 
Act as of 17 October 1992 on the mutual relations between the legislative 
and executive power of the Republic of Poland and on local self 
government, The Official Gazette, 1992. 
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electoral system was the key (in fact the only) element of its electoral 
platform. Turnout was only 7.8%. 
16.2 Local referendums 
Apart from national-level referendums, local referendums can also 
be organised in Poland, but their scope in practice is limited. The 
law allows for the following referendum objectives: 
- recalling local elected executives (presidents, mayors, 
councillors); 
- deciding on important issues related to a particular 
municipality; 
- issuing additional local taxation.  
It is regulated by the local referendum act.4 The referendum can be 
initiated by the local council (only a ‘substantial’ referendum) or by 
citizens (any referendum). In the second case the application must 
be supported by differing numbers of citizens, depending on the 
municipality level. At the lower level of community (gmina) or 
district (powiat) it is 10% and in the highest level (województwo), 5%. 
The signatures have to be collected within 60 days. 
To be valid the turnout in ‘recall’ referendums must be at least 
three-fifths of the turnout in the elections when the potentially 
recalled authority was elected and in the case of a ‘substantial’ 
referendum, it must reach the level of 30%. 
In practice, most of the referendums that are organised relate 
to the former purpose. In 2010-15 there were 172 local referendums, 
of which 132 were to recall local authorities and only 40 on 
substantial decisions (Wójcik, 2015). Most of them were invalid due 
to low turnout (see below). The most common issues for 
‘substantial’ referendums included the liquidation of the municipal 
police force (its tasks to be undertaken by the state police) and the 
localisation of wind power plants (Wójcik, 2015). 
According to a report prepared for the Chancellery of the 
President, most of the ‘recall’ referendums were in fact related to a 
particular authority decision being opposed by the initiators of 
                                                        
4 Ustawa z dnia 15 września 2000 r. o referendum lokalnym [Act on local 
referendum] (http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/ 
WDU20000880985/U/D20000985Lj.pdf).  
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referendum. It suggests that the “real reasons behind referendums 
are personal or political conflicts” and “that initiators treat 
referendums as a preliminary election campaign and a kind of pre-
election” (Chancellery of the President, 2013). 
A recent successful use of a local referendum was in 2017 
when the PiS government proposed a merger of the Warsaw 
municipality with the neighbouring suburban communities. The 
aim of the proposal was clearly political – to increase the chances of 
success of the ruling party in the forthcoming local elections by 
expanding the liberal-leaning Warsaw municipality to include 
conservative-voting suburban communities. This would lead to the 
absorption of small neighbouring municipalities. This blatant 
attempt at gerrymandering was met with fury from the smaller 
independent communities (most of which, it should be noted, voted 
for PiS in 2015). In 2017, in 22 municipalities (including the city of 
Warsaw) citizens’ committees managed to collect enough 
signatures to call the referendum on the government’s proposal.  In 
the end, six referendums were organised and more than 90% of 
participants voted against the government’s plan. These 
referendums easily reached the required turnout threshold and 
were therefore valid. In other municipalities, including the City of 
Warsaw, referendums were suspended by the wojewoda (province 
governor, representative of the central government). In response the 
government decided to withdraw the plan and the remaining 
referendums were suspended as no longer being relevant. 
16.3 Citizens’ initiative 
The citizens’ initiative exists in Poland and is often referred to in 
public debate, but its results are rather 
limited. To propose a legal act to 
Parliament one must establish a 
committee of 15 members and then 
collect 100,000 signatures from citizens 
who are eligible to vote. However, the 
proposal is non-binding and in most cases does not lead to the 
adoption of a new law.  
Between 1997 and 2015 there were 143 initiatives, 53 of which 
were successful, i.e. they fulfilled all conditions (including 100,000 
signatures) to be submitted to the Speaker of the Sejm. However, 
The citizens’ initiative exists 
in Poland and is often referred 
to in public debate, but its 
results are rather limited. 
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during this period (16 years) only 11 initiatives led to the adoption 
of a new law. Moreover, in some cases the resulting final draft of a 
legal act was contrary to the initiators’ intentions due to changes 
made by the Members of Parliament. This was the case with an 
initiative on pharmaceutical law. The system does not make any 
provision to prevent such a situation, namely for a referendum to 
be organised in the final stage (as exists in Latvia). In eight out of 
these 11 cases, the draft law proposed by citizens was considered by 
Parliament together with other drafts proposed by the government 
or Members of Parliament. Most of the 53 initiatives were submitted 
by trade unions, NGOs or political parties; that is, institutions with 
considerable organisational capacity rather than by spontaneously 
self-organised citizens (Rachwał, 2016). None of them directly 
concerned European issues. 
Nevertheless, there are frequent new proposals for such 
initiatives. For instance, abortion law is a recurrent issue. Initiatives 
proposing a restriction of the abortion law were submitted in 2011, 
2013, 2015 and 2018 (all four successful in collecting signatures, the 
first three rejected by Parliament, the last one still in process). 
Initiatives proposing a liberalisation of the law were started in 2011 
(unsuccessful in collecting signatures) and 2018 (successful but 
rejected by Parliament, despite being signed by half a million 
citizens). 
16.4 Voter mobilisation 
There is a general problem with voter mobilisation in Poland. Since 
1989, referendums have not reached the required majority of 
eligible voters, the one exception being the European referendum in 
2003, which was the result of exceptional 
work and effort. This is not related to the 
referendum instrument as such but is more 
the result of citizens’ generally minimal 
engagement in democratic processes. 
Turnout in parliamentary elections fluctuates between 40 and 55%; 
in local elections between 44 and 48% and in the most popular, and 
the most personalised elections, i.e. the presidential, it is around 50-
55% in the first round and up to 60% in the second. But citizens’ 
engagement is decreasing in general. At the other end of the 
spectrum are the European Parliamentary elections, for which the 
There is a general 
problem with voter 
mobilisation in Poland. 
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turnout has never exceeded 25%. See below for a summary of 
referendum turnout. 
Table 16.1 Turnout in state-wide referendums and in different types of 
elections  
Issue Date Turnout 
Privatisation of state assets and 
property restitution 
18.02.1996 32.44% 
New constitution 25.05.1997 42.86% 
EU accession 7-8.06.2003 58.85% 
Single-seat constituencies, 
financing political parties, tax 
system 
6.09.2015 7.80% 
 
Elections Year Round Turnout 
Parliamentary election 
(highest turnout)  
1989  62.70% 
Parliamentary election 
(lowest turnout) 
2005  40.57% 
Presidential election 
(highest turnout) 
1995 I round 
II round 
64.70% 
68.23% 
Presidential election 
(lowest turnout) 
2005 I round 
II round 
48.96% 
55.34% 
Local elections 
(highest turnout) 2014 
I round 
II round 
47.40% 
39.97% 
Local elections 
(lowest turnout) 
1994  33.78% 
European Parliament elections 
(highest turnout) 
 2009 24.53% 
European Parliament elections 
(lowest turnout) 
 2004 20.87% 
Source: Polish Electoral Commission. 
As regards local ‘substantial’ referendums, out of 40 organised in 
2010-15, 16 reached the turnout level and were valid (40%) (Wójcik, 
2015). Recall referendums, by comparison, were valid in only 15% 
of cases. Altogether 17 presidents or mayors and 5 councils were 
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recalled (Wójcik, 2015). One can conclude that substantial issues are 
more important for voters than recalling authorities. It has to be 
noted, however, that the low turnout in such referendums is not 
necessarily a result of citizens’ disengagement, rather that 
abstention from a vote can be equated to voting against the 
initiative. For these reasons (opponents of the elected authorities are 
usually more motivated), it is relatively easy to initiate a 
referendum, but difficult to reach the turnout threshold. This 
paradox was also apparent in Warsaw, where such a referendum 
was organised in 2013 to recall the City President, Hanna 
Gronkiewicz-Waltz. Although most voters favoured recalling her, 
the referendum was invalid because the threshold was not reached. 
The final turnout of 25.66% was lower than the legally required 
29.1%. 
Table 16.2 Turnout in local referendums in Poland (2010-15) 
Type of referendum Turnout 
Substantial – average 28.20% 
Recalling local authorities – average 17.89% 
Total 20.22% 
Source: Wójcik, 2015. 
16.5 The European referendum 2003 
The success of the European referendum is often attributed to the 
efforts and the mobilisation of civil society. At that time NGOs 
provided a number of voter mobilisation activities, information 
campaigns and pro-European 
initiatives, especially at the local level 
and very often with no financial 
support from either the state or EU 
institutions (Kucharczyk, Fałkowski, 
2005). A pro-turnout campaign was 
launched by the Institute of Public Affairs, which successfully 
advocated the adoption of pro-turnout measures such as giving 
turnout information at different stages of the vote, guaranteeing free 
access to public radio and TV for civil society organisations and, 
most importantly, extending the voting period from one to two 
The success of the European 
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days. This latter measure increased voters’ awareness about the 
importance of turnout. 
Political parties and other institutions and organisations, 
including the media, were also very active and the debate about the 
pros and cons of EU membership was very engaging. The then 
President Kwasniewski, who was at the peak of his popularity, 
threw all his political capital behind the Yes campaign. Although 
the mainstream parties’ levels of engagement differed, in the end 
the ruling Democratic Left Alliance (post-communist); the main 
opposition party at that time, the Civil Platform, and even the Law 
and Justice party all ran separate pro-European campaigns 
(Piasecki, 2004).  
In its news service Polish television channel (TVP1) showed a 
clock counting down the days and hours to the referendum. Both 
state and private (TVN) broadcasters presented separate 
programmes about the EU, and European issues were even featured 
in popular soap operas (Piasecki, 2004). 
Another important factor was the support of the Catholic 
Church. Its support was the result of the personal engagement of 
Pope John Paul II, whose openly pro-European endorsement weeks 
before the referendum encouraged the Polish Church, usually 
rather suspicious of Europe, to prepare a letter to read in all 
churches a week before the referendum encouraging people to vote 
Yes (Piasecki, 2004). Significantly, the Church’s pro-EU stance is 
thought to have been the result of a more or less formalised 
‘agreement’ with the post-communist government to abandon some 
of its policy programme, such as liberalising access to abortion, in 
exchange for the Church’s support for the European Union. 
16.6 Poles and the European Citizens Initiative 
Poles’ participation in the successful initiatives is significant. Out of 
four successful initiatives that reached the required one million 
signatures, Poles were the most numerous 
signatories in one (on abortion; 235,964 
signatures, followed by Romanians – 
110,405 and Spaniards – 144,827), and the 
third most numerous in the other (an 
initiative to stop vivisection; Germans – 164,304, Spaniards – 47,194, 
Poles’ participation in 
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330  POLITICS, IDEOLOGY AND VOTER APATHY: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN POLAND 
 
Poles – 38,824) (ECI Register, 2018).5 They were much less involved 
in the other two on banning pesticides and recognising access to 
water as a human right. Data on unsuccessful initiatives is 
unavailable. 
Table 16.3 Number of Polish signatories of four successful ECI 
Name of ECIs 
Number of 
Polish 
signatories 
Percentage 
of all 
signatories 
Ban glyphosate and protect people and 
the environment from toxic pesticides 
7,107 0.66% 
Stop vivisection 38,824 3.31% 
‘One of us’ 
Legal protection of the dignity, the right 
to life and of the integrity of every 
human being from conception (…) 
235,964 
 
13.71% 
‘Water and sanitation are a human right! 
Water is a public good, not a 
commodity!’ 
3,962 0.24% 
Sources: ECI Register, 2018. 
The fact that organisers managed to collect so many signatures for 
the abortion-related initiative is due to the support and active 
involvement of the Catholic Church and affiliated institutions 
(NGOs, right-wing media), which is also why so many signatures 
were collected in favour of a referendum on a total ban of abortion 
(which is supported by less than 10% of the population, but strongly 
endorsed by the Church hierarchy). 
16.7 Influence of direct democracy on national 
political realities 
Debates about organising referendums in Poland have recently 
concentrated on two issues: adopting single-mandate constituencies 
in parliamentary elections and access to abortion. Both cases 
                                                        
5 See http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/ 
successful/details/2012/000007. 
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confirm instrumental usage of this tool by 
politicians, which easily becomes a 
populist element to boost their visibility 
in public debates. Most recently (and 
controversially) President Andrzej Duda 
announced his intention to hold a 
referendum on whether the current 
Polish Constitution of 2007 should be 
amended or replaced. 
16.7.1 Single-mandate constituencies – case study 1 
A social non-partisan movement advocating single-mandate 
constituencies has been active since the early 1990s. It has promoted 
this electoral system as a way to create closer relations between 
Members of Parliament and ordinary citizens, resist partisan 
elections and promote democracy within political parties. The 
movement directly refers to the models in the UK, France and the 
US, real or imaginary. 
Introducing single-mandate constituencies in the 
parliamentary elections in Poland became one of the proposals of 
the founding political programme of the Civil Platform (of Platforma 
Obywatelska, PO), ruling the country in 2007-15. In 2004 the party 
managed to collect 750,000 signatures for a citizens’ initiative to 
introduce such legislation. However, it later implemented them 
only in the Senate and municipalities, but not in the Sejm (the lower 
chamber), because the latter case would be inconsistent with Article 
96 of the Constitution, stating that elections to the Sejm are 
proportional.6 
The fact that PO did not make good on its electoral pledge led 
to the creation of an anti-establishment, populist movement by 
former rock singer Paweł Kukiz (now called Kukiz’15), for whom 
the postulate of introducing single-mandate constituencies was the 
first and foremost political aim. Kukiz performed well in the 2015 
parliamentary elections, gaining third position with 8.81% of votes. 
Although single-mandate constituencies and criticism of the PO’s 
                                                        
6 It should be noted that the idea that single-mandate constituencies would 
‘heal’ Polish democracy was strongly contested by experts, but these voices 
were largely ignored by the key players. 
Debates about organising 
referendums in Poland have 
recently concentrated on 
two issues: adopting single-
mandate constituencies in 
parliamentary elections and 
access to abortion. 
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abandoned political programme were the main slogans of his 
campaign, one can assume that voters were more attracted by his 
general anti-establishment and populist rhetoric than by this 
particular promise.  
Nevertheless, single-mandate constituencies as a direct 
democracy issue returned as a ‘rescue initiative’ of President 
Bronisław Komorowski, who proposed it during the election 
campaign after his unexpectedly poor performance in the first 
round of presidential elections. The questions referred to i) 
changing the parliamentary election system to single-seat 
constituencies, ii) ending the financing of political parties from the 
state budget and ii) the tax system (introducing a rule that tax offices 
should resolve any doubts in legal tax interpretations in favour of 
the tax-payer). 
As experts pointed out, these proposals were intended to 
please voters, not to solve the persistent problems of democracy in 
Poland. Voters were not impressed and Komorowski lost the 
elections to PiS candidate Andrzej Duda. The referendum, 
organised a few months later, proved to be a failure with a turnout 
of only 7.8%.7 Unlike the previous referendums at national level (the 
constitutional, the European etc.) the 2015 referendum was mainly 
organised to save Komorowski’s presidency. Importantly, it did not 
impact the issue of electoral system in Poland. Single-seat 
constituencies have not been implemented and the issue has (at least 
temporarily) disappeared from the public agenda. 
16.7.2 The abortion issue – case study 2 
For the last 25 years there have been a number of attempts to change 
the so-called ‘abortion compromise’, not in fact a compromise, but 
one of the most restrictive abortion laws in Europe. The law was 
adopted after the 1989 democratic transition under pressure from 
the Catholic Church that had voiced strong opposition to abortion 
since the 1980s. It bans abortion in all but four cases (for medical but 
not social reasons). Since then both women’s rights groups and 
conservatives have tried to change the law that enjoyed the support 
                                                        
7 Some 78.75% voted to implement single-mandate constituencies; 82.63% 
were against financing political parties from the budget and 94.51% for 
implementing the rule favouring tax-payers. 
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of mainstream political parties. Initially, during the 1990s, public 
opinion was in favour of the earlier, more liberal legal framework, 
but with time and especially under the influence of the Church the 
status quo (the so called ‘abortion compromise’) was supported by 
a plurality, if not a majority, of voters.  
Direct democracy tools, i.e. citizens’ initiatives and 
referendum proposals, were used by groups seeking to change the 
law. Resistance to the restrictive abortion law led to the creation of 
a strong movement already in 1993, when the law was approved. 
The movement managed to collect 1.7 million signatures under an 
initiative to organise a referendum on this issue. The initiative was 
rejected by the Sejm, which was dominated by right-wing parties. 
In the 2010s several other abortion-related initiatives were 
undertaken, but those aimed at restricting the law were far more 
successful in collecting signatures. The debate was re-opened in 
2016 when an ultra-conservative organisation, Ordo Iuris (with 
strong links to similar conservative organisations in Latin America, 
the US and Russia) introduced a citizens’ initiative entitled ‘Stop 
Abortion’ to Parliament to totally outlaw abortion. Eventually it 
collected almost half a million of signatures. A counter-proposal: 
‘Save Women’ was launched in response, to liberalise the regime. It 
collected another half a million signatures. 
Both initiatives were submitted to Parliament and voted on 
simultaneously, but only the ‘Stop abortion’ initiative was passed 
on to be further processed by a parliamentary commission, whereas 
the ‘Save women’ initiative was rejected. In the process, some MPs 
from the liberal opposition came under strong criticism for not 
supporting the proposal to liberalise abortion law. They voted to 
reject both the liberal and conservative proposals and defended the 
status quo. 
An important development in Poland’s struggles with 
abortion legislation and reproductive rights was the Irish 
referendum of 2018, where an overwhelming majority of Irish 
citizens voted to liberalise the country’s restrictive laws. Polling 
conducted immediately after this referendum showed an upsurge 
in support for the liberalisation of the abortion law in Poland, 
despite the Polish Church’s strong condemnation of the vote in 
Ireland.  
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Conclusions are rather negative when it comes to 
strengthening democratic processes via direct democracy. Anti-
abortion movements are much stronger, better organised and can 
use the organisational and ‘marketing’ support of the Catholic 
Church and affiliated institutions (such as Catholic media) to collect 
large numbers of signatures quickly and frequently. This does not 
necessarily reflect the level of support for their positions in society, 
however, because according to research only around 10% of citizens 
support further restricting the abortion law. The frequent attempts 
to tighten the already strict legislation led to deeper polarisation of 
public opinion and – somewhat paradoxically – have created space 
for the supporters of liberalisation.  
16.7.3 President Duda’s 15-question referendum – case 
study 3 
The most recent use of direct democracy tools was the referendum 
proposed by the President Andrzej Duda in 2018. Duda’s initiative 
is, at least to some extent, an attempt to change the conversation 
about his own track record vis-à-vis the existing constitution. The 
opposition and the legal establishment have accused him of 
contravening the Constitution. A series of reforms of the Polish 
judiciary by the Law & Justice government, with the support of the 
president, have been criticised by international organisations as 
undermining the independence and legitimacy of the Constitutional 
Tribunal and the Supreme Court, namely forcing judges to retire 
after lowering their retirement age and granting the Minister of 
Justice discretionary power to appoint and dismiss all presidents of 
courts without concrete criteria etc. This has led the European 
Commission to trigger a procedure under Article 7 of the Treaty on 
the EU, which could result in sanctions against Poland for 
undermining the rule of law, enshrined in Article 2 of the 
aforementioned treaty. The reforms of the judicial branch of 
government led to massive street protests and calls for President 
Duda to veto them. However, Duda eventually signed the 
controversial legislation and publically defended the reforms. The 
proceedings under Article 7 as well as the decision of the European 
Court of Justice, which ordered the Polish government to suspend 
some of the reforms, gave further grounds to opposition party calls 
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for Duda’s impeachment (which is unlikely as long as the PiS has a 
parliamentary majority). 
In order to regain the initiative, President Duda has 
frequently referred to the need to adopt a new Constitution, for 
which PiS does not have the required ‘super majority’ in Parliament. 
To overcome this obstacle, President Duda proposed a referendum. 
According to his proposal, citizens would be asked 15 questions, the 
answers to which would set the direction of constitutional changes. 
The political motivation of the proposal is obvious from the 
first question: “Are you in favour of adopting (a) a new 
Constitution, or (b) changes to the current Constitution”, with no 
possibility to reject the idea of amending the Constitution at all. 
Other questions relate to ensuring the continuation of the Law and 
Justice social programmes in the Constitution.  
Interestingly, one of the questions proposes a new direct 
democracy tool, i.e. “3. Are you in favour of introducing in the 
Constitution an obligation to organise a country-wide referendum 
on issues of essential importance for the Country and the Nation, if 
at least 1,000,000 make such a request?”.8  
Two of the (mutually exclusive?) questions are related to 
Poland’s membership of the European Union: “7. Are you in favour 
of securing Poland’s membership of the EU in the Constitution?” 
and “8. Are you in favour of securing in the Constitution Poland’s 
sovereignty within the EU and the rule of superiority of the 
Constitution over international and European law?”. 
The referendum is part of the president’s drive to bolster his 
political position vis-à-vis his Law and Justice party. For this reason 
political reactions to the proposal were ambivalent and the party 
has not decided on the proposal so far (the organisation of the 
referendum has to be accepted by the Senate, which can only accept 
or reject the proposal, not propose amendments). The opposition 
has called to boycott the referendum, arguing that a president who 
routinely contravenes the Constitution does not have a mandate to 
change it. 
                                                        
8 Working translations by authors. 
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16.8 Political party attitudes towards direct 
democracy 
Referendums in Poland have mostly been run along partisan lines. 
One exception is the 2003 European referendum, where there was 
by-partisan support for the Yes vote across the left-right political 
divide, and only fringe parties and politicians supported a No vote 
or called for a boycott.  This was undoubtedly a key factor in the 
remarkable success of this referendum, especially when compared 
to others. The two referendums (one held, the other proposed) by 
Presidents Komorowski and Duda, are at the opposite end of the 
spectrum as their main aim seems to be to raise the political 
standing of their respective supporters. Both referendums are 
unusual in that they are deeply unpopular with their proponents’ 
home parties. 
Political parties represented in Parliament do not usually 
support citizens’ initiatives, for instance, in the collection of 
signatures. This is probably because such initiatives place them in 
an uncomfortable position that they cannot fully control, 
highlighting ideological divisions within the parties, not just 
between them.  
The citizens’ initiative has always been a rather cumbersome 
tool for political parties. Defining their positions on such initiatives 
may be divisive, as was the case with the last two initiatives to 
liberalise or restrict abortion law. The 2017 abortion liberalisation 
initiative was rejected by Parliament by only nine votes, because of 
the confusion of some members of the centre-right parties PO and 
Nowoczesna (or ‘Modern’). This situation and the ensuing media 
criticism led some parliamentary members of Nowoczesna to leave 
the party, causing a serious crisis and a decline in popularity among 
voters. At the same time, the more restrictive abortion proposals are 
a challenge for the ruling PiS party, which is hard pressed by the 
Church hierarchy and fears social protests against such measures. 
Another example is the European flag initiative. Despite the pro-
European statements of some political parties, none of them is 
directly involved in it. 
The situation is rather different for parties without a 
parliamentary representation, for which an initiative can be a way 
to mobilise votes and increase the party’s constituency. This is the 
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case for the most recent initiative of the left-wing Razem (or 
Together) party that is currently collecting signatures in support of 
an initiative to shorten the working-week from 40 to 35 hours.  
Conclusions: is Poland slouching towards a ‘Polexit’ 
referendum? 
Mobilisation around European issues has picked up more recently, 
largely due to the current government’s anti-European stance and 
its anti-democratic activities. There are two issues that dominate the 
Polish government’s European policy: 
refugee and asylum policy, and the rule 
of law. On both issues, the Polish 
government’s position is a long way 
from that of the European Commission 
and European Parliament. The recent 
proposals on the future MFF (multi-
annual financial framework, or the EU budget), which included a 
deep cut in funds for Poland, sparked a new wave of anti-EU 
statements from the ruling PiS party. 
The Law and Justice party has had considerable pushback 
from civil society organisations on its European-level activities. 
There have been protests against the government, at which the 
European flag is an important symbol. A large demonstration in 
Warsaw in May 2016 brought together all mainstream 
parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties and politicians 
opposing the Law and Justice party. It had as its motto “We are and 
will be in Europe”. In reaction to the removal of European flags 
from the room where the Polish prime minister organises press 
conferences, a citizens’ initiative was launched to provide the 
European flag with similar legal protection in Poland as the Polish 
red and white flag. It is promoted by a coalition of NGOs called ‘The 
European Front’.  
The most notable recent example of other European 
referendums having resonance in Poland was Brexit. The PiS 
government officials and pro-government media and experts used 
the results of this referendum in discussions about whether Brussels 
should pressure the Polish government on its backsliding on the 
rule of law. They argued that adopting Article 7 sanctions could 
There are two issues that 
dominate the Polish 
government’s European 
policy: refugee and asylum 
policy, and the rule of law. 
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generate anti-EU sentiment among the public and lead to calls for a 
‘Polexit’ referendum, whose results (they claimed) would be 
unpredictable. 
As it turned out there was no real anti-EU backlash among the 
public after the Brexit referendum, nor after triggering Article 7, and 
Polish society continues to support the 
country’s EU membership by 80-90%. 
According to the recent Institute of 
Public Affairs’ opinion poll, only 4% of 
Poles support exiting the European 
Union (Łada, 2018).  
Nevertheless, the aforementioned constitutional referendum 
proposal by President Duda includes a question about the 
supremacy of Polish law and the national Constitution. If such a 
statement is endorsed by the public in a referendum, it could 
encourage Eurosceptics and have troublesome implications for 
Poland’s membership of the EU. While it is hard to imagine a 
majority of Poles endorsing an exit from the EU, an ‘exit by stealth’ 
scenario, as an accumulated effect of the many conflicts between 
populists, the Eurosceptic Law and Justice government and the EU 
institutions, cannot be ruled out. 
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17. THE UNTAPPED POTENTIAL OF 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN 
ROMANIA 
MIHAI SEBE & ELIZA VAȘ1 
Introduction 
Direct democracy instruments have been used in Romania several 
times in recent years, both by the authorities and citizens. Six 
referendums were organised between 2003 and 2018 and there were 
also calls for various consultations, proving that citizens can have 
the power to decide both in elections and in other circumstances. 
Local referendums are also a good example of how the ‘power 
distance’ between people and decision-makers can be reduced by 
more inclusive formats of decision-making. 
When it comes to citizens’ initiatives and civic movements, 
we can observe an upsurge in their use between 2007 and 2018. 
While some of the initiatives and movements triggered many 
debates in society and led to a marked divergence of opinion, others 
paved the way for reforms and a change in attitudes. 
Romania may have lost a lot of its citizens to emigration in 
recent years, but on the plus side, seeing how things work in other 
countries has given rise to demands for reform, as in “I want a 
country like the ones abroad”. However, we have also seen that 
liberal-style democracy cannot and should not be taken for granted, 
                                                        
1 The authors would like to thank the third member of the Romanian 
research team, Mr. Bogdan Mureşan for his useful comments and 
assistance provided in the realisation of this paper. Also, the entire team 
would like to express their gratitude for the support and feedback provided 
by Professor Gabriela Drăgan, Director General of the European Institute 
of Romania and by Ms. Oana Mocanu, PhD, Head of Studies and Analyses 
Unit, European Institute of Romania.  
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even in the more developed Western European societies that 
usually serve as role models for Romanians and their political 
representatives. 
17.1 Transitioning from communism to democracy 
(1989-2007) 
Granted, the past decade has not been the best in the history of the 
European ‘project’, but arguably it was the best in the history of 
Romania’s modern state, which celebrates its 100th anniversary in 
2018. In spite of the numerous crises that have affected the EU as a 
whole and Romania as a member state, the country has progressed 
significantly in terms of its economic prosperity, political stability 
and overall security since accession in 2007, two and a half years 
after the ‘Big Bang’ enlargement of 2004. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, successive National 
Salvation Front (FSN)-dominated governments struggled to 
convince the European community that the country was serious 
about economic and political reform in its quest for Euro-Atlantic 
integration. Even though the 1990s were marked by (occasionally 
violent) domestic infighting and inter-ethnic incidents (especially 
concerning the Roma and Hungarian communities), Romania has 
learned to deal with its national minorities in a more consensual 
manner. It has learnt to keep racist and xenophobic sentiments at 
bay and follow its overarching Euro-Atlantic integration project, 
which was basically the most common denominator of all political 
parties, regardless of their left-right orientation. 
The Romanian government was among the first of the CEE 
countries to submit a membership application on 22 June 1995. The 
submission was preceded by the ‘Snagov Declaration’, a symbolic 
document signed by all major political parties in the country, which 
stated their firm commitment to the country’s integration into the 
EU. This signalled a higher than usual show of unity by the 
Romanian political elite. Negotiations were effectively launched in 
February 2000 and concluded in December 2004. 
In 2003, a constitutional referendum was held to revise and 
modernise the constitution (fundamental law), for the first time 
since its adoption in 1991 (Table 17.1, Permanent Electoral 
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Authority, 2003),2 in accordance with the future accession to the 
European Union. Around 70 articles (from a total of 156) were 
proposed for modification or completion. Of these we can mention 
a couple here regarding the instruments of direct democracy: in 
sum, national sovereignty must reside with the Romanian people 
who will exercise it by means of their representative bodies, by 
means of free, periodical and fair elections, as well as by 
referendum. Another change proposed was that organic laws 
should regulate the organisation and holding of referendums. Also, 
that the revision of the Constitution must be subject to approval by 
referendum, organised according to the provisions of Article 147 (3) 
of the Constitution of Romania (Law for the revision of the 
Constitution of Romania, 2003). 
Table 17.1 Constitutional referendum results of 18-19 October 2003 
Do you agree with the law on the revision of the Constitution of 
Romania as adopted by the Parliament? 
Voter turnout 55.70 % (corresponding to 9,938,441 citizens) 
Yes 89.70% (corresponding to 8,915,022 citizens) 
No 8.80% (corresponding to 875,172 citizens) 
 
Accession to the European Union in 2007 gave rise to joyful 
celebration and fulfilled the long-held hopes of millions of 
Romanian citizens. It represented a 
formal re-joining of the European 
family and union with 27 other 
countries, promising to be the best 
framework for Romania’s future 
development. Despite the consensus 
that accession to the EU was the most 
important event at that time, internally the political scene remained 
fragmented. Just one month after joining the European Union, there 
was a call to impeach President Traian Băsescu. 
                                                        
2 Permanent Electoral Authority website: http://alegeri.roaep.ro/. 
Despite the consensus that 
accession to the EU was the 
most important event at that 
time, internally the political 
scene remained fragmented. 
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17.2 Direct democracy instruments and citizens’ 
participation in Romania (2007-18) 
17.2.1 Referendums 
According to the Romanian Constitution (Article 95), the president 
can be suspended from office when grave acts infringing upon 
constitutional provisions have been committed. In this specific case, 
on 12 February 2007 the Social Democrat Party3 started court 
proceedings to suspend Traian Băsescu, the then Romanian 
president. Sixteen days later, Parliament voted to set up a 
commission of inquiry to further investigate the issue. The 
commission’s report concluded that the president had violated the 
Constitution. However, the constitutional court later ruled that the 
president could not be found guilty in the sense required by the 
fundamental law. As the opinion expressed was a non-binding one, 
the next step towards suspension was taken and Parliament voted 
to impeach Băsescu on 19 April 2007 (322 votes for, 108 against and 
8 abstentions). One month later a legally binding referendum was 
organised and citizens were called upon to cast their vote on the 
issue (Table 17.2, Permanent Electoral Authority, 2007).  
Table 17.2 Presidential referendum results of 19 May 2007 
Do you support the impeachment of the President of the Republic 
Traian Băsescu? 
Voter turnout 44.45% (corresponding to 8,135,272 citizens) 
Yes 24.74% (corresponding to 2,013,099 citizens) 
No 74.48% (corresponding to 6,059,315 citizens) 
 
As voter turnout did not exceed 50%, the president could not be 
impeached. The constitutional court had ruled that a minimum 50% 
of eligible voters would be needed to reach a quorum. The main 
accusations made by the opposition to impeach the president 
referred to partisanship towards the Democratic party, conflicts 
with parliament and the prime minister, disregarding the 
separation of powers principle and involvement in issues related to 
                                                        
3 Social Democrat Party website: http://www.psd.ro/. 
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the independence of the judiciary, among many others (Soare, 2014). 
Rather than leading to a dismissal vote, the allegations reinforced 
the president’s image as an anti-corruption hero. Messages used in 
the referendum campaign were later used to strengthen his political 
profile and secure majority support among citizens: namely that the 
fight against corrupt political oligarchs must continue, Romania’s 
government had to be modernised and the country’s status within 
the EU must be consolidated and safeguarded beyond dispute 
(Maxfield, 2007). 
This political turmoil continued during 2007, with 
governmental changes taking place as well. In the second half of the 
year it was the president who called for a new referendum, this time 
to change the electoral system. 
According to Romania’s constitution 
(Article 90), the president may, after 
consultation with Parliament, ask 
citizens to express their views on 
matters of national interest by 
referendum. The purpose of the 
referendum was to vote for or against 
the adoption of a new uninominal 
system for the election of MPs.4 This envisaged a majority-based 
voting system with two rounds of polls in which those obtaining an 
absolute majority won all the votes, and where constituencies have 
only one mandate (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 
2007). 
The referendum was scheduled to take place simultaneously 
with the first European Parliament elections open to Romanian 
citizens. Unfortunately, combining the two events proved 
problematic and caused confusion among voters; the participation 
rate was lower than expected in both cases. Even though the 
proposal to change the electoral system was approved with a 
majority of over 80% of votes cast, it remained only of symbolic 
importance as it was impossible to produce effects due to 
                                                        
4 A single-member district or single-member constituency is an electoral 
district that returns one officeholder to a body with multiple members such 
as a legislature. This is also called single-winner voting or winner takes all. 
According to Romania’s 
constitution (Article 90), the 
president may, after 
consultation with Parliament, 
ask citizens to express their 
views on matters of national 
interest by referendum. 
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insufficient voter turnout (Table 17.3, Permanent Electoral 
Authority, 2007). 
Table 17.3 Referendum results of 25 November 2007 
Do you agree that, beginning with the next elections that will be held 
for the Romanian Parliament, all deputies and senators be elected in 
single-member constituencies, based on a majority vote in two rounds? 
Voter turnout 26.52% (corresponding to 4,851,470 citizens) 
Yes 81.36% (corresponding to 3,947,212 citizens) 
No 16.17% (corresponding to 784,640 citizens) 
 
Discussions concerning the revision of the Romanian electoral 
system were nothing new; different positions on the topic had 
previously been expressed. However, it was soon after joining the 
European Union that the exchange of ideas on the matter between 
the president, the government, the parliament and civil society 
intensified. An important role in the process was that of the Pro-
Democracy Association (a non-governmental organisation), which 
has been promoting the idea of electoral reform since 1995. Years 
after organising public campaigns and gathering more than 470,000 
signatures to support a proposal on electoral law reform and the 
introduction of an uninominal system, the Pro-Democracy 
Association’s proposal was backed by the government and further 
discussed in Parliament. While the president’s plan was not 
approved through the advisory referendum, the Association’s 
proposal provided the background for the electoral law adopted in 
2008 (the Resource Centre for Public Participation, 2010). 
In 2009, a new call for a referendum was made by then 
President Băsescu, in an attempt to tackle the issue by putting two 
questions to citizens: whether Parliament should be changed to a 
unicameral one and whether the number of MPs should be reduced 
to 300 (Table 17.4, Permanent Electoral Authority, 2009). Being in 
the last year of his mandate and having a limited time span before 
the next presidential elections, he argued that these changes would 
lead to a more efficient system, with reduced costs. Another 
argument was linked to the financial crisis, whose socioeconomic 
consequences started to affect citizens directly and on a large scale. 
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At first, Romanians were told by the ruling class that the country 
was going to circumvent the crisis altogether. 
The 2009 referendum triggered much debate, mainly because 
it was organised at the same time as the first round of the 
presidential elections, on 22 November. Unsurprisingly, the 
incumbent president was running for a second term in office. On 
this matter, four NGOs asked the Romanian ombudsman to bring 
to the attention of the constitutional court that the simultaneous 
organisation of the referendum and the elections may give a clear 
and unfair advantage to the incumbent president. Moreover, civil 
society members pointed out that having a single presence list for 
voters both in the referendum and in the presidential election would 
increase the chance of electoral fraud (Hotnews, 2009). The NGOs’ 
request was denied, and the referendum date remained as 
previously set. 
Table 17.4 Referendum results of 22 November 2009 
Do you agree with the change to a unicameral Parliament 
in Romania? 
Voter turnout 50.94 % (corresponding to 9,320,240 citizens) 
Yes 83.31% (corresponding to 7,765,573 citizens) 
No 10.46% (corresponding to 975,252 citizens) 
Do you agree that the number of MPs be reduced to a maximum 300? 
Voter turnout 50.94 % (corresponding to 9,320,240 citizens) 
Yes 83.31% (corresponding to 7,765,573 citizens) 
No 10.46% (corresponding to 975,252 citizens) 
 
The referendum reached the compulsory turnout rate to be valid 
and the majority of votes were in favour of the proposals. However, 
as it was neither legally nor politically binding, it had little 
consequence. In order to reduce the number of MPs, a law adopted 
by Parliament is required, and although several bills had been 
introduced by different parties none had attained a majority of the 
votes by 2018. Traian Băsescu turned out to be the most popular 
candidate, later also winning the second round of the presidential 
elections, with 50.33% of the votes. 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  347 
 
The only thing that is constant is change, as Heraclitus is reputed 
to have said. This axiom also applied to President Băsescu’s second 
term, which was subject to a new referendum for impeachment 
(Table 17.5, Permanent Electoral Authority, 2012). In 2012, a new set 
of allegations emerged, adding to the ones invoked in 2007. It was 
claimed that the austerity measures supported by the president led 
to a further impoverishment of the population. The Social Liberal 
Union that was in office at that time started the process to suspend 
the president by arguing that the government’s policies were being 
blocked by the head of state (Corinne Deloy, 2012). Romania’s 
Parliament voted in favour of the suspension (256 in support, 114 
against) at the beginning of July 2012. The Constitutional Court later 
decided that the referendum would be considered valid and thus be 
legally binding if voter turnout exceeded 50% and the majority of 
votes favoured suspension (decision no. 371 of 10 July 2012). 
Table 17.5 Constitutional referendum results of 29 July 2012 
Do you support the impeachment of the President of the Republic 
Traian Băsescu? 
Voter turnout 46.24 % (corresponding to 8,459,053 citizens) 
Yes 87.52% (corresponding to 7,403,836 citizens 
No 11.15% (corresponding to 943,375 citizens) 
 
The votes were overwhelmingly in favour of suspension, but the 
turnout proved to be lower than 50%, thus ultimately leaving it to 
the Constitutional Court to invalidate the referendum in the end. 
In the months before and after the vote, Romania’s political 
scene was turbulent, to say the least. Five years after accession to the 
EU, Romania found itself in fresh 
political turmoil. José Manuel Barroso, 
President of the European Commission 
at the time, publicly addressed the 
Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta 
on “the importance of respect for the rule of law and the 
independence of the judiciary for restoring political and economic 
stability and confidence in Romania” (European Commission, 
2012). 
Five years after accession to 
the EU, Romania found itself 
in fresh political turmoil. 
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Six years later, between 6 and 7 October 2018, a controversial 
referendum took place. The purpose was to consult citizens on a 
proposal to amend the constitution to define marriage as a union 
between one man and one woman. It marked some important firsts 
for the Romanian political life: primarily that it was the first 
referendum initiated based on a citizen’s initiative without direct 
political backing. It represented an ongoing ideological debate and 
a resurgence of traditional Christian based-values among the 
population (see the Coalition for Family below). It was also the first 
referendum to take place under looser conditions, having cut the 
threshold for validation to just 30% of all the registered voters, and 
at least 25% of voters to cast a yes/no ballot for the result to be 
considered valid. Finally, it was the first with lax anti-fraud 
monitoring, unlike past electoral processes. 
The progressives, the civic and the pro-LGBTQ rights 
organisations had decided that the best strategy was to call for an 
organized boycott in order not to meet the voter threshold – a 
strategy that proved to be successful given that the referendum 
failed to reach a quorum (Table 17.6, Central Electoral Office, 2018). 
The aftermath of the referendum saw a heated debate on 
whether low turnout was a result of the boycott (as a sign of the pro-
European engagement of Romanian citizens), of a rejection of the 
current governing coalition or in a much broader sense, of 
Romanian citizens’ failure to partake in civic engagement and fulfil 
their civic duties. 
Table 17.6 Constitutional referendum results of 6-7 October 2018 
Do you agree with the law on the revision of the Constitution of 
Romania as adopted by the Parliament? 
Voter turnout 21.10 % (corresponding to 3,857,308 citizens) 
Yes 91.56% (corresponding to 3,531,732 citizens) 
No 6.47% (corresponding to 249,412 citizens) 
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Figure 17.1 Comparative view of voter turnout for national referendums 
(2003-18) 
 
Source: authors’ own elaboration. 
The referendums from 2003 to 2018 had three main purposes: to 
impeach the president, to vote on matters of national interest and to 
give citizens a voice on issues regarding the Constitution. As 
illustrated (Figure 17.1, Permanent Electoral Authority) voter 
turnout varied depending on the subject of the referendum (the 
highest rate of participation was in 2003 when the Constitution was 
amended for preparing the accession to the EU, and the lowest rate 
of participation was registered in the last referendum for defining 
family). But the referendum Law 3/2000 (Article 13) also included 
the possibility to organise local referendums on specific issues in the 
administrative-territorial units and the administrative-territorial 
subdivisions of the municipalities. 
An example with an EU dimension was that of the Oradea 
municipality (a city located in northwest Romania), which in 2015 
advanced the idea to unite with Sânmartin commune (comprising 
six villages and two spa resorts, of which Băile Felix is the biggest 
in Romania). The main arguments brought forward by the 
municipality related to the economic development of the area. With 
the two structures united, more European funds could be accessed 
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and the potential to attract tourists would increase significantly. Yet 
the city of Oradea also needed more space for housing and other 
services. The citizens of Sânmartin and Oradea were called to cast a 
vote on the issue in 2015, and later on in 2016. Turnout had to be 
higher than 30% according to the Romanian legislation, but because 
it failed to meet this threshold among the citizens of Oradea, the 
referendum had no effect. 
17.2.2 Citizens’ initiative 
Another direct democracy instrument, closely connected to 
referendums, is the citizens’ initiative. Romania’s fundamental law 
(Article 150) stipulates that the revision of the Constitution may be 
initiated by the president at the proposal of the government; by at 
least one quarter of the deputies or senators; or by at least 500,000 
citizens with the right to vote. Thereafter, citizens who initiate a 
revision of the Constitution must correspond to at least half the 
number of the counties in the country, and in each of the respective 
counties, or in the municipality of Bucharest, at least 20,000 
signatures must be registered in support of the initiative. 
For example, two cases of citizens’ initiative are the subject of 
considerable debate in Romania at the moment. The first one 
concerns the Coalition for Family,5 a group of 46 associations and 
foundations that advocated a change of the constitution to state that 
a family is composed of a woman and a man (Coalition for Family, 
2017). The issue brought Romania closer to the so-called Visegrad 
countries, such as Poland, and distanced it from the so-called ‘hard 
core’ of the European Union. What is a family at the end of the day? 
On the one hand, there is the Coalition for Family definition, and on 
the other there is the broader, more liberal definition (also 
represented by the Respect Platform6) that includes legal 
arrangements such as a civil partnership. In the end, it is not so 
much about family as about the associated civil liberties and social 
benefits, among others. 
The Coalition for Family gathered more than three million 
signatures nationwide in support of its cause, and against this 
                                                        
5 Coalition for Family website: http://coalitiapentrufamilie.ro/.  
6 RESPECT Platform for Rights and Liberties (2018), 
https://platformarespect.ro/despre_noi/. 
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background a constitutional amendment proposition was filed with 
the Romanian Senate in 2016. The Constitutional Court then gave a 
positive opinion on the amendment proposal (decision no. 580 of 20 
July 2016), after which it was debated in the Senate once the 
chamber of deputies had expressed a favourable vote on the 
amendment. Following discussions, the referendum was set to take 
place between the 6 and 7 October 2018.  
Another initiative set to revise the constitution concerns the 
Save Romania Union Party (USR),7 which has politicians’ criminal 
records in its sights. The political party started to gather signatures 
in March 2018 and by the end of September had more than 1 million 
supporters, exceeding 20,000 signatures in more than half of the 
counties. The campaign aims to amend Article 37 of the Constitution 
by adding a new paragraph: 
The citizens permanently convicted of deprivation of 
liberty for intended offences cannot be elected to the 
bodies of the local public administration, to the Chamber 
of Deputies, to the Senate or as President of Romania, until 
a situation that removes the consequences of the 
conviction occurs (Without convicted people in public offices, 
manifesto, 2018).  
The campaign’s website also specifies the legal steps required to put 
forward the initiative: a group comprising at least ten citizens is 
formed; the proposed draft amendment is sent to the legislative 
council for an opinion; the draft and the consultative opinion are 
published in the Official Gazette; the group starts to collect at least 
500,000 signatures in six months from at least 21 counties; the 
signature lists, together with the draft and the explanatory 
memorandum, are registered with Parliament; Parliament sends the 
proposal to the Constitutional Court for control; the parliamentary 
procedure starts, with debates in the committees and voting in the 
plenary session of the chamber of deputies and the senate; the 
referendum can then be organised. 
17.2.3 Civic movements 
The above-mentioned initiative has close links to the biggest civic 
movements that took place in Romania after 1989. At the beginning 
                                                        
7 Save Romania Union website: https://www.usr.ro/. 
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of 2017, the governing coalition led by former Prime Minister Sorin 
Grindeanu passed an emergency decree to amend the criminal code. 
The law, enacted without parliamentary deliberation, was seen as 
reversing a decade-long process to fight graft after Romania’s EU 
accession (i.e. it was meant to decriminalise official misconduct 
when the funds involved amounted to less than €44,000). On the one 
hand, it was argued that the proposed changes would lead to a more 
efficient judicial system, but citizens opposed the move and 
organised massive protests – nearly half a million citizens in total. 
On the other hand, such changes were likely to be perceived to 
benefit several politicians, including prominent figures of the ruling 
coalition who were either under investigation or facing trials for 
previous offences. In essence, the changes in law were seen as 
measures to decriminalise corruption, or at least to make it more 
socially acceptable. The European Commission released a statement 
saying that “the fight against corruption needs to be advanced, not 
undone.” (European Commission, 2017). In addition, the embassies 
of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the 
United States issued the joint statement: 
We, Romania’s international partners and allies, express 
our profound concern at the actions of the Romanian 
Government on the night of January 31, 2017, which have 
undermined Romania’s progress on rule of law and the 
fight against corruption over the past ten years. (US 
Embassy in Romania, 2017) 
The protests, which refused any formal affiliation or financing from 
opposition parties, changed the status quo. The government 
abrogated the emergency decree no. 13/2017 a few days later and 
asked the Justice Ministry to initiate public debates with all political 
parties and civil society on the topics in the decree (Romanian 
government, 2017). 
Other protests were a response to tragic events linked to 
corruption, such the Colectiv Revolution in 2015 (when 64 people 
died in a nightclub fire on 30 October), or environmental matters 
related to mining rights in natural sites or the exploration and 
exploitation of shale gas. 
The protests triggered by the deadly fire of 2015 in Bucharest's 
Colectiv club highlighted the devastating effects of corruption in 
general, and of safety norms in particular. Following the street 
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demonstrations and the calls for Prime Minister Victor Ponta to 
resign, the government left office a couple of days later (BBC, 2015). 
The president then called the political parties for consultation and a 
new prime minister was appointed, this time the technocrat Dacian 
Cioloș, former European Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural 
Development. People involved in the street demonstrations also 
formed part of the new government, as members of civil society. 
17.2.4 Petitions 
Romania’s Constitution stipulates that citizens have the right to 
address public authorities via petition, formulated only in the name 
of the signatories (Article 51). In addition, legally established 
organisations have the right to put forward petitions on behalf of 
the collective body they represent. The public authorities are bound 
to respond to petitions within the time limits and under the 
conditions established by law. The right to address petitions has 
been further developed in subsequent legislation (i.e. law no. 
233/2002). 
In order to exemplify the use of right to petition a public 
authority, we addressed a formal request to the Chamber of 
Deputies (Romanian Parliament), which provided us with some 
statistics (Table 17.7, Committee for the Investigation of Abuses, 
Corrupt Practices, and for Petitions - Chamber of Deputies, 2007-
2018). Depending on the petitions’ content addressed to the 
Committee, citizens were mostly interested in domains such as: 
justice (1,661), social (1,246), prison environment (895) and public 
administration (777).   
Table 17.7 Overview of petitions to the Committee for the Investigation of 
Abuses, Corrupt Practices, and Petitions  
Petitions addressed to the Committee for the Investigation of Abuses, 
Corrupt Practices, and for Petitions (Chamber of Deputies) 
between 2007 and 2018 
7,924 
registered petitions 
7,596 
admitted petitions 
7,596 
solved petitions 
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17.2.5 The main drivers of voter mobilisation in Romania 
To find out more about what drives voter mobilisation in Romania, 
we spoke with several experts in European affairs, each of them 
evoking several contrasting themes. Factors included emotions 
driving voters and person-centric (as opposed to party-centric) 
voting, fear and populism leading to turnout in presidential 
elections specifically, and low participation, attributed by one 
interviewee to lack of information and a tendency to act in 
accordance with others in their communities. The above views 
illustrate the dividing lines along Romania’s political spectrum, 
both in terms of citizen voter habits and party politics. The scientific 
literature points to two types of cleavage affecting Romanian society 
and thereby influencing all current and future political parties. In 
essence, and in view of their chronology, they can be summarised 
as follows: 
In terms of the pre-communist era divisions, we must 
consider rural-urban factors (economic in nature and manifesting 
themselves in greater support for the social-democrats in rural areas 
and for liberal forces in the urban ones); centre-periphery 
circumstances (the differences between the privileged capital and 
the other disadvantaged regions); state-church divisions (which is 
becoming increasingly visible due to the referendum on ‘traditional 
families’); owners versus workers factors (mostly seen as a conflict 
between the social-democrats and the liberals). 
As for the post-communist divisions, we have the 
maximalist-minimalist factors (between the parties that support a 
radical transition towards a market economy and those supporting 
a moderate transition); attitudes towards communism (separating 
the supporters of the communist structures from those opposing 
them [Vaida, 2006]), and globalisation and anti-globalisation 
forces (starting with the 2016 elections, between those identifying 
as domestic ‘representatives’ of Brussels and those in favour of a 
‘national approach’ [Carp, 2017]). 
17.3 EU topics and the influence of direct 
democracy on national politics  
It might be argued that European topics have now become more 
prominent in Romania’s public discourse, but not always in a way 
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that might be hoped. Often, these topics give rise to controversy and 
criticism, especially regarding immigration and common foreign 
and security policy. Other important issues, namely the labour 
market, the ageing population, social inequality, environmental 
protection, energy self-sufficiency, digital transformation, global 
competitiveness – are totally overlooked, not only at the level of 
public debate, but also at the level of policymaking.  
How to deal with the past and move forward radically 
divides public opinion in Romania. As such, some of the main bones 
of contention in the current political 
scene are the following: the reform of the 
legal system; Romania’s role in the EU; 
electoral reform; the best economic 
model for the country; deep divisions in 
the body politic and the ‘traditional 
family’ debate.  
17.3.1 Reform of the legal system  
The topic appeared on the public agenda only months after the 
general elections of 2016 when the government sought to modify 
the justice codes without trying to gather the necessary politically 
backing on such an important issue. This was despite the strong 
opposition of Romanian President Klaus Iohannis, who repeatedly 
warned against it. Moreover, the opposition of Western embassies 
and of professional associations generated a public outcry.  
Even though it draws its legitimacy from the need to update 
the criminal code with the decisions of the Constitutional Court and 
EU legislation, there was a lack of coherent debate and real 
dialogue. The perceived lack of transparency and the focus placed 
on the immediate ‘advantages’ provided to the ruling political class 
translated into a breach of good governance that was sanctioned by 
the general public (Sebe, 2017).  
17.3.2 The role of Romania in the European Union 
In the context of the upcoming Romanian Presidency of the Council 
of the European Union and the May 2019 Sibiu Summit on the 
future of the EU, the political parties have initiated a debate on what 
Romania’s role should be in a post-Brexit world. This is often carried 
How to deal with the past 
and move forward radically 
divides public opinion in 
Romania. 
356  THE UNTAPPED POTENTIAL OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN ROMANIA 
 
out formally through Citizens’ Dialogues and Forums (such as the 
Forum for Public Consultation, Communication, and Debates for 
the Preparation and Exercise of Romania’s Presidency of the 
Council of the European Union ‘EU-RO 2019’8 or Citizens 
Consultations for the Future of the European Union).  
This was initiated by the Social-Democrat party (socialist with 
conservative touches, pro-European governing party, S&D 
European Parliament affiliated political group) through the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs9 or through the initiation of the first 
Participative Governing Programme by the Save Romania Party- 
USR (pro-European, opposition party, non-affiliated to any 
European political group) in 2018, where ordinary citizens can 
contribute. The relationship of Romania with the European Union 
was also the subject of the 2003 referendum when voters were called 
to decide upon the country’s membership with the European Union 
(see above). 
On Europe Day (9 May 2018), the European Commission 
launched an online public consultation, asking all Europeans what 
direction they wanted the Union to take in the future, in order to 
consolidate its legitimacy and counter the so-called ‘democratic 
deficit’.  
The Romanian chapter of this unique consultation, part of the 
broader Future of Europe debate launched with the Commission’s 
White Paper on 1 March 2017, highlighted that, for Romanians, the 
main problems that the EU is facing (61%) relate to security 
challenges (such as terrorism and regional instability in the 
vicinity). Brexit was ranked last, with only 37%. This clearly shows 
that, at least for ordinary people, the political and economic impact 
of Brexit seems negligible when compared to other broader and 
somewhat more ‘tangible’ issues such as the overall lack of cohesion 
between member states or the rise of domestic inequalities that fuel 
social disparities. Romanians, according to the Standard 
Eurobarometer 88 (2017), tend to trust the EU (51% as compared to 
the EU28 average of 48%).  
                                                        
8 Romania’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union: 
www.romania2019.eu/en/topics-of-interest/. 
9 Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: www.mae.ro.   
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In a nutshell, Romania is going in the right direction yet there 
are subtle differences and progress is slower than desired. At times, 
the governing coalition seems to favour closer relations with the 
Visegrad Group countries as regards the bilateral relations 
(Măgrădean, 2017) while at the same time promoting the ideal of an 
“ever closer Union” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). Romania 
also has a series of common interests both inside and outside the EU 
that determine its pragmatic approach towards the Visegrad 
countries (i.e., the negotiation of the post-2020 Multiannual 
Financial Framework, where Romania looks to maintain a higher 
allocation of resources for traditional policies such as the Common 
Agricultural Policy and Cohesion Policy). 
With regards to the opposition parties and the president, they 
both favour a decisive and often unilateral engagement towards 
joining the perceived European Union core around the Franco-
German axis (Save Romania Union - USR, 2017; Presidential 
Administration, 2018).10 
17.3.3 Electoral reform 
The main problems of the opposition parties include lack of 
territorial structures. This is especially the case for the new 
parliamentarian parties such as USR and the Popular Movement 
party (PMP, centre-right, pro-European, opposition party, 
European People’s Party affiliated) of the former President Traian 
Băsescu. When considering electoral reform, one relevant citizen 
initiative was launched in June 2018 by USR, the Romania Together 
Movement (MRI, centre, pro-European, non-parliamentarian, 
initiated by the former PM Dacian Cioloş, non-affiliated to any 
European political group) and several dozen NGOs in order to 
modernise the electoral system. 
To conclude, in the last couple of years the opposition parties 
and the new entry-level parties have campaigned for a more flexible 
electoral legislation, benefiting from improved political 
competition. However, the debate has stalled, with limited chances 
of progression, in particular due to the opposition of mainstream 
parties. 
                                                        
10 Romania’s Presidential Administration website: www.presidency.ro. 
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17.3.4 What type of growth for Romania? 
A more pragmatic debate that is present in public debate and party 
manifestos is the impact of the government’s economic policies on 
Romania’s economy. Mindful of the 2016 electoral promises, the 
governing coalition has engaged in ‘wage-led growth’, supported 
by economic experts that work closely with the governing party 
(Socol, 2018). In practice, this means an increase of the minimum 
wage and of wages in general to stimulate economic growth (Socol 
et al., 2018). The results are mixed because, even though Romania 
has seen significant economic growth based on an increase in 
domestic consumption, there are still some economic indicators 
pointing otherwise: “This strong upswing will not be sustainable in 
the absence of reforms to increase the economy’s potential.” 
(European Commission, 2018).  
The opposition says wage-led growth is a dead-end 
mechanism that will result in inflation and economic crisis (Cîțu, 
2018). This debate is also supplemented by the decade-long quest to 
join the eurozone. After having been rescheduled several times and 
following several postponements, the current government has 
agreed upon a timeline for Romania’s accession to the eurozone by 
the year 2024 (PSD, 2018). In theory, that would require a 
concentrated and sustained effort on behalf of all political parties 
towards this common goal and would demand a series of measures 
to be adopted regardless of the party or parties that govern the 
country at a certain time in the future. 
All in all, the different approaches towards the role of the state 
in the economy and the best way to support economic growth 
characterise the Europe-wide debate between market-orientated 
versus people-orientated measures and are reflected as such in the 
political parties’ programmes. However, accession to the eurozone 
would require a convergence of economic measures to be taken by 
the current and future governments. 
Conclusions 
If we look at the context in which the referendums took place, there 
are a couple of correlations worth mentioning. The referendum of 
2003 had the largest voter turnout, but it was also open for two days. 
Rightfully associated with the future accession to the European 
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Union, it mobilised citizens to approve the law that would change 
more than 70 articles of the Constitution. Four years later, Romania 
was celebrating joining the EU, but at the same the political class 
was so divided that a referendum to impeach the president took 
place soon afterwards.  
The first European elections to be organised in Romania, in 
the autumn of 2007, were also coloured by domestic political issues. 
A second referendum in that year to modify the national electoral 
system saw a similar voter turnout (29.47% for the European 
elections and 26.52% for the referendum). 
The next referendum, in 2009, about a change in the structure 
of the parliament, was closely connected to the presidential 
elections at that time, triggered by the incumbent president who ran 
for a second mandate. It did not result in any immediate binding 
consequences, being purely consultative in nature, but it would 
represent a recurrent theme in subsequent years.  
The 2012 referendum to suspend the president (the same 
person as in 2007) drew moderate criticism from the European 
institutions and other foreign partners, namely on the subject of 
preserving the rule of law and assuring the continuation of the 
justice reforms. Six years later (2018), another referendum was set 
to take place, yet once again it appears to illustrate how direct 
democracy instruments can be misused and polarise opinion rather 
than solve contentious issues.  
Instruments of direct democracy (referendums, citizens’ 
initiative, petitions) are often used by political leaders to advance 
their own agenda and can be less effective when it comes to casting 
votes and/or higher interest when it comes to sign a list for 
advancing an initiative. In both cases, the credibility of direct 
democracy is affected by the quality of debate and transparency that 
lies beneath these processes. In Romania’s case, we can see that in 
recent years the instruments of participatory democracy (namely 
the civic movements) have been actively used by citizens and have 
contributed to an increase in civic participation. This also shows that 
participatory and direct democracies are connected and when one 
supports the other, the citizen becomes more empowered and the 
state can withstand challenges. 
As regards the major political fault lines over the past decade, 
Romania does not stand out from the regional context; issues of 
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corruption, civil rights and liberties, the economic model, what role 
to play in the EU etc. are all debated in the region. What 
differentiates Romania is perhaps the timing, as we are now 
debating issues that have been in the public arena of other EU 
member states in the region for years. What also makes Romania 
stand apart is its EU enthusiasm, which has so far resisted 
Eurosceptic attitudes. 
The conflict between maintaining the status quo and the need 
to change has favoured the emergence of new political movements 
from within civil society, the most visible one being, at the time of 
writing, USR, which originated from a public interest group based 
in Bucharest. Yet, like other similar domestic movements, it has 
trouble adapting to the rigours and constraints of formal political 
organisation. Recent years have seen various newly formed political 
parties (sometimes with an extremist right-wing twist) that have 
gradually taken their place in the mainstream political family (in 
Western and Central Europe). That was not the case for Romanian 
newcomers.  
Romania also has another regional peculiarity; the 
importance of national minorities in political life. By guaranteeing 
their political representation, the Constitution and the subsequent 
legislation has effectively removed the 
possibility of violent conflicts between 
the majority and the minority, which is 
not the case in other neighbouring 
countries. 
  
Romania also has another 
regional peculiarity; the 
importance of national 
minorities in political life. 
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18. DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE 
EU IN SLOVAKIA: LOOKING 
BEYOND THE REFERENDUM 
VLADIMÍR BILČÍK 
Introduction 
With the exception of the 2003 referendum on its membership of the 
EU, the use of direct democracy instruments in day-to-day politics 
is rather limited in Slovakia. Citizens’ initiatives have served as a 
useful mobiliser for people to express their preferences on what they 
would like to see regulated or abolished. At the same time, the 
Slovak institute the ‘National Convention on the EU’ has served as 
a limited (both in time and scope) basis for attracting public 
attention to strategic questions of European integration. On the 
whole, the EU agenda has been increasingly divisive in public 
discourse and this fact alone has served to mobilise the public rather 
than any official use of direct democracy instruments.  
18.1 Public deliberation and a Slovak export: 
National Convention on the EU 
Slovakia introduced its first participatory democracy instrument 
before it entered the European Union. Slovaks responded to the 
EU’s call at the Nice summit in December 2000 for the participation 
of candidate countries in the discussion on the future of Europe by 
establishing the National Convention on the European Future of 
Slovakia. It was a tool of deliberative democracy open to both 
political parties and organised interests, and NGOs covering broad 
segments of civil society. Its main aims were to offer a platform for 
public debate on the EU and Slovakia’s future in the EU and to foster 
public consensus and recommendations for the governmental 
strategy vis-à-vis the European Union. The National Convention 
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meant that Slovakia was the first 
candidate state to have institutionalised 
its national discussion on the future of 
the European Union.  
The main output of the National 
Convention in pre-accession Slovakia 
was a public and political confirmation 
of a broad societal consensus on EU membership. While the 
Convention’s conclusions were not legally binding, their advisory 
nature was important in fostering the drive towards EU 
membership after a period of gradual international isolation under 
the rule of Vladimír Mečiar’s coalition government (1994-98), when 
Slovakia had been excluded for political reasons from opening 
accession talks at the EU summit in Luxembourg in December 1997. 
The National Convention also addressed the discussions following 
the Laeken Declaration in 2001 and the proceedings of the Brussels-
based Convention on the Future of Europe, although the main 
message of the Slovak domestic debate was about equal 
participation in the Brussels debate rather than a specific shaping of 
EU contents. Until 2004, Slovakia was preoccupied with the 
successful completion of EU accession negotiations and its smooth 
entry into the Union.  
The idea and practice of the 
National Convention has lived on 
until 2007. It helped to strengthen the 
negotiating capacities on EU 
integration by engaging experts, 
practitioners and the general public in 
national policymaking on EU-related 
issues through the establishment of 
sectoral EU communities based on 
sectoral working groups. It also 
created an important channel for 
spreading information about EU 
issues in Slovakia. Since then, it has 
become an ad hoc mobilising tool for 
The National Convention 
meant that Slovakia was the 
first candidate state to have 
institutionalised its national 
discussion on the future of 
the European Union. 
The idea and practice of the 
National Convention has lived 
on until 2007. It helped to 
strengthen the negotiating 
capacities on EU integration by 
engaging experts, practitioners 
and the general public in 
national policymaking on EU-
related issues through the 
establishment of sectoral EU 
communities based on sectoral 
working groups. 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  365 
 
the government and a platform for discussing EU issues with 
university students.1 
The National Convention model has become an important 
export of Slovak foreign policy and overseas development 
assistance in countries aspiring to join 
the EU, both in the Western Balkans 
and within the Eastern Partnership. 
The project has aimed to foster public 
debate on association agreements and 
their implementation in countries 
such as Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Albania, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Ukraine and 
Georgia, and has been marketed as an 
important contribution of Slovakia’s diplomacy to the EU’s 
neighbourhood.2 
18.2 Referenda 
Slovakia’s constitutional provisions on the use of a referendum in 
part have their roots in the era of the Czechoslovak Federation. The 
Czechoslovak Federation adopted its provisions for calling a 
referendum in June 1991. Although initially there were suggestions 
for an array of subjects that could be 
scrutinised in a public plebiscite, the final 
provisions allowed for questions on the 
architecture of the federation and on the 
secession of one of the constituent republics 
whereby only the Czechoslovak federal assembly and national 
parliaments could initiate a referendum. Yet, during the dissolution 
of Czechoslovakia, no referendum ever took place. 
The Slovak Republic adopted constitutional provisions 
(articles 93 – 100 of the Slovak Constitution) according to which the 
                                                        
1 See https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/opinion/slovakia-
did-not-hesitate-to-start-its-national-eu-convention/.  
2 See https://www.mzv.sk/web/en/news/current_issues/-/ 
asset_publisher/lrJ2tDuQdEKp/content/minister-lajcak-positively-
appreciated-the-activities-of-the-research-center-of-the-slovak-foreign-
policy-association/10182.  
The National Convention 
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export of Slovak foreign policy 
and overseas development 
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the Eastern Partnership. 
During the dissolution of 
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country must hold a referendum on the entry into a state union and 
a referendum with the same question can only be held after a time 
lag of three years. In addition to this obligatory nature, a 
referendum in Slovakia can also be held 
on an important issue of public interest, 
though budgetary questions, taxes and 
basic human rights and freedoms are 
excluded. A national referendum of 
public interest can be initiated in two 
ways: either through a request tabled 
and approved by members of parliament 
or through a public petition supported 
by signatures of at least 350,000 Slovak 
citizens. The president of Slovakia calls a 
referendum based on either a successful parliamentary request or a 
successful public petition. The result of a referendum is only valid 
if more than 50% of Slovakia’s eligible voters participate. Since its 
establishment in 1993 Slovakia has 
organised six nation-wide referendums. 
Of these only one referendum was valid 
– that on EU accession held on 16-17 May 
2003.3 All other referendums have been 
unsuccessful. There was insufficient 
turnout for four plebiscites and the 
government barred one referendum on 
the controversial and very dubious 
grounds that a referendum cannot change the Constitution.4 
Indeed, the Slovak Constitution is not very clear on the legal 
impact of a referendum. The constitution talks in general terms of 
declaring proposals approved by a referendum as laws. While the 
                                                        
3 Some 52.15% of voters participated and 92.46% of those supported 
Slovakia’s entry into the Union. 
4 The Meciar-led coalition government spoilt the referendum held in May 
1997, which covered four questions. The so-called unconstitutional 
question – according to the government – on the direct election of 
Slovakia’s president was initiated through a public petition and enjoyed 
the support of opposition parties. The government argued that one could 
not change the constitution and allow for a public election of the country’s 
president. 
A national referendum of 
public interest can be 
initiated in two ways: either 
through a request tabled 
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on EU accession held on 16-
17 May 2003. 
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Slovak Parliament is expected to accept the referendum’s outcome 
– illustrated decisively when a huge majority of members of the 
Parliament conformed to the will of the people and approved the 
accession treaty following the result of the plebiscite on Slovakia’s 
entry into the European Union, it is also true that the members of 
the Communist Party of Slovakia did not vote in favour. This means 
that the issue of a binding referendum result remains somewhat 
open for the future, since there is no sanction for MPs who do not 
vote in line with the results of a valid referendum. 
In sum, apart from some lack of clarity regarding the 
constitutional provisions for a referendum, there are other question 
marks about participatory democracy in Slovakia. There is no clear 
consensus on the role of direct democracy. 
More than anything else, a referendum 
remains another bargaining tool for political 
parties. Slovakia’s accession to the EU was a 
rare example of a cross-party political 
consensus. Otherwise, conflicts among political parties 
characterised past unsuccessful referendums; on issues such as the 
privatisation of strategic industries, the shortening of electoral 
terms in office or the protection of marriage and the traditional 
family. This contributed to a low turnout of voters since some 
political forces urged citizens to ignore the plebiscite, thus making 
the whole exercise invalid. In this way, the high quorum does – to 
some extent – distort political competition and citizens have a 
decreasing ability to control the course of public events.5 
In addition to nationwide referendums, Slovak local 
authorities and municipalities have organised some of their own 
plebiscites, often having to do with the delineation of territorial 
municipal boundaries or mayoral mandates. However, there is no 
systematic record or analysis of these sub-national referendums, 
which opens up opportunities for future research.   
18.3 Referendum on the 2004 European Constitution 
The crux of the debate about whether Slovakia should or should not 
hold a referendum on the text of the Constitutional Treaty focused 
                                                        
5 E. Láštic (2011), V rukách polických strán. Referendum na Slovensku 1993-
2010, Bratislava: Univerzita Komenského. 
There is no clear 
consensus on the role of 
direct democracy. 
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around the issue of whether the European Constitution would 
create a state union. If the former were true, a referendum would be 
mandatory.  
It is important to state that article 7 of the Slovak Constitution 
distinguishes between three different acts: 
1. Entry into a state union (paragraph 1), 
2. Standard international treaties (paragraphs 3-5), 
3. A specific international treaty that transfers the execution of 
some rights and laws to the level of the European 
Communities and the European Union. The ratification of 
such a treaty requires a 3/5 majority of all members of the 
Slovak parliament – the same majority that is needed for an 
amendment of the country’s Constitution (paragraph 2). 
Therefore, those who argued that the Constitutional Treaty does not 
create a state union, pointed to article 7, paragraph 2 of the Slovak 
Constitution as the basis for domestic ratification. A referendum in 
this case is not obligatory. It may, however, still take place.    
Arguments for and against the referendum could be summed 
up in two ways. 
On the one hand, some experts and politicians argued that the 
EU Constitutional Treaty would have equipped the European 
Union with all doctrinally recognised features of a state union. 
Namely, it possessed the key institutional characteristics of a state, 
such as territory, citizenship and jurisdiction. In addition, the EU 
Constitution also charges the Union with fulfilling the functions of 
a state. Most notably, the EU Constitution provides for the 
protection of basic rights and freedoms (Charter of Fundamental 
Rights) and both internal and external security. Whilst the EU is by 
no means able to guarantee and carry out all functions related to 
security matters, it is an actor in its own right with specific functions 
and corresponding institutional structures.  
On the other hand, the critics of this view pointed out that it 
was too rigid. They argued that the debate had been framed too 
strictly within the existing legal doctrines and offered a perspective 
whereby the Constitutional Treaty was a qualitatively different 
source of law from the modern constitutions of nation states. They 
also stressed that European integration was not a linear process. 
Rather the EU has been built on an ongoing conflict between 
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intergovernmental and supranational approaches. However, no 
matter which of these two trends has prevailed, the decisive players 
have always been the member states of the Union. Although some 
competencies have been moved to the level of the EU, countries that 
form the EU decide the rules for such moves. In the Union there is 
no independent sovereign in the form of a single political nation. 
Instead, even if the Constitutional Treaty were ratified, the EU 
would derive its legal personality from member states. Hence, the 
language used to describe the common characteristics of individual 
nation states may not readily apply to an entity such as the 
European Union.  
Hence, it is highly debatable whether the EU does indeed 
possess the characteristics of a state. First, while it is possible to talk 
of the territory of the EU as the sum of its member states’ territories, 
this is not that evident. Most visibly, the euro and the Schengen 
regime, crucial features for a homogeneous EU legal and political 
space, do not apply equally across the Union. Moreover, the 
Constitutional Treaty talks of a whole range of member state 
territories where EU law either does not apply or applies only in 
part. The sheer complexity of exceptions to the rules and 
overlapping ties between the states inside and outside the EU 
confirm the treaty basis governing relations between countries 
rather than the existence of a dominant source of some central and 
uniform state power. Second, while the Constitutional Treaty 
broadens the freedoms of an individual person to the space of the 
whole Union, member states remain the source of legitimacy of the 
EU’s architecture. Third and finally, the European Union is not 
united on the basis of some sovereign state authority but on the 
basis of strict conformity with the principle pacta sunt servanda. 
This legal debate was effectively ended by the rejection of the 
EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands in 2005. The 
experience of direct democracy across the EU over the last decade 
has made politicians in Slovakia much more careful and resistant to 
the use of a referendum on EU-related matters. More recently, the 
UK’s decision to exit the EU highlighted the existential threat posed 
by referendums to EU membership itself and decreased appetites 
for a national plebiscite on EU-related matters among all those who 
support Slovakia’s membership of the EU.  
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18.4 European Citizens’ Initiative 
The European Citizens’ Initiative 
(ECI) has been an important 
mobilising tool on ethical and 
environmental issues. In the three 
initiatives in which Slovakia took 
part, the country gathered more 
signatures than the neighbouring 
Czech Republic that has twice the 
population of Slovakia. 
To take part in the ECI 
signatories must be resident in Slovakia or Slovakian nationals even 
if they reside outside Slovakia. The quorum is 9,750 signatures 
obtained during one year. Slovakia did not take part in the initiative 
to ban glyphosate and other pesticides.6 
However, it mobilised 12,055 signatures for ‘Stop 
Vivisection’, the ECI to protect animal rights7, 31,951 signatures to 
support the ‘One of Us’ initiative to protect the dignity of the human 
embryo and stop funding research that uses human embryos,8 while 
the initiative to support the principle that water and sanitation are 
a human right obtained 20,988 signatures.9 
18.5 Future of Europe and Slovak politics10 
Slovakia’s politics has been less Eurosceptic than that of its 
neighbours. While the European elections in May 2014 were 
                                                        
6 See http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/ 
successful/details/2017/000002. 
7 See http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/ 
successful/details/2012/000007. 
8 See http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/ 
successful/details/2012/000005. 
9 See http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/ 
successful/details/2012/000003. 
10 This section draws on V. Bilčík, “The Slovak EU Council Presidency: In 
defense of post-Brexit EU”, JCMS AR 2017 and V. Bilčík, “Back to Normal: 
Slovak European Policy in 2017”, in Yearbook of Slovak Foreign Policy, 
The ECI has been an important 
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interpreted throughout Europe as a sign of political earthquake 
with Europhobic and extremist parties 
gaining more significant voter support 
than ever before, this was not the case 
in Slovakia.11  
Nevertheless, the political 
landscape is also changing in Slovakia. 
The neo-fascist political party led by 
Marian Kotleba has been in the Slovak Parliament since 2016 and 
has openly called for a referendum on Slovakia’s EU membership.  
The UK referendum on EU membership defined the political 
backdrop for Slovakia’s Council Presidency.12 The UK’s decision to 
leave the EU did not derail Slovakia’s original plans for the Council 
Presidency. At the same time, the UK decision to leave tabled the 
hitherto unimagined possibility of a potential EU breakup as a 
result of rising political divisions inside the European club. The new 
constellation of European politics in turn raised the profile of the 
Council Presidency.  
The Bratislava summit of 27 EU leaders may be the one thing 
for which Slovakia’s Council Presidency earned a mention in the 
                                                        
Bratislava: SFPA, 2018 (http://www.sfpa.sk/wp-content/uploads/2018/ 
04/Rocenka_2017_web985.pdf).  
11 The ruling party, Direction Social Democracy (Smer-SD – S&D group), 
won the election, even if it gained four seats as opposed to its five MEPs in 
2009. The EPP group gained six seats in Slovakia; two for the Christian 
Democratic Movement (KDH), two for Slovak Democratic and Christian 
Union – Democratic Party (SDKÚ-DS), one for Party of the Hungarian 
Community (SMK) and one for Most-Híd. The Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe (ALDE) secured one seat through Freedom and 
Solidarity (SaS) and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) 
group gained two MEPs – one from New Majority (NOVA) and the other 
from Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO).  
12 EurActiv.sk, 21 June 2016 (http://euractiv.sk/clanky/manazer-eu-
eu2016sk-ukreferendum-migracia/tazke-to-bude-s-brexitom-aj-bez-
neho/).  
Slovakia’s politics has been 
less Eurosceptic than that of 
its neighbours. Nevertheless, 
the political landscape is also 
changing in Slovakia. 
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history books. An informal meeting of EU leaders had been 
proposed prior to the UK referendum in June 2016.13  
In March 2018 the European Commission launched its White 
Paper on the Future of Europe followed by a series of reflection 
papers on various EU policy fields.14 The point of the paper was to 
stimulate discussion on the EU’s future after Brexit and in the 
aftermath of various political and economic crises since the onset of 
this decade. The Commission offered five possible scenarios for the 
EU to frame the public debate. At the same time, however, it 
acknowledged that none of these were likely to reflect the Union’s 
future.  
Slovakia engaged in the future of Europe debate in the 
aftermath of its active role during the EU Council Presidency that 
produced the so-called Bratislava roadmap adopted by 27 member 
states at the informal EU summit in September 2017.15 The aim of 
the roadmap was to reinforce the Union’s internal and external 
security and improve the state of its economy. The Commission’s 
document, on the other hand, offered a broader setting for EU 
reform. In this context, Slovakia’s response to the Future of Europe 
discussion oscillated between a statesmanlike attempt to foster 
common strategic commitment to the EU and diverse responses by 
individual political actors.  
Arguably, the most important 
statement of where Slovakia stands vis-
à-vis the EU came in October 2017. In a 
joint statement, Slovakia’s President, 
                                                        
13 TASR, NewsNow, 28 June 2016 (https://newsnow.tasr.sk/foreign/ 
bratislava-to-hold-informal-meeting-of-eu-leaders-in-september/).  
14 European Commission, While Paper on the Future of Europe: Five scenarios, 
Brussels, 1 March 2017 (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/white-paper-
future-europe/white-paper-future-europe-five-scenarios_en, accessed on 
15 January 2018). 
15 “Bratislava Declaration and Roadmap, Bratislava”, European Council, 
Bratislava, September 2016 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ 
policies/eu-future-reflection/bratislava-declaration-and-roadmap/, 
accessed on 20 December 2017). 
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DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  373 
 
Speaker of Parliament and Prime Minister declared, among others, 
the following shared goals:16 
- ensure clear and responsible communication of the 
pro-European and pro-Atlantic orientation of the 
Slovak Republic and of the jointly adopted decisions 
at the level of the European Union and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. This should be done 
equally in our communication outwards as well as 
inwards towards the citizens of Slovakia; 
- support a future for Slovakia inside the core of 
European integration. Our decisions and actions shall 
be primarily conducted in the interests of our citizens 
in order for them to fully use the possibilities of EU 
membership as well as being in the interests of the 
entire European Union;    
- support the continual deepening of the Eurozone and 
the development of tools which will support its 
stability as well as its resilience to future crises; 
- advocate principles of equal treatment in the internal 
single market and the non-discrimination of citizens 
and consumers in all parts of the European Union (e.g. 
the dual quality of foodstuffs); 
- support a strong and “wise” EU budget that will 
enable the funding of traditional EU policies and at the 
same time be capable of reacting to new challenges;   
- push for steps that will increase the security of our 
citizens and the defence capacity of Slovakia, 
especially by means of implementing the updated 
Security Strategy, Defence Strategy, and Military 
Strategy of the Slovak Republic. 
This was a rather unprecedented declaration of resolve and unity in 
the context of divided and increasingly Eurosceptic political 
landscape across Central Europe. It seemed to reflect the importance 
                                                        
16 “Declaration by the President, Speaker and Prime Minister on the EU and 
NATO”, President of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava, 23 October 2017 
(https://www.prezident.sk/en/article/vyhlasenie-prezidenta-predsedu-
narodnej-rady-a-predsedu-vlady-k-eu-a-nato/, accessed on 15 February 
2018). 
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of Slovakia’s international standing for 
its domestic success, especially with 
respect to membership in the EU, the 
eurozone, the single market and 
Schengen. It also reflected public support 
for these projects, which has been 
consistently solid. 
A closer look at the actions and 
positions of major political players suggests, however, a much more 
mixed picture of political support for the EU. The day that President 
Andrej Kiska spoke in favour of more cooperation, integration and 
solidarity in the EU and warned against Russian propaganda,17 the 
Speaker of the National Council Andrej Danko delivered a speech 
in the Russian Duma calling for a strong Russia and closer Slavic 
ties.18  
In terms of the government, Prime Minister Robert Fico 
(Smer-SD) declared in August 2017 that Slovakia should be firmly 
anchored to the EU’s deeply integrated core, driven by France and 
Germany. Fico distanced himself somewhat from more sceptic 
partners in the Visegrad group when he claimed interest in 
Visegrad cooperation while saying that Slovakia’s “vital interest 
was in the EU”.19 Robert Fico has maintained this more positive 
stance towards the EU, which he adopted following the Brexit vote 
                                                        
17 “President Kiska addressed the European Parliament”, President of the 
Slovak Republic, Strasbourg, 15 November 2017 
(https://www.prezident.sk/en/article/prezident-kiska-vystupil-s-
prihovorom-v-europskom-parlamente/, accessed on 25 January 2018). 
18 “Danko zožal v ruskej Štátnej dume standing ovation, Kiska zatiaľ v 
Štrasburgu varoval pred propagandou Moskvy” [Danko received in 
Russia’s state Duma standing ovation, meanwhile in Strasbourg Kiska 
warned against propaganda from Moscow], HNonline.sk, 15 November 
2017 (https://slovensko.hnonline.sk/1063297-kym-kiska-v-strasburgu-
varoval-pred-propagandou-moskvy-danko-zozal-v-ruskej-statnej-dume-
standing-ovation, accessed on 18 March 2018).  
19 T. Jancarikova, “Slovakia’s future is with core EU, not eurosceptic eastern 
nations: PM”, Reuters, 15 August 2017 (https://www.reuters.com/article/ 
us-slovakia-politics-eu/slovakias-future-is-with-core-eu-not-eurosceptic-
eastern-nations-pm-idUSKCN1AV1YY, accessed on 9 March 2018). 
This was a rather 
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and Slovakia’s EU Council Presidency. While Fico continued to 
refuse the quotas on accepting refugees across the EU, he avoided 
the legal action launched by the Commission against Hungary, the 
Czech Republic and Poland as Slovakia continued to work actively 
towards fulfilling an old pledge to accept 100 asylum seekers from 
Greece and Italy. Fico also reacted quietly – unlike Hungarian 
politicians – to the dismissal by the European Court of Justice of a 
complaint filed by Hungary and Slovakia against compulsory 
quotas on asylum seekers in 2015.20    
In practice, Visegrad cooperation in the EU did not break 
down, it just differed across policy areas and diverged on some 
issues based on the strategic goals of the individual member states. 
Broadly speaking, the V4, including Slovakia, remained united on 
migration and in rejection of quotas for dealing with asylum seekers 
in the EU. At the same time, the V4 offered financial assistance to 
Libya to deal with migration in the EU’s southern neighbourhood 
when the four countries pledged €35m to help with Libyan border 
control in December 2017.21 Moreover, in October 2017 it was 
important for Slovakia and the rest of the V4 to reject continued 
internal border checks within the Schengen area that had 
undermined the smooth operation of the single market, so essential 
for the success of Slovakia’s economy, with much of its performance 
reliant on exports within the EU.22  
                                                        
20 While Robert Fico reacted calmly, he played down the ECJ’s ruling by 
referring to it as a different legal opinion. “EU Court dismisses complaints 
by Hungary and Slovakia over refugee quotas”, The Guardian, 6 September 
2017 (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/06/eu-court-
dismisses-complaints-by-hungary-and-slovakia-over-refugees, accessed 
on 9 March 2018). 
21 “V4 to contribute to Libya border control”, MTI, 14 December 2017 
(http://www.visegradgroup.eu/news/v4-to-contribute-to, accessed on 3 
March 2018). 
22 “Slovensko na summite odmietne kontroly vo vnútri Schengenu” 
[Slovakia will refuse internal Schengen checks at the summit], EurActiv.sk, 
19 October 2017 (https://euractiv.sk/section/buducnost-eu/news/ 
slovensko-na-summite-odmietne-kontroly-na-vnutornych-hraniciach-
schengenu/, accessed on 20 February 2018). 
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In February 2018, the Slovak government, with the support of 
the V4 countries raised the issue of dual food quality across the EU. 
Prime Minister Fico said “if the Commission does not address the 
issue vigorously enough, the Slovak government stands ready to 
introduce one-off measures to restrict the import of EU food 
products to the Slovak market”.23  
The V4 and some other smaller and newer EU member states 
called the practice of companies selling lower quality foodstuff in 
Central and Eastern Europe under a single European brand 
unethical. The Commission promised to take up the issue, in which 
Slovakia and other CEE member states are calling for greater EU 
competence. However, as the initiative so far lacks the support of 
bigger member states, the result may just be more public pressure 
and greater national screening mechanisms.   
Beyond the issues of migration and 
double standards between the West and 
the East of the Union, the Slovak 
government also pursued an agenda that 
distinguished it from some of its V4 
partners. Most notably, Slovakia 
announced a structured dialogue across 
policy sectors with Germany. It also – 
together with the Czech Republic – was 
willing to compromise with France on a 
change to the Posted Workers Directive.24 The Slovak government 
was also ready for more integration in the eurozone, including a 
more common European approach on tax and social policy.25 
                                                        
23 “Slovakia: Dual food quality”, CEC Brief, 18 October 2017 
(http://cecgr.com/2017/08/10/slovakia-dual-food-quality/, accessed on 
20 January 2018). 
24 “Slovensko a Česko sa zbližujú s Nemeckom a Francúzskom, V4 ostáva 
bokom” [Slovakia and Czech Republic are aligning with Germany and 
France, V4 is being sidelined], EurActiv.sk, August 18, 2017. Available 
online: https://euractiv.sk/section/buducnost-eu/news/slovensko-
cesko-sa-zblizuju-s-nemeckom-francuzskom-v4-ostava-bokom/ (accessed 
on March 3, 2018). 
25 “Fico očakáva hlbšiu integráciu eurozóny. V daňových aj sociálnych 
veciach” [Fico expects deeper integration of the eurozone. In tax and social 
Beyond the issues of 
migration and double 
standards between the West 
and the East of the Union, 
the Slovak government also 
pursued an agenda that 
distinguished it from some 
of its V4 partners. 
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Minister of Finance Peter Kažimír (Smer-SD) – who in 2017 failed to 
become the new head of the Eurogroup26 – publicly outlined his 
plan for the eurozone with a complete banking union and a solid 
fiscal union with reliable institutions.27  
These visions for more integration, were, however, not shared 
by the wider political spectrum in Slovakia. Besides the sceptical 
coalition partner, the Slovak National Party whose leader Andrej 
Danko spoke in the Russian Parliament in 2017, Richard Sulík, 
leader of the largest opposition party Freedom and Solidarity (SaS), 
questioned the whole drive towards the EU core as something that 
could damage rather than help Slovakia.28 Instead, the SaS 
presented its own vision of ‘Eurorealism’ for Slovakia that is 
reminiscent of several elements of Czech Euroscepticism of the early 
years of this century.29  
Conclusions 
While visions for Slovakia’s place in the EU differ across its 
democratic political spectrum, there is a broader consensus within 
the country and in newer EU member states on the need to push for 
                                                        
affairs], TASR, 16 June 2017 (https://euractiv.sk/section/buducnost-
eu/news/fico-ocakava-hlbsiu-integraciu-eurozony-v-danovych-aj-
socialnych-veciach/, accessed on 20 February 2018). 
26 “Slovak finance chief fails to become new head of the Eurogroup”, 
Spectator.sme.sk, 4 December 2017 (https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20711013/ 
slovak-finance-chief-fails-to-become-new-head-of-the-eurogroup.html, 
accessed on 2 February 2018). 
27 “Speech by Peter Kažimír at Bruegel Annual Dinner 2017”, Bruegel.org, 7 
September 2017 (http://bruegel.org/2017/09/speech-by-peter-kazimir-
at-bruegel-annual-dinner-2017/, accessed on 2 March 2018). 
28 “Sulík: byť v jadre EÚ by bolo pre Slovensko nevýhodné” [Sulík: to be in 
the core of the EU would be disadvantageous for Slovakia], TASR, 3 April 
2017 (https://euractiv.sk/section/buducnost-eu/news/sulik-byt-v-jadre-
eu-by-bolo-pre-slovensko-nevyhodne/, accessed on 2 March 2018). 
29 R. Sulík, “Manifest slovenského eurorealizmu k 60. výročiu podpisu 
Rímskych zmlúv” [Manifesto of Slovak Euro-realism on 60th anniversary of 
the signing of the Rome Treaties], Sulik.sk, 25 March 2017 
(http://sulik.sk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/reforma-europskej-unie-
2017-sas.pdf, accessed on 3 April 2017). 
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continuity in EU cohesion policy beyond 2020.30 In the near future 
we may therefore expect more Slovak willingness to compromise in 
the name of additional EU resources for member states rather than 
to adopt a major policy reform in the Union just on its own. At the 
same time, referendums and public initiatives are likely to be used 
increasingly to challenge the EU status quo or to question Slovakia’s 
benefits from EU membership.  
 
                                                        
30 “Joint Paper of the Visegrad Group, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and 
Slovenia on Cohesion Policy after 2020”, Visegradgroup.eu, 2 March 2017 
(http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/selected-events-in-2017-
170203/joint-paper-of-the, accessed on 10 March 2017). 
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19. SPAIN: NO COUNTRY FOR DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY? 
JAVIER LORENTE 
Spain has two main participatory democracy mechanisms: the 
referendum and the citizens’ initiative. Only four referendums have 
so far been called at the national level, with seven in various 
autonomous communities (regions). The 
citizens’ initiative has mostly been 
ignored: only two initiatives have been 
approved by the Spanish parliament after 
modifications. However, the way in 
which referendums have been used in 
Spain avoids certain problems related to 
direct democracy. Political elites have not 
used them to blur political responsibility 
or called referendums to decide on divisive issues, and politicians 
have favoured agreement and consensus over calling a referendum. 
It might be interesting to extend these participatory tools to the 
European level. 
Introduction 
Spain made the transition to democracy in the late 1970s following 
the authoritarian regime of General Francisco Franco, which began 
in 1936-39 and came to an end with his death in 1975. The 
‘Transition’ is considered to be one of the main success stories of 
recent Spanish history; it is key to understanding present-day 
Spanish politics. During the Transition democratic institutions were 
designed to leave behind almost 40 years of authoritarian rule 
(Powell, 2001, pp. 127-8). The trauma of the Civil War (1936-39) and 
the dictatorship favoured an institutional architecture that would 
privilege representative democracy and strong government over 
participatory instruments (Powell, 2001, pp. 192 & 228). This design 
Only four referendums have 
so far been called at the 
national level, with seven in 
various autonomous 
communities (regions). The 
citizens’ initiative has 
mostly been ignored. 
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aimed to avoid mass polarisation and instability, two factors that 
characterised the end of the democratic experience of the Second 
Republic (1931-36/39) (Gunther, Montero & Botella, 2006, pp. 79-
80). Spain has enjoyed a strong and stable party system ever since.  
The Spanish Constitution nevertheless provides for two 
mechanisms of participatory democracy: referendums and the 
popular legislative initiative. Still, 
referendums are less frequent (Sartori, 
1976, p. 50) because parties are able to 
aggregate political preferences (Almond 
& Powell, 1966; Lutz, 2012). 
However, the development of 
regional governments and parliaments 
has meant the emergence of laws that 
allow new participatory tools to involve 
citizens in political decisions, mainly at the local level. The internet 
has also opened up new ways for people to engage with politics – 
ways that are usually understood to improve the quality of political 
outcomes. Political changes experienced since 2011, the Social 
Movement of the Indignados (also known as 15-M) and the 
emergence of new parties such as Podemos have transformed the 
political space, introducing demands to improve and create new 
tools for direct democracy. 
Supporters of direct democracy defend it as a means of 
improving representative democracy. They hold that participatory 
tools end up positively affecting policy outcomes, introducing more 
perspectives into political negotiations and conferring legitimacy 
upon the political process (della Porta, Reiter & Alarcón, 2014). This 
could be particularly interesting for the European Union (EU), 
which has been criticised for its democratic deficit. One way to 
solve, or at least to minimise, the democratic deficit would be to 
adopt new direct democracy tools to involve citizens in European 
matters. The first question should therefore be: what do we know 
about national experiences of direct democracy? Once the national 
instruments have been identified, it should be possible to 
understand how these direct democracy tools can influence EU 
politics and whether they can help to minimise the democratic 
deficit. 
The Spanish Constitution 
nevertheless provides for 
two mechanisms of 
participatory democracy: 
referendums and the 
popular legislative 
initiative. 
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19.1 How has direct democracy been designed and 
used in Spain? 
19.1.1 Referendums 
The Spanish Constitution allows for two mechanisms of 
participatory democracy: referendums and citizens’ initiatives. 
These two tools have been underused since the Constitution’s entry 
into force. Including the 
constitutional referendum itself, 
Spanish citizens have participated in 
three referendums: the constitutional 
referendum (1978), Spain’s 
membership of NATO (1986) and the 
Treaty for a New Constitution for 
Europe (2005). The same goes for the 
citizens’ initiative: only two have been 
debated and approved (the first with substantial addendums and 
modifications) by the Spanish Parliament, in 2012 and 2017. 
Referendum at the national level 
The main principles to regulate referendums in Spain are in the 
Constitution, Article 92. Spanish referendums are advisory; that is, 
governments are not legally obliged to accept the results of the 
processes although politically it would be difficult to ignore them. 
The king calls referendums on the proposal of the prime minister 
and authorisation by the Spanish Parliament. An organic law (LO 
2/1980) regulated referendums in greater depth (as regards 
campaigns and specific procedures). Both government and 
parliament can ask citizens to decide on all manner of topics within 
their national competences while respecting the rights and 
principles covered by the Constitution. Parties are responsible for 
campaigning, whereas government and institutions may only 
provide information about the referendum and call for greater 
participation without influencing the vote. 
Referendums are also needed to reform both the Constitution 
and the statutes of autonomy of four regions (the Basque Country, 
Catalonia, Galicia and Andalusia). The constitutional text regulates 
the procedure to reform constitutional articles. If changes do not 
Spanish citizens have 
participated in three 
referendums: the constitutional 
referendum (1978), Spain’s 
membership of NATO (1986) 
and the Treaty for a New 
Constitution for Europe (2005). 
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affect the most important part of the Constitution, referendums are 
optional, but if changes affect core principles or fundamental rights 
there is a reinforced procedure that consists of calling for snap 
elections, approving the reform in the newly elected parliament and 
holding a referendum. 
During the Franco regime, referendums were used to 
legitimise authoritarian rule. They were not participatory 
instruments since they complied with no democratic standards and 
were called in completely non-competitive contexts. Turnouts and 
approval percentages were extremely high, clearly pointing to 
fraud. For this reason, this paper only discusses referendums held 
during the democratic period (see Table 19.1). 
Table 19.1 National referendums in democratic Spain (%) 
Issue Date Question 
Turnout and 
results 
Parties  
Turn-
out 
Yes No Yes No Absten-
tion 
Ratification 
of Spanish 
constitution 
6 Dec. 
1978 
Do you 
approve the 
constitutional 
project? 
67.1 88.5 7.9 
AP, 
UCD, 
PSOE, 
PCE, 
Catalan 
Minority 
Small 
radical 
parties 
from 
left to 
right. 
PNV 
Spain’s 
membership 
of NATO 
12 
March 
1986 
Do you 
consider it 
convenient to 
remain in 
NATO on the 
terms agreed 
by the 
national 
government? 
59.4 52.5 39.8 
AP, 
UCD-
CDS, 
PSOE 
CiU 
PNV 
PCE-IU 
Small 
radical 
parties 
 
European 
Constitution 
20 Feb. 
2005 
Do you 
approve the 
Treaty that 
establishes a 
Constitution 
for Europe? 
42.3 76.1 17.1 
PP, 
PSOE, 
CiU, 
PNV 
IU, 
small 
radical 
parties 
 
Note: national parties listed from right to left included AP/PP (Popular Alliance, Popular 
Party), UCD-CDS (Centrist Democratic Union-Social-Democratic Center), PSOE 
(Socialist Party), PCE-IU (Spanish Communist Party, United-Left). Regional parties on 
the centre-right were PNV (Basque National Party) and CiU-Catalan Minority 
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(Convergence and Union). By ‘small radical parties’, I mean parties without 
representation in Parliament and radical nationalist parties from Galicia, Basque 
Countries and Catalonia: BNG (Nationalist Group of Galicia), EHB (radical nationalist 
party which supported the terrorist group ETA and changed the name several times), 
and ERC (Republican Left of Catalonia).  
Source: the author based on http://www.congreso.es/consti/elecciones/referendos/. 
The first democratic referendum was held to approve the 
Constitution. In the referendum, Spanish citizens were called to 
vote for or against the ‘constitutional project’, which had previously 
been agreed between the main political parties across the left-right 
spectrum. The Popular Alliance (AP, the predecessor of the Popular 
Party), the Centrist Democratic Union, the Socialist Party, the 
Spanish Communist Party and the predecessor of the regionalist 
Catalan Party (Democracy and Union) campaigned for approval. 
The main Basque regionalist party, the Basque Nacional Party, 
called for abstention in the referendum, which explains why 
turnout was lower in that region.1 Turnout was close to average and 
the support of the main political parties contributed to the approval 
of the Constitution, which explains why almost 90% of Spaniards 
voted in favour of it. There were certain procedural problems (for 
instance, the electoral roll was deficient in certain provinces) but 
they were overcome without being considered significant enough 
to affect the result or the standards of the democratic process. 
The second referendum was called to determine Spanish 
public opinion about membership of NATO. Spain joined the 
Atlantic Alliance in May 1982 after a decision by the centrist UCD 
government. There were protests against the decision led by the 
Socialist and the Communist parties, among others. They 
demanded Spain’s exit from the alliance as soon as possible. 
However, following the Socialist victory in the general election of 
November 1982, the Socialist Party shifted its position. To deal with 
this inconsistency, Felipe González called for a referendum to 
support Spain’s membership of NATO in 1986. The three biggest 
parties – UCD, AP and the centrist regionalist parties – campaigned 
for NATO membership. The Communist Party led the opposition to 
                                                        
1 The Basque Country comprises the three provinces of Álava, Guipúzcoa 
and Vizcaya. In Álava less than 60% of the population voted in the 
constitutional referendum, while turnout in Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya was 
even lower, at around 43%. 
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Spain’s membership of the Alliance along with the smaller (and 
more radical) regionalist parties. The result was closer than in the 
constitutional referendum, with over a ten-point difference. 
Turnout, however, was lower. 
The latest national referendum concerned the relationship 
between Spain and the EU. Spain generally shows high levels of 
support for the European project; according to the available data 
(for instance, Eurobarometer trends) Spaniards are among the most 
pro-European in the Union and political parties reflect this 
preference. In 2005 the government called for a referendum to ratify 
the new treaty to update the competences of Europe’s institutions. 
Some changes were far-reaching enough to consider the treaty a 
‘Constitution for Europe’. Once again, all the main Spanish political 
parties supported the Yes option in the referendum (the Popular 
Party, the Socialist Party and the moderate regionalist parties), 
while smaller parties promoted a negative vote (United Left and the 
radical regionalist parties). Given the lack of competition, turnout 
was low but the Yes vote exceeded 75%. The EU is an issue that 
generates broad-based consensus both at the elite and popular 
levels.  
In Spain, referendums have not been used as instruments to 
resolve political conflicts but rather to ratify agreements reached by 
the political parties and elites. In fact, national referendums have 
been approved by Spaniards in 
accordance with the position of the 
large political parties. The political 
parties are thus the main players since 
civil society is not powerful enough 
(with the exception of trade unions, 
which are usually close to the leftist 
parties). In this respect, the role of 
social movements, associations and other collectives is significant in 
mobilising citizens’ votes. Both the lack of civil society mobilisation 
and the lack of consensus around any topic among the main parties 
help to explain why turnout to referendums has been low in Spain. 
Since there was no real sense of contest the results were predictable; 
it is difficult to mobilise citizens in such circumstances. Political 
actors did not need to expend resources to ensure a favourable 
outcome. Neither competition nor top-down mobilisation can be 
In Spain, referendums have 
not been used as instruments 
to resolve political conflicts 
but rather to ratify agreements 
reached by the political parties 
and elites. 
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used to explain the electoral participation. The consensus among the 
main parties is one reason for the huge distance between the voting 
percentages for both options on the ballot.    
As for turnout, the Spanish average is around 70% in national 
elections, slightly lower in regional and local elections, and even 
lower in elections for the European Parliament (Anduiza, Rico & 
Muñoz, 2014). Meanwhile, referendums have an average turnout of 
56%. The relative certainty lack and the weak competition in 
national referendums help to explain the low turnout. 
 
Referendums at the regional level 
As mentioned above, autonomous 
communities have competences 
regarding referendums but are subject 
to the limitations set by the 
Constitution. The latter allows 
referendums to approve and reform the 
statutes of autonomy of regions that are 
considered to be ‘historical 
nationalities’: the Basque Country, 
Catalonia and Galicia. Andalusia is also 
thought to be part 
of the group 
because it initiated a special process to gain 
fast-track autonomy, requiring two 
referendums. All the referendums to approve 
regional statutes of autonomy have been 
successful, despite significant differences in 
turnout. 
  
The Constitution allows 
referendums to approve and 
reform the statutes of 
autonomy of regions that are 
considered to be ‘historical 
nationalities’: the Basque 
Country, Catalonia and 
Galicia. Andalusia is also 
thought to be part of the 
group. 
All the referendums to 
approve regional statutes 
of autonomy have been 
successful, despite 
significant differences in 
turnout. 
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Table 19.2 Regional referendums in democratic Spain 
Issue Year 
Turnout and results (%) 
Turnout Yes No 
Statute of Autonomy – Basque 
Country 1979 59.77 90.29 4.71 
Statute of Autonomy - Catalonia 1979 59.70 88.15 7.71 
Autonomous Initiative of 
Andalusia 1980 64.19 86.94 5.36 
Statute of Autonomy – Galicia 1980 28.27 73.35 19.77 
Statute of Autonomy – 
Andalusia 1981 53.49 89.38 7.00 
Statute of Autonomy (reform) - 
Catalonia 2006 48.85 73.24 20.57 
Statute of Autonomy (reform) - 
Andalusia 2007 36.28 87.45 9.48 
Source: the author based on http://www.congreso.es/consti/elecciones/ 
referendos/. 
The two first autonomous-community referendums were in 
Catalonia and the Basque Country, both regions with a strong 
demand for decentralisation and whose cultural identity was 
harshly repressed by the Franco regime. Turnout was similar to that 
of local and regional elections. The same can be said of the 
referendum in Andalusia. Galicia, which was granted a statute of 
autonomy before the Civil War, recorded the lowest turnout. The 
regional referendums matched the parties’ positions in the 
constitutional referendum, except in the Basque case, where the 
Basque National Party (PNV) had campaigned for abstention in the 
constitutional referendum. However, the PNV promoted the Yes 
option for the statute of autonomy along with the parties that 
campaigned in favour of the constitutional referendum. 
No autonomous-community referendums were called until 
the 2000s. In that decade, several regional autonomy statutes were 
reformed. During the 1990s the state transferred many competences 
to the regions. And, after that, some autonomous communities 
agreed that it was necessary to adapt their regional constitution to 
the new realities. Reforms began in Valencia, Andalusia, Castilla-La 
Mancha and Catalonia. However, only the historical regions need 
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to put their statutes to referendum. Consequently, only in 
Andalusia and Catalonia were referendums called in accordance 
with the articles of their existing statute and the constitution. 
Turnout levels were lower than in previous cases, showing how 
little enthusiasm the public had for territorial issues. 
All referendums reflected a broad consensus among the main 
political parties prior to their approval, except for the latest reform 
of the Catalan statute of autonomy. In 
Catalonia the main parties at the 
regional level agreed on the 2006 reform 
although the left-wing nationalist ERC 
eventually withdrew its support in 
protest at amendments introduced in 
the negotiations that took place at the 
national level, in the Congress of 
Deputies. 
During the entire process, as a result of the confrontational 
behaviour of all parties (from the PP to the Catalan nationalists), 
there was an increasing polarisation as regards the territorial 
preferences of the public, with a particularly heavy impact in 
Catalonia. In 2010, when the Constitutional Court declared that 
some of the provisions of the statute of autonomy were contrary to 
the Spanish Constitution (and, subsequently, declared void or 
redrafted), most political forces in Catalonia (including the regional 
branch of the Socialist Party) reacted angrily to the judicial decision. 
The sentence declared some aspects of the Catalan statute of 
autonomy that eroded national competences as unconstitutional 
and changed the interpretation of some other articles. There was 
controversy around the categorisation of Catalonia as a nation in the 
preamble to the regional constitution. Depending on one’s 
perspective in this conflict, the Court’s decision either served as a 
way to justify, or caused the change of position by the moderate 
nationalist party Convergence and Union (CiU) towards 
independence.  
Since that moment, when the CiU shifted its historical 
position the movement for Catalan independence gained support. 
Parties favourable to independence and other social movements 
began a period of mobilisation. They organised massive 
demonstrations in which almost one million people demanded self-
All referendums reflected a 
broad consensus among the 
main political parties prior to 
their approval, except for the 
latest reform of the Catalan 
statute of autonomy. 
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determination. The idea of calling a referendum to decide on the 
independence of Catalonia was widely accepted in the region. At 
least, that seems to be true in some surveys. Nevertheless, the 
parties that reject the referendum have more than 40% of the votes. 
Besides, some surveys that use different questions to ask about 
citizens’ support for a referendum point to a more moderate 
support at the popular level. In spite of citizens’ views on 
referendums, the Constitutional Court and a broad majority of 
Spanish scholars maintain that this referendum is not legal since it 
contravenes some constitutional articles. A referendum in Catalonia 
is only possible with the explicit authorisation of the central 
government. And, as with all Spanish referendums, its outcome 
does not have direct effect.  
Despite not having this authorisation, 
the Catalan government called two 
referendums, both without guarantees.2 
The first one was considered a 
simulacrum, and had no major 
consequences. However, the regional 
government of Catalonia pushed ahead 
with other referendum on national self-
determination on 1 October 2017 – a 
referendum that was previously banned 
by the Constitutional Court and with no 
authorisation from the central government. The referendum was 
conducted in a context of polarisation and the response of the 
Spanish police was harshly criticised for its disproportionality. Even 
though the results cannot be interpreted because there were no 
guarantees, the Catalan president accepted the results of the 
referendum in favour of Catalan independence.  
In his speech before the Catalan regional parliament on 10 
October 2017, Catalan President Carles Puigdemont refrained from 
declaring independence but stated that the referendum of 1st 
October gave Catalans a mandate to create a sovereign state. The 
                                                        
2 In legal electoral calls (both in referendums and elections) there is a 
protocol established by the law that requires a census, an electoral board, 
randomly chosen citizens to count the votes, and a certain electoral 
campaign period. 
The regional government of 
Catalonia pushed ahead with 
other referendum on national 
self-determination on 1 
October 2017 – a referendum 
that was previously banned 
by the Constitutional Court 
and with no authorisation 
from the central government. 
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constitutional crisis came to a head on 27 October 2017 when, after 
several deadlines set by the Spanish government of Mariano Rajoy 
passed, the parliament of Catalonia unilaterally declared 
independence from Spain. Within hours, the Spanish Senate 
approved actions proposed by the government to invoke Article 155 
of the Spanish Constitution and assume direct control over some of 
Catalonia's autonomous powers. Catalan President Carles 
Puigdemont and his cabinet were fired, the parliament of Catalonia 
dissolved and fresh Catalan elections scheduled for 21 December 
2017. Before the elections, Puigdemont and other secessionists fled 
the country and the action of the judicial courts, and those who did 
not were imprisoned due to their contravention of regional 
government duties.  
Under those circumstances, in these regional elections, the 
parties for independence retained a slim majority as a consequence 
of the electoral system, which over-represents rural areas where 
nationalists have greater support. 
Official results showed an actual 
support for independence of 47.6% 
(all independence-supporting parties 
taken together) versus 52.4% who 
voted for parties that did not support 
independence.  Some 43.5% voted for 
constitutionalist parties. Podemos 
obtained about 8% of the votes. The 
role of Podemos is interesting in 
understanding the electoral results, if that is possible. In the end, the 
elections were regional in nature; it is problematic to interpret the 
results as the elections were also a referendum on other party-
specific policies besides independence, such as pensions or school 
budgets, for example. Podemos supported the call for a referendum 
but rejected independence, which meant that the vote for Podemos 
cannot be considered as either pro-independence or pro-status quo. 
For that reason, the votes in favour of independence are close to the 
majority but, election after election they are unable to reach a 
support level of over 50%.  
Puigdemont, who fled to Belgium after charges of rebellion, 
sedition, misuse of public funds, prevarication and disobedience, 
had European Arrest Warrants issued against him and other 
In the end, the elections were 
regional in nature; it is 
problematic to interpret the 
results as the elections were 
also a referendum on other 
party-specific policies besides 
independence, such as pensions 
or school budgets, for example. 
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members of his government. He was not elected by the Catalan 
parliament as he was considered a fugitive from Spanish justice. 
Parliament finally elected Quim Torra, a politician very close to 
Puigdemont. 
The independence referendum broke the (Catalan and 
Spanish) tradition of calling referendums only to ratify agreements 
previously approved by the central or regional parliaments with 
sizeable majorities and a consensus among the elites (although the 
1986 NATO membership referendum was also divisive). It also 
showed the incapacity of political elites in both Catalonia and Spain 
to agree a new form of coexistence.  
The conflict has two sides. On the one hand, it affects the 
relationship between the Spanish and Catalan governments. In this 
regard, it can be seen as a battle between state and region. On the 
other hand, the conflict caused deep divisions between the citizens 
of Catalonia, depending on their sense of national identity and 
territorial loyalties.   
For some, the territorial crisis of 2017-18 showed the rigidity 
of the Spanish Constitution and the counterproductive stance of 
successive Rajoy governments in dealing with the territorial crisis. 
For others, the territorial crisis 
revealed the disrespect and the 
disloyalty of the Catalan government 
towards the Constitution and legal 
procedures, including the Catalan 
Constitution (the Statute of 
Autonomy), in that they made 
promises without limit and broke the 
foundational agreements of the 
democratic period. The new Spanish 
government, headed by Pedro 
Sánchez, is opening a dialogue to 
restore trust between the regional and the national government, 
based on respect for the law and the Constitution. Only from mutual 
acknowledgement can division, dissatisfaction and disaffection be 
overcome.  
The new Spanish government, 
headed by Pedro Sánchez, is 
opening a dialogue to restore 
trust between the regional and 
the national government, based 
on respect for the law and the 
Constitution. Only from 
mutual acknowledgement can 
division, dissatisfaction and 
disaffection be overcome. 
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Referendums at the local level 
The organic law on referendums (LO 2/1980) allows municipalities 
to call referendums on local issues. Whatever the case, they must 
request authorisation from the central government, specifying both 
the matter at stake and the election roll. Some regional constitutions, 
not only of those regions considered to be historical nationalities, 
allow regional governments and municipalities to call referendums. 
Despite the constitutional limits for autonomous communities to 
call referendums of their own accord, regions can request 
authorisation from the central government to call referendums in 
certain other cases. 
Since 1980 authorisation has been requested 60 times but only 
24 referendums have been approved. Municipalities can appeal 
against government decisions not to authorise a referendum. In one 
case, the Supreme Court overturned the central government’s 
decision not to allow a referendum in an Andalusian town. 
In any event, informal processes by local governments to 
gauge public opinion on local issues are largely irrelevant because 
they lack the resources or authority to guarantee a transparent 
process. 
19.1.2  Citizens’ initiatives 
The Popular Initiative is a mechanism for citizens to propose laws 
to the Spanish Parliament or other legislative assemblies at the 
regional level. The Constitution regulates them in Article 87.3, while 
Organic Law 3/1984 regulates the appropriate procedures. The 
Spanish Constitution requires 500,000 signatories in order for 
Parliament to consider a petition, unless it affects fundamental 
rights and other issues regulated by organic laws, tax regulations, 
international agreements or judicial pardons. At the regional level, 
statutes of autonomy establish even more limits. Local governments 
have no competence to legislate. Even if they have certain processes 
to pass on demands or petitions, these cannot be strictly considered 
as popular initiatives. 
Parliaments can accept and process initiatives or not. They do 
not require a formal vote by their members but their governing 
bodies can halt any process. If an initiative is accepted it then passes 
to the plenary sessions to be voted upon. An initiative can be 
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accepted if approved by a majority, refused if it lacks sufficient votes 
or amended and then voted upon again. Figure 19.1 shows the data 
on popular initiatives at the national level. 
Figure 19.1 Popular initiatives in Spain (frequency) 
 
Source: https://www.lamarea.com/2012/11/17/ilp-el-poder-del-pueblo-llega 
-al-parlamento-y-alli-muere/. 
 
Spanish citizens have presented 94 initiatives but some of them have 
not obtained the 500,000 signatures required to be processed. The 
topics covered by these initiatives are fairly broad, but none are 
related to the EU. Twelve received sufficient support but the 
Spanish Parliament only approved two of them, finally. The first 
called for the protection of families subject to eviction due to their 
inability to meet mortgage payments and was approved but with 
major changes. The second, more recent, case led Parliament to 
accept an initiative to protect bullfighting as a ‘cultural good’. 
At regional level, statutes of autonomy allow popular 
initiatives and reduce the number of signatories required to be 
accepted, while introducing some changes in procedures and the 
capacity to process them. By April 2007, 127 regional popular 
initiatives had been presented but, once again, the topics did not 
involve the EU (Cabedo, 2009). Their results are similar to those of 
national popular initiatives; they failed because it is not easy to 
reach the signatures threshold and because representative 
assemblies have a considerable capacity to reject them.  
0510
152025
303540
45
Approved Refused Not processed Insufficientpopular support
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  393 
 
If Spain is no country for referendums, the same applies to 
popular initiatives. The conditions for being accepted are difficult 
to meet and parliaments are not 
readily disposed to process citizens’ 
demands. These mechanisms should 
be reformed to introduce the public’s 
demands that are not addressed by 
the political parties. Spain has 
experienced something of a ‘crisis of 
representation’,3 a reform of its party 
system and a territorial crisis that 
might be easier to manage if citizens’ 
preferences were channelled through 
democratic institutions. The popular legislative initiative could be a 
way forward. 
The European Citizens’ Initiative 
The EU has developed a new tool for participatory democracy in 
line with the petition mechanism already in existence in some 
European countries. It is considered to be an interesting means for 
citizens to engage in and influence European policies. The 
procedure (part of the Lisbon Treaty) is very similar to the Spanish 
citizens’ initiative described above.  
Four initiatives have succeeded since 2012 (see Table 19.3). In 
all of them Spain made a modest contribution to the one million 
signatures required, except in the case of the ‘pro-life’ initiative. This 
could be due to the lesser importance of green parties and 
associations in Spain compared to other countries such as Germany. 
Moral issues, on the contrary, are highly politicised in Spain and 
mobilise more people to sign petitions. 
  
                                                        
3 In 2012 less than 50% of voters intended to vote for the biggest parties, the 
PP and the PSOE. By contrast, in 2008 these parties gained over 80% of the 
vote. The 2015 general election showed high volatility, with almost 40% of 
voters changing their vote between 2011 and 2015. Finally, two new parties 
gained over 10% of the vote and entered Parliament: Cs (Citizens, centre-
right) and Podemos (far left). 
If Spain is no country for 
referendums, the same applies 
to popular initiatives. The 
conditions for being accepted 
are difficult to meet and 
parliaments are not readily 
disposed to process citizens’ 
demands. These mechanisms 
should be reformed. 
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Table 19.3 Spanish participation in successful ECIs 
Name Year Supporters Signatories 
from Spain 
Signatories 
(total) 
Right2Water 2014 
European 
Federation of 
Service Unions 
58,051 1,659,543 
One of us 2014 
Various anti-
abortion 
associations 
144,827 1,721,626 
Stop 
vivisection 2015 
Various 
ecological 
associations 
47,194 1,173,130 
Prohibition of 
glyphosates 2017 
Various 
ecological 
associations 
72,357 1,070,865 
Source: http://ec.europe.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/successful. 
19.1.3 Innovations in direct democracy: the internet, 
deliberative forums and participatory budgeting 
Local governments are implementing new ways to improve the 
participation of citizens in politics. Since local governments are 
closer to their citizens, the interaction between them and their 
political representatives is easier. Some issues are of limited local 
interest and have a moderate impact on the political system, so it is 
the level of government more appropriate to developing new 
democratic experiences because, if something goes wrong the 
consequences do not affect the entire political system.  
One of the most representative innovations in direct 
democracy is participatory budgeting. Following the example of 
Porto Alegre (Brazil, 1989) some municipalities have opened up 
their budgets to citizens in order to prioritise the areas of public 
spending. Córdoba was one of the first cities in Spain to implement 
such a system of direct democracy (in 2000), allowing citizens to 
decide on a small part of the city budget. There have been similar 
cases in Rubí, Alicante, Málaga, San Quirze del Vallés, Cabezas de 
San Juan, Casteldefells, Puente Genil, Barcelona, San Juan de 
Alicante, Rivas Vaciamadrid and Madrid (Ramírez Nárdiz, 2009). 
The emergence of new parties, such as Podemos, on the far left, has 
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intensified the importance of these initiatives, including the creation 
of digital platforms to facilitate interaction between citizens and 
local authorities. 
Some of the new democratic experiences are being channelled 
through the internet, as in the case of certain participatory online 
platforms to influence local policies. Since 2015 there have been 
many such instances in Spain. Madrid is an interesting case to 
illustrate these new forms of direct electronic democracy. The local 
government, under the leftist Podemos, has developed an online 
platform that allows citizens to decide how to spend a percentage 
of the budget or to choose different renovation projects for certain 
areas and neighbourhoods in the city. Citizens can both propose 
projects and specific policies, vote for different proposals and, 
finally, prioritise which projects should be carried out. The 
introduction of the internet in the formula to improve citizen 
participation elicits two different reactions: optimistic and 
pessimistic. Some authors see the internet as reducing the cost of 
becoming politically involved; since citizens have more access to 
political information and are exposed to many mobilisation 
networks they can interact easily with politicians (Michels & de 
Graaf, 2010). Other authors consider that online participation 
compounds the inequalities derived from politics and inequalities 
derived from the digital divide (Norris, 2001; Shane, 2015). Security 
concerns, the lack of transparency and the risk of fraud should be 
taken into consideration when discussing problems generated by e-
democracy. 
19.1.4 Participatory democracy in non-institutional 
contexts 
Direct democracy does not only occur 
in institutional politics. Social 
organisations such as trade unions 
and social movements – i.e. the 
Indignados Movement (also known as 
15-M) – use some of these 
participatory tools. In fact, the popular 
use of certain instruments of direct 
democracy is key to understanding 
Direct democracy does not only 
occur in institutional politics. 
Social organisations such as 
trade unions and social 
movements – i.e. the 
Indignados Movement (also 
known as 15-M) – use some of 
these participatory tools. 
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why and how they have been incorporated into the institutional 
design. 
Referendums are one of the main instruments of trade unions, 
used to determine the position of workers when negotiating labour 
conditions (Almond & Powell, 1966). Deliberative referendums 
were one of the most characteristic forms of action in the 15-M 
movement (Fernández-Albertos, 2012). Large-scale street 
assemblies were the way to decide on the social movement’s future 
action and these initiatives were imitated by other social 
movements in New York (Occupy Wall Street) and Paris (Nuit 
Debout). Even if these social movements are radical versions of 
direct democracy, when political parties close to them take office at 
local level, they end up introducing deliberative processes that 
reproduce the logic and repertoires of the protests (as in Barcelona, 
for instance). 
19.2 Critical lessons from Spain: the impact of 
referendums 
Beyond local developments, the most important mechanism for 
participatory democracy in Spain is the referendum. Spain has only 
held three national referendums since it became a democratic 
society but, nevertheless, the processes have been considered to be 
positive. First, they led to no polarisation or instability. The 
agreement between the political elites (on not only calling a 
referendum but also on the favoured option) allowed citizens to 
ratify a prior consensus. Second, neither the topics nor the issues 
were especially divisive: they did not question the status quo or 
imply a fundamental change to the political system, other than the 
foundational constitutional referendum. The most significant 
political cleavage in Spain is the left-right divide. All referendums 
were agreed between the main parties, from both left and right. 
The main problem with referendums in Spain concerns 
Catalonia. For Catalan nationalist parties, from both right and left, 
a referendum is the best way to solve the territorial crisis. In fact, 
two referendum simulacrums with no legal or constitutional 
coverage were called, in November 2014 and October 2017, by the 
Catalan regional government. The Catalan parties that are not 
nationalist, such as the PSOE, PP and Cs refused to campaign 
against independence. Only the 40% of Catalan citizens voted in this 
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referendum. This is a number close to the support for nationalist 
parties in regional elections. The results, even if the lack of 
democratic guarantees prevented any serious conclusions, were 
clearly favourable to Catalan independence from Spain. The results 
can only be interpreted as proof that voters who did not opt for 
independence abstained.  
Such a scenario is relatively new to Spain, since referendums 
have previously been called on the basis of agreements between 
political elites. Despite the legal aspects, and however this kind of 
referendum fits in with Spanish Constitution, some authors have 
expressed concern about whether referendums are the appropriate 
tool to solve the Catalan political conflict.4 On the one hand, certain 
authors underline the growing polarisation in Catalonia around the 
issue of independence, with society riven down the middle. A 
simple majority could impose its 
political choice by means of a 
referendum, obliterating the middle-
ground choices between outright 
independence and the status quo. 
Referendums also make it difficult to 
incorporate the voices of minorities 
and to respect their rights. In such 
cases, and given the political context, 
referendums fail to respect the 
plurality of visions held by complex 
societies on complex issues such as territoriality. Parliament, on the 
other hand, is a better space to deliver solutions that only can be 
reached on the basis of negotiation and consensus. 
Concluding remarks: can the Spanish experience 
influence EU politics? 
Spain is not a particularly good country for direct democracy. At the 
very least, it has had limited experience at the national, regional or local 
levels of government. It could be an interesting example, however, 
because of how it has dealt with referendums, having used them only 
to ratify a prior consensus or broader agreements between the political 
                                                        
4 See, for instance, https://www.politico.eu/article/catalonia-referendum-
independence-want-to-vote-not-secede/. 
Referendums fail to respect the 
plurality of visions held by 
complex societies on complex 
issues such as territoriality. 
Parliament, on the other hand, 
is a better space to deliver 
solutions that only can be 
reached on the basis of 
negotiation and consensus. 
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elites. Legal referendums in Spain have neither led to division nor 
polarisation. Politicians have not used referendums to blur 
responsibilities or sidestep accountability. Even the reform of the 
Catalan Statute in 2006, approved in a moderately polarised context, 
gained an acceptance rate of almost 80%. 
There are perhaps four lessons to be drawn from how 
referendums have been deployed in Spain: i) they have avoided 
divisive issues that polarise society; ii) they have made it easier for 
political elites to reach agreement and for them to present a common 
front about what is good for the country; iii) political elites have 
avoided referendums that blur political responsibilities; and iv) 
governments have avoided resorting to referendums on decisions that 
especially affect minorities or fundamental rights. 
Nevertheless, this analysis shows that social scientists must 
evaluate local experiences in greater depth. There are many different 
participatory tools in local politics and this is an ideal moment to study 
and evaluate how they work. For instance, although we know about 
political participation in direct democracy, we know less about the 
biases that can exist. Are citizens equally represented in public debates 
or in online deliberation processes? Looking at the future, is it 
important to determine the long-term effects of these instruments: do 
they actually improve citizens’ skills? If referendums are used at the 
European level, what will be their effect on citizens’ attitudes towards 
the political system? Do referendums lead to an engaged and 
participatory citizenry? 
Since the 1980s authors have discussed the EU’s democratic 
deficit. Some have proposed participatory tools to correct the problem. 
However, democratic deficits have more to do with the deficiencies of 
representative democracy than with introducing participatory tools at 
the European level. The evidence from Spain suggests that Europe 
should work harder to reach a political consensus using parliaments as 
a preferential resource. There is a debate about the consequence of 
voting on divisive issues by referendum, regarding their capacity to 
increase polarisation and blur accountability. This is particularly 
relevant when the instruments proposed are beyond legal frameworks, 
as was the case in Catalonia. A misuse of participatory democracy can 
trigger a rejection of those instruments, thereby invalidating them as a 
solution to a political problem. In a context of growing volatility and 
polarisation in many European countries, politicians should be very 
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cautious about those participatory instruments and be mindful of their 
limits and unintended consequences for democratic performance.  
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20. DOES DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
WORK IN THE UK? 
AGATA GOSTYŃSKA-JAKUBOWSKA & 
BETH OPPENHEIM 
This chapter explores how British citizens have used direct and 
participatory democracy to take decisions about European affairs, 
and traces the roots and repercussions of these instruments across 
the European Union. The referendum is the most powerful direct 
democracy instrument available to British citizens. However, 
referendums have often been called more out of cynical political 
interest at critical moments than out of a desire to facilitate genuine 
democratic expression. Voters have sometimes appeared to lack 
sufficient knowledge to participate meaningfully. Despite these 
shortcomings, referendums have been powerful in capturing the 
public’s attention and increasing civic participation, as seen with the 
2014 Scottish independence referendum and the 2016 EU 
referendum. Direct democracy is most effective when underpinned 
by a thriving participatory democracy scene, which educates and 
engages citizens in decision-making in the long term.1  
20.1 Decision-making by British citizens 
Modern democracies, of which the UK is one, are based on three 
forms of democracy: representative, direct, and participatory. In a 
representative democracy, the people delegate decision-making to 
their parliamentary representatives, who tend to be better placed to 
take complicated decisions. Direct democracy is where the people 
                                                        
1 The authors are grateful to Vernon Bogdanor, Ian Bond, Claudia 
Chwalisz, Maarten de Groot, Alan Renwick, and John Springford for their 
insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The authors also thank 
Peadar Ó hÚbáin for his research assistance. The responsibility for any 
errors or omissions is with the authors of this piece. 
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determine policy directly (for instance through referendums). 
Participatory democracy involves citizens in decision-making (for 
instance through public consultations). Deliberative democracy is a 
subcategory of participatory democracy, whereby a wide cross-
section of society engages deeply with a particular policy area 
before giving concrete recommendations to policymakers (e.g. 
citizens’ juries). All these forms can coexist and complement one 
another. A mainly representative system may include some 
elements of direct democracy – for example, referendums on 
constitutional changes – and participatory and deliberative 
democracy.  
20.1.1 Direct democracy: referendums and the right to 
recall  
The best-known direct democracy tool is the referendum, in which 
the electorate votes for or against a proposition. Unusually, the UK 
does not have a codified constitution, which means its rules are 
based on precedent rather than set out in a single text. As a result, 
its democratic instruments have 
developed organically, so there is a great 
deal of flexibility in how or why 
referendums can be called (Constitution 
Unit, 2018). The lack of a codified 
constitution makes calling referendums 
vulnerable to electoral calculation and 
party interest. But referendums have also performed the role of 
constitutional protection and ensured that governments cannot 
introduce policies that would go against the people’s will. For 
instance, a precedent has been established whereby referendums 
are needed to validate constitutional 
reforms, or introduce significant devolution 
(Bogdanor, 2009).  
In the UK, the outcome of referendums is 
usually advisory rather than legally binding 
on Parliament, because of the principle of 
The lack of a codified 
constitution makes calling 
referendums vulnerable to 
electoral calculation and 
party interest. 
In the UK, the outcome of 
referendums is usually 
advisory rather than legally 
binding on parliament, 
because of the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty. 
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parliamentary sovereignty.2 In reality, however, they are often 
politically binding. Neither Parliament nor the government of the 
day can easily ignore citizens’ decisions once expressed in a 
referendum. The Brexit referendum was advisory, and Leave won 
by just asmall margin. Yet both the prime minister and her Labour 
counterpart have been adamant that they will implement the ‘will 
of the people’.  
Referendums have largely tackled constitutional questions in 
the UK. Since 1973, referendums have been held on the devolution 
(delegation) of powers to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, as 
well as to London and the North East of England. These plebiscites 
have conferred legitimacy on new forms 
of sub-national government, as in the 
case of the 1973 and 1998 Northern 
Ireland referendums; the Scottish 
referendums in 1979 and 1997; and the 
Welsh referendums in 1979 and 1997. 
The first referendum held in the UK was the 1973 Northern Ireland 
border poll, which asked Northern Irish citizens whether they 
wanted to remain part of the UK, or form a united Ireland with the 
Republic. Altogether, British authorities have held ten referendums 
on power structures in the UK’s nations and regions (Owen, 2016).  
UK-wide referendums are rarer. The UK held two such 
referendums on Europe, one on continued membership of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1975, and one on EU 
membership in 2016. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government (2010-15) also promised to hold a referendum if EU 
member states decided to transfer greater powers to EU institutions. 
The relevant legislation was passed in the European Union Act of 
2011, but no referendum was ever held under the act. The British 
people were also asked whether they wanted to change their 
electoral system in a referendum in 2011 but they decided against it.  
Local authorities also hold referendums. These can address 
questions such as introducing an elected mayor (House of 
                                                        
2 However, there were three referendums in the UK which asked voters to 
accept or reject legislation previously passed by Parliament:  the 1979 
referendums on the devolution of powers to Wales and Scotland and the 
2011 referendum on electoral reform. 
These plebiscites have 
conferred legitimacy on new 
forms of sub-national 
government. 
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Commons Library, 2016), or more trivial questions such as whether 
pubs should open on Sundays (Owen, 2016). 
The coalition government also introduced another direct 
democracy instrument in 2015 – a limited power of ‘recall’. It allows 
constituents to depose their Member of Parliament (MP), subject to 
strict conditions. The origin of the new power was a serious loss of 
trust in MPs, following the 2009 scandal in which numerous MPs 
were found to have claimed excessive or fraudulent expenses. In the 
event of serious misconduct by an MP, a petition signed within six 
weeks by 10% of their constituents triggers a by-election (Electoral 
Commission, 2016b). This is a high threshold, and at the time of 
writing no MP has been recalled. In September 2018, the first ever 
parliamentary recall petition was circulated, but failed to reach the 
required number of signatures.  
20.1.2 Participatory and deliberative democracy: 
e-petitions, public consultations, citizens’ juries  
British citizens can use petitions to propose legislative changes 
(Hazell, 2010). According to Peter Riddell, former director of the 
Institute for Government, they “represent a marriage of direct and 
representative democracy” (Riddell, 2011). We decided to place 
petitions within the scope of participatory democracy because they 
set the agenda but do not directly determine policy outcomes. The 
world’s first e-petition system was created in Scotland alongside the 
new Parliament in 1999 (Scottish Parliament, 2018). British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair followed suit with an e-petition site for 
Downing Street in 2006, where petitions were addressed by 
government departments. In 2011 the coalition government linked 
petitions to parliamentary debates. Since then, any petition that 
gathers 10,000 electronic signatures receives a written government 
response; a petition with 100,000 electronic signatures will be 
considered for debate in the House of Commons; a video of the 
debate and a response is also posted on the petitions website. The 
petition must demand a specific action from the UK government or 
House of Commons, and be within their sphere of competence; it 
cannot be either offensive or extreme (Petitions: UK Government 
and Parliament, 2018). 
It is difficult to point to tangible policy outcomes from e-
petitions, though a report by the Scottish Parliament claimed that its 
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own petitions system has “brought about changes in the law, in 
government policy” (Carman, 2008). Petitions can mobilise and 
unite citizens; provide a valve for citizens to express their discontent 
with their government’s (in)action; and draw parliament’s attention 
to particular concerns (Leston-Bandeira, 2017). 
The UK government and the devolved administrations also 
hold public consultations, mostly online in the form of surveys. 
Citizens are given three months to evaluate a policy proposal, and 
then the government publishes a response after 12 weeks (UK 
Government, 2018a). But consultations have proved expensive, 
costing up to £40,000 each, and have been neglected by the 
government; in March almost a third of public consultations 
commissioned by Conservative governments since the 2015 election 
had yet to receive a government response (Morgan-Bentley, 2018). 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Labour Prime Ministers 
Tony Blair and Gordon Brown held ‘citizens’ juries’, a form of public 
consultation originating in Germany and the US (Maer, 2017). 
Citizens’ juries bring together between 12 to 24 citizens, chosen at 
random from different demographic groups, for three or four days. 
A facilitator encourages participants to deliberate on a policy 
suggestion and then arrive at recommendations, with input from 
experts. The government or local authority must then respond. 
Examples have included two juries of women that deliberated on 
the national childcare strategy in 1998; multiple juries on pension 
reforms in 2006; and a jury on crime and communities in 2007 (Maer, 
2017). Both leaders thought that the juries would address low voter 
turnout and trust in politics, and that they would strengthen rather 
than threaten representative democracy in the UK (Brown, 2007). 
Citizens’ juries, however, were of limited success. They were costly, 
time-consuming, and participants were sceptical that they were 
being listened to. One citizens’ jury in the late 2000s held five 
meetings for the Department of Children, Schools and Families, at 
the cost of £467,704 (Chwalisz, 2017b, p. 65). When the financial 
crash hit in 2008, expensive democratic experiments could no longer 
be justified, and juries were discontinued. 
Whilst governments have not revived the citizens’ jury, there 
has been increased interest in this form of citizens’ engagement 
among non-governmental organisations since the 2016 EU 
referendum. The Constitution Unit at University College London 
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held its own Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit in September 2017, with 
no government involvement. The Assembly consisted of around 50 
randomly selected people, who heard from experts and deliberated 
over two weekends with the support of professional facilitators on 
what shape the future UK-EU trade and migration relationship 
should take. Despite the controversial subject matter, participants 
were enthusiastic and engaged in a constructive discussion 
(Renwick, 2017). More recently the Health and Social Care 
Committee and the Housing, Communities and the Local 
Government Committee in the House of Commons have 
commissioned a citizens’ assembly on social care; its 
recommendations have strongly influenced the committees’ report, 
and the assembly was praised in the subsequent Commons debate 
(Parliament UK, 2018).  
Whereas participatory and deliberative democracy have been 
criticised at the national level, they have flourished at the regional 
level. Consultations have been held recently in all the devolved 
administrations, for instance, Participation Cymru in Wales, or the 
National Conversation in Scotland regarding devolution, or the 
emergence of experimental civic groups in Scotland called ‘tings’ 
(from Old Norse, meaning an assembly of the people), where local 
community members gather to discuss problems and formulate 
solutions (Chwalisz, 2017a). Another example is the 2016 People’s 
Plan for Manchester, an independent public engagement 
programme that gathered citizens together to deliberate on local 
issues, before publishing recommendations (People’s Plan, 2017).   
20.2 UK citizens’ engagement in European affairs  
The British people have used direct and participatory democracy to 
express their take on EU affairs. Two of the three national 
referendums held in the UK addressed the relationship with the 
European Union. EU affairs also featured in the Scottish 
independence referendum campaign because secession from the 
UK would have had implications for Scotland’s membership of the 
bloc. Referendums have in turn contributed to increased civic 
participation, for instance via the growing use of petitions to debate 
EU affairs. During the coalition government (2010-15), just 2% of 
406  DOES DIRECT DEMOCRACY WORK IN THE UK? 
 
petitions related to Europe.3 During the subsequent Conservative 
government that spanned the EU referendum (2015-17), this rose to 
12%. A petition which urged the government to hold another 
referendum if turnout was not sufficiently high and if the winning 
margin was slim elicited over four million signatures (Petitions: UK 
Government and Parliament, 2016). Petitions on European themes 
fell significantly during 2017-18, to 3%, indicating that referendums 
struggle to stimulate citizen engagement in the long term.  
Table 20.1 British petitions and Europe 
 2010-15 2015-17 2017-2018 All years 
All petitions 60,949 31,731 9,878 102,558 
Petitions on the 
themes of Europe, 
European and EU 
1,266 3,943 315 5,524 
%  2% 12% 3% 5% 
Source: House of Commons Petition Committee (2018), data provided via email 
in August 2018 and analysed by the authors. 
Whilst British citizens have expressed interest in European affairs 
via petitions, British governments have been reluctant to engage. 
Governments have been particularly unenthusiastic about 
promoting EU-wide instruments for civic engagement. London has 
argued that the EU lacks democratic legitimacy, and that neither the 
European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) (see Russack, chapter 2 for an 
explanation of how the ECI works) nor citizens’ dialogues are – in 
the words of then Europe Minister David Lidington – a “durable 
solution … to the real problem of democratic legitimacy in the EU”. 
Lidington and others believed the solution lay in “greater powers to 
national parliaments” (European Scrutiny Committee, 2014). 
Indeed, British citizens trust their national government more than 
the EU – the opposite of the trend across Europe.4 But the UK 
                                                        
3 Raw data provided by the House of Commons Petitions Committee in 
August (2018). Analysis by authors based on searching for the terms 
‘Europe’, ‘European’, and ‘EU’ in petition titles. 
4 In 2017, trust for the EU was higher than in national governments, with 
41% of European citizens trusting the EU, and 36% trusting their own 
governments (European Commission, 2017). 
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parliament does not always effectively engage in the EU decision-
making process via the existing instruments (Gostyńska, 2015).  
The UK held just one citizens’ dialogue, which took place in 
February 2014 with then Vice-President of the Commission Viviane 
Reding, David Lidington and members of the British public. 
Citizens’ dialogues are public debates that aim to narrow the gap 
between the public and the EU and educate 
citizens about their rights arising from EU 
citizenship. In comparison with the UK, Italy 
hosted seven and Germany four dialogues 
between September 2012 and March 2014 (European Commission, 
2014), and 26 and 22 respectively between 2015 and 2018 (European 
Commission, 2018a). The UK has not hosted any of the 
Commission’s citizens’ dialogues held since Jean-Claude Juncker 
became President in late 2014.  
Participation by British citizens in the ECI has also been lower 
than average. The ECI requires one million signatures from 
European citizens, from at least seven member states (each member 
state needs to individually reach a quota of signatures). Available 
data on the four successful initiatives shows that UK participation 
fell significantly below its allocated quota (i.e. 54,750) on three out 
of four initiatives. This contrasts with the public interest expressed 
in the ECI in, say, Germany where all successful initiatives reached 
the required threshold (i.e. 72,000) (Bertelsmann-Stiftung, 2018b, see 
also von Ondarza, chapter 12). Negligible government and media 
coverage of the initiative in the UK undoubtedly contributed to the 
lack of enthusiasm for ECI among British citizens. 
Table 20.2 Participation in successful ECIs by British, French, German 
and Italian citizens5 
Date ECI British 
signatures 
French 
signatures 
German 
signatures 
Italian 
signatures 
10/05/2012 Right2Water 7,104 0 (17,247)* 1,236,455 65,223 
11/05/2012 One of Us 26,298 83,503 137,874 623,947 
22/06/2012 Stop 
Vivisection 
19,472 61,818 164,304 690,325 
                                                        
5 Germany, France and Italy are chosen for comparable-sized populations. 
The UK held just one 
citizens’ dialogue. 
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25/01/2017 Stop 
Glyphosate 
0 (94,502)* 57,895 663,867 71,367 
* Signatures were not certified in time for the initiative’s submission and as such 
were not included in the total number of signatories. 
Source: European Commission (2018). 
The outcome of the Brexit referendum in June 2016 has generated 
greater interest in the ECI among British citizens. The instrument 
was used in an effort to stop Brexit, and also to convince the 
Commission to submit a proposal that would allow British citizens 
to retain their EU citizenship rights after the UK’s departure from 
the EU. The Commission refused to register a ‘Stop Brexit’ initiative, 
arguing that it fell beyond its competences to propose EU legislation 
to that end. But on 23 July 2018 the Commission registered an 
initiative that calls for permanent European citizenship whereby EU 
citizenship and associated rights cannot be lost once they have been 
attained. The initiative was established with British citizens in mind, 
who are due to lose their EU citizenship after Brexit. The organisers 
will now have one year to collect one million signatures in at least 
seven member states (European Commission, 2018b).  
20.3 Politics, parties and referendums 
The lack of a written constitution in the UK makes it easier for 
British politicians to call referendums at their will. Political elites 
have used referendums to resolve 
internal political divisions rather than to 
facilitate genuine democratic expression. 
Vernon Bogdanor, a constitutional 
expert, argues that the referendum has 
served the political class rather than the 
people (Bogdanor, 2009). This approach 
was particularly marked on the issue of 
Europe; as demonstrated by the Labour Party’s 1975 referendum on 
joining the EEC and the Conservatives’ in 2016 on leaving the EU.6 
                                                        
6 Initially, Euroscepticism found its home in the left of the Labour Party, 
which opposed EEC membership, whilst the Conservative Party was 
supportive. But roles reversed in the 1980s when European Commission 
Political elites have used 
referendums to resolve 
internal political divisions 
rather than to facilitate 
genuine democratic 
expression. 
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But the 1975 and 2016 referendums did not resolve the vexed 
question of Europe in either party. At the time of writing, two years 
after the UK voted to leave the EU in 2016, neither the Conservatives 
nor Labour have reached consistent views on the future UK-EU 
relationship. Both parties are tussling over the trade-off between 
sovereignty and close economic ties with the EU. Prime Minister 
Theresa May recently lost several of her cabinet members over her 
position on Brexit, whilst Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn lost six 
junior frontbench MPs over his refusal to keep post-Brexit Britain in 
the European Economic Area. 
The idea of holding a referendum on the final withdrawal 
agreement is also proving divisive for both political parties.7 The 
‘People’s Vote’ campaign was founded in April 2018, and seeks to 
ensure a vote on the final Brexit deal. Theresa May rejected the idea, 
anxious that being seen to override ‘the will of the people’ would be 
toxic for her party’s image and its political ratings. But the campaign 
has drawn support across the political divide from around 100 
MPs.8 Its supporters argue that voters were insufficiently informed 
in 2016, and that they should have the opportunity to revisit the 
question in light of new facts (People’s Vote, 2018). The Labour 
party recently argued that it could envisage another vote if Theresa 
May’s Brexit deal is rejected by 
Parliament and if Labour fails to force 
through a snap election.  
The growing power of populist 
movements such as th e right-wing UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) has no 
doubt influenced mainstream parties’ 
stance on direct democracy. UKIP has 
                                                        
President Jacques Delors promised to make social protection a central 
principle of European integration. 
7 The only parties to have made another referendum their official policy are 
the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party. 
8 Prominent members of all major parties have backed the campaign. Some 
names include: Chuka Umunna and Stella Creasy from Labour; Anna 
Soubry and Justine Greening from the Conservatives; Vince Cable and Tim 
Farron from the Liberal Democrats; Caroline Lucas from the Greens 
(McDonald, 2018).  
The growing power of 
populist movements such as 
the right-wing UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) 
has no doubt influenced 
mainstream parties’ stance 
on direct democracy. 
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been an enthusiastic supporter of direct democracy since its 
inception in 1991. It has proposed giving citizens the right to initiate 
referendums on matters of national significance, as well as the right 
to recall MPs. Under Farage’s leadership, UKIP went from being an 
irrelevant fringe party to a source of real electoral anxiety for both 
the Labour and Conservative parties. UKIP’s idea of recalling MPs 
was diluted and taken up by the coalition government in 2015. Its 
popular brand of Euroscepticism also exerted pressure on David 
Cameron to call the EU referendum in 2016. UKIP’s influence has, 
however, waned since the vote and the party has thus far struggled 
to shape the debate about Brexit.  
20.4 The people, referendums, and participation  
Whilst referendums were driven by politicians’ calculations, they 
tended to attract quite impressive public interest and contributed to 
increased citizen participation in public life. Some 64% voted in the 
1975 referendum (House of Commons Library, 2015), 72.2% cast a 
vote in the 2016 referendum (BBC, 2016) and 84.6% of the Scots went 
to the polls in the 2014 independence referendum (BBC, 2014a).  
This section examines these three votes and aims to establish 
what drives British voters to participate in referendums and 
whether they are sufficiently knowledgeable about national and 
European politics to use these instruments effectively. It also 
investigates whether direct democracy increases citizens’ 
knowledge and participation; and whether referendums contribute 
to a policy outcome.  
20.4.1 Case study no. 1: the Scottish independence 
referendum 
The Scottish National Party (SNP) promised to hold a referendum 
on Scotland’s independence in its 2011 election manifesto. After the 
SNP won a majority of seats in the Scottish Parliament, the central 
government in Westminster could not easily dismiss these calls. In 
October 2012, the UK and Scottish governments concluded an 
agreement enabling Holyrood to legislate for an independence 
referendum (House of Lords, 2012). The Scottish Independence 
Referendum Act was passed by the Scottish Parliament in 2013, and 
on 18 September 2014 Scottish citizens went to the polls to answer 
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the following question: “Should Scotland be an independent 
country?” The three main UK political parties, Labour, the 
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats joined together to 
campaign for No. Some 55.3% of voters listened and opted to remain 
in the UK, while 44.7% voted for independence (BBC, 2014a).   
What drove voters? 
Disaffection with Westminster and the desire for sovereignty were 
key issues for supporters of Scotland’s independence. Fear and 
uncertainty surrounding the economy and public spending 
motivated No voters (Ashcroft, 2014). Class was a significant 
marker of voting intention, with working class citizens traditionally 
supportive of independence (Maxwell, 2011). In January 2012, 58% 
of citizens in the most deprived parts of Scotland supported 
independence, whilst just 27% of those living in wealthy areas did 
so (Ipsos Mori, 2012).  This class division was also present in the 1979 
and 1997 referendums on Scottish devolution, where the majority of 
working class citizens voted for a Scottish legislative assembly and 
the majority of middle class people voted against (Denver, 2003).  
The referendum aimed to determine Scotland’s relationship 
with the UK. But Scotland’s potential secession from the UK would 
have affected its place in the EU, so 
European matters surfaced during 
campaigning. Scottish citizens are 
generally more pro-European than 
British citizens as a whole (they voted to 
remain in the EU in the 2016 
referendum); the No camp hoped that by 
arguing that an independent Scotland 
would have to re-apply for EU 
membership, it would sway undecided 
voters. Then First Minister of Scotland 
Alex Salmond initially argued that Scotland would automatically 
“inherit” membership. But the Scottish government position 
gradually shifted towards an acknowledgement that Scotland 
would have to negotiate its EU accession. Interestingly, however, 
EU membership per se was a low-ranking concern for referendum 
voters. A poll from the month of the referendum found that just 12% 
of Yes voters and 15% of No voters listed it as a top priority 
The referendum aimed to 
determine Scotland’s 
relationship with the UK. 
But Scotland’s potential 
secession from the UK 
would have affected its place 
in the EU, so European 
matters surfaced during 
campaigning. 
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(Ashcroft, 2014). This chimes with another survey conducted by 
‘What Scotland Thinks’, where just 3% of respondents felt that EU 
membership was the most important deciding factor (What 
Scotland Thinks, 2014). Voters on both sides of the argument were 
significantly more concerned by the National Health Service (NHS), 
public spending and jobs. EU membership was linked to voters’ 
notions of economic security, however. 
Did voters take an informed decision? 
There is no data available on citizens’ actual knowledge of the issues 
at stake, but people’s estimations of their own knowledge are 
revealing nonetheless. Ninety per cent of citizens voting in the 
Scottish referendum felt they knew a great deal or a fair amount 
about the issue (ICM Research, 2014). Scottish citizens had three 
years’ notice of the referendum, at least informally, beginning with 
the inclusion of a referendum in the SNP’s election manifesto 
followed by their victory in 2011: ample time to familiarise 
themselves with all the arguments for and against independence.  
Self-reported knowledge varied according to class and 
education. The Electoral Commission found that affluent citizens 
from the highest social classes were more confident in their 
understanding of the Scottish referendum than those from lower 
classes. There is a direct link between class, education and 
participation in the referendum: citizens who felt they understood 
the issues at stake were more likely to turn out to vote (ICM 
Research, 2014). 
The media can help campaigners to educate citizens. Its 
coverage of the Scottish referendum was significantly less partisan 
and vitriolic than the 2016 EU vote. A study found that the majority 
of headlines on the referendum were neutral, at 61.8%. But those 
headlines that were not neutral, however, showed a 4:1 bias against 
independence (Patrick, 2014).  
Did the referendum contribute to greater public knowledge and 
civic participation?  
The referendum boosted public engagement in Scotland. Turnout at 
the referendum was 84.6% (BBC, 2014a), compared to 65.1% in the 
2010 Scottish general election (BBC, 2015). Scottish citizens became 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  413 
 
more politically engaged than in previous years, with engagement 
rising far beyond the national average. The percentage of Scottish 
citizens turning out to vote in the 2015 general election rose to 71.1% 
(BBC, 2015). There was a huge increase in membership of Scotland's 
pro-independence parties after the vote in 2014, including the SNP 
and the Greens (BBC, 2014b). The Scottish independence 
referendum in particular stimulated young people to participate. 
Turnout was 75% among 16 to 17-year-olds who had just been given 
the vote, significantly higher than for 18-24 year olds, which was 
54% (Electoral Commission, 2014, p. 64). This triggered a UK-wide 
debate about enfranchising 16-year-olds, a debate that has only 
intensified following the increased youth turnout during the 2016 
Brexit referendum (where 16 and 17-year-olds were not allowed to 
vote).  
The referendum also facilitated participatory and deliberative 
democracy. Engagement took the form of dramatic head-to-head 
debates between campaign figures, or participatory forms of 
democracy (Mitchell, 2016). Local groups organised phone 
canvassing and door-stepping, and community meetings to educate 
citizens. However, two years on from the Scottish referendum, 
engagement levels have now declined in line with the national 
average (Hansard Society, 2017). 
Did the referendum contribute to a policy outcome? 
Since Scotland voted to stay in the Union, there was no fundamental 
policy change: the majority held the status quo. Changes did, 
however, emerge from the referendum, just not what was specified 
on the ballot paper. In the final weeks of the campaign, David 
Cameron had promised that more powers would flow to Scotland 
if it voted to remain in the UK. After the Scottish referendum, he set 
up the Smith Commission and charged it with further Scottish 
devolution. The Commission’s work resulted in two bills on 
devolution; they gave greater legislative control to Scotland on a 
number of issues, including the Scottish electoral system; income 
tax and rail franchising. The Commission received over 400 
submissions from civic organisations and groups, and over 18,000 
submissions (such as emails, letters and petitions) from individuals 
across Scotland (Smith Commission, 2014).  
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20.4.2 Case study no. 2: referendums on Europe 
The British people have twice been asked whether they would like 
the UK to remain a member of the European bloc (first the EEC, then 
the EU): on 5 June 1975 and on 23 June 2016.  
What drove voters? 
The two Europe referendums attracted a variety of socio-political 
grievances not always directly related to the EU. Before the 1975 and 
2016 referendums, the market research 
company Ipsos Mori asked voters what 
they saw as the decisive issues facing the 
UK. In 1975, the top five issues were: 
price inflation and the cost of living; food 
prices and shortages; unemployment; 
sovereignty; and Britain’s role in the 
world. In the 2016 survey immigration came first by far; followed 
by the NHS; the economy; the EU; and education (Worcester, 2016).  
The EU referendum in 2016 
attracted those who felt forgotten by the 
political establishment. Turnout at 
elections among working class citizens 
has declined. In the 2010 general 
election, there was a 23% gap in turnout 
between the wealthiest and poorest citizens (Flinders, 2014). 
Labour, originally the workers’ party, alienated voters with its pro-
European stance and liberal immigration policies (Evans and 
Mellon, 2016). The appearance of UKIP drew lapsed voters back to 
the ballot box. But these voters were not rewarded with change. The 
British electoral system is divided into constituencies, which means 
that small parties whose votes are distributed across many 
constituencies rather than concentrated in a few struggle to gain 
parliamentary seats. In the 2015 general election, UKIP won 12.6% 
of the vote (BBC, 2015), but just one seat, adding to voters’ sense of 
marginalisation. The majority of their votes came from working 
class, older white voters (Ipsos Mori, 2015). On the 22 June 2016, 
Nigel Farage described the referendum as “the people versus the 
establishment” (Heffer, 2016), hoping that the referendum would 
turn into a protest vote against status quo. 
The two Europe 
referendums attracted a 
variety of socio-political 
grievances not always 
directly related to the EU. 
The EU referendum in 2016 
attracted those who felt 
forgotten by the political 
establishment. 
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However, a poll by Lord Ashcroft shows that voters were 
driven by EU issues rather than by a desire to ‘stick it’ to the political 
elite. After the referendum, almost half of Leave voters said that 
their biggest motivation in voting was “the principle that decisions 
about the UK should be taken in the UK”. A desire to take back 
control over immigration drove 33% of Leave voters, and unease 
about the EU’s expansion of its powers motivated 13% of them 
(Ashcroft, 2016).  
Did voters take an informed decision in the referendum? 
When the UK first joined the EEC in 1973, there was an initial wave 
of educational communication with citizens. But this educational 
drive was neglected, and by 1975, three-quarters of the British 
public said they needed more information about British 
membership of the EEC in order to take an informed decision 
(Talking Humanities, 2016). When British citizens were asked about 
their perceived knowledge of the EU in 2011, 82% felt they knew 
little or nothing (European Commission, 2011). A questionnaire by 
Ipsos Mori a month before the EU referendum found that although 
the public answered certain EU-related questions correctly, in 
general they were misinformed. For instance, citizens vastly 
overestimated the number of EU immigrants in the UK and were 
rarely able to correctly attribute several popular regulations to the 
EU, such as statutory holiday entitlement (Ipsos Mori, 2016b). Such 
misconceptions about the EU can be 
traced back to the British media, which 
turned Eurosceptic under Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher in the 
1980s. Where journalists could have 
served to educate citizens, all too they 
often opted for Eurosceptic rhetoric and 
myth-making, which they found sold 
papers. 
Limited knowledge of the EU and its actual powers played 
into hands of the Leave campaign, which blamed the EU for 
problems such as the under-resourcing of the NHS or housing 
shortages, which largely result from the British government’s policy 
choices. The Remain campaign also made exaggerated claims about 
the immediate economic impact of Brexit, earning it the name 
Where journalists could have 
served to educate citizens, all 
too they often opted for 
Eurosceptic rhetoric and 
myth-making, which they 
found sold papers. 
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‘Project Fear’ (Full Fact, 2016). However, the most misleading and 
influential claims came from the official Vote Leave campaign, 
which stated that the UK sent £350 million per week to the EU – 
money that could be better spent on the NHS. Nigel Farage and 
businessman Arron Banks, who ran the unofficial Leave.EU 
campaign, launched a successful Twitter and Facebook operation, 
posting emotive but false content: “Dave [Cameron] wants to give 
75m Turks access to your #NHS!” read one Tweet.  
Despite this climate of dishonesty, a survey by the Electoral 
Commission after the referendum found that 62% of respondents 
felt they had enough information from both campaigns to take an 
informed decision on how to vote in the 2016 referendum (Electoral 
Commission, 2016). Self-reported knowledge does not necessarily 
equate to actual knowledge, however. The 2016 referendum 
campaign triggered a wider debate in the UK about ways of 
promoting honest discussion and holding lead campaigners 
accountable for disseminating false information.  
In the aftermath of the referendum, 50 MPs supported the 
establishment of the independent Office of Electoral Integrity, 
which would verify campaign claims and fine those who 
deliberately spread falsehood (Parliament UK, 2016). But the 
Independent Commission on Referendums, which was set up by the 
Constitution Unit and which has reviewed the role of referendums 
in the UK, came to a different conclusion: it argued that no official 
body should make a “definitive judgment” on the truth of the 
arguments disseminated in the campaign and that this role should 
be left to academics, experts, fact-checking organisations and 
broadcasters. The Commission also suggested that the fight against 
online disinformation should be tackled jointly by the government 
and technology companies; the platforms should not decide 
themselves on what is illegal as this could have negative 
implications for freedom of speech (Constitution Unit, 2018). 
Did the referendum contribute to greater public knowledge and 
civic participation?  
The referendum captured the attention of people who had not voted 
for decades and had lost faith in politics. Some 5.7 million citizens 
who had not voted in the previous general election turned out for 
the referendum (Pickard, 2016). It was these new or returning voters 
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who swung the vote: 60% voted for Brexit (Swales, 2016). But the 
engagement of new demographics can be overstated. Whilst 
turnout was high among all social classes, there was a gap of 
fourteen percentage points between the wealthiest and poorest 
citizens (Ipsos Mori, 2016a). In 1975, a survey conducted shortly 
before the referendum found that 42% of those from the least 
wealthy demographic said they were either unsure if they would 
vote, or that they would not vote (Gallup Poll, 1975). In both 
referendums, education and class played a crucial role. In 2016, 
higher education corresponded with Remain votes (Antonucci, 
2017), and in 1975, those educated beyond school age and the more 
economically secure tended to support membership (Clements, 
2017).  
Figure 20.1 Voter turnout and Leave-Remain share, 2016 EU referendum 
 
Like the Scottish independence referendum, the 2016 
referendum increased political engagement; 30% of people 
surveyed after the vote said that they were now more active in a 
political or civic cause; nine million people reported that they would 
be more likely to volunteer in their local community; membership 
of political parties increased; and voter registration increased 
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(House of Lords, 2017). But, as in Scotland, this engagement has 
abated over time.  
It is less clear if the referendum has contributed to increased 
knowledge about the EU. Indeed, a 2017 Eurobarometer report on 
the UK found that over a period of one year, there had been a 5% 
increase in respondents claiming to understand how the EU works, 
from 55 to 60% (European Commission, 2017). But the 2017 Hansard 
Society audit was less optimistic:  
although more people than ever in the life of the Audit 
now claim to be knowledgeable about the EU, at 43%, that 
is still barely more than four in 10 people (Hansard 
Society, 2017).  
Did the referendum contribute to a policy outcome? 
The 2016 referendum has had a significant impact on policy. A 
victory by the Leave campaign pushed David Cameron, who 
advocated Remain, to resign and led to his replacement by Theresa 
May. Prime Minister May triggered Article 50 of the Treaty on the 
European Union, which sets out the procedure for leaving the EU, 
setting the Brexit clock for 29 March 2019. British parliamentarians, 
many of whom favoured Remain, gave their consent to triggering 
the Article 50 negotiations despite concerns about the consequences. 
But many have argued that the decision to leave the EU does not 
correspond with the direction set by the Conservative government. 
British citizens were simply asked whether they wanted the UK to 
remain in the EU or to leave it. Cameron’s cabinet did not sketch out 
how it would implement the outcome of the referendum. If voters 
had been clearer on the details of departure or on the UK’s future 
relationship with the EU, they might have voted differently.  
20.5 Referendums on Europe: domino effect? 
The UK may be an island, but as part of a bloc of 28, its fortunes 
have been intimately bound up with its fellow member states. 
Euroscepticism in one country bleeds into the next, as does populist 
enthusiasm for referendums. A referendum in one country might 
have repercussions elsewhere.  
The decisions of Denmark, Ireland and Norway to hold 
referendums on their accession to the EEC inevitably contributed to 
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the British debate about the public vote on its own membership 
(Westlake, 2017, p. 9). These countries were due to join the EEC 
alongside the UK in 1973. Whereas Denmark and Ireland voted to 
join, Norway opted to remain outside.9 The British decision not to 
hold a popular vote on its own accession in 1973 has haunted 
political elites in London and influenced Labour’s decision to 
eventually legislate for the referendum in 1975, two years after the 
UK’s accession.  
Since then member states and third countries such as 
Switzerland and Norway have held 49 referendums on EU 
membership and other Union policies (European Parliament, 2016). 
The 2016 referendum campaign also coincided with the public 
plebiscite held in the Netherlands on the EU’s association 
agreement with Ukraine. Nigel Farage endorsed the No campaign 
there, arguing that a rejection of the agreement would help Brexit. 
Although it is difficult to measure the exact impact of the outcome 
of the Dutch referendum on voters’ motivations in the UK, the 
Dutch ‘Nee’ provided the Leave campaign with some impetus. 
Dutch activists who instigated the referendum admitted that the 
EU’s agreement with Ukraine was an excuse to promote the idea of 
the Netherlands’ departure from the EU.10  
The Scottish independence referendum in 2014 and the Brexit 
referendum in 2016 also made waves elsewhere on the continent. 
The Scottish referendum was closely followed in Spain where the 
central government has tried to suppress independence initiatives 
in Catalonia; supporters of Catalan independence hoped that a Yes 
vote in the Scottish referendum would embolden their movement. 
The central government in Madrid attempted to calm this 
enthusiasm, arguing that while a referendum in Scotland was legal, 
a Catalan one would be in breach of the Spanish constitution. Like 
London, it claimed that an independent Catalonia would have to 
                                                        
9 France, a founding member-state, also held a referendum on the first 
enlargement; more than 68% of French citizens supported it (European 
Parliament, 2016). 
10 Interestingly, research shows that Dutch voters did not necessarily treat 
the referendum as a way to express their dissatisfaction with the EU 
(Jacobs, 2018). 
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reapply for EU membership and that it could take years before it 
could re-join the EU.  
Whilst the reverberations of the Scottish referendum were 
mostly confined to Spain, the 2016 vote was felt across the member 
states (Oliver, 2018). For the first time in 
European history, the citizens of a 
member state decided that their country 
should leave the EU. Populist 
politicians such as France’s Marine Le 
Pen or the Netherlands’ Geert Wilders 
celebrated; they have long called for 
similar referendums. The risk of a 
domino effect encouraged the leaders of 
the EU-27 to adopt a tough negotiating 
stance vis-à-vis the UK; fearing that if 
the UK were allowed to pick and choose the policy areas it wanted 
to participate in post-Brexit, Eurosceptics elsewhere would press 
their governments for similar concessions. But since the British 
referendum, trust in the EU has increased and neither Le Pen nor 
Wilders has gained power.11 Where populists did gain power, their 
calls for public votes on crucial European matters abated; the 
populist Five Star Movement and nationalist League, which formed 
the coalition government in Italy, have dropped their calls for 
referendums on eurozone membership for now. Public opinion 
polls show that citizens of the remaining five EU largest member 
states are wary of following in the UK’s footsteps; polling by the 
Bertelsmann-Stiftung shows that around 80% of Poles and 
Spaniards would vote to remain in the EU if their country held a 
referendum (Bertelsmann-Stiftung, 2018a). 
It would, however, be premature to say that Euroscepticism 
has been defeated on the continent. In this context, the 2016 
referendum offers a valuable lesson for pro-European forces: direct 
democracy can be a meaningful tool in engaging citizens in the EU 
decision-making but only if it is underpinned by an education 
campaign about the EU. Otherwise, it risks being hijacked by those 
                                                        
11 A public opinion poll by the Bertelsmann-Stiftung conducted in August 
2016 in the six largest EU member states showed increased support for the 
EU (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016). 
Whilst the reverberations of 
the Scottish referendum were 
mostly confined to Spain, the 
2016 vote was felt across the 
member states. For the first 
time in European history, the 
citizens of a member state 
decided that their country 
should leave the EU. 
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who are not interested in helping the public to take an informed 
decision, but only in advancing their own political agenda.  
Conclusions and recommendations 
The British have at times seen direct, participatory and deliberative 
democracy as threats to representative democracy and the principle 
of parliamentary sovereignty. But all these forms of democracy can 
interact and complement each other. E-petitions, public 
consultations and citizens’ juries can usefully inform the 
government’s policy proposals.  
Referendums can help to foster political engagement. 
Responsibility for direct policymaking can awaken citizens’ sense of 
duty and encourage self-education. The 
Scottish referendum in 2014 and the 
referendum on EU membership in 2016 
boosted political engagement. But this 
increased interest in public life tends to 
wane after a while. The central 
government, local authorities and 
political parties should therefore 
nurture a climate of vibrant 
participatory democracy and ensure 
that this is not neglected after the 
critical moment has passed. 
As this chapter has attempted to 
show, a decision to hold a referendum 
that is not preceded by wide public 
consultation but simply driven by 
divisions in the ruling party can do more harm than good. If the 
British government decides to hold a referendum on the final 
withdrawal agreement, it should consider organising a citizens’ 
assembly on this topic. The assembly could help the public to 
understand the implications of a Yes or No vote, and could prepare 
a clear one-page document laying out the pros and cons of each 
perspective, which would be distributed to the wider public.  
In the past, participants in government-designed citizens’ 
juries were sceptical that their recommendations would be 
implemented. The Constitution Unit’s Citizens’ Assembly, for 
The Scottish referendum in 
2014 and the referendum on 
EU membership in 2016 
boosted political engagement. 
But this increased interest in 
public life tends to wane after 
a while. The central 
government, local authorities 
and political parties should 
therefore nurture a climate of 
vibrant participatory 
democracy and ensure that 
this is not neglected after the 
critical moment has passed. 
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example, had no government backing or interest from the start. But 
if the government promised to publicly respond to the assembly’s 
recommendations, this could be powerful. There have been 
successful examples of governments commissioning citizens’ juries 
in other countries, for instance Ireland’s Constitutional Convention, 
which was established in 2012 and led to the government accepting 
three of the proposed reforms to the constitution (Chwalisz, 2017a). 
This demonstrates that citizens take such a task seriously and come 
up with concrete solutions when given the time and resources to 
deliberate and when they know that their contribution is given 
proper consideration. 
One of the challenges with referendums is that they can 
become a repository for all manner of malaises; decades of 
Eurosceptic arguments by mainstream 
political parties, the low level of EU 
education in the UK, compounded by 
irresponsible media coverage and 
campaigning, made British voters 
vulnerable to myths about the EU. Any 
further use of the instrument in the UK therefore requires careful 
review. One idea is to create an authority that would hold 
unscrupulous campaigners to account for their claims. This could 
prove helpful if the UK decides to hold another referendum on the 
outcome of negotiations with the EU. 
In the case of another referendum, the government should 
explain how it intends to implement its outcome. In 2016, the 
absence of any proposal for leaving the EU meant that citizens were 
taking a blind decision, ultimately leaving the mandate open to 
interpretation and hijacking by the politicians in charge of 
implementing the result of referendum.  
The 2016 referendum has not resulted in a domino effect for 
other member states. On the contrary, support for the EU increased 
in some European capitals immediately after the referendum. Pro-
Europeans should grasp this opportunity and better educate 
citizens about the European project and the benefits associated with 
membership. This would help to lay solid foundations for engaging 
citizens in the EU decision-making process, be it either through 
direct, participatory or deliberative forms of democracy.  
One of the challenges with 
referendums is that they can 
become a repository for all 
manner of malaises. 
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21. GETTING EUROPE’S DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY RIGHT 
RICHARD YOUNGS 
Debates about how to revive European democracy involve starkly 
contrasting views on direct democracy. For some, a greater use of 
direct democracy is vital to successful democratic innovation. For 
sceptics, the very concept is dubious; the direct democracy tools that 
have been used in recent years have proved profoundly damaging.  
Getting European direct democracy right is fundamental. 
Currently, both support for direct democracy and resistance to it are 
growing. On the one hand, analysts routinely point to the 
increasingly evident shortcomings of indirect, representative 
democracy and to the burgeoning possibilities that digital 
technology gives citizens to exercise more direct forms of 
accountability. Enthusiasts see direct democracy as an inevitable 
and desirable pillar of an impending post-representative politics 
that moves channels of accountability and participation away from 
parliaments and political parties.   
On the other hand, Brexit and other EU-related referendums 
have clearly been polarising experiences that have unduly 
simplified policy choices. They have failed in practice to engender 
high quality democratic deliberation. 
Particularly in the wake of the Brexit 
referendum, many writers have 
advocated more circumscribed forms of 
popular engagement and a tighter 
curtailment of direct democracy. As 
citizens make what experts consider to be 
‘wrong’ populist-fuelled choices, 
As citizens make what 
experts consider to be 
‘wrong’ populist-fuelled 
choices, sympathy has 
resurged for the classical 
concept of epistocracy or 
elite-mediated governance. 
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sympathy has resurged for the classical concept of epistocracy or 
elite-mediated governance.1 
There is some merit to both sides of this argument. Many 
recent European referendums have indeed distorted accountability 
rather than improved democratic quality. Yet bottom-up citizen 
interest in more direct forms of political control is a genie that 
cannot easily be put back into a bottle of elite-crafted, managerial 
democracy. Across Europe, direct democracy needs to be improved 
rather than suppressed. 
21.1 Direct democracy evolving 
Direct democracy has become more widespread around the world 
over the last decade2 and polls suggest that demand for direct 
democracy is on the rise across Europe.3 Our project has shown that 
people’s interest in exploring direct democracy has increased in the 
wake of the EU’s polycrisis of recent years – although this trend is 
far from overwhelming and is even absent in some countries. In 
Germany, traditionally one of the countries most sceptical about 
national-level direct democracy, polls are showing some support for 
its use. In June 2018, the new Italian coalition government came to 
power promising more direct democratic voting, in what may 
become the most significant test yet of whether direct democracy 
helps revive European democracy, undermines it or proves to be an 
over-hyped, unrealisable promise.  
A standard distinction is between mandatory referendums, 
plebiscites called at governments’ behest and bottom-up citizens’ 
initiatives. A further distinction is that different varieties of citizens’ 
initiatives entail differing degrees of direct democracy. Some argue 
that petitions and citizens’ consultations are not full direct 
democracy if they do not lead to a competitive vote; they are 
                                                        
1 A.C. Grayling, Democracy and its Crisis, 2017; D. Runciman, How Democracy 
Ends, Profile Books, 2017. 
2 D. Altmann, Direct Democracy Worldwide, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; B. Kaufmann and J. Mathews, “Democracy doomsday 
prophets are missing this critical shift”, Washington Post, 8 May 2018. 
3 Pew Research Center, “Globally, broad support for representative and 
direct democracy”, October 2017, pp. 22-4. 
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sometimes referred to as ‘agenda initiatives’ that get issues onto 
government or parliamentary agendas without leading to a popular 
vote.4  
An important change is underway in the balance between 
these different types of direct democracy. Until recently, debates 
were almost exclusively focused on 
governments calling referendums, 
especially on determinant and exceptional 
questions like EU accession. In recent 
years, this has been supplemented by a 
focus on the large number of citizens’ 
initiatives that have been introduced 
across Europe. Even if it is an exaggeration 
to talk of a groundswell of popular 
engagement, these initiatives have begun 
to inject direct democracy with a much more bottom-up, locally 
rooted ethos. Some of these emerging initiatives are ‘agenda 
initiatives’, some offer direct democratic votes. 
Finland introduced enhanced citizens’ initiative provisions at 
the national level in 2012 and the municipal level in 2015, and 
Denmark followed suit by creating a similar tool in early 2018; these 
are widely used in both countries. The UK government introduced 
an e-petition provision in 2015. The current Czech government is on 
the verge of reforming the country’s restrictive provisions to make 
it easier for citizens to trigger national referendums. Similar changes 
have been made in 2018 in Austria to foster greater use of citizens’ 
instruments – which, apart from petitions, include randomly 
selected ‘wisdom councils’ at a local level.  
In Romania, a push for less restrictive conditions for the use 
of direct democracy is one result of the ongoing mass protests 
against corruption. Latvia’s Manabalss.lv online petitioning platform 
has become a widely emulated leader in the field. Estonia has 
similar provisions and is the country that has inserted such direct 
citizen engagement, most notably into formal decision-making 
processes. A number of local-level referendums have been 
organised in Bulgaria in recent years. While Spain has some of the 
                                                        
4 International IDEA, Direct Democracy: The International IDEA Handbook, 
2008, p. 10. 
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most restrictive conditions limiting direct democracy – and has seen 
debates over referendums become unhelpfully embroiled in the 
heated polarisation of the Catalan conflict – municipalities across 
the country have pioneered direct engagement tools within local 
decision-making, influenced in particular by new movement-style 
parties such as Podemos. 
This momentum at the local level contrasts with the relative 
atrophy of the EU-level European Citizen’s Initiative (ECI). While 
the ECI is normally presented as the EU’s 
main direct democracy tool, it is a device 
for petitioning, not for direct popular 
votes.5 The virtues and shortcomings of 
the ECI have been exhaustively covered 
and are not the subject of this chapter;6 
suffice it to say here that the ECI’s limited 
impact is one among many factors that have galvanised pressure for 
direct democracy at the national level. One example: German 
citizens have accounted for a disproportionately high number of 
signatories to three of the four ECI petitions so far accepted by the 
Commission, yet in these cases the German government was against 
the demands of its own citizens, heightening their frustration.7 The 
growth of citizens’ initiatives at the national and local levels across 
Europe is in part related to the absence of well-developed and 
accessible forms of EU-level direct democratic accountability.  
The utility of direct democracy in Europe is likely to hinge on 
the wave of new citizens’ initiatives. Many studies have focused on 
the case for EU-wide referendums, to be invoked through EU-level 
legal triggers.8 However, a focus on harnessing the faint stirrings of 
momentum that now exist at local level may prove more 
productive. While in many EU states concerns have grown over 
governments using referendums for political advantage, a more 
                                                        
5 A. Lieninger “Direct democracy in Europe: potentials and pitfalls”, Global 
Policy, May 2015, p. 5. 
6 See chapter 2 by Sophia Russack. 
7 See chapter 12 on Germany by Erik Brandes, Nicolai Von Ondarza and 
Felix Schenuit. 
8 One good example of such a plea is F. Chevenal, “European Union and 
Direct Democracy: A Possible Combination?”, BEUCitizen project, 2016. 
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benign and citizen-led interest in democratic engagement may open 
the way to a more organic form of direct democracy across Europe.  
21.2 Only for populists? 
A familiar critique is that citizens use referendums simply to 
gainsay and punish elites for reasons unrelated to the subject matter 
ostensibly under consideration. In recent 
years in Europe, EU-related referendums 
in the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark and 
elsewhere have unleashed such contrarian 
dynamics more than they have promoted 
better-informed and well-reasoned 
debate. Some experts even fear that 
national referendums are the instruments 
most likely to sink the European project.9 
It is undoubtedly the case that anti-
EU and populist parties have recently 
been the strongest advocates of direct 
democracy – even if most referendums 
have not been related to EU affairs. Italy’s Five Star Movement has 
been an emblematic innovator of online tools for democratic 
participation and voting. In Denmark, the rise of the Danish 
People’s Party has been the main factor in pushing politicians to 
widen the use of direct popular votes. In Germany it is the AfD that 
is resisting the country’s historically rooted distrust of referendums 
the most, while in Austria it is the Freedom Party that presses most 
strongly for direct democracy. In the Czech Republic, populist 
parties explicitly focus on direct democracy as an absolute priority 
and one part of the far-right has even named itself the Freedom and 
Direct Democracy Party.  
The Polish Law and Order governmentally proposed to hold 
a multi-question referendum in November 2018 expressly as a 
means to help it fight back against EU criticism of rule of law 
infringements. In Romania, conservative groups are agitating for 
direct democracy in order to enshrine a ‘traditional’ definition of the 
family in the constitution, against EU liberal norms. 
                                                        
9 I. Krastev, After Europe, 2017. 
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Our project charts how most European governments have put 
obstacles in the way of referendums proposed by citizens under 
constitutional procedures. Often, this 
seems to have backfired, inadvertently 
fuelling populism further. Two 
illustrative examples can be given. In 
Germany, the constitutional court has 
more than once generated public 
frustration by decreeing that European 
integration is still not deep enough to 
warrant a referendum.10 In Italy, the rate of failure of citizens’ 
initiatives is especially dramatic, indeed almost absolute. Then 
Prime Minister Mateo Renzi lost the 2016 referendum on 
constitutional change partly because many voters saw this is a 
cynical attempt to disadvantage the new populists. In both 
countries, the populist challenge has intensified, not abated.11 
Elite resistance to participatory democracy means that when 
EU-related referendums do take place, they tend to be framed 
around frustration with the Union and ‘the elite’ rather than 
enthusiasm for new ideas about 
European integration. A vicious circle 
thus forms: political parties and state 
institutions increasingly try to reach 
deals on EU issues that avoid having to 
call a referendum, each time deepening 
citizens’ feelings of democratic 
disenfranchisement and dissatisfaction 
with EU and national elites. It is worth remembering that populist 
forces have not arisen due to any excess of direct democracy, but in 
a context where it remains relatively rare. For all the fears of direct 
democracy giving nativist-populists more sway, indirect 
democracy has itself done a rather good job in nurturing these 
forces. 
A key question is whether direct democracy can be 
‘reclaimed’ from populists. There is no logical reason why calls for 
more direct democracy should be the preserve of anti-EU populists. 
                                                        
10 Op cit. chapter 12. 
11 See chapter 14 on Italy by Eleonora Poli. 
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Considering the fears about these emergent forces, it is easy to be 
sneering and dismissive of direct democracy. Elites can readily 
denigrate citizens as too ignorant to understand the complexities of 
EU issues. In practice, the evidence is mixed on this. The UK’s 
experience unquestionably provides some stark warnings. Yet the 
Danes are both the best informed of all European populations and 
the people most likely to vote critically in EU-related referendums; 
in Denmark negative voters come from the educated middle class, 
which means that it is too easy to dismiss referendums as simply a 
chance for uneducated ‘losers’ to vent their spleen.12   
21.3 Participatory fusion 
These two trends – the burgeoning of local citizens’ initiatives and 
the populist surge – set the parameters for improving European 
direct democracy. The key link is with the quality of democratic 
participation.  
Many experts make what is now the fairly widely accepted 
point that direct and representative democracy should be seen as 
complementary – lamenting that in practice most direct democracy 
initiatives try to circumvent not nurture representative channels.13 
One example from our project: the UK has tried various forms of 
citizens’ juries and consultations since the mid-2000s, but these have 
run out of steam partly because they were disconnected from other 
measures of democratic reform.14   
The call for the direct and the representative to be fused needs 
to be taken further: the real imperative is to fashion a prudent use 
of direct democracy that flows from more meaningful citizen 
participation. More influential citizen participation is the catalyst 
needed to revive both indirect and direct democracy. Good direct 
democracy is not just about allowing citizens to trigger a 
referendum. It is about the quality and inclusiveness of the process 
                                                        
12 See chapter 10 on Denmark by Catharina Sørensen. 
13 B. Kaufmann and J. Mathews, “Democracy doomsday prophets are 
missing this critical shift”, Washington Post, 8 May 2018. 
14 See chapter 20 on UK by Agata Gostyńska-Jakubowska and Beth 
Oppenheim. 
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that shadows direct popular votes. This is the qualitative change 
that is needed to get European direct democracy right. 
The key relationship is not just direct-versus-indirect 
democracy, but between direct democracy and the incipient growth 
of citizen consultations. Many say that 
randomly selected groups of citizens are 
the key to reviving democracy.15 In 
practice, they are often conceived as an 
alternative to high-level, one-off 
referendums. While there is much debate 
about high-profile cases of plebiscites held 
at governments’ behest, there are many 
more unreported examples of the inverse 
problem: governments refusing to hold votes on matters previously 
deliberated in detail in citizens assembles and the like – denials that 
disillusion citizens who have given up time to participate in such 
forums yet see no change. There could be more benefit to be had 
from a tighter tandem of citizen participation and other levels and 
forms of direct democratic voting.  
To move beyond being a heavily instrumentalised wrecking-
ball, direct democracy would need to meet certain participatory 
preconditions. This is not to say that direct democracy should be 
suppressed simply to exclude EU-critical voices – these have as 
much right to be heard as any other positions. But it does mean that 
direct democracy should grow more organically out of current 
efforts across Europe to strengthen citizen participation around 
practical, day-to-day matters. Direct democracy is a responsibility 
that citizens need to learn incrementally – a lesson that emerges 
from the most successful case of Switzerland. 
This would entail loose deliberative forums leading into more 
decisive popular voting – the challenge is to develop these new 
instruments for petitions and consultations into a direct form of 
democracy with more bite. It would see a more tailored use of 
deliberative-participatory forums to prepare the ground for popular 
votes. Such developments would help structure direct democracy 
around citizen engagement in pursuit of positive and constructive 
                                                        
15 D. van Reybrouk, “Against elections”; C. Chwalisz, “The People’s 
Verdict”. 
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policy options. They may also help to ensure that votes come from 
a more representative cross-section of the population. Our project 
reveals that direct democratic instruments have so far failed to 
include all sections of the electorate equally.  
The challenge is to fashion a direct democracy that stresses its 
positive and generic contribution to democratic process – and move 
away from it being used for predetermined political agendas, 
especially in EU debates. While anti-EU populists see direct 
democracy as the best way to break through the elite-consensus 
upheld through the indirect representative channels of current 
parliamentary procedures, it is the overall quality of democracy per 
se that is most likely to address populism’s underlying causes. 
Direct democracy needs to work as a means of incentivising on-
going and constructive citizen participation, not simply as an 
occasional means for giving national and EU elites a figurative 
kicking.16  
Alongside participation, one other precondition is crucial to 
getting direct democracy right. Amidst 
Europe’s wave of populism, direct 
democracy must categorically distinguish 
itself from unrestrained majoritarianism. 
The use of direct democracy must not 
allow a majority to infringe upon the core 
liberal protection of minorities – this is a 
key part of breaking the link with 
populism.17 Where this condition is met, 
direct democracy need be no more 
dangerous than representative democracy. Indeed, recent illiberal 
trends show that the protection of liberal rights is a challenge for 
representative democracy as much as direct democracy. In fact, 
where basic rights are ring-fenced, direct democracy tools can 
actually work in favour of minorities, as it allows them to get issues 
                                                        
16 The recommendations of the UK Independent Commission on 
Referendums that reported in July 2018 point in a similar direction. 
Independent Commission on Referendums, Report of the Independent 
Commission on Referendums, Constitution Unit, UCL, London, 2018. 
17 A. Lieninger, “Direct democracy in Europe: potentials and pitfalls”, 
Global Policy, May 2015, p. 16. 
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onto the agenda despite the existence of quasi-permanent majorities 
in representative institutions.18  
Conclusions 
Getting European direct democracy right will involve difficult 
balancing acts. Events in recent years have both strengthened the case 
for direct democracy and heightened its risks. The challenge of 
populism begs for more direct democracy, while also rendering more 
acute the danger that it could produce deeply disruptive and illiberal 
outcomes. Many citizens do seem to want more rather than less direct 
influence over decisions that affect their lives, even as many experts 
have pushed in the opposite direction of warning that EU integration 
must not be held ransom to the ‘passions of the rabble’. 
Direct democracy is neither a panacea nor an unmitigated ill to 
be shunned. At most, it merits a modestly widened usage if used in the 
right way and if combined with other 
areas of democratic reform. The challenge 
across Europe is to conjoin better direct 
democracy with more effective indirect 
and participative democracy – not to have 
any of these displace the others. Each 
dynamic – indirect representation, direct 
popular influence and deliberative citizen 
participation – has its rightful place in 
democratic renewal. On this basis, the 
policy dilemma will be whether a denser web of direct democracy at 
the local level could be extended upwards to have more constructive 
relevance for EU-level matters.  
                                                        
18 Idea Handbook, p. 23. 
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